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Philosophy,​  ​as ​  ​I​  ​shall​  ​understand​  ​the​  ​word,​  ​is ​  ​something​  ​intermediate​  ​between​  ​theology​  ​and  
science.​  ​Like​  ​theology,​  ​it​  ​consists ​  ​of​  ​speculations ​  ​on​  ​matters ​  ​as ​  ​to​  ​which​  ​definite​  ​knowledge  
has,​  ​so​  ​far,​  ​been​  ​unascertainable;;​  ​but​  ​like​  ​science,​  ​it​  ​appeals ​  ​to​  ​human​  ​reason​  ​rather​  ​than​  ​to  
authority,​  ​whether​  ​that​  ​of​  ​tradition​  ​or​  ​that​  ​of​  ​revelation.​  ​All​  ​​definite​  ​​knowledge-­so​  ​I​  ​should  
contend-­belongs ​  ​to​  ​science;;​  ​all​  ​​dogma​  ​​as ​  ​to​  ​what​  ​surpasses ​  ​definite​  ​knowledge​  ​belongs ​  ​to  
theology.​  ​But​  ​between​  ​theology​  ​and​  ​science​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​No​  ​Man's ​  ​Land,​  ​exposed​  ​to​  ​attack​  ​from  
both​  ​sides;;​  ​this ​  ​No​  ​Man's ​  ​Land​  ​is ​  ​philosophy.​  ​Almost​  ​all​  ​the​  ​questions ​  ​of​  ​most​  ​interest​  ​to  
speculative​  ​minds ​  ​are​  ​such​  ​as ​  ​science​  ​cannot​  ​answer...     
(Russell​  ​2013,​  ​1)  
  
Philosophy​  ​investigates ​  ​reality​  ​in​  ​the​  ​same​  ​way​  ​as ​  ​science.​  ​Its ​  ​methods ​  ​are​  ​akin​  ​to​  ​scientific  
methods,​  ​and​  ​the​  ​knowledge​  ​it​  ​yields ​  ​is ​  ​akin​  ​to​  ​scientific​  ​knowledge.   
(Papineau​  ​2014​  ​:​  ​166)  
  
Most​  ​of​  ​us ​  ​don't​  ​worry​  ​about​  ​these​  ​questions ​  ​[i.e.​  ​fundamental​  ​questions ​  ​about​  ​the​  ​nature​  ​of​  ​the  
universe]​  ​most​  ​of​  ​the​  ​time.​  ​But​  ​almost​  ​all​  ​of​  ​us ​  ​must​  ​sometimes ​  ​wonder:​  ​Why​  ​are​  ​we​  ​here?  
Where​  ​do​  ​we​  ​come​  ​from?​  ​Traditionally,​  ​these​  ​are​  ​questions ​  ​for​  ​philosophy,​  ​but​  ​philosophy​  ​is  
dead.​  ​[...]​  ​Philosophers ​  ​have​  ​not​  ​kept​  ​up​  ​with​  ​modern​  ​developments ​  ​in​  ​science.​  ​Particularly  
physics.​  ​Scientists ​  ​have​  ​become​  ​the​  ​bearers ​  ​of​  ​the​  ​torch​  ​of​  ​discovery​  ​in​  ​our​  ​quest​  ​for  
knowledge.​  ​[…​  ​new​  ​theories]​  ​lead​  ​us ​  ​to​  ​a​  ​new​  ​and​  ​very​  ​different​  ​picture​  ​of​  ​the​  ​universe​  ​and​  ​our  
place​  ​in​  ​it.  
(Stephen​  ​Hawking​  ​2011,​  ​May)  
  
Our​  ​current​  ​name​  ​[i.e.​  ​'philosophy']​  ​is ​  ​harmful​  ​because​  ​it​  ​posits ​  ​a​  ​big​  ​gap​  ​between​  ​the​  ​sciences  
and​  ​philosophy;;​  ​we​  ​do​  ​something​  ​that​  ​is ​  ​not​  ​a​  ​science.​  ​Thus ​  ​we​  ​do​  ​not​  ​share​  ​in​  ​the​  ​intellectual  
prestige​  ​associated​  ​with​  ​that​  ​thoroughly​  ​modern​  ​word.​  ​We​  ​are​  ​accordingly​  ​not​  ​covered​  ​by​  ​the  
media​  ​that​  ​cover​  ​the​  ​sciences,​  ​and​  ​what​  ​we​  ​do​  ​remains ​  ​a​  ​mystery​  ​to​  ​most​  ​people.​  ​But​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​really  
quite​  ​clear​  ​that​  ​academic​  ​philosophy​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​science.​  ​The​  ​dictionary​  ​defines ​  ​a​  ​science​  ​as ​  ​“a  
systematically​  ​organized​  ​body​  ​of​  ​knowledge​  ​on​  ​any​  ​subject.”​  ​This ​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​very​  ​broad​  ​definition,  
which​  ​includes ​  ​not​  ​just​  ​subjects ​  ​like​  ​physics ​  ​and​  ​chemistry​  ​but​  ​also​  ​psychology,​  ​economics,  
mathematics ​  ​and​  ​even​  ​“library​  ​science.”  




Philosophy​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​field​  ​that,​  ​unfortunately,​  ​reminds ​  ​me​  ​of​  ​that​  ​old​  ​Woody​  ​Allen​  ​joke,​  ​‘those​  ​that  
can’t​  ​do,​  ​teach,​  ​and​  ​those​  ​that​  ​can’t​  ​teach,​  ​teach​  ​gym.' ​  ​And​  ​the​  ​worst​  ​part​  ​of​  ​philosophy​  ​is ​  ​the  
philosophy​  ​of​  ​science;;​  ​the​  ​only​  ​people,​  ​as ​  ​far​  ​as ​  ​I​  ​can​  ​tell,​  ​that​  ​read​  ​work​  ​by​  ​philosophers ​  ​of  
science​  ​are​  ​other​  ​philosophers ​  ​of​  ​science.​  ​It​  ​has ​  ​no​  ​impact​  ​on​  ​physics ​  ​what​  ​so​  ​ever.​  ​...​  ​they​  ​have  
every​  ​right​  ​to​  ​feel​  ​threatened,​  ​because​  ​science​  ​progresses ​  ​and​  ​philosophy​  ​doesn’t.  
(Krauss ​  ​2012,​  ​April​  ​23)  
  
Although​  ​there​  ​are​  ​real​  ​methodological​  ​differences ​  ​between​  ​philosophy​  ​and​  ​the​  ​other​  ​sciences,  
as ​  ​actually​  ​practiced,​  ​they​  ​are​  ​less ​  ​deep​  ​than​  ​is ​  ​often​  ​supposed.  
(Williamson​  ​2007​  ​:​  ​3)  
  
I​  ​see​  ​philosophy​  ​not​  ​as ​  ​an​  ​​a​  ​priori​​  ​propaedeutic​  ​or​  ​groundwork​  ​for​  ​science,​  ​but​  ​as ​  ​continuous  
with​  ​science.​  ​I​  ​see​  ​philosophy​  ​and​  ​science​  ​as ​  ​in​  ​the​  ​same​  ​boat​  ​–​  ​a​  ​boat​  ​which,​  ​to​  ​revert​  ​to  
Neurath's ​  ​figure​  ​as ​  ​I​  ​so​  ​often​  ​do,​  ​we​  ​can​  ​rebuild​  ​only​  ​at​  ​sea​  ​while​  ​staying​  ​afloat​  ​in​  ​it.  
(Quine​  ​1969​  ​:​  ​126-­27)  
  
Now,​  ​it​  ​seems ​  ​to​  ​me​  ​obvious,​  ​but​  ​apparently​  ​it​  ​needs ​  ​to​  ​be​  ​stated​  ​that:​  ​a)​  ​philosophy​  ​and  
science​  ​are​  ​two​  ​distinct​  ​activities ​  ​(at​  ​least​  ​nowadays,​  ​since​  ​science​  ​did​  ​start​  ​as ​  ​a​  ​branch​  ​of  
philosophy​  ​called​  ​natural​  ​philosophy);;​  ​b)​  ​they​  ​work​  ​by​  ​different​  ​methods ​  ​(empirically-­based  
hypothesis ​  ​testing​  ​vs.​  ​reason-­based​  ​logical​  ​analysis);;​  ​and​  ​c)​  ​they​  ​inform​  ​each​  ​other​  ​in​  ​an  
inter-­dependent​  ​fashion​  ​(science​  ​depends ​  ​on​  ​philosophical​  ​assumptions ​  ​that​  ​are​  ​outside​  ​the  
scope​  ​of​  ​empirical​  ​validation,​  ​but​  ​philosophical​  ​investigations ​  ​should​  ​be​  ​informed​  ​by​  ​the​  ​best  
science​  ​available​  ​in​  ​a​  ​range​  ​of​  ​situations,​  ​from​  ​metaphysics ​  ​to​  ​ethics ​  ​and​  ​philosophy​  ​of​  ​mind).  
(Piggliuci​  ​2009​  ​:​  ​Nov​  ​19)  
  
While​  ​science​  ​and​  ​philosophy​  ​do​  ​at​  ​times ​  ​overlap,​  ​they​  ​are​  ​fundamentally​  ​different​  ​approaches  
to​  ​understanding.  
(Friedland​  ​2012​  ​:​  ​April​  ​5)
  
Search​  ​your​  ​mind,​  ​or​  ​pay​  ​attention​  ​to​  ​the​  ​conversations ​  ​you​  ​have​  ​with​  ​other​  ​people,​  ​and​  ​you  
will​  ​discover​  ​that​  ​there​  ​are​  ​no​  ​real​  ​boundaries ​  ​between​  ​science​  ​and​  ​philosophy—or​  ​between  
those​  ​disciplines ​  ​and​  ​any​  ​other​  ​that​  ​attempts ​  ​to​  ​make​  ​valid​  ​claims ​  ​about​  ​the​  ​world​  ​on​  ​the​  ​basis  
of​  ​evidence​  ​and​  ​logic.  









In ​  ​this ​  ​thesis ​  ​I ​  ​argue​  ​for ​  ​​aspirational​  ​naturalism ​.​  ​​  ​Aspirational​  ​naturalism​  ​is ​  ​a  
metaphilosophical ​  ​thesis ​  ​that​  ​encourages ​  ​a​  ​continuation ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​interdisciplinary  
relationship ​  ​between ​  ​philosophy ​  ​and ​  ​science. ​  ​​  ​It​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​kind ​  ​of ​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalism,  





As ​  ​the​  ​above​  ​quotations ​  ​make​  ​clear, ​  ​the​  ​perceived ​  ​relationship ​  ​between ​  ​philosophy ​  ​and  
science​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​vexed ​  ​one;;​  ​views ​  ​run ​  ​the​  ​gamut​  ​from​  ​science​  ​and ​  ​philosophy ​  ​being  
more-­or-­less ​  ​indistinguishable ​  ​bedfellows ​  ​to ​  ​their ​  ​occupying ​  ​separate, ​  ​autonomous  
domains.  
  
Whatever ​  ​naturalism​  ​might​  ​be, ​  ​it’s ​  ​popular. ​  ​​  ​A ​  ​recent​  ​survey ​  ​of ​  ​philosophical​  ​beliefs  
polling ​  ​all​  ​members ​  ​of ​  ​faculty ​  ​at​  ​99​  ​leading ​  ​departments ​  ​of ​  ​philosophy, ​  ​largely  
focusing ​  ​on​  ​departments ​  ​specialising ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​analytic ​  ​or ​  ​Anglocentric ​  ​tradition, ​  ​found  
that​  ​49.8% ​  ​favour ​  ​naturalism​  ​as ​  ​a​  ​metaphilosophical ​  ​view, ​  ​whilst​  ​almost​  ​half ​  ​as ​  ​many  
favour ​  ​non-­naturalism​  ​(25.9%), ​  ​and ​  ​“other”​  ​views ​  ​(24.3%) ​   ​(Bourget​  ​and ​  ​Chalmers  
2014,​  ​476). ​  ​​  ​A ​  ​49.8% ​  ​consensus ​  ​on​  ​any ​  ​philosophical​  ​issue​  ​is ​  ​rather ​  ​rare. ​  ​​  ​Under ​  ​my  
home​  ​country's ​  ​(New ​  ​Zealand’s) ​  ​political ​  ​structure, ​  ​a​  ​consensus ​  ​in ​  ​voting ​  ​for ​  ​a​  ​political  
party ​  ​at​  ​this ​  ​level, ​  ​would ​  ​all​  ​but​  ​allow ​  ​a​  ​single​  ​political ​  ​party ​  ​to ​  ​govern ​  ​alone .​  ​​  ​​Many  1
1 This ​  ​is ​  ​not​  ​strictly​  ​true,​  ​due​  ​to​  ​the​  ​possibility​  ​of​  ​separations ​  ​between​  ​those​  ​voted​  ​in​  ​by​  ​way​  ​of  
electorate​  ​seats ​  ​and​  ​party​  ​seats,​  ​under​  ​MMP,​  ​New ​  ​Zealand's ​  ​voting​  ​system.​  ​​  ​But​  ​for​  ​a​  ​party​  ​to​  ​not  
5  
philosophers ​  ​commit​  ​to ​  ​something ​  ​called ​  ​‘naturalism’ ​  ​but, ​  ​as ​  ​we​  ​shall​  ​see,​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​very  
little ​  ​agreement ​  ​on​  ​what​  ​naturalism​  ​is.  
  
Although ​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​nothing ​  ​approaching ​  ​an ​  ​agreed ​  ​definition ​  ​of ​  ​naturalism, ​  ​we​  ​can  
nonetheless ​  ​identify ​  ​family ​  ​resemblance: ​  ​in ​  ​particular, ​  ​naturalist​  ​philosophical​  ​views  
have​  ​in ​  ​common ​  ​their ​  ​relationship ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​sciences. ​  ​​  ​​Naturalists ​  ​like​  ​science ;;​  ​they ​  ​afford  2
it​  ​some​  ​special​  ​epistemic, ​  ​methodological ​  ​or ​  ​sometimes ​  ​even ​  ​metaphysical ​  ​priority.     
  
  
§1.2​  ​Aspirational​  ​naturalism  
  
Aspirational​  ​naturalism​  ​encourages ​  ​the​  ​philosopher ​  ​to ​  ​make​  ​use​  ​of ​  ​relevant ​  ​scientific  
methods ​  ​and ​  ​findings ​  ​where​  ​possible, ​  ​and ​  ​to ​  ​exercise​  ​some​  ​caution ​  ​when ​  ​using​  ​some​  ​of  
their ​  ​own​  ​traditional ​  ​methods. ​  ​​  ​As ​  ​the​  ​thesis ​  ​progresses,​  ​it​  ​will​  ​become​  ​evident​  ​that​  ​I ​  ​am  
of ​  ​the​  ​view ​  ​that​  ​philosophy ​  ​often ​  ​does ​  ​this ​  ​already. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​make​  ​no​  ​calls ​  ​for ​  ​wholesale  
reform​  ​of ​  ​philosophical​  ​methods ​  ​or ​  ​domains ​  ​as ​  ​currently ​  ​practiced, ​  ​yet​  ​I ​  ​offer ​  ​some  
heuristics ​  ​drawn ​  ​from​  ​some​  ​naturalist​  ​critiques ​  ​of ​  ​philosophical​  ​method, ​  ​and ​  ​from  





govern​  ​alone​  ​with​  ​50%​  ​of​  ​the​  ​party​  ​vote​  ​is ​  ​both​  ​a​  ​highly​  ​unlikely​  ​possibility,​  ​and​  ​an​  ​irrelevant  
digression.  
2 More​  ​specifically,​  ​my​  ​thesis ​  ​is ​  ​focused​  ​on​  ​scientific​  ​naturalism,​  ​which​  ​concerns ​  ​the​  ​relationship  
between​  ​science​  ​and​  ​philosophy.​  ​​  ​For​  ​present​  ​purposes,​  ​I'm​  ​not​  ​interested​  ​in​  ​those​  ​free-­spirited​  ​groups  
of​  ​people​  ​who​  ​like​  ​to​  ​express ​  ​themselves ​  ​by​  ​wearing​  ​no​  ​clothes,​  ​or​  ​naturalism​  ​in​  ​the​  ​context​  ​of​  ​the  
philosophy​  ​of​  ​religion​  ​(e.g.​  ​see​  ​Plantinga​  ​1997)​  ​which​  ​explores ​  ​the​  ​relationship​  ​between​  ​science​  ​and  
religion,​  ​or​  ​views ​  ​descended​  ​from​  ​the​  ​later​  ​Wittgenstein​  ​(e.g.​  ​​Philosophical​  ​Investigations ​,​  ​§258),  
which​  ​have​  ​also​  ​sometimes ​  ​shared​  ​the​  ​name​  ​‘naturalism’​  ​(e.g.​  ​see​  ​McDowell​  ​(1998)​  ​,​  ​or​  ​Penelope  
Maddy’s ​  ​mathematical​  ​naturalism​  ​(1997​  ​:​  ​184).  
6  
§1.3​  ​The​  ​naturalistic​  ​starting ​  ​point  
  
My​  ​thesis ​  ​assumes ​  ​what​  ​I ​  ​will​  ​call​  ​​the​  ​naturalistic​  ​starting ​  ​point​.​  ​​  ​I ​  ​define​  ​this ​  ​as  
holding ​  ​the​  ​assumptions ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​are​  ​successful​  ​epistemic ​  ​enterprises, ​  ​and ​  ​that  
they ​  ​do​  ​generate ​  ​knowledge. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​assume​  ​further, ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​methods ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​are  
responsible​  ​for ​  ​the​  ​generation ​  ​of ​  ​scientific ​  ​knowledge. ​  ​​  ​That​  ​is, ​  ​I ​  ​think ​  ​that​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​no​  ​mere  
accident ​  ​of ​  ​history ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​should​  ​be​  ​treated ​  ​with​  ​epistemic ​  ​respect;;​  ​it​  ​isn’t  
that​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​have​  ​generated ​  ​knowledge​  ​through ​  ​sheer ​  ​luck, ​  ​but​  ​rather ​  ​that​  ​the  
methods ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​viewed ​  ​as ​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​are​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​treated ​  ​as ​  ​epistemically  
respectable. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​will​  ​not​  ​argue​  ​for ​  ​these​  ​assumptions ​  ​here, ​  ​as ​  ​I ​  ​am​  ​more​  ​interested ​  ​in  
holding ​  ​these​  ​views ​  ​fixed, ​  ​and ​  ​focusing ​  ​on​  ​consequences ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​naturalistic ​  ​starting  
point, ​  ​to ​  ​inform​  ​conversations ​  ​regarding ​  ​the​  ​applicability ​  ​of ​  ​scientific ​  ​methods ​  ​in  
philosophy. ​  ​​  ​Holding ​  ​that​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​scientific ​  ​knowledge​  ​has ​  ​interesting ​  ​consequences ​  ​for  
one’s ​  ​epistemology, ​  ​as ​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​often ​  ​hard ​  ​to ​  ​square​  ​scientific ​  ​knowledge​  ​with​  ​traditional  
philosophical​  ​accounts ​  ​of ​  ​knowledge. ​  ​​  ​Thus,​  ​holding ​  ​the​  ​naturalistic ​  ​starting ​  ​point​  ​can  
help ​  ​illuminate ​  ​what​  ​kinds ​  ​of ​  ​knowledge​  ​have​  ​been ​  ​generated ​  ​by​  ​the​  ​sciences.  
  
Some​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalists ​  ​hold ​  ​normative​  ​views ​  ​about​  ​the​  ​methods ​  ​of ​  ​science  
and ​  ​philosophy ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​relationship ​  ​between ​  ​the​  ​two ​  ​domains. ​  ​​  ​One​  ​group ​  ​of ​  ​such  
views, ​  ​I ​  ​will​  ​call​  ​​reformist​  ​methodological​  ​naturalisms ​.​  ​​  ​This ​  ​group ​  ​of ​  ​views ​  ​shares ​  ​the  
belief ​  ​that​  ​either ​  ​philosophical​  ​methods ​  ​ought​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​reformed, ​  ​so​  ​that​  ​they ​  ​are​  ​made  
more​  ​like​  ​those​  ​of ​  ​science, ​  ​or ​  ​that​  ​some​  ​domains ​  ​of ​  ​philosophical​  ​inquiry ​  ​ought​  ​to ​  ​be  
changed ​  ​or ​  ​abandoned, ​  ​due​  ​to ​  ​a​  ​perceived ​  ​inapplicability ​  ​of ​  ​scientific ​  ​methods ​  ​to ​  ​them.  
Reformist​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalists ​  ​rely ​  ​on​  ​a​  ​descriptive ​  ​claim​  ​-­ ​  ​that​  ​philosophy ​  ​and  
the​  ​sciences ​  ​differ ​  ​in ​  ​some​  ​way, ​  ​and ​  ​a​  ​normative​  ​claim​  ​-­ ​  ​that​  ​they ​  ​ought​  ​not​  ​to ​  ​differ,  







§1.4​  ​Could ​  ​philosophy​  ​be​  ​more​  ​scientific? ​  ​​  ​If​  ​so,​  ​should ​  ​it?  
  
The​  ​reformist​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalists ​  ​rely ​  ​on​  ​the​  ​truth ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​descriptive​  ​claim, ​  ​for  3
their ​  ​normative ​  ​claim​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​non-­redundant. ​  ​​  ​That​  ​is, ​  ​if ​  ​philosophy ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​do  
not​  ​differ ​  ​in ​  ​some​  ​relevant ​  ​sense, ​  ​the​  ​normative​  ​claim, ​  ​however ​  ​true, ​  ​has ​  ​already ​  ​been  
delivered ​  ​on.​  ​​  ​If ​  ​philosophical​  ​methods ​  ​are​  ​already ​  ​sufficiently ​  ​scientific, ​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​no  
work​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​done​  ​in ​  ​terms ​  ​of ​  ​changing ​  ​philosophical​  ​method ​  ​to ​  ​make​  ​them​  ​so.​  ​​  ​Other  
methodological ​  ​naturalists ​  ​argue​  ​that​  ​the​  ​descriptive ​  ​claim​  ​that​  ​the​  ​reformist​  ​relies ​  ​on​  ​is  
false, ​  ​and ​  ​that​  ​therefore​  ​no​  ​changes ​  ​in ​  ​philosophical​  ​methods ​  ​are​  ​required ​  ​in ​  ​light​  ​of  
treating ​  ​scientific ​  ​methods ​  ​with​  ​epistemic ​  ​respect. ​  ​​  ​These​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalists ​  ​I  
call​  ​​vindicatory​  ​methodological​  ​naturalists ​;;​  ​they ​  ​argue​  ​that​   ​a​  ​careful​  ​inspection ​  ​of  
scientific ​  ​and ​  ​philosophical​  ​methods ​  ​vindicates ​  ​the​  ​methods ​  ​currently ​  ​used ​  ​by  
philosophers ​  ​as ​  ​sufficiently ​  ​naturalistic.  
  
This ​  ​thesis ​  ​takes ​  ​science​  ​as ​  ​its ​  ​object​  ​of ​  ​inquiry ​  ​initially, ​  ​observing ​  ​science​  ​as ​  ​practiced  
and ​  ​looking ​  ​at​  ​the​  ​methods ​  ​that​  ​it​  ​uses.​  ​​  ​One​  ​component​  ​of ​  ​implementing ​  ​the  
naturalistic ​  ​starting ​  ​point, ​  ​involves ​  ​my ​  ​trying ​  ​to ​  ​leave​  ​any ​  ​​a​  ​priori​​  ​conceptions ​  ​of  
science​  ​behind, ​  ​trying ​  ​as ​  ​carefully ​  ​as ​  ​possible​  ​to ​  ​observe​  ​science​  ​as ​  ​actually ​  ​practiced,  
and ​  ​drawing ​  ​conclusions ​  ​about​  ​the​  ​methods ​  ​of ​  ​science​  ​from​  ​observing ​  ​science​  ​itself.  
This ​  ​I ​  ​think ​  ​is ​  ​significant, ​  ​in ​  ​that​  ​many ​  ​other ​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalisms ​  ​that​  ​I ​  ​discuss  
throughout, ​  ​start​  ​from​  ​a​  ​different​  ​perspective, ​  ​oftentimes ​  ​starting ​  ​with​  ​a​  ​preconceived  
view ​  ​about​  ​what​  ​scientific ​  ​methods ​  ​are, ​  ​and ​  ​what​  ​scientific ​  ​methods ​  ​are​  ​not, ​  ​and ​  ​then  
discussing​  ​how ​  ​various ​  ​philosophical​  ​theories ​  ​look ​  ​according ​  ​to ​  ​these​  ​​a​  ​priori​​  ​views ​  ​of  
science. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​suspect​  ​that​  ​some​  ​of ​  ​these​  ​theorists ​  ​begin ​  ​with​  ​a​   ​view ​  ​of ​  ​kinds ​  ​of ​  ​philosophy  
that​  ​they ​  ​intuitively ​  ​feel​  ​are​  ​non-­naturalistic, ​  ​and ​  ​look ​  ​to ​  ​describe​  ​naturalism​  ​in ​  ​a​  ​way  
that​  ​will​  ​rule​  ​those​  ​philosophical​  ​practices ​  ​or ​  ​theories ​  ​out​  ​as ​  ​epistemically ​  ​inferior.  
This ​  ​strikes ​  ​me​  ​as ​  ​a​  ​dangerous ​  ​approach ​  ​in ​  ​many ​  ​ways.​  ​​  ​If ​  ​a​  ​theorist​  ​adopts ​  ​the  
naturalistic ​  ​starting ​  ​point, ​  ​it​  ​seems​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​in ​  ​conflict ​  ​with​  ​their ​  ​respect​  ​for ​  ​the​  ​sciences  
for ​  ​them​  ​to ​  ​take​  ​these​  ​​a​  ​priori​​  ​intuitions ​  ​of ​  ​theirs ​  ​about​  ​science​  ​as ​  ​serious ​  ​evidence ​  ​as ​  ​to  
what​  ​the​  ​methods ​  ​of ​  ​science​  ​are​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​first​  ​place.     




§1.5​  ​Scientific​  ​practice​  ​and ​  ​pluralism  
  
I ​  ​pay ​  ​close​  ​attention ​  ​to ​  ​a​  ​study​  ​of ​  ​scientific ​  ​practice, ​  ​informed ​  ​by​  ​both ​  ​contemporary  
and ​  ​historical​  ​examples ​  ​drawn ​  ​from​  ​science, ​  ​to ​  ​inform​  ​an ​  ​analysis ​  ​of ​  ​scientific  
methods. ​  ​​  ​From​  ​a​  ​study​  ​of ​  ​scientific ​  ​method ​  ​based ​  ​on​  ​observing ​  ​science, ​  ​I ​  ​argue​  ​for  
methodological​  ​pluralism ​.​  ​​  ​That​  ​is, ​  ​I ​  ​argue​  ​that​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​not​  ​one​  ​overarching ​  ​account​  ​of  
scientific ​  ​method ​  ​that​  ​catches ​  ​all​  ​of ​  ​what​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​that​  ​science​  ​does, ​  ​rather ​  ​there​  ​are​  ​a  
number ​  ​of ​  ​different​  ​methods ​  ​employed ​  ​throughout​  ​the​  ​sciences. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​am​  ​importantly ​  ​not  
arguing ​  ​for ​  ​methodological ​  ​nihilism, ​  ​a​  ​view ​  ​that​  ​there​  ​are​  ​no​  ​methods ​  ​that​  ​are​  ​used ​  ​in  
the​  ​sciences, ​  ​and ​  ​nor ​  ​am​  ​I ​  ​arguing ​  ​for ​  ​methodological ​  ​anarchism, ​  ​a​  ​view ​  ​that​  ​is  
sometimes ​  ​ascribed ​  ​to ​  ​Feyerabend, ​  ​probably ​  ​due​  ​to ​  ​his ​  ​quoteworthy ​  ​slogan ​  ​that  
“anything ​  ​goes”​  ​(Feyerabend ​  ​1975). ​  ​​  ​Rather, ​  ​I ​  ​am​  ​arguing ​  ​that​  ​there​  ​are​  ​a​  ​number ​  ​of  
different​  ​methods ​  ​which ​  ​have​  ​been ​  ​used ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​sciences, ​  ​many ​  ​with​  ​some​  ​degree​  ​of  
success. ​  ​​  ​To ​  ​borrow ​  ​a​  ​slogan ​  ​from​  ​Hasok​  ​Chang, ​  ​this ​  ​is ​  ​not​  ​the​  ​view ​  ​that​  ​“anything  
goes”, ​  ​but​  ​rather ​  ​that​  ​“many ​  ​things ​  ​go”​  ​(Chang ​  ​2012​  ​:​  ​285).     
  
From​  ​here, ​  ​the​  ​descriptive ​  ​claim​  ​that​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​and ​  ​philosophy ​  ​differ ​  ​in ​  ​a​  ​significant  
way, ​  ​can ​  ​be​  ​inspected ​  ​more​  ​carefully. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​outline​  ​two ​  ​different​  ​ways ​  ​in ​  ​which ​  ​we​  ​could  
find ​  ​a​  ​descriptive ​  ​difference ​  ​in ​  ​methods ​  ​used ​  ​by​  ​science​  ​and ​  ​philosophy ​  ​that​  ​the  
reformist​  ​requires ​  ​for ​  ​the​  ​cogency ​  ​of ​  ​their ​  ​argument. ​  ​​  ​We​  ​could ​  ​either ​  ​a) ​  ​find ​  ​significant  
scientific ​  ​methods ​  ​that​  ​are​  ​not​  ​being ​  ​used ​  ​by​  ​philosophy, ​  ​or ​  ​b) ​  ​we​  ​could ​  ​find ​  ​a  
philosophical​  ​method ​  ​that​  ​is ​  ​not​  ​used ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​sciences. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​argue​  ​that​  ​a​  ​significant  
descriptive ​  ​difference ​  ​between ​  ​the​  ​methods ​  ​used ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​two ​  ​domains ​  ​is ​  ​hard ​  ​to ​  ​find ​  ​at  
such ​  ​an ​  ​abstract​  ​level. ​  ​​  ​Thus,​  ​the​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalism​  ​that​  ​I ​  ​defend ​  ​in ​  ​this ​  ​thesis,  





§1.6​  ​Progress ​  ​in ​  ​philosophy​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​sciences  
  
Despite​  ​arguing ​  ​against​  ​the​  ​descriptive ​  ​claim​  ​that​  ​the​  ​reformist​  ​relies ​  ​on,​  ​I ​  ​spend ​  ​some  
time​  ​analysing ​  ​the​  ​normative ​  ​claim​  ​that​  ​is ​  ​part​  ​of ​  ​their ​  ​view. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​argue​  ​that​  ​the​  ​normative  
claim​  ​is ​  ​largely ​  ​a​  ​result​  ​of ​  ​perceived ​  ​views ​  ​of ​  ​​progress ​.​  ​​  ​I ​  ​think ​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​fair ​  ​to ​  ​characterise  
the​  ​overwhelming ​  ​majority ​  ​of ​  ​reformists, ​  ​as ​  ​sharing ​  ​the​  ​view ​  ​that​  ​science​  ​makes ​  ​more  
progress ​  ​than ​  ​philosophy ​  ​does. ​  ​​  ​On​  ​the​  ​basis ​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​idea, ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​reliance ​  ​on​  ​a  
significant​  ​descriptive ​  ​difference ​  ​between ​  ​domains, ​  ​a​  ​reformist​  ​argues ​  ​that​  ​an ​  ​adoption  
of ​  ​scientific ​  ​methods ​  ​or ​  ​an ​  ​abandonment ​  ​of ​  ​non-­scientific ​  ​methods, ​  ​or ​  ​a​  ​combination ​  ​of  
these​  ​two ​  ​things, ​  ​will​  ​lead ​  ​to ​  ​greater ​  ​philosophical​  ​progress.​  ​​  ​Talk ​  ​of ​  ​progress ​  ​in ​  ​science  
and ​  ​philosophy, ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​thought​  ​that​  ​scientific ​  ​methods ​  ​might​  ​generate ​  ​more​  ​progress  
than ​  ​non-­scientific ​  ​methods ​  ​in ​  ​philosophy, ​  ​assumes ​  ​that​  ​to ​  ​some​  ​extent​  ​philosophy ​  ​and  
science​  ​share​  ​similar​  ​goals. ​  ​​  ​Progress,​  ​I ​  ​will​  ​argue, ​  ​involves ​  ​trajectory ​  ​towards ​  ​a​  ​goal.  
The​  ​assumption ​  ​that​  ​philosophy ​  ​and ​  ​science​  ​have​  ​a​  ​shared ​  ​goal, ​  ​seems​  ​plausible​  ​to ​  ​an  
extent. ​  ​​  ​However, ​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​more​  ​accurate ​  ​to ​  ​say​  ​that​  ​philosophy ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​share  
similar​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims. ​  ​​  ​Here, ​  ​I ​  ​argue​  ​that​  ​observing ​  ​scientific ​  ​practice ​  ​motivates  
pluralism​  ​about​  ​​epistemic​  ​aims ​,​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​sciences, ​  ​and ​  ​for ​  ​philosophy.  
  
  
§1.7​  ​Methodological​  ​pluralism  
  
Whilst​  ​ultimately ​  ​dismissing ​  ​a​  ​variety ​  ​of ​  ​naturalist​  ​critiques ​  ​of ​  ​philosophy, ​  ​I ​  ​draw ​  ​from  
them​  ​several​  ​heuristics ​  ​for ​  ​methodological ​  ​practice ​  ​in ​  ​philosophy ​  ​that​  ​help ​  ​to ​  ​shape​  ​my  
positive​  ​view. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​argue​  ​that​  ​observing ​  ​scientific ​  ​practice ​  ​supports ​  ​​methodological  
pluralism ​.​  ​​  ​This ​  ​is ​  ​the​  ​view ​  ​that​  ​there​  ​are​  ​a​  ​number ​  ​of ​  ​different​  ​scientific ​  ​methods, ​  ​and  
no​  ​one​  ​of ​  ​them​  ​can ​  ​reasonably ​  ​be​   ​considered ​  ​more​  ​important​  ​than ​  ​the​  ​others ​  ​in ​  ​any  
straightforward ​  ​and ​  ​universal​  ​sense. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​argue​  ​that​  ​non-­observational ​  ​methods ​  ​should  
remain ​  ​an ​  ​important​  ​member ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​toolkits ​  ​of ​  ​both ​  ​the​  ​scientist​  ​and ​  ​philosopher. ​  ​​  ​In  
some​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​more​  ​theoretical ​  ​branches ​  ​of ​  ​both ​  ​philosophy ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​sciences, ​  ​it​  ​seems  
implausible ​  ​that​  ​stereotypically ​  ​scientific ​  ​methods, ​  ​such ​  ​as ​   ​observation ​  ​and ​  ​controlled  
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experiment, ​  ​should​  ​or ​  ​even ​  ​could ​  ​have​  ​traction. ​  ​​  ​Finding ​  ​out​  ​which ​  ​methods ​  ​will​  ​be  
more​  ​or ​  ​less ​  ​suited ​  ​for ​  ​a​  ​given ​  ​area​  ​will​  ​be​  ​a​  ​partly ​  ​empirical ​  ​matter, ​  ​and ​  ​a​  ​variety ​  ​of  
methods ​  ​might​  ​need ​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​trialed ​  ​and ​  ​compared ​  ​across ​  ​philosophical​  ​practices, ​  ​as ​  ​is  
instanced ​  ​within ​  ​the​  ​sciences. ​  ​​  ​Use​  ​of ​  ​a​  ​wider ​  ​set​  ​of ​  ​methods ​  ​need ​  ​not​  ​be​  ​chastised, ​  ​nor  
should​  ​those​  ​more​  ​theoretical ​  ​branches ​  ​of ​  ​philosophy ​  ​suffer ​  ​premature ​  ​arboristry ​  ​due​  ​to  
a​  ​perceived ​  ​inapplicability ​  ​of ​  ​scientific ​  ​methods.    
  
  
§1.8​  ​An ​  ​alternative​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​continuity​  ​models ​  ​of ​  ​naturalism:​  ​​alignment  
  
One​  ​novel​  ​feature​  ​of ​  ​my ​  ​view ​  ​is ​  ​my ​  ​proposal​  ​to ​  ​change​  ​the​  ​way​  ​the​  ​relationship  
between ​  ​science​  ​and ​  ​philosophy ​  ​is ​  ​viewed ​  ​in ​  ​discussions ​  ​of ​  ​naturalism. ​  ​​  ​From​  ​at​  ​least  
as ​  ​far ​  ​back ​  ​as ​  ​Quine​  ​(1969, ​  ​126–7), ​  ​naturalism​  ​in ​  ​philosophy ​  ​has ​  ​often ​  ​been ​  ​discussed  
within ​  ​a​  ​model​  ​of ​  ​continuity. ​  ​​  ​A ​  ​philosophical​  ​theory ​  ​is ​  ​naturalistic ​  ​if, ​  ​and ​  ​only ​  ​if, ​  ​it​  ​is  
continuous ​  ​with​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​-­ ​  ​or ​  ​so​  ​the​  ​claim​  ​goes. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​argue​  ​that​  ​the​  ​continuity ​  ​model  
faces ​  ​serious ​  ​challenges, ​  ​and ​  ​propose​  ​that​  ​instead ​  ​we​  ​look ​  ​at​  ​the​  ​relationship ​  ​between  
philosophy ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​in ​  ​terms ​  ​of ​  ​​alignment​.​  ​​  ​A ​  ​philosophical​  ​theory ​  ​can ​  ​be  
aligned ​  ​with​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​in ​  ​numerous ​  ​ways,​  ​by​  ​way​  ​of ​  ​implementing ​  ​some​  ​or ​  ​all​  ​of ​  ​the  
various ​  ​scientific ​  ​methods, ​  ​or ​  ​by​  ​utilising ​  ​the​  ​products ​  ​of ​  ​scientific ​  ​methods ​  ​to ​  ​inform  
philosophical​  ​arguments.     
  
I ​  ​encourage​  ​philosophers ​  ​to ​  ​do​  ​their ​  ​best​  ​to ​  ​keep ​  ​informed ​  ​and ​  ​make​  ​use​  ​of ​  ​relevant  
scientific ​  ​methods ​  ​and ​  ​their ​  ​products ​  ​that​  ​may ​  ​have​  ​an ​  ​impact​  ​on​  ​their ​  ​positions. ​  ​​  ​In  
many ​  ​cases, ​  ​the​  ​best​  ​way​  ​for ​  ​this ​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​achieved ​  ​is ​  ​by​  ​continued ​  ​dialogue​  ​in ​  ​the  
structured ​  ​fashion ​  ​by​  ​which ​  ​academic ​  ​philosophy ​  ​already ​  ​works,​  ​e.g. ​  ​via​  ​refereed  
journal​  ​publishing, ​  ​and ​  ​conferences, ​  ​departmental ​  ​seminars, ​  ​and ​  ​personal  
correspondence. ​  ​​  ​However, ​  ​philosophy ​  ​should​  ​not​  ​blindly ​  ​follow ​  ​science, ​  ​and ​  ​it​  ​has  
further ​  ​important​  ​roles ​  ​as ​  ​a​  ​critical ​  ​spectator ​  ​of, ​  ​commentator ​  ​on,​  ​and ​  ​incubator ​  ​for,  
science. ​  ​​  ​These​  ​all​  ​provide​  ​further ​  ​means ​  ​for ​  ​fruitful​  ​alignment ​  ​between ​  ​philosophy ​  ​and  
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science, ​  ​and ​  ​give​  ​rise​  ​to ​  ​a​  ​plurality ​  ​of ​  ​important​  ​roles ​  ​for ​  ​philosophy ​  ​to ​  ​play.  
  
  
§1.9​  ​Methodological​  ​heuristics  
  
Throughout​  ​this ​  ​thesis, ​  ​I ​  ​develop ​  ​several​  ​methodological ​  ​heuristics ​  ​to ​  ​do​  ​with​  ​various  
methods ​  ​used ​  ​in ​  ​philosophy. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​view ​  ​I ​  ​defend ​  ​involves ​  ​a​  ​consideration ​  ​of ​  ​​relevance ​.  
Relevance ​  ​involves ​  ​treating ​  ​the​  ​plurality ​  ​of ​  ​sciences ​  ​as, ​  ​in ​  ​principle, ​  ​potentially ​  ​relevant  
to ​  ​all​  ​domains ​  ​of ​  ​philosophical​  ​inquiry. ​  ​​  ​Precisely ​  ​when ​  ​particular ​  ​scientific ​  ​methods ​  ​or  
products ​  ​of ​  ​these​  ​methods ​  ​will​  ​be​  ​relevantly ​  ​applied ​  ​to ​  ​philosophical​  ​inquiry ​  ​will​  ​be  
very ​  ​much ​  ​a​  ​case ​  ​by​  ​case ​  ​matter. ​  ​​  ​This ​  ​involves ​  ​denying ​  ​the​  ​assumption ​  ​that​  ​philosophy  
has ​  ​its ​  ​own​  ​autonomous ​  ​domain ​  ​of ​  ​inquiry, ​  ​either ​  ​isolated ​  ​from, ​  ​or ​  ​somehow ​  ​prior ​  ​to,  
the​  ​sciences. ​  ​​  ​This ​  ​is ​  ​more​  ​or ​  ​less ​  ​following ​  ​Quine​  ​(1969 ​  ​:​  ​126-­7), ​  ​who​  ​argues ​  ​for  
continuity ​  ​between ​  ​philosophy ​  ​and ​  ​science. ​  ​​  ​My​  ​own​  ​view ​  ​is ​  ​differentiated ​  ​from  
Quine’s, ​  ​when ​  ​I ​  ​develop ​  ​my ​  ​positive​  ​views ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​most​  ​detail​  ​in ​  ​chapter ​  ​five. ​  ​​  ​Whilst​  ​I  
depart​  ​from​  ​Quine​  ​in ​  ​some​  ​respects, ​  ​I ​  ​think ​  ​that​  ​my ​  ​aspirational ​  ​naturalism​  ​is ​  ​Quinean  
in ​  ​spirit. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​discuss ​  ​the​  ​implications ​  ​this ​  ​has ​  ​for ​  ​argumentative ​  ​strategies ​  ​in ​  ​philosophy.  
  
  
§1.10​  ​Rejecting ​  ​monism​  ​as ​  ​an ​  ​​a​  ​priori​  ​​assumption  
  
Motivations ​  ​for ​  ​methodological ​  ​pluralism​  ​stem​  ​from​  ​observing ​  ​scientific ​  ​practice.  
Empirical ​  ​observation ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​supports ​  ​pluralism;;​  ​there​  ​are​  ​currently ​  ​a​  ​pluarlity  
of ​  ​different​  ​methods ​  ​at​  ​play ​  ​both ​  ​between ​  ​and ​  ​within ​  ​scientific ​  ​domains. ​  ​​  ​Many  
reformist​  ​naturalist​  ​arguments ​  ​rely ​  ​on​  ​assumptions ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​exhibit​  ​far ​  ​less  
diversity, ​  ​assuming ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​really ​  ​exhibit​  ​some​  ​kind ​  ​of ​  ​monism. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​follow  
Kellert​  ​et​  ​al. ​  ​(2006), ​  ​who​  ​describe​  ​the​  ​argument​  ​for ​  ​monism​  ​as ​  ​follows:  
  
   1.​  ​the​  ​ultimate ​  ​aim​  ​of ​  ​a​  ​science​  ​is ​  ​to ​  ​establish ​  ​a​  ​single, ​  ​complete, ​  ​and  
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comprehensive ​  ​account​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​natural​  ​world ​  ​(or ​  ​the​  ​part​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​world  
investigated ​  ​by​  ​the​  ​science) ​  ​based ​  ​on​  ​a​  ​single​  ​set​  ​of ​  ​fundamental ​  ​principles;;    
2.​  ​the​  ​nature​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​world ​  ​is ​  ​such ​  ​that​  ​it​  ​can, ​  ​at​  ​least ​  ​in ​  ​principle, ​  ​be​  ​completely  
described ​  ​or ​  ​explained ​  ​by​  ​such ​  ​an ​  ​account;;  
3.​  ​there​  ​exist, ​  ​at​  ​least ​  ​in ​  ​principle, ​  ​methods ​  ​of ​  ​inquiry ​  ​that​  ​if ​  ​correctly ​  ​pursued  
will​  ​yield ​  ​such ​  ​an ​  ​account;;    
4.​  ​methods ​  ​of ​  ​inquiry ​  ​are​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​accepted ​  ​on​  ​the​  ​basis ​  ​of ​  ​whether ​  ​they ​  ​can ​  ​yield  
such ​  ​an ​  ​account;; ​  ​and    
5.​  ​individual​  ​theories ​  ​and ​  ​models ​  ​in ​  ​science​  ​are​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​evaluated ​  ​in ​  ​large​  ​part​  ​on  
the​  ​basis ​  ​of ​  ​whether ​  ​they ​  ​provide​  ​(or ​  ​come​  ​close​  ​to ​  ​providing) ​  ​a  
comprehensive ​  ​and ​  ​complete ​  ​account​  ​based ​  ​on​  ​fundamental ​  ​principles.  
( ​x​)  
  
I ​  ​argue​  ​that​  ​observing ​  ​scientific ​  ​practice ​  ​provides ​  ​no​  ​support​  ​for ​  ​the​  ​argument​  ​for  
monism, ​  ​and ​  ​that​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​therefore​  ​a​  ​naturalistically ​  ​unacceptable ​  ​view. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​various  
premises ​  ​on​  ​which ​  ​the​  ​monist​  ​argument​  ​relies ​  ​on​  ​are​  ​not​  ​supported ​  ​by​  ​empirical  
evidence. ​  ​​  ​Even ​  ​if ​  ​it​  ​was​  ​an ​  ​aim​  ​of ​  ​science​  ​to ​  ​establish ​  ​a​  ​monist​  ​picture​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​world,  
there​  ​is ​  ​no​  ​evidence ​  ​to ​  ​suggest​  ​that​  ​such ​  ​an ​  ​aim​  ​could ​  ​ever ​  ​be​  ​achieved. ​  ​​  ​As ​  ​it​  ​stands  
now,​  ​the​  ​current​  ​state​  ​of ​  ​science​  ​is ​  ​patently ​  ​pluralistic. ​  ​​  ​Thus, ​  ​at​  ​this ​  ​stage​  ​in  
proceedings, ​  ​accepting ​  ​pluralism​  ​as ​  ​a​  ​working ​  ​hypothesis, ​  ​is ​  ​the​  ​most​  ​naturalistically  
acceptable ​  ​view ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​sciences.  
  
Kellert​  ​et​  ​al. ​  ​outline​  ​monism, ​  ​in ​  ​order ​  ​to ​  ​argue​  ​against​  ​it. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​use​  ​their ​  ​outline​  ​in ​  ​a​  ​similar  
fashion, ​  ​however ​  ​I ​  ​do​  ​not​  ​need ​  ​to ​  ​refute​  ​monism​  ​for ​  ​my ​  ​arguments ​  ​to ​  ​succeed. ​  ​​  ​For​  ​my  
view ​  ​to ​  ​succeed, ​  ​I ​  ​merely ​  ​need ​  ​to ​  ​establish ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​argument​  ​for ​  ​monism​  ​is ​  ​not  
conclusive​  ​by​  ​naturalistic ​  ​standards, ​  ​and ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​naturalistic ​  ​starting ​  ​point​  ​encourages  
us ​  ​to ​  ​treat​  ​the​  ​question ​  ​of ​  ​monism​  ​or ​  ​pluralism​  ​as ​  ​an ​  ​open ​  ​one. ​  ​​  ​An​  ​accurate ​  ​description  
of ​  ​science​  ​as ​  ​practiced ​  ​shows ​  ​us ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​are​  ​currently ​  ​pluralistic, ​  ​not​  ​just  
between ​  ​sciences ​  ​such ​  ​as ​  ​biology ​   ​and ​  ​physics,​  ​but​  ​also ​  ​within ​  ​these​  ​domains. ​  ​​  ​I  
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illustrate ​  ​that​  ​this ​  ​is ​  ​so​  ​using​  ​case ​  ​studies ​  ​in ​  ​§3.4​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​thesis. ​  ​​  ​Should​  ​evidence  
eventually ​  ​weigh ​  ​in ​  ​favour ​  ​of ​  ​monism, ​  ​naturalists ​  ​could ​  ​then ​  ​happily ​  ​endorse​  ​this ​  ​view.  
For​  ​now,​  ​the​  ​prudent​  ​naturalist​  ​should​  ​treat​  ​this ​  ​as ​  ​an ​  ​open ​  ​question, ​  ​and ​  ​the  
continuation ​  ​of ​  ​both ​  ​monistic​  ​and ​  ​pluralistic ​  ​programmes ​  ​should​  ​be​  ​encouraged ​  ​in ​  ​order  
to ​  ​make​  ​progress ​  ​on​  ​settling ​  ​this ​  ​question.  
  
  
§1.11​  ​Taxonomising​  ​naturalisms  
  
In ​  ​arguing ​  ​for ​  ​aspirational ​  ​naturalism, ​  ​I’ll​  ​first​  ​establish ​  ​a​  ​taxonomy ​  ​of ​  ​naturalist​  ​views  
in ​  ​chapter ​  ​two,​  ​which ​  ​in ​  ​turn ​  ​allows ​  ​me​  ​to ​  ​narrow ​  ​my ​  ​focus ​  ​to ​  ​methodological  
naturalism, ​  ​which ​  ​my ​  ​view ​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​version ​  ​of. ​  ​​  ​As ​  ​well​  ​as ​  ​helping ​  ​to ​  ​narrow ​  ​the​  ​scope​  ​of  
this ​  ​thesis, ​  ​the​  ​second ​  ​chapter ​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​thesis ​  ​adds ​  ​a​  ​positive​  ​contribution ​  ​to ​  ​future  
discussions ​  ​of ​  ​naturalism, ​  ​by​  ​way​  ​of ​  ​clarifying ​  ​a​  ​number ​  ​of ​  ​distinctions ​  ​within ​  ​a​  ​very  
large​  ​pool​  ​of ​  ​naturalisms. ​  ​​  ​This ​  ​chapter ​  ​merely ​  ​sketches ​  ​a​  ​number ​  ​of ​  ​positions, ​  ​and ​  ​I  
make​  ​no​  ​claims ​  ​that​  ​it​  ​provides ​  ​an ​  ​exhaustive​  ​taxonomy. ​  ​​  ​It​  ​does ​  ​however ​  ​outline​  ​a  
number ​  ​of ​  ​popular ​  ​views ​  ​within ​  ​the​  ​literature ​  ​that​  ​are​  ​relevant ​  ​for ​  ​the​  ​purposes ​  ​of ​  ​this  
thesis. ​  ​​  ​In ​  ​chapter ​  ​five, ​  ​I ​  ​outline​  ​aspirational ​  ​naturalism. ​  ​​  ​This ​  ​involves ​  ​returning ​  ​to  
some​  ​of ​  ​views ​  ​from​  ​the​  ​taxonomy ​  ​of ​  ​chapter ​  ​two,​  ​by​  ​elaborating ​  ​on​  ​the​  ​implications  




§1.12​  ​Challenges ​  ​for​  ​aspirational​  ​naturalism  
  
It​  ​could ​  ​be​  ​complained ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​aspirational ​  ​naturalism​  ​I ​  ​defend ​  ​is ​  ​weak, ​  ​in ​  ​ways ​  ​that  
concern ​  ​Timothy ​  ​Williamson ​  ​when ​  ​he​  ​criticises ​  ​some​  ​variants ​  ​of ​  ​naturalism​  ​for ​  ​“​falling  
back ​  ​on​  ​a​  ​more​  ​inclusive​  ​understanding ​  ​of ​  ​science​  ​that​  ​drastically ​  ​waters ​  ​down  
naturalism” ​  ​(2014 ​  ​:​  ​30). ​  ​​  ​If ​  ​a​  ​broad ​  ​survey ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​leads ​  ​to ​  ​a​  ​pluralistic  
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understanding ​  ​of ​  ​science, ​  ​as ​  ​I ​  ​will​  ​argue​  ​it​  ​does, ​  ​then ​  ​the​  ​naturalist​  ​who​  ​aspires ​  ​to ​  ​align  
philosophy ​  ​with​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​has ​  ​no​  ​plausible​  ​alternative ​  ​but​  ​to ​  ​offer ​  ​a​  ​pluralistic  
understanding ​  ​of ​  ​naturalism, ​  ​however ​  ​watered ​  ​down​  ​that​  ​may ​  ​be​  ​considered ​  ​to ​  ​be. ​  ​​  ​My  
positive​  ​contribution ​  ​is ​  ​an ​  ​incomplete ​  ​outline, ​  ​and ​  ​more​  ​work​  ​needs ​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​done​  ​to  
further ​  ​develop ​  ​this ​  ​view.     
  
Some​  ​commentators ​  ​have​  ​complained ​  ​that​  ​methodological ​  ​pluralism​  ​collapses ​  ​into  
either ​  ​a​  ​vicious ​  ​relativism, ​  ​fact-­constructivism, ​  ​or ​  ​methodological ​  ​anarchism. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​defend  
the​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalism​  ​which ​  ​I ​  ​endorse​  ​from​  ​these​  ​criticisms. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​naturalistic  
starting ​  ​point​  ​involved ​  ​first​  ​having ​  ​epistemic ​  ​respect​  ​for ​  ​the​  ​sciences. ​  ​​  ​If ​  ​it​  ​turns ​  ​out​  ​that  
the​  ​sciences ​  ​are​  ​methodologically ​  ​pluralistic, ​  ​then ​  ​there​  ​need ​  ​be​  ​no​  ​worry​  ​that  
methodological ​  ​pluralism​  ​will​  ​amount​  ​to ​  ​a​  ​kind ​  ​of ​  ​vicious ​  ​relativism, ​  ​a​  ​dangerous  
constructivism, ​  ​or ​  ​methodological ​  ​anarchism. ​  ​​  ​Methodological ​  ​pluralism​  ​both ​  ​describes  
science​  ​as ​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​currently ​  ​practiced, ​  ​the​  ​area​  ​with​  ​which ​  ​the​  ​naturalist​  ​approached ​  ​with  
epistemic ​  ​respect, ​  ​and ​  ​also ​  ​includes ​  ​the​  ​evaluative ​  ​claim​  ​that​  ​the​  ​plurality ​  ​that​  ​one​  ​finds  
descriptively ​  ​is ​  ​​okay​,​  ​and ​  ​is ​  ​perhaps ​  ​even ​  ​a​  ​​good​  ​thing ​.  
  
In ​  ​earlier ​  ​stages ​  ​of ​  ​my ​  ​research, ​  ​I ​  ​was​  ​hesitant​  ​to ​  ​consider ​  ​my ​  ​positive  
metaphilosophical ​  ​position ​  ​an ​  ​instance​  ​of ​  ​‘naturalism’, ​  ​due​  ​to ​  ​having ​  ​precisely ​  ​the​  ​same  
concerns ​  ​expressed ​  ​here​  ​by​  ​Williamson:  
  
I ​  ​am​  ​sometimes ​  ​described ​  ​as ​  ​a​  ​naturalist. ​  ​Why ​  ​do​  ​I ​  ​resist​  ​the​  ​description?​  ​Not  
for ​  ​any ​  ​religious ​  ​scruple:​  ​I ​  ​am​  ​an ​  ​atheist​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​most​  ​straightforward ​  ​kind. ​  ​But  
accepting ​  ​the​  ​naturalist​  ​slogan ​  ​without​  ​looking ​  ​beneath ​  ​the​  ​slick​  ​packaging ​  ​is ​  ​an  
unscientific ​  ​way​  ​to ​  ​form​  ​one’s ​  ​beliefs ​  ​about​  ​the​  ​world, ​  ​not​  ​something ​  ​naturalists  
should​  ​recommend.  
(2014 ​  ​:​  ​29)  
  
I ​  ​take​  ​Williamson’s ​  ​concerns ​  ​seriously, ​  ​and ​  ​do​  ​my ​  ​best​  ​to ​  ​resist​  ​assuming ​  ​anything  
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sloganistic, ​  ​attempting ​  ​to ​  ​carefully ​  ​observe​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​in ​  ​order ​  ​to ​  ​help ​  ​inform​  ​my  
views.  
  
§1.13​  ​Concerns ​  ​about​  ​scope  
  
The​  ​naturalist​  ​meta-­philosophical ​  ​views ​  ​that​  ​I ​  ​deal​  ​with​  ​in ​  ​this ​  ​thesis ​  ​tend ​  ​themselves ​  ​to  
be​  ​very ​  ​sweeping ​  ​and ​  ​wide-­scope​  ​-­ ​  ​or ​  ​at​  ​the​  ​very ​  ​least, ​  ​they ​  ​typically ​  ​don’t​  ​themselves  
give​  ​any ​  ​reasons ​  ​why​  ​they ​  ​wouldn’t​  ​be​  ​sweepingly ​  ​wide​  ​in ​  ​their ​  ​scope. ​  ​​  ​That​  ​being ​  ​so,​  ​I  
need ​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​sweeping ​  ​and ​  ​wide-­scope​  ​also, ​  ​if ​  ​I’m​  ​to ​  ​chase​  ​these​  ​views ​  ​down​  ​and ​  ​hold  
them​  ​to ​  ​account. ​  ​​  ​Doing​  ​so​  ​necessarily ​  ​implies ​  ​also ​  ​that​  ​I ​  ​can ​  ​only ​  ​be​  ​brief ​  ​and  
somewhat​  ​explanatory ​  ​in ​  ​each ​  ​particular ​  ​aspect​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​large​  ​terrain ​  ​that​  ​I ​  ​canvass.     
  
One​  ​of ​  ​my ​  ​thesis ​  ​supervisors ​  ​shared ​  ​with​  ​me​  ​an ​  ​anecdote ​  ​from​  ​a​  ​contemporary ​  ​of ​  ​his ​  ​at  
graduate​  ​school​  ​at​  ​Oxford​  ​University .​  ​​  ​Apparently, ​  ​David ​  ​Owen​  ​used ​  ​to ​  ​say​  ​there​  ​are  4
two ​  ​sorts ​  ​of ​  ​thesis:​  ​those​  ​that​  ​tackle ​  ​an ​  ​unsatisfyingly ​  ​narrow ​  ​topic​  ​and ​  ​consequently  
might​​  ​advance​  ​it​  ​somewhat, ​  ​and ​  ​those​  ​that​  ​tackle ​  ​a​  ​satisfyingly ​  ​wide​  ​topic​  ​and  
consequently ​  ​​won’t​​  ​advance​  ​it. ​  ​​  ​Regardless ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​truth ​  ​of ​  ​Owen’s ​  ​claim, ​  ​my ​  ​thesis ​  ​is  
surely ​  ​an ​  ​instance​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​latter ​  ​in ​  ​terms ​  ​of ​  ​scope. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​am​  ​confident​  ​that​  ​this ​  ​thesis ​  ​does  
advance​  ​various ​  ​discussions ​  ​of ​  ​importance, ​  ​but​  ​in ​  ​this ​  ​thesis ​  ​I ​  ​argue​  ​that​  ​a​  ​philosopher  
ought​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​somewhat​  ​sceptical ​  ​about​  ​relying ​  ​on​  ​their ​  ​own​  ​intuitions ​  ​as ​  ​sufficient  
evidence ​  ​for ​  ​any ​  ​given ​  ​claim. ​  ​​  ​Given ​  ​this ​  ​caution, ​  ​the​  ​reader ​  ​will​  ​have​  ​to ​  ​judge​  ​whether  





My​  ​aim​  ​in ​  ​this ​  ​thesis ​  ​is ​  ​to ​  ​take​  ​Williamson’s ​  ​comments ​  ​about​  ​naturalism​  ​seriously,  
looking ​  ​beneath ​  ​naturalism’s ​  ​“slick ​  ​packaging” ​  ​(2014 ​  ​:​  ​29), ​  ​outlining ​  ​the​  ​ways ​  ​in ​  ​which  
4 ​  ​A.​  ​Moore,​  ​Personal ​  ​communication,​  ​June ​  ​2017  
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philosophy ​  ​could ​  ​usefully ​  ​be​  ​aligned ​  ​with​  ​science, ​  ​and ​  ​illustrating ​  ​some​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​many  
ways ​  ​in ​  ​which ​  ​it​  ​already ​  ​is. ​  ​​  ​There​  ​is ​  ​much ​  ​more​  ​work​  ​to ​  ​do​  ​in ​  ​terms ​  ​of ​  ​applying  
relevant ​  ​methods ​  ​from​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​within ​  ​philosophy, ​  ​and ​  ​this ​  ​motivates ​  ​important​  ​and  
































As ​  ​discussed ​  ​in ​  ​my ​  ​introductory ​  ​chapter, ​  ​naturalism​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​name​  ​that​  ​has ​  ​been ​  ​given ​  ​to ​  ​a  
number ​  ​of ​  ​different​  ​positions ​  ​within ​  ​the​  ​discipline​  ​of ​  ​analytic ​  ​philosophy. ​  ​​  ​Naturalism,  
for ​  ​my ​  ​purposes,​  ​is ​  ​to ​  ​do​  ​with​  ​philosophy ​  ​and ​  ​its ​  ​relationship ​  ​to ​  ​science. ​  ​​  ​This ​  ​thesis  
critically ​  ​examines ​  ​and ​  ​defends ​  ​a​  ​kind ​  ​of ​  ​​methodological​  ​naturalism ​,​  ​a​  ​view ​  ​to ​  ​do​  ​with  
the​  ​relationship ​  ​between ​  ​philosophical​  ​methods ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​sciences. ​  ​​  ​There​  ​are​  ​two ​  ​other  
broad ​  ​kinds ​  ​of ​  ​naturalism​  ​which ​  ​I ​  ​discuss ​  ​here:​  ​​ontological​  ​naturalism ​​  ​-­ ​  ​which ​  ​involve  
scientifically ​  ​informed ​  ​metaphysical ​  ​views, ​  ​and ​  ​​epistemological ​  ​naturalism ​​  ​-­ ​  ​involving  
views ​  ​about​  ​knowledge​  ​that​  ​are​  ​informed ​  ​or ​  ​shaped ​  ​by​  ​the​  ​sciences. ​  ​​  ​After ​  ​outlining  
these​  ​views, ​  ​I ​  ​briefly ​  ​examine ​  ​the​  ​relationships ​  ​among ​  ​these​  ​three​  ​kinds ​  ​of ​  ​naturalism.  
In ​  ​the​  ​final​  ​chapter ​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​thesis, ​  ​I ​  ​return ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​relationships ​  ​among ​  ​methodological,  
epistemological, ​  ​and ​  ​ontological ​  ​naturalism. ​  ​I ​  ​discuss ​  ​how ​  ​the​  ​methodological  
naturalism​  ​which ​  ​I ​  ​defend ​  ​motivates, ​  ​places ​  ​constraints ​  ​on,​  ​or ​  ​otherwise​  ​affects,  
epistemological ​  ​and ​  ​metaphysical ​  ​concerns ​  ​(see​  ​§5.4,​  ​this ​  ​thesis).  
  
  
§2.1​  ​Motivations ​  ​for​  ​providing​  ​a​  ​taxonomy  
  
David ​  ​Papineau ​  ​has ​  ​commented ​  ​that​  ​“'naturalism' ​  ​has ​  ​no​  ​very ​  ​precise​  ​meaning ​  ​in  
contemporary ​  ​philosophy”, ​  ​and ​  ​that​  ​“[d]ifferent ​  ​contemporary ​  ​philosophers ​  ​interpret  
'naturalism' ​  ​differently” ​  ​(Papineau ​  ​2010​  ​:​  ​1). ​  ​​  ​He​  ​argues ​  ​further ​  ​that​  ​getting ​  ​into  
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definitional ​  ​issues ​  ​about​  ​naturalism​  ​is ​  ​unfruitful​  ​(ibid.). ​  ​​  ​Whilst​  ​I ​  ​agree​  ​with​  ​Papineau  
that​  ​there​  ​are​  ​many ​  ​different​  ​views ​  ​that​  ​could ​  ​be​  ​placed ​  ​under ​  ​the​  ​umbrella​  ​of  
naturalism, ​  ​each ​  ​with​  ​various ​  ​considerations ​  ​at​  ​play, ​  ​I ​  ​disagree​  ​with​  ​his ​  ​claim​  ​that  
getting ​  ​into ​  ​definitional ​  ​debates ​  ​about​  ​naturalism​  ​is ​  ​unfruitful​  ​-­ ​  ​in ​  ​fact, ​  ​I ​  ​think ​  ​a​  ​careful  
look ​  ​at​  ​the​  ​details ​  ​of ​  ​different​  ​naturalisms ​  ​could ​  ​be​  ​most​  ​beneficial, ​  ​by​  ​first​  ​drawing  
conceptual ​  ​lines ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​sand ​  ​to ​  ​help ​  ​delineate ​  ​different​  ​naturalisms, ​  ​and ​  ​subsequently ​  ​to  
clarify ​  ​one’s ​  ​own​  ​positive​  ​view, ​  ​and ​  ​compare​  ​this ​  ​view ​  ​with​  ​other ​  ​naturalisms. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​do​  ​not  
attempt ​  ​to ​  ​give​  ​an ​  ​ultimate ​  ​description ​  ​of ​  ​one​  ​true​  ​naturalism, ​  ​but​  ​instead ​  ​I ​  ​introduce​  ​a  
number ​  ​of ​  ​positions, ​  ​and ​  ​critically ​  ​discuss ​  ​them.  
  
Some​  ​brands ​  ​of ​  ​naturalism​  ​have​  ​a​  ​strong​  ​normative​  ​component, ​  ​prescribing ​  ​views ​  ​about  
the​  ​practice ​  ​of ​  ​science​  ​and ​  ​philosophy. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​next​  ​chapter ​  ​directly ​  ​engages ​  ​with  
arguments ​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​kind, ​  ​and ​  ​carefully ​  ​analyses ​  ​claims ​  ​that​  ​philosophical​  ​methods ​  ​​ought  
to ​  ​be​  ​reformed, ​  ​in ​  ​order ​  ​to ​  ​best​  ​implement ​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalism. ​  ​​  ​More​  ​precise  
definitions ​  ​of ​  ​naturalism​  ​will​  ​help ​  ​to ​  ​analyse​  ​such ​  ​arguments.     
  
Barry ​  ​Stroud​  ​(1996) ​  ​has ​  ​commented ​  ​that​  ​naturalism​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​vague​  ​term, ​  ​and ​  ​that​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​no  
agreed ​  ​usage​  ​for ​  ​the​  ​term. ​  ​​  ​Stroud​  ​goes ​  ​on​  ​to ​  ​make​  ​a​  ​witty​  ​analogy, ​  ​comparing  
naturalism​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​idea​  ​of ​  ​world ​  ​peace. ​  ​​  ​He​  ​argues ​  ​that​  ​both ​  ​naturalism​  ​and ​  ​world ​  ​peace  
are​  ​things ​  ​that​  ​many ​  ​would​  ​declare ​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​in ​  ​favour ​  ​of, ​  ​but​  ​when ​  ​pressed ​  ​on​  ​the​  ​finer  
details ​  ​of ​  ​how ​  ​they ​  ​are​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​realised, ​  ​vast​  ​disagreements ​  ​ensue​  ​about​  ​how ​  ​best​  ​to  
implement ​  ​such ​  ​an ​  ​ideology, ​  ​or ​  ​even ​  ​what​  ​these​  ​ideologies ​  ​are​  ​precisely ​  ​(43). ​  ​​  ​As ​  ​a  
naive​  ​pacifist, ​  ​I ​  ​once​  ​conversed ​  ​with​  ​a​  ​friend ​  ​and ​  ​peace​  ​and ​  ​conflict​  ​studies ​  ​academic,  
and ​  ​argued ​  ​that​  ​war​  ​and ​  ​peace​  ​were​  ​mutually ​  ​exclusive. ​  ​​  ​It​  ​was​  ​pointed ​  ​out​  ​to ​  ​me​  ​that  
there​  ​is ​  ​empirical ​  ​evidence ​  ​to ​  ​suggest​  ​that​  ​war​  ​is ​  ​sometimes ​  ​the​  ​least ​  ​harmful​  ​way​  ​to  
achieve ​  ​peace .​  ​​  ​We​  ​both ​  ​agreed ​  ​that​  ​world ​  ​peace​  ​was​  ​important, ​  ​but​  ​the​  ​view ​  ​that​  ​I  5
naively ​  ​held ​  ​as ​  ​a​  ​means ​  ​to ​  ​best​  ​implement ​  ​this ​  ​shared ​  ​ideology ​  ​was​  ​radically ​  ​different  
to ​  ​hers. ​  ​​  ​Luckily, ​  ​purely ​  ​academic ​  ​philosophical​  ​warfare​  ​is ​  ​much ​  ​cheaper ​  ​and ​  ​involves  
much ​  ​less ​  ​loss ​  ​of ​  ​life​  ​than ​  ​military ​  ​endeavours, ​  ​and ​  ​as ​  ​philosophers ​  ​of ​  ​naturalism​  ​we  
can ​  ​ponder ​  ​the​  ​best​  ​ways ​  ​to ​  ​interpret, ​  ​and ​  ​to ​  ​implement ​  ​naturalism​  ​from​  ​our ​  ​armchairs  
and ​  ​laboratories, ​  ​and ​  ​leave​  ​the​  ​world-­peace ​  ​debate​  ​to ​  ​some​  ​other ​  ​sub-­set​  ​of  
5 ​  ​L.​  ​Quinger,​  ​Personal ​  ​correspondence,​  ​2012.  
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philosophers ​  ​who​  ​wish​  ​to ​  ​engage​  ​with​  ​those​  ​ethical ​  ​domains. ​  ​​  ​For​  ​now,​  ​I ​  ​leave​  ​myself  
with​  ​the​  ​more​  ​modest​  ​but​  ​still​  ​important​  ​job ​  ​of ​  ​discussing​  ​ways ​  ​to ​  ​best​  ​interpret​  ​and  
implement ​  ​naturalism.  
  
Owen​  ​Flanagan ​  ​jokes ​  ​that​  ​he​  ​has ​  ​found ​  ​more​  ​kinds ​  ​of ​  ​naturalism​  ​than ​  ​Paul​  ​Simon ​  ​had  
ways ​  ​to ​  ​leave​  ​his ​  ​lover ​  ​(2006 ​  ​:​  ​431). ​  ​​  ​He​  ​presents ​  ​fifteen ​  ​different​  ​slogans,​  ​which ​  ​he  
considers ​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​key ​  ​components ​  ​of ​  ​various ​  ​kinds ​  ​of ​  ​naturalism:    
  
1. Philosophy​  ​should​  ​‘respect’, ​  ​‘be​  ​informed ​  ​by’, ​  ​‘whole-­heartedly ​  ​accept’ ​  ​the  
methods ​  ​and ​  ​claims ​  ​of ​  ​science.  
2. When ​  ​a​  ​well-­grounded ​  ​philosophical​  ​claim​  ​and ​  ​an ​  ​equally ​  ​well-­grounded  
scientific ​  ​claim​  ​are​  ​inconsistent​  ​(whatever ​  ​‘equally ​  ​well-­grounded ​  ​means), ​  ​the  
scientific ​  ​claim​  ​trumps.  
3. Philosophical​  ​questions ​  ​are​  ​not​  ​distinct​  ​from​  ​scientific ​  ​questions ​  ​-­ ​  ​they ​  ​differ, ​  ​if  
they ​  ​do​  ​differ, ​  ​only ​  ​in ​  ​level​  ​of ​  ​generality.  
4. Both ​  ​science​  ​and ​  ​philosophy ​  ​are​  ​licensed ​  ​only ​  ​to ​  ​describe​  ​and ​  ​explain ​  ​the​  ​way  
things ​  ​are.  
5. Both ​  ​philosophy ​  ​and ​  ​science​  ​are, ​  ​in ​  ​addition ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​business ​  ​of ​  ​description ​  ​and  
explanation, ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​business ​  ​of ​  ​giving ​  ​naturalistic ​  ​justifications ​  ​for ​  ​epistemic ​  ​and  
ethical ​  ​ideals ​  ​and ​  ​norms.  
6. There​  ​is ​  ​no​  ​room, ​  ​or ​  ​need, ​  ​for ​  ​the​  ​invocation ​  ​of ​  ​immaterial ​  ​agents ​  ​or ​  ​forces ​  ​or  
causes ​  ​in ​  ​describing ​  ​or ​  ​accounting ​  ​for ​  ​things.  
7. Mathematics ​  ​and ​  ​logic​  ​can ​  ​be​  ​understood ​  ​without​  ​invoking ​  ​a​  ​Platonic  
(non-­naturalistic) ​  ​ontology.  
8. Ethics ​  ​can ​  ​be​  ​done​  ​without​  ​invoking ​  ​theological ​  ​or ​  ​Platonic​  ​foundations.  
Ethical ​  ​norms,​  ​values, ​  ​and ​  ​virtues ​  ​can ​  ​be​  ​defended ​  ​naturalistically.  
9. Naturalism​  ​is ​  ​another ​  ​name​  ​for ​  ​materialism ​  ​or ​  ​physicalism;;​  ​what​  ​there​  ​is, ​  ​and ​  ​all  
there​  ​is, ​  ​is ​  ​whatever ​  ​physics ​  ​says ​  ​there​  ​is.  
10. Naturalism​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​form​  ​of ​  ​non-­reductive ​  ​physicalism;;​  ​there​  ​are​  ​genuine​  ​levels ​  ​of  
nature​  ​above​  ​the​  ​elemental ​  ​level.  
11. Naturalism​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​thesis ​  ​that​  ​rejects ​  ​both ​  ​physicalism​  ​and ​  ​materialism;; ​  ​there​  ​are  
natural​  ​but​  ​‘non-­physical’ ​  ​properties, ​  ​e.g. ​  ​informational ​  ​states.  
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12. Naturalism​  ​claims ​  ​that​  ​most​  ​knowledge​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​posteriori.  
13. Naturalism​  ​is ​  ​indifferent ​  ​to ​  ​claims ​  ​about​  ​whether ​  ​knowledge​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​priori​  ​or ​  ​a  
posteriori, ​  ​so​  ​long ​  ​as ​  ​whatever ​  ​kind ​  ​of ​  ​knowledge​  ​exists ​  ​can ​  ​be​  ​explained, ​  ​as ​  ​it  
were, ​  ​naturalistically.  
14. Naturalism​  ​is, ​  ​first​  ​and ​  ​foremost, ​  ​an ​  ​ontological ​  ​thesis ​  ​that​  ​tells ​  ​us ​  ​about  
everything ​  ​that​  ​there​  ​is.  
15. Naturalism​  ​is, ​  ​first​  ​and ​  ​foremost, ​  ​an ​  ​epistemic ​  ​thesis, ​  ​which ​  ​explains, ​  ​among  
other ​  ​things, ​  ​why​  ​we​  ​should​  ​make​  ​pronouncements ​  ​about​  ​‘everything ​  ​there​  ​is’.    
(430-­431)  
  
Whilst​  ​Flanagan ​  ​lays ​  ​out​  ​a​  ​number ​  ​of ​  ​slogans ​  ​that​  ​have​  ​been ​  ​associated ​  ​with​  ​or  
pronounced ​  ​by​  ​naturalists ​  ​over ​  ​the​  ​years, ​  ​his ​  ​article ​  ​does ​  ​not​  ​yet​  ​do​  ​much ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​way​  ​of  
clearly ​  ​organising ​  ​naturalisms ​  ​into ​  ​kinds.​  ​​  ​As ​  ​can ​  ​be​  ​seen​  ​from​  ​these​  ​fifteen  
pronouncements ​  ​of ​  ​naturalism, ​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​wide​  ​variety ​  ​of ​  ​views ​  ​that​  ​make​  ​claim​  ​to ​  ​fall  
under ​  ​the​  ​umbrella​  ​of ​  ​naturalism.  
  
Timothy ​  ​Williamson ​  ​has ​  ​argued ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​term​  ​naturalism​  ​is ​  ​vague​  ​in ​  ​ways ​  ​that​  ​are  
damaging ​  ​(Williamson ​  ​2016,​  ​Feb​  ​11). ​  ​​  ​He​  ​suggests ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​normative​  ​force​  ​behind  
many ​  ​contemporary ​  ​naturalistic ​  ​views ​  ​is ​  ​strong,​  ​but​  ​that​  ​the​  ​unclarity ​  ​of ​  ​naturalism  
makes ​  ​the​  ​details ​  ​of ​  ​these​  ​views ​  ​difficult​  ​to ​  ​analyse. ​  ​​  ​Elsewhere, ​  ​he​  ​accuses ​  ​some  
naturalists ​  ​of ​  ​having ​  ​“oscillating” ​  ​views, ​  ​suggesting ​  ​such ​  ​naturalists ​  ​are​  ​involved ​  ​in  
“dogmatic ​  ​equivocation” ​  ​(2014 ​  ​:​  ​30).     
  
I ​  ​agree​  ​with​  ​Papineau, ​  ​Stroud,​  ​and ​  ​Flanagan, ​  ​that​  ​definitions ​  ​of ​  ​naturalism​  ​are​  ​unclear.  
I ​  ​further ​  ​agree​  ​with​  ​Williamson ​  ​that​  ​this ​  ​unclarity ​  ​can ​  ​be​  ​dangerous. ​  ​​  ​For​  ​this ​  ​reason, ​  ​I  
think ​  ​a​  ​more​  ​careful​  ​taxonomy ​  ​is ​  ​required ​  ​for ​  ​more​  ​fruitful​  ​discussions ​  ​about  
naturalism. ​  ​​  ​In ​  ​the​  ​rest​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​chapter ​  ​I ​  ​will​  ​lay ​  ​out​  ​and ​  ​critically ​  ​discuss ​  ​a​  ​number ​  ​of  
distinct​  ​naturalistic ​  ​positions, ​  ​as ​  ​held ​  ​by​  ​various ​  ​philosophers ​  ​within ​  ​the​  ​literature. ​  ​​  ​I  
hope​  ​that​  ​with​  ​some​  ​of ​  ​these​  ​distinctions ​  ​in ​  ​place, ​  ​future​  ​discussions ​  ​focussed ​  ​towards  
naturalism​  ​can ​  ​be​  ​more​  ​clearly ​  ​defined ​  ​and ​  ​hence​  ​more​  ​easily ​  ​understood. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​take​  ​this ​  ​as  
a​  ​positive​  ​part​  ​of ​  ​my ​  ​thesis, ​  ​in ​  ​that​  ​it​  ​responds ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​calls ​  ​of ​  ​Stroud,​  ​Williamson,  
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Papineau, ​  ​and ​  ​Flanagan, ​  ​by​  ​providing ​  ​a​  ​more​  ​comprehensive ​  ​taxonomy ​  ​than ​  ​exists  
elsewhere.    
  
I ​  ​distinguish ​  ​three​  ​broad ​  ​kinds ​  ​of ​  ​naturalism​  ​that​  ​are​  ​already ​  ​somewhat​  ​delineated ​  ​in ​  ​the  
literature: ​  ​methodological, ​  ​ontological, ​  ​and ​  ​epistemological. ​  ​​  ​This ​  ​thesis ​  ​takes  
methodological ​  ​naturalism​  ​as ​  ​its ​  ​main ​  ​concern, ​  ​but​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​worthwhile​  ​to ​  ​look ​  ​at​  ​other  
kinds ​  ​of ​  ​naturalism​  ​for ​  ​several​  ​reasons. ​  ​​  ​It​  ​is ​  ​useful​  ​to ​  ​separate​  ​naturalisms ​  ​into ​  ​these  
kinds ​  ​for ​  ​reasons ​  ​of ​  ​clarity, ​  ​for ​  ​reasons ​  ​discussed ​  ​above, ​  ​and ​  ​to ​  ​refine​  ​the​  ​scope​  ​of ​  ​my  
particular ​  ​interest​  ​in ​  ​this ​  ​thesis:​  ​​methodological​  ​naturalism ​. ​  ​​  ​Moreover, ​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​interesting  
to ​  ​look ​  ​at​  ​the​  ​relationships ​  ​among ​  ​the​  ​various ​  ​naturalisms ​  ​and ​  ​see​  ​whether ​  ​they ​  ​are  
complementary, ​  ​as ​  ​sometimes ​  ​assumed ​  ​(e.g. ​  ​Forrest​  ​2000), ​  ​or ​  ​whether ​  ​certain  




§2.2​  ​Methodological​  ​Naturalism  
  
Methodological ​  ​naturalism, ​  ​as ​  ​I ​  ​shall​  ​understand ​  ​the​  ​term, ​  ​names ​  ​a​  ​family ​  ​of ​  ​views ​  ​to  
do​  ​with​  ​philosophical​  ​practice ​  ​and ​  ​its ​  ​relationship ​  ​to ​  ​scientific ​  ​practices .​  ​​  ​I ​  ​show ​  ​two  6
different​  ​ways ​  ​in ​  ​which ​  ​philosophical​  ​practice ​  ​could ​  ​align ​  ​with​  ​the​  ​sciences, ​  ​which  7






6​  ​There​  ​are​  ​groups ​  ​of​  ​views ​  ​within​  ​the​  ​philosophy​  ​of​  ​religion​  ​that​  ​share​  ​the​  ​name​  ​“methodological  
naturalism”,​  ​claiming​  ​something​  ​about​  ​the​  ​lack​  ​of​  ​a​  ​need​  ​for​  ​invocation​  ​of​  ​supernatural​  ​agents.​  ​​  ​These  
views ​  ​are​  ​somewhat​  ​related,​  ​but​  ​are​  ​importantly​  ​different​  ​to​  ​the​  ​methodological​  ​naturalisms ​  ​in​  ​which​  ​my  
thesis ​  ​is ​  ​interested,​  ​although​  ​they​  ​are​  ​somewhat​  ​relevant​  ​to​  ​discussions ​  ​of​  ​ontological​  ​naturalism.​  ​​  ​These  
kinds ​  ​of​  ​‘methodological​  ​naturalism’​  ​are​  ​to​  ​do​  ​with​  ​the​  ​relationship​  ​between​  ​science​  ​and​  ​religion,  
whereas ​  ​the​  ​kinds ​  ​I​  ​am​  ​interested​  ​in​  ​are​  ​to​  ​do​  ​with​  ​the​  ​relationship​  ​between​  ​science​  ​and​  ​philosophy.  
7​  ​I​  ​often​  ​talk​  ​about​  ​‘philosophical​  ​practice’​  ​in​  ​the​  ​singular,​  ​but​  ​of​  ​course​  ​there​  ​are​  ​really​  ​a​  ​number​  ​of  
philosophical​  ​practices.​  ​​  ​I​  ​intend​  ​the​  ​term​  ​to​  ​include​  ​the​  ​various ​  ​philosophical​  ​practices ​  ​in​  ​general,​  ​unless  
I​  ​specify​  ​otherwise.  
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Results/methods ​  ​distinction  
  
The​  ​first​  ​distinction ​  ​within ​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalisms ​  ​that​  ​I ​  ​will​  ​discuss ​  ​is ​  ​between ​  ​the  
results ​​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​​methods ​​  ​of ​  ​science. ​  ​​  ​Brian ​  ​Leiter ​  ​(1998) ​  ​suggests ​  ​two ​  ​ways ​  ​in ​  ​which  
philosophical​  ​methods ​  ​can ​  ​be​  ​aligned ​  ​with​  ​science, ​  ​either ​  ​by​  ​way​  ​of ​  ​employing ​  ​or  
emulating ​  ​the​  ​methods ​  ​of ​  ​science​   ​directly, ​  ​or ​  ​by​  ​making ​  ​use​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​products ​  ​of ​  ​scientific  
methods ​  ​as ​  ​a​  ​component​  ​of ​  ​philosophical​  ​methods ​  ​​  ​-­ ​  ​i.e. ​  ​bringing ​  ​scientific ​  ​results ​  ​to  
bear ​  ​upon ​  ​philosophical​  ​work.​  ​​  ​I ​  ​outline​  ​each ​  ​of ​  ​these​  ​axes ​  ​of ​  ​alignment ​  ​with​  ​science,  





One​  ​way​  ​of ​  ​realising ​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalism, ​  ​is ​  ​by​  ​way​  ​of ​  ​aligning ​  ​philosophical  
methods ​  ​​with​  ​scientific ​  ​methods. ​  ​​  ​Recent​  ​philosophical​  ​literature ​  ​encompasses ​  ​a  
developing ​  ​trend ​  ​in ​  ​a​  ​branch ​  ​of ​  ​philosophy ​  ​called ​  ​​experimental ​  ​philosophy​​  ​(for ​  ​the  
classic ​  ​presentation, ​  ​see​  ​Weinberg ​  ​et​  ​al. ​  ​2001). ​  ​​  ​Experimental ​  ​philosophers ​  ​express  
scepticism​  ​about​  ​the​  ​epistemic ​  ​credibility ​  ​of ​  ​using​  ​one’s ​  ​intuitions ​  ​as ​  ​evidence ​  ​to  
support​  ​conclusions ​  ​about​  ​‘folk’ ​  ​beliefs. ​  ​​  ​In ​  ​light​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​scepticism, ​  ​experimental  
philosophers ​  ​instead ​  ​suggest​  ​that​  ​we​  ​begin ​  ​with​  ​predictions ​  ​of ​  ​folk ​  ​beliefs, ​  ​and ​  ​test  
them​  ​using​  ​experiments, ​  ​usually ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​form​  ​of ​  ​surveys ​  ​and ​  ​polls, ​  ​to ​  ​gather ​  ​data​  ​to  
support​  ​findings ​  ​about​  ​what​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​‘folk’ ​  ​really ​  ​do​  ​believe. ​  ​​  ​Experimental  
philosophy ​  ​is ​  ​an ​  ​example ​  ​of ​  ​a​  ​philosophical​  ​method ​  ​emulating ​  ​the​  ​methods ​  ​of  
psychology, ​  ​by​  ​way​  ​of ​  ​testing ​  ​individuals ​  ​in ​  ​a​  ​fashion ​  ​that​  ​is ​  ​relevantly ​  ​analogous ​  ​to ​  ​a  
psychological​  ​examination. ​  ​​  ​Thus,​  ​experimental ​  ​philosophy ​  ​aligns ​  ​itself ​  ​with​  ​methods  
from​  ​the​  ​sciences, ​  ​and ​  ​especially ​  ​psychology, ​  ​and ​  ​so​  ​is ​  ​an ​  ​instance​  ​of  





A ​  ​different​  ​way​  ​of ​  ​aligning ​  ​the​  ​methods ​  ​of ​  ​philosophy ​  ​with​  ​science, ​  ​is ​  ​by​  ​utilising  
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scientific ​  ​​results ​  ​​as ​  ​part​  ​of ​  ​one’s ​  ​philosophical​  ​method ​.​​  ​​  ​An​  ​example​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​can ​  ​be  
found ​  ​In ​  ​the​  ​debate​  ​between ​  ​A-­theorists ​  ​and ​  ​B-­theorists ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​philosophy ​  ​of ​  ​time  
literature ​  ​(e.g. ​  ​Sklar, ​  ​1976,​  ​1985;;​  ​Balashov ​  ​and ​  ​Janssen,​  ​2003). ​  ​​  ​A-­theorists ​  ​believe  
there​  ​is ​  ​an ​  ​ontological ​  ​distinction ​  ​between ​  ​the​  ​present, ​  ​the​  ​past, ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​future.  
B-­theorists, ​  ​on​  ​the​  ​other ​  ​hand, ​  ​think ​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​no​  ​unique​  ​ontological ​  ​distinction ​  ​between  
any ​  ​times. ​  ​​  ​Thus,​  ​B​  ​theorists ​  ​think ​  ​that​  ​all​  ​times ​  ​are​  ​equally ​  ​“real”.  
  
In ​  ​some​  ​of ​  ​these​  ​debates, ​  ​it​  ​has ​  ​been ​  ​argued ​  ​that​  ​there​  ​are​  ​contradictions ​  ​between  
consequences ​  ​of ​  ​Einstein’s ​  ​special​  ​theory ​  ​of ​  ​relativity ​  ​and ​  ​consequences ​  ​of ​  ​the  8
A-­theory ​  ​of ​  ​time. ​  ​​  ​Many ​  ​B-­theorists ​  ​argue​  ​that​  ​this ​  ​purported ​  ​inconsistency ​  ​between ​  ​the  
A-­theory ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​special​  ​theory ​  ​of ​  ​relativity ​  ​lends ​  ​weight​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​truth ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​B-­theory,  
thus ​  ​bringing ​  ​scientific ​  ​results ​  ​to ​  ​bear ​  ​on​  ​philosophical​  ​debates. ​  ​​  ​An​  ​argument​  ​structure  
for ​  ​such ​  ​a​  ​view ​  ​is ​  ​illustrated ​  ​below:  
  
P1) Either ​  ​the​  ​A-­theory ​  ​or ​  ​the​  ​B-­theory ​  ​is ​  ​the​  ​correct​  ​metaphysical ​  ​theory ​  ​of ​  ​time  
P2) The​  ​A-­theory ​  ​is ​  ​inconsistent​  ​with​  ​the​  ​STR,​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​B-­theory ​  ​is ​  ​consistent​  ​with  
the​  ​STR  
P3) We​  ​should​  ​prefer ​  ​theories ​  ​which ​  ​are​  ​consistent​  ​with​  ​well-­established ​  ​scientific  
results ​  ​to ​  ​ones ​  ​that​  ​are​  ​not  
∴ On​  ​these​  ​grounds,​  ​we​  ​should​  ​prefer ​  ​the​  ​B-­theory ​  ​of ​  ​time  
  
  
Results-­alignment​  ​is ​  ​not​  ​a​  ​necessary ​  ​condition ​  ​for​  ​methodological​  ​naturalism  
  
Results-­alignment ​  ​is ​  ​one​  ​way​  ​a​  ​philosophical​  ​theory ​  ​can ​  ​do​  ​what​  ​methodological  
naturalism​  ​recommends, ​  ​as ​  ​I ​  ​have​  ​shown​  ​above. ​  ​​  ​However, ​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​not​  ​the​  ​case ​  ​that​  ​all  
philosophical​  ​theories ​  ​have​  ​to ​  ​draw ​  ​upon​  ​scientific ​  ​results ​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​considered ​  ​instances ​  ​of  
what​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalism​  ​endorses. ​  ​​  ​We​  ​don’t​  ​expect​  ​physicists ​  ​to ​  ​draw ​  ​upon​  ​the  
results ​  ​of ​  ​other ​  ​sciences, ​  ​for ​  ​them​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​considered ​  ​as ​  ​using​  ​naturalistic ​  ​methods. ​  ​​  ​I  
suggest​  ​it​  ​would​  ​be​  ​unreasonably ​  ​harsh ​  ​to ​  ​impose​  ​a​  ​constraint​  ​on​  ​philosophical​  ​methods  
that​  ​is ​  ​not​  ​required ​  ​by​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​themselves, ​  ​in ​  ​order ​  ​that​  ​they ​  ​be​  ​considered ​  ​suitable  
8​  ​Henceforth:​  ​STR  
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by​  ​methodologically ​  ​naturalistic ​  ​standards. ​  ​​  ​It​  ​can’t​  ​be​  ​a​  ​requirement ​  ​that​  ​all​  ​philosophy  
must​  ​engage​  ​with​  ​some​  ​result​  ​from​  ​science​  ​at​  ​all​  ​times, ​  ​in ​  ​order ​  ​to ​  ​exhibit​  ​the  
recommendations ​  ​of ​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalism. ​  ​​  ​However, ​  ​when ​  ​scientific ​  ​results ​  ​are  
relevant ​  ​to ​  ​a​  ​particular ​  ​philosophical​  ​debate, ​  ​it​  ​would​  ​be​  ​careless ​  ​to ​  ​pay ​  ​them​  ​no  
attention. ​  ​​  ​Aspiring​  ​to ​  ​utilise​  ​the​  ​results ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​when ​  ​they ​  ​are​  ​relevant ​  ​to  
philosophy ​  ​is ​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​encouraged ​  ​as ​  ​a​  ​methodological ​  ​heuristic. ​  ​​  ​Philosophy​  ​can  
implement ​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalism​  ​by​  ​either ​  ​using​  ​scientific ​  ​methods ​  ​directly, ​  ​or ​  ​by  
drawing ​  ​upon​  ​the​  ​products ​  ​of ​  ​those​  ​methods.  
  
  
Distinctions ​  ​within ​  ​sciences​  ​and ​  ​their​  ​impacts ​  ​on ​  ​methodological​  ​naturalism  
  
W​e​  ​can ​  ​make​  ​still​  ​finer ​  ​distinctions ​  ​between ​  ​kinds ​  ​of ​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalisms, ​  ​by  
focusing ​  ​on​  ​the​  ​methods ​  ​or ​  ​results ​  ​of ​  ​particular ​  ​sciences. ​  ​​  ​With ​  ​such ​  ​distinctions ​  ​in  
mind, ​  ​some​  ​commentators ​  ​propose​  ​a​  ​distinction ​  ​between ​  ​natural​  ​and ​  ​social​  ​science, ​  ​​  ​or  
between ​  ​experimental ​  ​and ​  ​historical​  ​sciences. ​  ​​  ​Some​  ​naturalists ​  ​have​  ​tied ​  ​their  
naturalist​  ​masts ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​“natural” ​  ​or ​  ​“experimental” ​  ​sciences ​  ​(e.g. ​  ​Rosenberg ​  ​2014,  
Ladyman ​  ​and ​  ​Ross ​  ​2007), ​  ​claiming ​  ​that​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​some​  ​primacy ​  ​or ​  ​greater ​  ​epistemic  
credit​  ​belonging ​  ​to ​  ​these​  ​particular ​  ​areas ​  ​of ​  ​scientific ​  ​inquiry, ​  ​that​  ​makes ​  ​them​  ​more  
appropriate ​  ​for ​  ​drawing ​  ​upon​  ​for ​  ​methodological ​  ​purposes.​  ​​  ​I ​  ​will​  ​not​  ​develop ​  ​these  
views ​  ​further ​  ​presently, ​  ​but​  ​in ​  ​chapter ​  ​three​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​thesis ​  ​I ​  ​argue​  ​that​  ​such ​  ​restrictions  
are​  ​untenable ​  ​from​  ​the​  ​naturalistic ​  ​starting ​  ​point, ​  ​as ​  ​they ​  ​rely ​  ​on​  ​intuitions ​  ​about​  ​science  
that​  ​have​  ​no​  ​evidential ​  ​support​  ​from​  ​observing ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​themselves.  
  
  
Reformist ​  ​and ​  ​vindicatory ​  ​naturalisms  
  
As ​  ​well​  ​as ​  ​descriptive ​  ​views ​  ​about​  ​the​  ​methods ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​and ​  ​philosophy ​  ​use, ​  ​there  
are​  ​also ​  ​normative ​  ​views ​  ​about​  ​what​  ​these​  ​methods ​  ​​should​  ​​be. ​  ​​  ​Some​  ​methodological  
naturalists ​  ​argue​  ​that​  ​philosophical​  ​methods ​  ​need ​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​changed, ​  ​in ​  ​order ​  ​to ​  ​become  
suitably ​  ​naturalistic ​  ​(e.g. ​  ​Rosenberg ​  ​2014). ​  ​​  ​Others ​  ​argue​  ​that​  ​particular ​  ​domains ​  ​of  
inquiry ​  ​are​  ​epistemically ​  ​inaccessible ​  ​using​  ​naturalistic ​  ​methods, ​  ​and ​  ​think ​  ​that​  ​these  
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domains ​  ​of ​  ​inquiry ​  ​should​  ​be​  ​abandoned ​  ​as ​  ​a​  ​result​  ​(e.g. ​  ​Ladyman ​  ​and ​  ​Ross ​  ​2007).  
Reformist​  ​naturalists ​  ​often ​  ​argue​  ​that​  ​if ​  ​naturalistic ​  ​methods ​  ​are​  ​not​  ​appropriate ​  ​for ​  ​a  
domain ​  ​of ​  ​inquiry, ​  ​no​  ​set​  ​of ​  ​methods ​  ​will​  ​be​  ​(e.g. ​  ​Rosenberg ​  ​2014,​  ​Ladyman ​  ​and ​  ​Ross  
2007), ​  ​and ​  ​therefore​  ​that​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​something ​  ​dubious ​  ​about​  ​these​  ​domains ​  ​of ​  ​inquiry.  
Those​  ​who​  ​argue​  ​for ​  ​either ​  ​changes ​  ​of ​  ​philosophical​  ​method, ​  ​or ​  ​abandonment ​  ​of ​  ​areas  
of ​  ​philosophical​  ​inquiry ​  ​due​  ​to ​  ​a​  ​perceived ​  ​inapplicability ​  ​of ​  ​naturalistic ​  ​methods, ​  ​I ​  ​call  
reformist​  ​methodological​  ​naturalisms ​,​  ​due​  ​to ​  ​their ​  ​suggesting ​  ​that​  ​philosophy ​  ​is ​  ​in ​  ​need  
of ​  ​reform​  ​for ​  ​purportedly ​  ​naturalistic ​  ​methodological ​  ​reasons.  
  
Others ​   ​disagree​  ​that​  ​philosophical​  ​methods ​  ​need ​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​reformed ​  ​in ​  ​light​  ​of ​  ​naturalistic  
critiques, ​  ​yet​  ​still​  ​take​  ​the​  ​naturalistic ​  ​starting ​  ​point​  ​seriously ​  ​(e.g. ​  ​Papineau ​  ​2014,  
Williamson ​  ​2014). ​  ​​  ​Views​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​kind ​  ​I ​  ​call​  ​​vindicatory ​  ​methodological​  ​naturalisms ​.  
This ​  ​thesis ​  ​mostly ​  ​sides ​  ​with​  ​the​  ​vindicatory ​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalists, ​  ​in ​  ​that​  ​it​  ​makes  
no​  ​call​  ​for ​  ​wholesale​  ​methodological ​  ​overhauls, ​  ​nor ​  ​abandonment​  ​of ​  ​domains ​  ​of  
inquiry, ​  ​within ​  ​philosophical​  ​practice. ​  ​​  ​However, ​  ​neither ​  ​does ​  ​it​  ​write​  ​the​  ​philosopher ​  ​a  
blank ​  ​methodological ​  ​cheque. ​  ​​  ​Throughout​  ​the​  ​thesis ​  ​I ​  ​develop ​  ​some​  ​methodological  
heuristics, ​  ​and ​  ​these​  ​are​  ​presented ​  ​collectively ​  ​in ​  ​§5.3​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​thesis.  
  
In ​  ​chapter ​  ​three, ​  ​I ​  ​present​  ​and ​  ​critically ​  ​discuss ​  ​what​  ​I ​  ​take​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​the​  ​most​  ​common  
argument​  ​for ​  ​reformist​  ​naturalism, ​  ​which ​  ​often ​  ​points ​  ​to ​  ​a​  ​perceived ​  ​lack ​  ​of ​  ​progress ​  ​in  
philosophy, ​  ​when ​  ​compared ​  ​to ​  ​science. ​  ​​  ​For​  ​now,​  ​I ​  ​have​  ​sketched ​  ​various  
methodological ​  ​naturalisms:​  ​methods-­naturalism, ​  ​results-­naturalism, ​  ​reformist  
naturalism, ​  ​and ​  ​vindicatory ​  ​naturalism. ​  ​​  ​These​  ​distinctions ​  ​will​  ​be​  ​returned ​  ​to  
throughout​  ​the​  ​remainder ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​thesis, ​  ​as ​  ​I ​  ​motivate ​  ​aspirational ​  ​naturalism, ​  ​which  
involves ​  ​methods-­naturalism, ​  ​aspires ​  ​towards ​  ​results-­naturalism, ​  ​and ​  ​sides ​  ​mostly ​  ​with  
the​  ​vindicatory ​  ​naturalists ​  ​in ​  ​terms ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​appropriateness ​  ​of ​  ​philosophical​  ​practice ​  ​as ​  ​it  
stands.​  ​​  ​For​  ​the​  ​rest​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​chapter ​  ​I ​  ​sketch ​  ​some​  ​other ​  ​views, ​  ​​epistemological  
naturalism ​,​  ​and ​  ​​ontological​  ​naturalism ​,​  ​in ​  ​order ​  ​to ​  ​clarify ​  ​the​  ​discussions ​  ​of ​  ​my  
preferred ​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalism, ​  ​and ​  ​its ​  ​relationship ​  ​with​  ​these​  ​substantive  




§2.3​  ​Substantive​  ​naturalisms  
  
With ​  ​distinctions ​  ​within ​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalism​  ​in ​  ​place, ​  ​I ​  ​look ​  ​at​  ​two ​  ​other ​  ​kinds ​  ​of  
naturalism​  ​found ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​philosophical​  ​literature: ​  ​​ontological​​  ​and ​  ​​epistemological ​,​  ​and  
briefly ​  ​explore​  ​the​  ​relationships ​  ​they ​  ​each ​  ​have​  ​with​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalism​  ​and  





Ontological​  ​naturalisms ​  ​are​  ​substantive​  ​meta-­metaphysical ​  ​views, ​  ​drawing ​  ​inspiration  
from​  ​science. ​  ​​  ​Ontology ​  ​is ​  ​the​  ​study​  ​of ​  ​what​  ​there​  ​is, ​  ​or ​  ​more​  ​simply:​  ​existence. ​  ​​  ​To  
claim​  ​that​  ​birds ​  ​exist​  ​is ​  ​to ​  ​include​  ​birds ​  ​in ​  ​one’s ​  ​ontology. ​  ​​  ​There​  ​are​  ​a​  ​number ​  ​of  
nuanced ​  ​variations ​  ​of ​  ​ontological ​  ​naturalism​  ​that​  ​I ​  ​will​  ​discuss ​  ​here. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​begin ​  ​this  
section ​  ​with​  ​several​  ​pronouncements ​  ​of ​  ​what​  ​ontological ​  ​naturalism​  ​has ​  ​been ​  ​taken ​  ​to  
mean ​  ​by​  ​various ​  ​philosophers, ​  ​to ​  ​give​  ​a​  ​flavour ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​position, ​  ​before​  ​discussing​  ​some  
more​  ​specific​  ​views ​  ​throughout​  ​the​  ​remainder ​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​section:  
  
Ontological​  ​S[ubstantive] ​  ​naturalism​  ​is ​  ​the​  ​view ​  ​that​  ​there​  ​exist​  ​only ​  ​​natural​​  ​or  
physical​​  ​things.    
(Leiter ​  ​1998​  ​:​  ​80)  
  
I ​  ​define​  ​[naturalism] ​  ​as ​  ​the​  ​doctrine​  ​that​  ​reality ​  ​consists ​  ​of ​  ​nothing ​  ​but​  ​a​  ​single  
all-­embracing ​  ​spatio-­temporal ​  ​system.    
(Armstrong ​  ​1978​  ​:​  ​261)  
  
A ​  ​central ​  ​thought​  ​in ​  ​ontological ​  ​naturalism​  ​is ​  ​that​  ​all​  ​spatiotemporal ​  ​entities  
must​  ​be​  ​identical ​  ​to ​  ​or ​  ​metaphysically ​  ​constituted ​  ​by​  ​physical​  ​entities. ​  ​[...]  
They ​  ​hold ​  ​that​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​nothing ​  ​more​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​mental, ​  ​biological ​  ​and ​  ​social  
realms ​  ​than ​  ​arrangements ​  ​of ​  ​physical​  ​entities.  
(Papineau ​  ​2016,​  ​Winter ​  ​edition)  
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Naturalism​  ​is ​  ​the​  ​realist​  ​ontology ​  ​that​  ​recognizes ​  ​only ​  ​those​  ​objects ​  ​required ​  ​by  
the​  ​explanations ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​natural​  ​sciences.  
(Linsky ​  ​and ​  ​Zalta​  ​1995​  ​:​  ​1)  
  
  
Only ​  ​the​  ​entities ​  ​posited ​  ​by​  ​the​  ​sciences​  ​exist  
  
A ​  ​common ​  ​view ​  ​of ​  ​ontological ​  ​naturalism​  ​is ​  ​that​  ​ontology ​  ​can ​  ​be​  ​somehow ​  ​read ​  ​off ​  ​our  
best​  ​science. ​  ​​  ​If ​  ​one​  ​subscribed ​  ​to ​  ​such ​  ​a​  ​view, ​  ​one​  ​can ​  ​countenance ​  ​such ​  ​things ​  ​as  
quarks, ​  ​electrons, ​  ​waves, ​  ​and ​  ​fields, ​  ​via​  ​the​  ​ontology ​  ​of ​  ​physics. ​  ​​  ​Other ​  ​sciences  
provide​  ​their ​  ​own​  ​ontologies, ​  ​e.g. ​  ​chemistry ​  ​contains ​  ​chemical ​  ​elements, ​  ​biology  
contains ​  ​species ​  ​and ​  ​organisms, ​  ​mathematics ​  ​contains ​  ​sets​  ​and ​  ​categories. ​  ​​  ​Depending  
on​  ​which ​  ​sciences ​  ​the​  ​naturalist​  ​takes ​  ​ontologically ​  ​seriously, ​  ​different​  ​entities ​  ​may ​  ​be  
posited. ​  ​​  ​As ​  ​was​  ​the​  ​case ​  ​with​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalism, ​  ​some​  ​ontological ​  ​naturalisms  
argue​  ​that​  ​particular ​  ​sciences ​  ​are​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​favoured ​  ​when ​  ​it​  ​comes ​  ​to ​  ​claims ​  ​of ​  ​existence,  
often ​  ​placing ​  ​physics ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​box​  ​seat,​  ​perhaps ​  ​seeing ​  ​quarks, ​  ​or ​  ​strings,​  ​as ​  ​the  
fundamental ​  ​constituents ​  ​of ​  ​reality ​  ​(e.g. ​  ​Rosenberg ​  ​2014). ​  ​​   ​Less ​  ​austere​  ​ontological  
naturalisms ​  ​could ​  ​also ​  ​countenance ​  ​such ​  ​things ​  ​as ​  ​psychological​  ​illnesses, ​  ​debt​  ​crises,  
child ​  ​poverty, ​  ​and ​  ​global​  ​warming, ​  ​to ​  ​name​  ​only ​  ​a​  ​few ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​myriad ​  ​possibilities.  
  
  
E​ntities ​  ​that​  ​are​  ​required ​  ​to ​  ​make​  ​sense​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​sciences​  ​exist  
  
Some​  ​think ​  ​that​  ​there​  ​are​  ​existing ​  ​entities ​  ​beyond ​  ​the​  ​ones ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​have​  ​currently  
posited, ​  ​and ​  ​evidence ​  ​for ​  ​their ​  ​existence ​  ​is ​  ​connected ​  ​to ​  ​scientific ​  ​ontologies ​  ​in ​  ​some  
way. ​  ​​  ​Such ​  ​naturalists ​  ​might​  ​countenance ​  ​entities ​  ​that​  ​they ​  ​claim​  ​are​  ​either ​  ​necessary  
for, ​  ​assumptions ​  ​of, ​  ​consequences ​  ​of, ​  ​or ​  ​otherwise​  ​indispensable​  ​to, ​  ​the​  ​sciences.     
  
Linsky ​  ​and ​  ​Zalta​  ​express ​  ​such ​  ​a​  ​view:  
  
Naturalism​  ​is ​  ​the​  ​realist​  ​ontology ​  ​that​  ​recognizes ​  ​only ​  ​those​  ​objects ​  ​required ​  ​by  
the​  ​explanations ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​natural​  ​sciences. ​  ​But​  ​some​  ​abstract​  ​objects, ​  ​such ​  ​as  
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mathematical ​  ​objects ​  ​and ​  ​properties, ​  ​are​  ​required ​  ​for ​  ​the​  ​proper ​  ​philosophical  
account​  ​of ​  ​scientific ​  ​theories ​  ​and ​  ​scientific ​  ​laws.  
(Linsky ​  ​and ​  ​Zalta​  ​1995​  ​:​  ​1)  
  
Many ​  ​mathematical ​  ​realists, ​  ​those​  ​who​  ​consider ​  ​that​  ​mathematical ​  ​objects ​  ​exist, ​  ​do​  ​so  
based ​  ​on​  ​​indispensability ​  ​arguments ​​  ​(e.g. ​  ​​Quine​  ​(1976;;​  ​1980a;;​  ​1980b;;​  ​1981a;;​  ​1981b),  
Putnam,​  ​(1979a;;​  ​1979b)​,​  ​and ​  ​Colyvan ​  ​(1998, ​  ​2001)). ​  ​​  ​Evidence ​  ​is ​  ​provided ​  ​to ​  ​support  
positing ​  ​the​  ​existence ​  ​of ​  ​mathematical ​  ​objects ​  ​due​  ​to ​  ​claims ​  ​that​  ​mathematics ​  ​is  
indispensable​  ​to ​  ​science, ​  ​and ​  ​that​  ​a​  ​realist​  ​ontology ​  ​of ​  ​mathematics ​  ​underpins ​  ​this.  
There​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​variety ​  ​of ​  ​mathematical-­realist ​  ​positions, ​  ​ranging ​  ​from​  ​those​  ​of ​  ​Quine,  
Putnam, ​  ​and ​  ​Colyvan, ​  ​who​  ​posit​  ​mathematical ​  ​objects ​  ​as ​  ​abstracta, ​  ​to ​  ​those​  ​placing  
them​  ​in ​  ​space​  ​and ​  ​time​  ​(e.g. ​  ​Armstrong ​  ​1989,​  ​Bigelow ​  ​1988). ​  ​​  ​All​  ​of ​  ​these​  ​kinds ​  ​of  
mathematical ​  ​realism​  ​could ​  ​claim​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​endorsed ​  ​by​  ​ontological ​  ​naturalism​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​sense  
that​  ​their ​  ​ontologies ​  ​are​  ​purportedly ​  ​necessary ​  ​to ​  ​make​  ​sense​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​sciences.     
  
Instances ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​theoretically ​  ​based ​  ​positing ​  ​of ​  ​entities ​  ​occur ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​sciences, ​  ​very  
commonly ​  ​within ​  ​physics.​  ​​  ​The​  ​Higgs ​  ​Boson,​  ​initially ​  ​suggested ​  ​as ​  ​a​  ​consequence​  ​of  
the​  ​particle ​  ​physics ​  ​theory ​  ​in ​  ​1964​  ​(Higgs ​  ​1964), ​  ​is ​  ​an ​  ​example ​  ​of ​  ​physics ​  ​postulating  
the​  ​existence ​  ​of ​  ​an ​  ​entity, ​  ​which ​  ​at​  ​that​  ​stage​  ​was​  ​not​  ​amenable ​  ​to ​  ​empirical ​  ​enquiry,  
for ​  ​theoretical ​  ​reasons. ​  ​​  ​It​  ​was​  ​only ​  ​recently, ​  ​in ​  ​2012,​  ​that​  ​a​  ​series ​  ​of ​  ​experiments ​  ​have  
lent​  ​observational ​  ​evidence ​  ​for ​  ​the​  ​existence ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​Higgs ​  ​Boson​  ​(CMS ​  ​collaboration  
2012). ​  ​​  ​It​  ​was​  ​initially ​  ​postulated ​  ​due​  ​to ​  ​its ​  ​being ​  ​a​  ​theoretical ​  ​consequence​  ​of ​  ​some​  ​of  
our ​  ​best​  ​current​  ​science. ​  ​​  ​So,​  ​positing ​  ​the​  ​existence ​  ​of ​  ​theoretical ​  ​entities, ​  ​or ​  ​entities ​  ​that  
are​  ​not​  ​yet​  ​known​  ​by​  ​observation, ​  ​is ​  ​something ​  ​that​  ​happens ​  ​within ​  ​the​  ​sciences  
themselves, ​  ​and ​  ​is ​  ​not​  ​a​  ​special​  ​conjuring ​  ​trick ​  ​used ​  ​merely ​  ​by​  ​philosophers. ​  ​​  ​​  ​The  
positing ​  ​of ​  ​unobservables ​  ​does ​  ​not, ​  ​in ​  ​and ​  ​of ​  ​itself, ​  ​require​  ​non-­naturalistic ​  ​ontological  









Another ​  ​group ​  ​of ​  ​metaphysical ​  ​views ​  ​which ​  ​sometimes ​  ​claim​  ​support​  ​from​  ​naturalistic  
constraints ​  ​are​  ​labelled ​  ​nominalisms. ​  ​​  ​Nominalists, ​  ​as ​  ​opposed ​  ​to ​  ​realists, ​  ​hold ​  ​that​  ​the  
entities ​  ​for ​  ​which ​  ​they ​  ​are​  ​nominalists ​  ​about, ​  ​do​  ​not​  ​exist. ​  ​​  ​They ​  ​are​  ​often ​  ​called  
anti-­realists. ​  ​​  ​Oftentimes ​  ​such ​  ​views ​  ​involve​  ​arguing ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​entities ​  ​in ​  ​question ​  ​are  
unavailable ​  ​to ​  ​naturalistic ​  ​inquiry, ​  ​and ​  ​hence​  ​we​  ​should​  ​conclude​  ​that​  ​the​  ​entities ​  ​they  
posit​  ​do​  ​not​  ​exist.     
  
Whereas ​  ​the​  ​mathematical ​  ​realists ​  ​discussed ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​previous ​  ​section ​  ​argued ​  ​that​  ​the  
sciences ​  ​require​  ​an ​  ​ontology ​  ​of ​  ​mathematical ​  ​objects ​  ​for ​  ​a​  ​successful​  ​interpretation ​  ​of  
the​  ​sciences, ​  ​nominalists ​  ​about​  ​mathematical ​  ​objects ​  ​argue​  ​that​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​do​  ​not  
require​  ​such ​  ​ontologies. ​  ​​  ​Hartry ​  ​Field​  ​(2016) ​  ​argues ​  ​for ​  ​nominalism​  ​about​  ​mathematical  
objects, ​  ​demonstrating ​  ​that​  ​a​  ​small​  ​part​  ​of ​  ​physical​  ​theory ​  ​can ​  ​be​  ​interpreted ​  ​without​  ​an  
assumption ​  ​of ​  ​mathematical ​  ​objects ​  ​such ​  ​as ​  ​sets,​  ​or ​  ​categories. ​  ​​  ​It​  ​is ​  ​not​  ​my ​  ​intention  
here​  ​to ​  ​adjudicate ​  ​between ​  ​realists ​  ​and ​  ​anti-­realists ​  ​in ​  ​any ​  ​of ​  ​these​  ​debates, ​  ​but​  ​it​  ​is  
important​  ​to ​  ​note​  ​that​  ​both ​  ​can ​  ​claim​  ​to ​  ​align ​  ​their ​  ​ontologies ​  ​with​  ​findings ​  ​from  
science, ​  ​and ​  ​hence​  ​have​  ​some​  ​endorsement​  ​for ​  ​their ​  ​views ​  ​via​  ​naturalistic ​  ​concerns.  
Nominalists ​  ​and ​  ​realists ​  ​might​  ​agree​  ​on​  ​some​  ​indispensability ​  ​of ​  ​mathematics ​  ​thesis,  




Scientifically ​  ​informed ​  ​constraints ​  ​on ​  ​ontology  
  
David ​  ​Armstrong ​  ​endorses ​  ​a​  ​kind ​  ​of ​  ​ontological ​  ​naturalism​  ​based ​  ​on​  ​spatio-­temporality,  
arguing ​  ​that​  ​everything ​  ​that​  ​exists, ​  ​does ​  ​so​  ​in ​  ​space​  ​and ​  ​time​  ​(1978 ​  ​:​  ​261). ​  ​​  ​He​  ​claims ​  ​to  
draw ​  ​inspiration ​  ​from​  ​science​  ​for ​  ​this ​  ​view, ​  ​arguing ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​are​  ​only  
concerned ​  ​with​  ​entities ​  ​that​  ​exist​  ​in ​  ​space​  ​and ​  ​time, ​  ​and ​  ​that​  ​philosophers ​  ​should​  ​adopt  
the​  ​same​  ​constraints ​  ​for ​  ​positing ​  ​their ​  ​ontologies. ​  ​​  ​For​  ​these​  ​reasons, ​  ​he​  ​disagrees ​  ​with  
the​  ​naturalist-­mathematical-­platonists ​  ​discussed ​  ​above, ​  ​due​  ​to ​  ​their ​  ​positing ​  ​of ​  ​abstract  
entities ​  ​supposedly​  ​floating ​  ​free​  ​from​  ​the​  ​spatio-­temporal ​  ​world.  
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One​  ​peculiarity ​  ​of ​  ​Armstrong’s ​  ​view, ​  ​is ​  ​that​  ​he​  ​doesn’t​  ​have​  ​many ​  ​other ​  ​scientifically  
informed ​  ​constraints ​  ​on​  ​the​  ​types ​  ​of ​  ​entities ​  ​that​  ​he​  ​can ​  ​posit, ​  ​apart​  ​from  
spatio-­temporality. ​  ​​  ​For​  ​example, ​  ​as ​  ​a​  ​proposed ​  ​solution ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​problem​  ​of ​  ​universals ​  ​in  
metaphysics, ​  ​Armstrong ​  ​posits ​  ​immanent ​  ​universals, ​  ​existing ​  ​as ​  ​non-­spatio ​  ​temporal  
parts ​  ​of ​  ​objects, ​  ​yet​  ​still​  ​existing ​  ​within ​  ​space​  ​and ​  ​time​  ​(1989). ​  ​​  ​Whilst​  ​intuitively,  
immanent ​  ​universals ​  ​such ​  ​as ​  ​these​  ​seem​  ​atypical ​  ​kinds ​  ​of ​  ​things ​  ​to ​  ​study​  ​using​  ​typically  
scientific ​  ​methods, ​  ​they ​  ​meet​  ​his ​  ​spatio-­temporal ​  ​constraints, ​  ​and ​  ​he​  ​claims ​  ​the  
constraint​  ​is ​  ​justified ​  ​by​  ​science. ​  ​​   ​This ​  ​seems​  ​tricky ​  ​at​  ​best. ​  ​​  ​These​  ​entities ​  ​meet  
Armstrong’s ​  ​condition ​  ​because​  ​they ​  ​exist​  ​in ​  ​space​  ​and ​  ​time​  ​just​  ​in ​  ​virtue​  ​of ​  ​being  
non-­spatio-­temporal ​  ​parts ​  ​of ​  ​entities ​  ​that​  ​do​  ​( ​really​​  ​do,​  ​one​  ​is ​  ​tempted ​  ​to ​  ​say) ​  ​exist​  ​in  
space​  ​and ​  ​time.  
  
Leaving ​  ​these​  ​specific​  ​details ​  ​of ​  ​Armstrong’s ​  ​ontologies ​  ​aside, ​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​further  
problem​  ​with​  ​his ​  ​overall​  ​spatio-­temporality ​  ​constraint. ​  ​​  ​Despite​  ​claiming ​  ​to ​  ​draw ​  ​this  
ontological ​  ​constraint​  ​from​  ​the​  ​sciences, ​  ​it​  ​doesn’t​  ​seem​  ​in ​  ​keeping ​  ​with​  ​contemporary  
scientific ​  ​views, ​  ​as ​  ​Ladyman ​  ​and ​  ​Ross ​  ​point​  ​out:     
  
[C]ontemporary ​  ​physics ​  ​takes ​  ​very ​  ​seriously ​  ​the​  ​idea​  ​that​  ​spacetime ​  ​itself ​  ​is  
emergent ​  ​from​  ​some​  ​more​  ​fundamental ​  ​structure.  
(Ladyman ​  ​and ​  ​Ross ​  ​2007​  ​:​  ​23)  
  
  
Ladyman ​  ​and ​  ​Ross’s ​  ​point​  ​is ​  ​that​  ​this ​  ​fundamental ​  ​structure​  ​therefore​  ​cannot​  ​itself ​  ​exist  
in ​  ​space​  ​or ​  ​time, ​  ​and ​  ​so​  ​does ​  ​not​  ​meet​  ​Armstrong’s ​  ​condition. ​  ​​  ​On​  ​the​  ​basis ​  ​of ​  ​this  
consideration, ​  ​Armstrong’s ​  ​view ​  ​is ​  ​not​  ​a​  ​plausible​  ​view ​  ​of ​  ​ontological ​  ​naturalism​  ​as ​  ​it  
seems​  ​to ​  ​have​  ​adopted ​  ​​a​  ​priori​​  ​constraints ​  ​on​  ​ontology ​  ​that​  ​are​  ​at​  ​conflict​  ​with  
currently ​  ​accepted ​  ​science, ​  ​or ​  ​at​  ​least ​  ​with​  ​what​  ​current​  ​science​  ​“takes ​  ​very ​  ​seriously”  
(Ladyman ​  ​and ​  ​Ross ​  ​2007​  ​:​  ​23). ​  ​​  ​Such​  ​a​  ​view ​  ​is ​  ​not​  ​justifiable ​  ​from​  ​the​  ​naturalistic  
starting ​  ​point.  
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Suppose​  ​however, ​  ​there​  ​were​  ​some​  ​constraints ​  ​that​  ​science​   ​did ​  ​support​  ​about​  ​existence.  
Were​  ​that​  ​the​  ​case, ​  ​an ​  ​ontological ​  ​naturalist​  ​could ​  ​limit​  ​their ​  ​domain ​  ​of ​  ​ontology  
accordingly.  
  
An​  ​example ​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​occurs ​  ​within ​  ​David ​  ​Lewis’ ​  ​(1986a) ​  ​arguments ​  ​against​  ​Armstrong’s  
structural​  ​universals ​.​  ​​  ​Lewis ​  ​points ​  ​out​  ​that​  ​consequences ​  ​of ​  ​David ​  ​Armstrong’s ​  ​views  
entail​  ​that​  ​the​  ​properties ​  ​of ​  ​‘being ​  ​Methane’ ​  ​and ​  ​‘being ​  ​Butane’ ​  ​are​  ​identical ​  ​on  
Armstrong’s ​  ​account. ​  ​​  ​Whatever ​  ​one’s ​  ​metaphysics ​  ​of ​  ​properties ​  ​is, ​  ​it​  ​should​  ​be​  ​able​  ​to  
account​  ​for ​  ​differences ​  ​in ​  ​properties ​  ​that​  ​are​  ​detectable ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​sciences. ​  ​​  ​Chemists ​  ​can  
discern ​  ​the​  ​difference ​  ​between ​  ​what​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​methane ​  ​and ​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​butane​  ​-­ ​  ​they ​  ​are  
different​  ​chemical ​  ​properties. ​  ​​  ​On​  ​those​  ​grounds,​  ​David ​  ​Armstrong’s ​  ​view ​  ​is ​  ​dismissed  
by​  ​Lewis. ​  ​​  ​Properties ​  ​are​  ​supposed​  ​to ​  ​explain ​  ​resemblance ​  ​between ​  ​various ​  ​entities. ​  ​​  ​If  
Armstrong’s ​  ​view ​  ​cannot​  ​explain ​  ​what​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​that​  ​makes ​  ​different​  ​molecules ​  ​of ​  ​butane  
resemble​  ​each ​  ​other ​  ​in ​  ​a​  ​way​  ​that​  ​differentiates ​  ​butane​  ​from​  ​methane, ​  ​it​  ​cannot​  ​be​  ​a  





Supervenience ​  ​of ​  ​properties ​  ​describes ​  ​a​  ​necessary ​  ​relation ​  ​between ​  ​two ​  ​sets​  ​of  
properties, ​  ​whereby ​  ​there​  ​​cannot​​  ​be​  ​a​  ​difference ​  ​in ​  ​one​  ​set,​  ​without​  ​there​  ​being ​  ​a  
difference ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​other. ​  ​​  ​There​  ​seems​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​a​  ​supervenience ​  ​relation ​  ​between ​  ​the​  ​amount  
of ​  ​beer ​  ​I ​  ​consume, ​  ​and ​  ​my ​  ​body​  ​mass, ​  ​for ​  ​instance.     
  
Supervenience ​  ​naturalism ​​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​kind ​  ​of ​  ​ontological ​  ​naturalism. ​  ​​  ​It​  ​requires ​  ​of ​  ​its ​  ​ontology  
that​  ​it​  ​commit​  ​only ​  ​to ​  ​entities ​  ​that​  ​supervene​  ​upon​  ​the​  ​natural​  ​world, ​  ​the​  ​area​  ​which ​  ​the  
naturalist​  ​claims ​  ​is ​  ​best​  ​explored ​  ​by​  ​science. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​will​  ​illustrate ​  ​the​  ​idea​  ​using​  ​a​  ​view ​  ​of  
David ​  ​Lewis’s, ​  ​inspired ​  ​by​  ​a​  ​framework ​  ​of ​  ​Hume’s, ​  ​which ​  ​he​  ​calls ​  ​​Humean  
supervenience ​​  ​(1986b ​  ​;;​  ​1994). ​  ​​  ​Lewis ​  ​presents ​  ​his ​  ​view ​  ​as ​  ​follows:     
  
[A]ll​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​world ​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​vast​  ​mosaic​  ​of ​  ​local​  ​matters ​  ​of ​  ​particular ​  ​fact, ​  ​all  
else ​  ​supervenes ​  ​on​  ​that.  
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(1986b, ​  ​​ix-­x​)  
  
Presumably, ​  ​Lewis ​  ​takes ​  ​“local ​  ​matters ​  ​of ​  ​particular ​  ​fact”​  ​to ​  ​mean ​  ​something ​  ​like  
synthetic​  ​facts, ​  ​i.e. ​  ​facts ​  ​about​  ​the​  ​world, ​  ​the​  ​kinds ​  ​of ​  ​things ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​sciences  
investigate ​  ​and ​  ​have​  ​generated ​  ​knowledge​  ​about. ​  ​​  ​Lewis’s ​  ​idea​  ​is ​  ​that​  ​necessarily,  
there’s ​  ​no​  ​difference ​  ​of ​  ​any ​  ​other ​  ​entity ​  ​without​  ​some​  ​difference ​  ​of ​  ​‘local​  ​mosaic’  
entity.  
  
So,​  ​for ​  ​a​  ​supervenience ​  ​naturalist, ​  ​the​  ​entities ​  ​that​  ​are​  ​posited ​  ​do​  ​not​  ​have​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​directly  
amenable ​  ​to ​  ​scientific ​  ​inquiry ​  ​​per ​  ​se​,​  ​it​  ​merely ​  ​has ​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​argued ​  ​that​  ​they ​  ​supervene  
upon​  ​the​  ​kinds ​  ​of ​  ​things ​  ​that​  ​are​  ​amenable ​  ​to ​  ​scientific ​  ​inquiry.     
  
  
Reduction ​  ​naturalism  
  
Reduction ​  ​naturalists ​  ​are​  ​a​  ​particular ​  ​kind ​  ​of ​  ​supervenience ​  ​naturalist, ​  ​who​  ​claim​  ​that​  ​all  
entities ​  ​in ​  ​their ​  ​ontologies ​  ​can ​  ​be​  ​reduced ​  ​to ​  ​something ​  ​natural. ​​  ​​  ​Reduction ​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​kind ​  ​of  
supervenience ​  ​relation, ​  ​whereby ​  ​one​  ​set​  ​of ​  ​properties ​  ​is ​  ​reduced ​  ​to ​  ​some​  ​other ​  ​set​  ​of  
properties. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​bare​  ​minimum​  ​for ​  ​a​  ​supervenience ​  ​claim​  ​is ​  ​that​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​difference ​  ​in  
the​  ​supervening ​  ​set​  ​of ​  ​properties ​  ​only ​  ​if ​  ​there’s ​  ​a​  ​difference ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​base​  ​set​  ​of  
properties. ​  ​​  ​Identity ​  ​is ​  ​one​  ​kind ​  ​of ​  ​reduction. ​  ​​  ​If ​  ​we​  ​hold ​  ​a​  ​reductionist​  ​view ​  ​towards  
two ​  ​groups ​  ​of ​  ​properties ​  ​A ​  ​and ​  ​B,​  ​suggesting ​  ​that​  ​A ​  ​and ​  ​B​  ​are​  ​identical, ​  ​or ​  ​that​  ​B​  ​is  
somehow ​  ​composed ​  ​of ​  ​or ​  ​otherwise​  ​reduced ​  ​to ​  ​A,​  ​a​  ​change​  ​in ​  ​A ​  ​would​  ​necessarily  
entail​  ​a​  ​change​  ​in ​  ​B,​  ​and ​  ​​vice-­versa ​.​  ​​  ​In ​  ​the​  ​philosophy ​  ​of ​  ​mind ​  ​literature, ​  ​there​  ​are  
various ​  ​views ​  ​that​  ​argue​  ​for ​  ​the​  ​mind ​  ​supervening ​  ​on​  ​the​  ​natural​  ​world. ​  ​​  ​An​  ​instance​  ​of  
this ​  ​view ​  ​is ​  ​the​  ​mind-­brain ​  ​identity ​  ​theory ​  ​(see​  ​Smart​  ​2017), ​  ​which ​  ​holds ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​mind  
and ​  ​the​  ​brain ​  ​are​  ​one​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​same.​  ​​  ​Thus,​  ​the​  ​mind ​  ​is ​  ​reduced ​  ​to ​  ​something ​  ​amenable  
to ​  ​the​  ​sciences, ​  ​i.e. ​  ​the​  ​brain. ​  ​​  ​Eliminativist ​  ​reductionists ​  ​(e.g. ​  ​Chuchland ​  ​1981) ​  ​argue  
that​  ​such ​  ​an ​  ​identity ​  ​relation ​  ​is ​  ​somehow ​  ​asymmetrical, ​  ​in ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​mind ​  ​is ​  ​​really​​  ​some  





Ontological​  ​reduction ​  ​and ​  ​explanatory ​  ​reduction  
  
An​  ​important​  ​distinction ​  ​that​  ​helps ​  ​to ​  ​clarify ​  ​some​  ​of ​  ​these​  ​reductionist​  ​views ​  ​is ​  ​that  
between ​  ​​ontological​  ​reduction ​​  ​and ​  ​​explanatory​  ​reduction ​.  
  
Reductionists ​  ​about​  ​ontology ​  ​make​  ​claims ​  ​about​  ​existence, ​  ​reducing ​  ​a​  ​phenomenon  
such ​  ​as ​  ​‘the​  ​mind’ ​  ​to ​  ​some​  ​more​  ​fundamental ​  ​entity, ​  ​such ​  ​as ​  ​‘the​  ​brain’, ​  ​for ​  ​instance.     
One​  ​might​  ​be​  ​an ​  ​ontological ​  ​reductionist, ​  ​but​  ​that​  ​does ​  ​not​  ​entail​  ​a​  ​commitment ​  ​to ​  ​one’s  
also ​  ​being ​  ​an ​  ​explanatory ​  ​reductionist. ​  ​​  ​Explanatory ​  ​reductionists ​  ​think ​  ​that​  ​not​  ​only ​  ​is  
a​  ​particular ​  ​phenomenon ​  ​reducible ​  ​in ​  ​an ​  ​ontological ​  ​sense​  ​to ​  ​some​  ​natural​  ​entity, ​  ​but  
that​  ​an ​  ​explanation ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​more​  ​basic​  ​item​  ​which ​  ​the​  ​phenomenon ​  ​can ​  ​purportedly ​  ​be  
reduced ​  ​to, ​  ​also ​  ​provides ​  ​an ​  ​adequate ​  ​(often, ​  ​better) ​  ​explanation ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​particular  
phenomenon ​  ​itself. ​  ​​  ​Eliminative ​  ​materialists, ​  ​such ​  ​as ​  ​Paul​  ​Churchland ​  ​(1981), ​  ​argue  
that​  ​we​  ​should​  ​eliminate ​  ​explanations ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​mind ​  ​(e.g. ​  ​psychology), ​  ​and ​  ​that​  ​the  
neurosciences ​  ​will​  ​provide​  ​adequate ​  ​and ​  ​exclusive​  ​descriptions ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​phenomena​  ​that  
theories ​  ​of ​  ​mind ​  ​have​  ​entertained .  9
  
To ​  ​explain ​  ​how ​  ​one​  ​might​  ​be​  ​an ​  ​ontological ​  ​reductionist, ​  ​but​  ​not​  ​an ​  ​explanatory  
reductionist, ​  ​I ​  ​will​  ​illustrate ​  ​with​  ​an ​  ​example ​  ​from​  ​economics. ​  ​​  ​Within ​  ​economics,  
explanations ​  ​are​  ​given ​  ​for ​  ​things ​  ​such ​  ​as ​  ​a​  ​​financial​  ​crisis ​.​  ​​  ​Whilst​  ​one​  ​might​  ​agree​  ​that  
all​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​world ​  ​-­ ​  ​ontologically ​  ​speaking ​  ​-­ ​  ​is ​  ​combinations ​  ​of ​  ​quarks ​  ​and  
electrons ​  ​(or ​  ​probably ​  ​something ​  ​more​  ​fundamental ​  ​still,​  ​perhaps ​  ​parts ​  ​or ​  ​strings ​  ​-­ ​  ​or  
whatever ​  ​the​  ​ontology ​  ​some​  ​future​  ​fundamental ​  ​physics ​  ​provides ​  ​us ​  ​with), ​  ​they ​  ​may ​  ​not  
agree​  ​that​  ​a​  ​description ​  ​or ​  ​explanation ​  ​of ​  ​these​  ​fundamental ​  ​entities ​  ​will​  ​adequately  
explain ​  ​phenomena​  ​such ​  ​as ​  ​financial ​  ​crises. ​  ​​  ​It​  ​seems​  ​obvious,​  ​at​  ​least ​  ​presently, ​  ​that​  ​a  
quantum​  ​mechanical ​  ​theory ​  ​could ​  ​not​  ​provide​  ​an ​  ​explanation ​  ​of ​  ​a​  ​financial ​  ​crisis ​  ​in ​  ​a  
way​  ​that​  ​is ​  ​superior ​  ​to ​  ​economics.  
9​  ​Sometimes ​  ​I​  ​wonder​  ​whether​  ​Paul​  ​or​  ​Mary​  ​Churchland​  ​tell​  ​the​  ​other​  ​they​  ​love​  ​them,​  ​given​  ​that​  ​love​  ​is ​  ​a  
folk​  ​psychological​  ​concept​  ​that​  ​they​  ​think​  ​doesn’t​  ​really​  ​refer.​  ​​  ​Elimination​  ​of​  ​entities ​  ​is ​  ​one​  ​thing.  
Elimination​  ​of​  ​the​  ​associated​  ​self-­indulgence​  ​is ​  ​another.  
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One​  ​could ​  ​provide​  ​a​  ​complete ​  ​physical​  ​description, ​  ​by​  ​pointing ​  ​out​  ​that​  ​a​  ​financial  
crisis ​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​conjunction ​  ​of ​  ​physical​  ​things:​  ​people​  ​(biological ​  ​individuals) ​  ​and ​  ​their  
psychological​  ​states​  ​(brain ​  ​states), ​  ​economic ​  ​policy ​  ​(pieces ​  ​of ​  ​paper, ​  ​ink, ​  ​computers)  
implemented ​  ​by​  ​way​  ​of ​  ​democratic ​  ​process ​  ​(utterances ​  ​(sound-­waves) ​  ​of ​  ​people​  ​and  
their ​  ​physical​  ​movements, ​  ​more​  ​paper, ​  ​more​  ​ink, ​  ​computers), ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​psychological  
states​  ​(brain ​  ​states)​  ​and ​  ​physical​  ​behaviours ​  ​of ​  ​financial ​  ​institutions ​  ​(physically  
constituted ​  ​by​  ​groups ​  ​of ​  ​people, ​  ​buildings ​  ​made​  ​of ​  ​various ​  ​matter, ​  ​money ​  ​(pieces ​  ​of  
paper, ​   ​and ​  ​metal), ​  ​utterances ​  ​(more​  ​sound​  ​waves), ​  ​and ​  ​behaviours ​  ​of ​  ​groups ​  ​of ​  ​people  
(physical​  ​motions ​  ​of ​  ​individuals, ​  ​more​  ​soundwaves).​  ​​  ​An​  ​ontological ​  ​reductionist​  ​could  
attempt ​  ​to ​  ​reduce​  ​the​  ​various ​  ​entities ​  ​that​  ​I ​  ​included ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​parenthesis ​  ​to ​  ​those​  ​posited  
by​  ​a​  ​quantum​  ​mechanical ​  ​theory, ​  ​describing ​  ​the​  ​entirety ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​constituents ​  ​of ​  ​a  
financial ​  ​crisis ​  ​in ​  ​this ​  ​way, ​  ​but​  ​refuse​  ​to ​  ​countenance ​  ​that​  ​a​  ​financial ​  ​crisis ​  ​could ​  ​be  
explanatorily ​  ​​reduced ​  ​via​  ​a​  ​quantum​  ​mechanical ​  ​definition ​  ​of ​  ​its ​  ​physical​  ​constituents.  
I ​  ​suggest​  ​that​  ​the​  ​following ​  ​beginnings ​  ​of ​  ​a​  ​definition ​  ​of ​  ​a​  ​financial ​  ​crisis, ​  ​serve​  ​pretty  
well​  ​as ​  ​an ​  ​explanation ​  ​of ​  ​a​  ​debt​  ​crisis, ​  ​without​  ​warranting ​  ​explanatory ​  ​reduction ​  ​to  
quantum​  ​mechanics.   10
  
We​  ​begin ​  ​by​  ​developing ​  ​working ​  ​definitions ​  ​of ​  ​what​   ​constitutes ​  ​a​  ​financial ​  ​crisis,  
as ​  ​well​  ​as ​  ​the​  ​methods—[...] ​  ​the​  ​boundaries ​  ​drawn ​  ​are​  ​generally ​  ​consistent​  ​with  
the​  ​existing ​  ​empirical ​  ​economics ​  ​literature, ​  ​which ​  ​by​  ​and ​  ​large​  ​is ​  ​segmented  
across ​  ​the​  ​various ​  ​types ​  ​of ​  ​crises ​  ​considered ​  ​(e.g., ​  ​sovereign ​  ​debt, ​  ​exchange​  ​rate,  
etc.). ​  ​Two ​  ​approaches ​  ​are​  ​used ​  ​to ​  ​identify ​  ​crisis ​  ​episodes. ​  ​One, ​  ​which ​  ​can ​  ​be  
applied ​  ​to ​  ​inflation ​  ​and ​  ​exchange​  ​rates ​  ​crises, ​  ​is ​  ​quantitative ​  ​in ​  ​nature, ​  ​while​  ​the  
other, ​  ​which ​  ​we​  ​apply ​  ​to ​  ​debt​  ​and ​  ​banking ​  ​crises, ​  ​is ​  ​based ​  ​on​  ​a​  ​chronology ​  ​of  
events.    
(Reinhart​  ​and ​  ​Rogoff ​  ​:​  ​1677-­8)  
  
10 ​  ​​One​  ​might​  ​rightly​  ​insist​  ​that​  ​economics ​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​science,​  ​and​  ​that​  ​as ​  ​such​  ​this ​  ​is ​  ​already​  ​explanatorily  
naturalistic.​  ​​  ​However,​  ​my​  ​intention​  ​was ​  ​merely​  ​to​  ​show ​  ​the​  ​distinction​  ​between​  ​explanatory​  ​and  
ontological​  ​reduction,​  ​and​  ​my​  ​example​  ​succeeds ​  ​in​  ​illustrating​  ​this ​  ​distinction.  
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Views​  ​about​  ​explanatory ​  ​reduction ​  ​are​  ​not​  ​ontological ​  ​views, ​  ​they ​  ​are​  ​epistemological  
views. ​  ​​  ​This ​  ​distinction ​  ​is ​  ​discussed ​  ​here​  ​in ​  ​order ​  ​to ​  ​clarify ​  ​what​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​that​  ​ontological  
reduction ​  ​involves, ​  ​and ​  ​what​  ​it​  ​does ​  ​not.  
  
  
Structural​  ​realism    
  
In ​  ​this ​  ​section ​  ​I ​  ​discuss ​  ​a​  ​group ​  ​of ​  ​views ​  ​that​  ​could ​  ​be​  ​described ​  ​as ​  ​​structural​  ​realisms ​.  
The​  ​locus ​  ​classicus ​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​view ​  ​is ​  ​found ​  ​in ​  ​John​  ​Worrall’s ​  ​‘Structural​  ​Realism:​  ​the​  ​best  
of ​  ​both ​  ​worlds?’ ​  ​(1989). ​  ​​  ​Worrall​  ​argues ​  ​that​  ​his ​  ​position ​  ​can ​  ​accommodate ​  ​the​  ​best  
arguments ​  ​for ​  ​and ​  ​against​  ​traditional ​  ​forms ​  ​of ​  ​scientific ​  ​realism. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​two ​  ​arguments ​  ​in  
question ​  ​are​  ​Larry ​  ​Laudan’s ​  ​pessimistic​  ​meta-­induction, ​  ​an ​  ​argument​  ​for ​  ​scientific  
anti-­realism ​  ​(see​  ​Laudan ​  ​1981), ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​no-­miracles ​  ​argument​  ​for ​  ​scientific ​  ​realism​  ​(see  
Putnam​  ​1975,​  ​and ​  ​Musgrave​  ​1988).     
  
Laudan’s ​  ​(1981) ​  ​argument​  ​draws ​  ​upon​  ​instances ​  ​of ​  ​theory-­change ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​sciences. ​  ​​  ​He  
argues ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​history ​  ​of ​  ​science​  ​shows ​  ​us ​  ​that​  ​we​  ​often ​  ​overturn ​  ​widely ​  ​accepted  
scientific ​  ​views, ​  ​and ​  ​replace ​  ​them​  ​with​  ​new ​  ​ones. ​  ​​  ​Examples ​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​can ​  ​be​  ​found ​  ​via  
the​  ​various ​  ​scientific ​  ​revolutions, ​   ​including ​  ​the​  ​Copernican ​  ​revolution, ​  ​involving ​  ​the  
shift​  ​in ​  ​acceptance ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​Ptolemaic ​  ​geocentric ​  ​model​  ​of ​  ​astronomy ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​Copernican  
heliocentric ​  ​model, ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​chemical ​  ​revolution, ​  ​which ​  ​involved ​  ​a​  ​shift​  ​of ​  ​acceptance ​  ​of  
the​  ​phlogiston ​  ​theory ​  ​of ​  ​combustion, ​  ​to ​  ​Lavoisier’s ​  ​oxygen ​  ​theory ​  ​of ​  ​combustion,  
widely ​  ​regarded ​  ​as ​  ​being ​  ​the​  ​beginnings ​  ​of ​  ​modern ​  ​chemistry.     
  
Laudan ​  ​argues ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​overturning ​  ​of ​  ​previously ​  ​accepted ​  ​scientific ​  ​theories ​  ​is ​  ​rife  
throughout​  ​the​  ​history ​  ​of ​  ​science, ​  ​and ​  ​by​  ​induction, ​  ​that​  ​we​  ​should​  ​expect​  ​this ​  ​process  
to ​  ​continue. ​  ​​  ​He​  ​argues ​  ​that​  ​this ​  ​provides ​  ​observational ​  ​evidence ​  ​that​  ​our ​  ​current  
scientific ​  ​theories ​  ​are​  ​quite​  ​likely ​  ​false, ​  ​and ​  ​that​  ​future​  ​ones ​  ​will​  ​likely ​  ​be​  ​also. ​  ​​  ​Thus,  
the​  ​pessimistic​  ​meta-­induction ​  ​is ​  ​the​  ​view ​  ​that​  ​we​  ​ought​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​pessimistic​  ​with​  ​regards  
to ​  ​our ​  ​prospects ​  ​of ​  ​science​  ​obtaining ​  ​truths, ​  ​or ​  ​converging ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​truth. ​  ​​  ​As ​  ​such, ​  ​we  
ought​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​sceptical ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​posits ​  ​of ​  ​ontologies ​  ​of ​  ​scientific ​  ​theories, ​  ​such ​  ​as ​  ​electrons,  
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or ​  ​oxygen, ​  ​as ​  ​we​  ​will​  ​likely ​  ​find ​  ​the​  ​theories ​  ​in ​  ​which ​  ​these​  ​ontologies ​  ​are​  ​embedded  
within ​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​false.  
  
The​  ​no-­miracles ​  ​argument​  ​for ​  ​scientific ​  ​realism​  ​suggests ​  ​that​  ​as ​  ​our ​  ​scientific ​  ​theories  
have​  ​generated ​  ​such ​  ​a​  ​high ​  ​degree​  ​of ​  ​predictive ​  ​success, ​  ​it​  ​would​  ​be​  ​a​  ​miracle ​  ​if ​  ​none  
of ​  ​them​  ​genuinely ​  ​referred ​  ​to ​  ​entities ​  ​to ​  ​which ​  ​those​  ​theories ​  ​are​  ​committed. ​  ​​  ​Given ​  ​the  
predictive ​  ​success ​  ​of ​  ​physics,​  ​proponents ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​no-­miracles ​  ​argument​  ​might​  ​argue​  ​that  
it​  ​would​  ​be​  ​a​  ​miracle ​  ​if ​  ​there​  ​were​  ​no​  ​such ​  ​things ​  ​as ​  ​electrons, ​  ​say. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​entities ​  ​that​  ​a  
proponent​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​no-­miracles ​  ​argument​  ​is ​  ​committed ​  ​to ​  ​is ​  ​somewhat​  ​up​  ​for ​  ​grabs. ​  ​​  ​A  
useful​  ​discussion​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​argument, ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​issue​  ​of ​  ​which ​  ​ontologies ​  ​one​  ​might​  ​be​  ​a  
realist​  ​about​  ​is ​  ​found ​  ​in ​  ​Musgrave​  ​(1992), ​  ​but​  ​for ​  ​now ​  ​I ​  ​will​  ​present​  ​the​  ​structural  
realist​  ​view ​  ​in ​  ​sketch ​  ​form.  
  
John​  ​Worrall​  ​draws ​  ​upon​  ​instances ​  ​of ​  ​theory ​  ​change​  ​in ​  ​science, ​  ​and ​  ​argues ​  ​that​  ​even  
during ​  ​radical ​  ​scientific ​  ​theory ​  ​change, ​  ​structural​  ​features ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​theories ​  ​can ​  ​stay​  ​intact.  
For​  ​instance, ​  ​when ​  ​the​  ​chemical ​  ​revolution ​  ​took ​  ​place, ​  ​what​  ​Lavoisier ​  ​proposed ​  ​as  
oxygen, ​  ​might​  ​be​  ​considered ​  ​structurally ​  ​analogous ​  ​to ​  ​what​  ​Priestly, ​  ​a​  ​proponent​  ​of ​  ​the  
superseded ​  ​phlogiston ​  ​theory, ​  ​had ​  ​called ​  ​dephlogistonated ​  ​air.  
  
Worrall​  ​agrees ​  ​with​  ​Laudan, ​  ​that​  ​science​  ​will​  ​likely ​  ​continue​  ​to ​  ​experience ​  ​theory  
change, ​  ​and ​  ​that​  ​we​  ​are​  ​right​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​pessimistic​  ​about​  ​the​  ​various ​  ​entities ​  ​that​  ​our  
currently ​  ​accepted ​  ​theories ​  ​commit​  ​us ​  ​to. ​  ​​  ​However, ​  ​he​  ​also ​  ​agrees ​  ​with​  ​the​  ​no-­miracles  
argument, ​  ​at​  ​least ​  ​in ​  ​terms ​  ​of ​  ​claiming ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​predictive ​  ​success ​  ​of ​  ​our ​  ​theories,  
combined ​  ​with​  ​the​  ​shared ​  ​structure​  ​that​  ​can ​  ​be​  ​found ​  ​between ​  ​accepted ​  ​and ​  ​overturned  
scientific ​  ​theories, ​  ​means ​  ​it​  ​would​  ​be​  ​a​  ​miracle ​  ​if ​  ​our ​  ​theories ​  ​hadn’t​  ​uncovered ​  ​truths  
about​  ​the​  ​​structure​​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​natural​  ​world. ​  ​​  ​He​  ​thus ​  ​thinks ​  ​that​  ​we​  ​ought​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​realists ​  ​with  
regards ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​structure​  ​represented ​  ​by​  ​some​  ​scientific ​  ​theories. ​  ​​  ​Contemporary ​  ​defences  
of ​  ​structural​  ​realism​  ​include​  ​Ladyman ​  ​and ​  ​Ross’s ​  ​​Ontic-­Structural​  ​Realism ​​  ​(2007). ​  ​​  ​A  
relevantly ​  ​similar​  ​view ​  ​is ​  ​Daniel​  ​Dennett’s ​  ​​Real​  ​Patterns ​​  ​(1991), ​  ​where​  ​Dennett​  ​argues  
we​  ​should​  ​be​  ​realists ​  ​about​  ​patterns, ​  ​rather ​  ​than ​  ​objects ​  ​or ​  ​entities. ​  ​​  ​Earlier ​  ​expressions  
of ​  ​similar​  ​views ​  ​include​  ​Poincare​  ​(1905, ​  ​1906), ​  ​and ​  ​Bertrand ​  ​Russell’s ​  ​​The​  ​Analysis ​  ​of  
Matter ​​  ​(1927). ​  ​​  ​A ​  ​comprehensive ​  ​historical​  ​survey ​  ​of ​  ​structural​  ​realisms ​  ​can ​  ​be​  ​found  
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Perspectival ​  ​realism  
  
Another ​  ​group ​  ​of ​  ​ontological ​  ​views ​  ​motivated ​  ​by​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​are​  ​what​  ​I ​  ​will​  ​call  
perspectival ​  ​realisms ​.​  ​​  ​Views​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​kind ​  ​take​  ​an ​  ​egalitarian ​  ​approach, ​  ​at​  ​least ​  ​as ​  ​a  
principled ​  ​starting ​  ​point, ​  ​towards ​   ​the​  ​various ​  ​sciences, ​  ​and ​  ​argue​  ​that​  ​there​  ​are​  ​a  
number ​  ​of ​  ​unique​  ​ways ​  ​of ​  ​accurately ​  ​describing ​  ​aspects ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​world ​  ​that​  ​give​  ​rise​  ​to  
various ​  ​scientific ​  ​frameworks ​  ​from​  ​which ​  ​to ​  ​motivate ​  ​ontological ​  ​conclusions. ​  ​​  ​These  
views ​  ​are​  ​usually ​  ​influenced ​  ​by​  ​a​  ​pluralistic ​  ​understanding ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​sciences, ​  ​and ​  ​maintain  
that​  ​observing ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​indicates ​  ​that​  ​there​  ​are​  ​different​  ​scientific ​  ​theories, ​  ​models,  
methodologies, ​  ​or ​  ​perspectives, ​  ​through ​  ​which ​  ​we​  ​can ​  ​describe​  ​the​  ​world, ​  ​and ​  ​that​  ​no  
one​  ​of ​  ​these​  ​should​  ​be​  ​considered ​  ​more​  ​fundamental ​  ​than ​  ​any ​  ​other, ​  ​unless ​  ​we​  ​have  
strong​  ​evidence ​  ​to ​  ​think ​  ​otherwise.     
  
On​  ​this ​  ​approach, ​  ​one​  ​could ​  ​be​  ​a​  ​realist​  ​about​  ​electrons, ​  ​say, ​  ​from​  ​the​  ​perspective ​  ​of  
physics,​  ​and ​  ​might​  ​also ​  ​be​  ​a​  ​realist​  ​about​  ​organisms, ​  ​from​  ​the​  ​perspective ​  ​of ​  ​biology,  
without​  ​committing ​  ​to ​  ​some​  ​kind ​  ​of ​  ​supervenience ​  ​or ​  ​reduction ​  ​view ​  ​about​  ​biological  
organisms ​  ​and ​  ​their ​  ​relationship ​  ​with​  ​the​  ​ontologies ​  ​of ​  ​physics.​  ​​  ​Importantly,  
perspectival ​  ​realism​  ​denies ​  ​fundamentalism. ​  ​​  ​Fundamentalism ​  ​was​  ​outlined ​  ​in ​  ​chapter  
one, ​  ​section ​  ​​x​​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​thesis, ​  ​and ​  ​I ​  ​will​  ​restate​  ​the​  ​first​  ​premise​  ​from​  ​Kellert​  ​et​  ​al’s  
(2006) ​  ​presentation ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​argument​  ​for ​  ​monism​  ​to ​  ​remind ​  ​the​  ​reader.  
  
[T]he​  ​ultimate ​  ​aim​  ​of ​  ​a​  ​science​  ​is ​  ​to ​  ​establish ​  ​a​  ​single, ​  ​complete, ​  ​and  
comprehensive ​  ​account​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​natural​  ​world ​  ​(or ​  ​the​  ​part​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​world  
investigated ​  ​by​  ​the​  ​science) ​  ​based ​  ​on​  ​a​  ​single​  ​set​  ​of ​  ​fundamental ​  ​principles[.]  
( ​x​)  
Denying ​  ​fundamentalism ​  ​implies ​  ​that​  ​different​  ​scientific ​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice, ​  ​or  
perspectives, ​  ​focus ​  ​on​  ​different​  ​objects ​  ​of ​  ​inquiry. ​  ​​  ​On​  ​this ​   ​view, ​  ​the​  ​reductionist​  ​and  
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supervenience ​  ​claims ​  ​that​  ​were​  ​discussed ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​previous ​  ​chapter ​  ​are​  ​less ​  ​plausible​  ​​tout  
court​.​  ​​  ​Unless ​  ​we​  ​have​  ​strong​  ​evidence ​  ​that​  ​a​  ​particular ​  ​ontology ​  ​can ​  ​be​  ​reduced ​  ​to  
something ​  ​more​  ​basic, ​  ​which ​  ​has ​  ​happened ​  ​on​  ​occasion ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​(famously ​  ​with  
Einstein’s ​  ​(1945) ​  ​reduction ​  ​of ​  ​Newtonian ​  ​mechanics), ​  ​we​  ​should​  ​not​  ​assume​  ​that​  ​there  
is ​  ​a​  ​hierarchy ​  ​of ​  ​sciences, ​  ​with​  ​fundamental ​  ​physics ​  ​at​  ​the​  ​bottom​  ​level​  ​of ​  ​reality.  
Whilst​  ​theoretical ​  ​unification ​  ​might​  ​be​  ​promoted ​  ​as ​  ​a​  ​positive​  ​goal​  ​for ​  ​various ​  ​sciences,  
or ​  ​for ​  ​science​  ​as ​  ​a​  ​whole, ​  ​it​  ​should​  ​be​  ​considered ​  ​an ​  ​open ​  ​question ​  ​whether ​  ​the​  ​world ​  ​is  
such ​  ​that​  ​such ​  ​a​  ​goal​  ​could ​  ​be​  ​achieved, ​  ​or ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​human ​  ​enterprise​  ​of ​  ​science​  ​could  
achieve ​  ​such ​  ​a​  ​goal, ​  ​given ​  ​the​  ​limited ​  ​nature​  ​of ​  ​our ​  ​cognitive​  ​structures, ​  ​even ​  ​if ​  ​it​  ​were  
possible​  ​in ​  ​principle. ​  ​​  ​At​  ​present, ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​are​  ​radically ​  ​disunified. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​only  
justification ​  ​for ​  ​thinking ​  ​they ​  ​will​  ​turn ​  ​out​  ​otherwise​  ​seems​  ​to ​  ​stem​  ​from​  ​​a​  ​priori  
metaphysical ​  ​assumptions ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​effect​  ​that​  ​the​  ​world ​  ​is ​  ​such ​  ​that​  ​it​  ​an ​  ​accurate  
description ​  ​of ​  ​it​  ​would​  ​turn ​  ​out​  ​to ​  ​cohere​  ​with​  ​this ​  ​fundamentalist ​  ​picture, ​  ​and  
epistemological ​  ​speculations ​  ​about​  ​what​  ​kinds ​  ​of ​  ​knowledge​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​will​  ​be​  ​able​  ​to  
produce .    11
  
Ronald ​  ​Giere​  ​(2006) ​  ​argues ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​natural​  ​world ​  ​is ​  ​incredibly ​  ​complex, ​  ​and ​  ​that​  ​a  
unified ​  ​theory ​  ​of ​  ​everything ​  ​via​  ​one​  ​unified ​  ​model​  ​would​  ​be​  ​remarkably ​  ​difficult​  ​to  
achieve. ​  ​​  ​He​  ​also ​  ​argues ​  ​that​  ​various ​  ​scientific ​  ​observations ​  ​are​  ​performed ​  ​using  
different​  ​scientific ​  ​instruments, ​  ​and ​  ​that​  ​as ​  ​such, ​  ​observational ​  ​data​  ​should​  ​be  
considered ​  ​relative ​  ​to ​  ​those​  ​particular ​  ​instruments.  
  
To ​  ​say​  ​that​  ​scientific ​  ​observation ​  ​is ​  ​perspectival ​  ​relativizes ​  ​observations ​  ​to ​  ​the  
perspective ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​relevant ​  ​instrument. ​  ​There​  ​is ​  ​no​  ​such ​  ​thing, ​  ​for ​  ​example, ​  ​as  
the​  ​way​  ​the​  ​Milky ​  ​Way ​  ​looks.​  ​There​  ​is ​  ​only ​  ​the​  ​way​  ​it​  ​looks ​  ​to ​  ​such ​  ​and ​  ​such  
instrument.  
(2006 ​  ​:​  ​30)  
  
11​  ​The​  ​reader​  ​is ​  ​directed​  ​to​  ​appendix​  ​1,​  ​which​  ​contains ​  ​a​  ​comic-­illustration​  ​of​  ​the​  ​notion​  ​of  
fundamentalism.​  ​​  ​The​  ​illustration​  ​was ​  ​created​  ​by​  ​a​  ​close​  ​friend​  ​after​  ​discussing​  ​some​  ​of​  ​these​  ​ideas.​  ​​  ​It​  ​is  
included​  ​here​  ​to​  ​add​  ​colour,​  ​but​  ​is ​  ​not​  ​to​  ​be​  ​taken​  ​as ​  ​an​  ​argumentative​  ​device.  
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Views​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​kind ​  ​are​  ​becoming ​  ​more​  ​popular ​  ​within ​  ​contemporary ​  ​philosophy ​  ​of  
science​  ​literature, ​  ​and ​  ​other ​  ​related ​  ​examples ​  ​are​  ​found ​  ​in ​  ​Hasok​  ​Chang’s ​  ​“active  
realism” ​  ​(2012), ​  ​Michaela ​  ​Massimi’s ​  ​“scientific ​  ​perspectivism” ​  ​(2012), ​  ​John​  ​Dupre’s  
“promiscuous ​  ​realism” ​  ​(1996), ​  ​and ​  ​Nancy ​  ​Cartwright’s ​  ​view ​  ​of ​  ​a​  ​“dappled ​  ​world”  
(1999). ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​come​  ​back ​  ​to ​  ​develop ​  ​a​   ​similar​  ​view ​  ​of ​  ​my ​  ​own​  ​in ​  ​§5.4​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​thesis, ​  ​which ​  ​I  
call​  ​​aspectival​  ​realism ​.  
     
  
Summary​  ​of ​  ​ontological​  ​naturalisms  
  
In ​  ​the​  ​first​  ​part​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​section, ​  ​I ​  ​have​  ​spent​  ​time​  ​taxonomising ​  ​a​  ​number ​  ​of ​  ​distinct  
views ​  ​that​  ​might​  ​reasonably ​  ​be​  ​considered ​  ​instances ​  ​of ​  ​ontological ​  ​naturalism​  ​-­ ​  ​various  
ontological ​  ​views ​  ​that​  ​take​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​seriously. ​  ​​  ​As ​  ​can ​  ​be​  ​seen, ​  ​different  
commentators ​  ​have​  ​drawn ​  ​significantly ​  ​different​  ​metaphysical ​  ​conclusions, ​  ​despite​  ​all  
claiming ​  ​to ​  ​ground ​  ​their ​  ​ontologies ​  ​in ​  ​a​  ​scientifically ​  ​respectable ​  ​way. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​next​  ​section  
discusses ​  ​epistemological ​  ​naturalisms. ​  ​​  ​These​  ​are​  ​views ​  ​about​  ​knowledge, ​  ​that​  ​are  





For​  ​the​  ​rest​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​section, ​  ​I ​  ​will​  ​outline​  ​a​  ​number ​  ​of ​  ​distinct​  ​positions ​  ​within ​  ​a​  ​group ​  ​of  
views ​  ​that​  ​might​  ​be​  ​broadly ​  ​labelled ​  ​as ​  ​epistemological ​  ​naturalisms. ​  ​​  ​Epistemology ​  ​is  
the​  ​study​  ​of ​  ​knowledge. ​  ​​  ​Epistemological ​  ​naturalisms ​  ​are​  ​views ​  ​about​  ​knowledge​  ​that  
align ​  ​themselves ​  ​with​  ​the​  ​sciences. ​  ​​  ​Most​  ​epistemologically ​  ​naturalistic ​  ​views  
incorporate ​  ​some​  ​elements ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​naturalistic ​  ​starting ​  ​point​  ​which ​  ​I ​  ​outlined ​  ​in ​  ​the  
introductory ​  ​chapter, ​  ​such ​  ​as ​  ​treating ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​with​  ​epistemic ​  ​respect. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​begin ​  ​with  
several​  ​quotations ​  ​that​  ​outline​  ​some​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​variety ​  ​of ​  ​views ​  ​that​  ​have​  ​been ​  ​put​  ​forward  
under ​  ​this ​  ​banner, ​  ​before​  ​spending ​  ​some​  ​time​  ​characterising ​  ​useful​  ​distinctions ​  ​within  




Naturalism​  ​is ​  ​the​  ​philosophical​  ​theory ​  ​that​  ​treats ​  ​science​  ​as ​  ​our ​  ​most​  ​reliable  
source​  ​of ​  ​knowledge​  ​and ​  ​scientific ​  ​method ​  ​as ​  ​the​  ​most​  ​effective ​  ​route​  ​to  
knowledge.  
(Rosenberg ​  ​2014​  ​:​  ​32)  
  
[T]here​  ​is ​  ​only ​  ​one​  ​reliable ​  ​method ​  ​of ​  ​reaching ​  ​the​  ​truth ​  ​about​  ​the​  ​nature​  ​of ​  ​things  
...​  ​this ​  ​reliable ​  ​method ​  ​comes ​  ​to ​  ​full​  ​fruition ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​methods ​  ​of ​  ​science  
(Hook​  ​1965​  ​:​  ​183)  
  
  
[W]e​  ​take​  ​naturalism​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​the​  ​view ​  ​that​  ​only ​  ​natural​   ​science​  ​deserves ​  ​full​  ​and  
unqualified ​  ​credence.  
(Wagner ​  ​&​  ​Warner ​  ​1993​  ​:​  ​1)  
  
[N]aturalism​  ​[is] ​  ​…​  ​the​  ​claim​  ​that​  ​the​  ​methods ​  ​and ​  ​techniques ​  ​of ​  ​natural​  ​science  
are​  ​​the​​  ​source​  ​of ​  ​knowledge​  ​about​  ​the​  ​world.  
(Hylton ​  ​1994​  ​:​  ​261,​  ​​emphasis ​  ​​mine)  
  
  
Degrees ​  ​of ​  ​strength  
  
From​  ​the​  ​quotations ​  ​presented ​  ​above, ​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​clear ​  ​that​  ​epistemological ​  ​naturalisms ​  ​come  
in ​  ​varying ​  ​degrees ​  ​of ​  ​strength. ​  ​​  ​A ​  ​modest​  ​epistemological ​  ​naturalism​  ​might​  ​claim​  ​that  
the​  ​sciences ​  ​instantiate ​  ​plausible​  ​routes ​  ​to ​  ​knowledge. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​take​  ​it​  ​that​  ​this ​  ​should​  ​be​  ​a  
minimal ​  ​and ​  ​uncontentious ​  ​constraint​  ​on​  ​epistemological ​  ​naturalisms. ​  ​​  ​Stronger  
epistemological ​  ​naturalisms ​  ​may ​  ​claim​  ​that​  ​science​  ​is ​  ​our ​  ​most​  ​reliable ​  ​route​  ​to ​  ​truth  
(Rosenberg ​  ​2014,​  ​Hook​  ​1965), ​  ​that​  ​it​  ​deserves ​  ​unqualified ​  ​credence ​  ​that​  ​other ​  ​areas ​  ​of  
inquiry ​  ​do​  ​not​  ​(Wagner ​  ​&​  ​Warner ​  ​1993), ​  ​or ​  ​stronger ​  ​still,​  ​that​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​our ​  ​only ​  ​source​  ​of  





Domain ​  ​specificity  
  
Some​  ​epistemological ​  ​naturalists ​  ​favour ​  ​particular ​  ​sciences ​  ​over ​  ​others, ​  ​and ​  ​afford ​  ​them  
more​  ​epistemic ​  ​credibility, ​  ​arguing ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​knowledge​  ​these​  ​domains ​  ​generate ​  ​is ​  ​more  
secure​  ​than ​  ​the​  ​conjectures ​  ​offered ​  ​by​  ​other ​  ​domains. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​epistemological ​  ​naturalist  
makes ​  ​claims ​  ​about​  ​how ​  ​philosophical, ​  ​psychological, ​  ​economic, ​  ​etc, ​  ​inquiry ​  ​does ​  ​or   12
ought​​  ​to ​  ​proceed ​  ​as ​  ​knowledge-­seeking ​  ​practices.  
  
Alex​  ​Rosenberg ​  ​suggests ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​“natural” ​  ​sciences ​  ​(usually ​  ​taken ​  ​to ​  ​refer ​  ​to ​  ​at​  ​least  
physics,​  ​and ​  ​usually ​  ​chemistry ​  ​and ​  ​biology) ​  ​provide​  ​us ​  ​with​  ​our ​  ​most​  ​secure​  ​claims ​  ​to  
knowledge, ​  ​and ​  ​that​  ​their ​  ​tests ​  ​of ​  ​knowledge​  ​are:  
  
the​  ​experimental/observational ​  ​methods ​  ​all​  ​the​  ​natural​  ​sciences ​  ​share, ​  ​the​  ​social  
sciences ​  ​increasingly ​  ​adopt, ​  ​and ​  ​that​  ​naturalists ​  ​devote​  ​themselves ​  ​to ​  ​making  
specific.  
(Rosenberg ​  ​2014​  ​:​  ​33)  
  
I ​  ​will​  ​argue​  ​in ​  ​§3.4​  ​why​  ​I ​  ​think ​  ​domain ​  ​specific​  ​epistemological ​  ​naturalisms ​  ​are​  ​difficult  
positions ​  ​to ​  ​maintain. ​  ​​  ​In ​  ​the​  ​next​  ​chapter ​  ​I ​  ​will​  ​argue​  ​for ​  ​methodological ​  ​pluralism  
about​  ​the​  ​sciences, ​  ​arguing, ​  ​​pace​​  ​Rosenberg, ​  ​that​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​no​  ​secure​  ​set​  ​of  
“experimental/observational ​  ​methods ​  ​[that] ​  ​all​  ​the​  ​natural​  ​sciences ​  ​share”​  ​(Rosenberg  
2014​  ​:​  ​33), ​  ​there​  ​are​  ​rather ​  ​a​  ​number ​  ​of ​  ​different​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​used ​  ​by​  ​different  
sciences, ​  ​and ​  ​even ​  ​within ​  ​singular ​  ​sciences ​  ​-­ ​  ​including ​  ​the​  ​natural​  ​sciences ​  ​-­ ​  ​and ​  ​that  
many ​  ​of ​  ​these​  ​can ​  ​be​  ​viewed ​  ​as ​  ​epistemically ​  ​successful​  ​in ​  ​their ​  ​domains. ​  ​​  ​Whether ​  ​a  
particular ​  ​system​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​can ​  ​be​  ​applied ​  ​to ​  ​a​  ​particular ​  ​domain ​  ​of ​  ​inquiry ​  ​is ​  ​a  
domain ​  ​specific​  ​matter, ​  ​and ​  ​we​  ​should​  ​not​  ​assume​  ​that​  ​one​  ​set​  ​of ​  ​methods ​  ​will​  ​work​  ​in  
any ​  ​one​  ​area. ​  ​​  ​Here​  ​I ​  ​mean ​  ​to ​  ​raise​  ​doubt​  ​about​  ​whether ​  ​one​  ​method ​  ​can ​  ​work​  ​in ​  ​​all  
areas ​  ​of ​  ​inquiry ​  ​(e.g. ​  ​in ​  ​both ​  ​ethics ​  ​and ​  ​also ​  ​mathematics). ​  ​​  ​Particular ​  ​scientific ​  ​methods  
might​  ​be​  ​usefully ​  ​implemented ​  ​within ​  ​some​  ​domains ​  ​of ​  ​inquiry, ​  ​but​  ​may ​  ​not​  ​be  
effective ​  ​for ​  ​others.  
  
12 ​  ​​This ​  ​disjunction​  ​is ​  ​intended​  ​to​  ​be​  ​interpreted​  ​inclusively.  
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I ​  ​certainly ​  ​do​  ​not​  ​think ​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​bad ​  ​idea​  ​to ​  ​attempt ​  ​to ​  ​use​  ​observational​  ​or ​  ​experimental  
methods ​  ​within ​  ​philosophy, ​  ​and ​  ​I ​   ​encourage​  ​philosophers ​  ​to ​  ​apply ​  ​these​  ​methods ​  ​where  
possible. ​  ​​  ​However, ​  ​I ​  ​note​  ​that​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​are​  ​not​  ​unified ​  ​in ​  ​their ​  ​methods ​  ​presently,  
neither ​  ​between ​  ​sciences, ​  ​nor ​  ​within ​  ​specific​  ​scientific ​  ​domains ​  ​(the​  ​case ​  ​studies  
presented ​  ​in ​  ​§3.4​  ​provide​  ​evidence ​  ​for ​  ​this ​  ​claim). ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​see​  ​no​  ​reason ​  ​why​  ​the​  ​methods ​  ​of  
philosophy ​  ​should​  ​be​  ​unified ​  ​in ​  ​a​  ​way​  ​that​  ​those​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​are​  ​not, ​  ​in ​  ​order ​  ​that  
they ​  ​be​  ​considered ​  ​either ​  ​naturalistic ​  ​or ​  ​sufficiently ​  ​good.​  ​​  ​Some​  ​reasonably ​  ​obvious  
challenges ​  ​for ​  ​these​  ​narrower ​  ​domain ​  ​specific​  ​naturalisms ​  ​include​  ​a​  ​correct​  ​treatment ​  ​of  
the​  ​methods ​  ​of ​  ​mathematics ​  ​and ​  ​history ​  ​within ​  ​such ​  ​a​  ​narrow ​  ​framework. ​  ​​  ​Given ​  ​that  
mathematics ​  ​and ​  ​history ​  ​are​  ​both ​  ​drawn ​  ​upon​  ​with​  ​gusto​  ​within ​  ​“natural” ​  ​and  
“experimental” ​  ​scientific ​  ​practices ,​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​challenge ​  ​for ​  ​these​  ​domain-­specific  13
naturalists ​  ​to ​  ​maintain ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​methods ​  ​of ​  ​their ​  ​favoured ​  ​domains ​  ​are​  ​both ​  ​generally  
superior ​  ​and ​  ​appropriate ​  ​for ​  ​all​  ​areas ​  ​of ​  ​inquiry.  
  
  
Connection ​  ​to ​  ​ontological​  ​naturalisms ​  ​in ​  ​previous ​  ​sections  
  
Epistemologically ​  ​naturalistic ​  ​views ​  ​can ​  ​be​  ​used ​  ​as ​  ​parts ​  ​of ​   ​arguments ​  ​for ​  ​various  
ontological ​  ​naturalisms. ​  ​​  ​One​  ​could ​  ​argue​  ​for ​  ​realism​  ​about​  ​electrons, ​  ​for ​  ​instance, ​  ​with  
an ​  ​argument​  ​along ​  ​the​  ​following ​  ​lines:  
  
1) Physics ​  ​posits ​  ​entities ​  ​including ​  ​electrons  
2) We​  ​have​  ​good​  ​reasons ​  ​to ​  ​believe ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​entities ​  ​posited ​  ​by​  ​physics ​  ​exist  
∴ We​  ​have​  ​good​  ​reasons ​  ​to ​  ​believe ​  ​that​  ​electrons ​  ​exist  
  
At​  ​other ​  ​times, ​  ​constraints ​  ​endorsed ​  ​by​  ​epistemological ​  ​naturalism​  ​are​  ​used ​  ​as ​  ​parts ​  ​of  
arguments ​  ​for ​  ​nominalism, ​  ​by​  ​arguing ​  ​that​  ​we​  ​should​  ​be​  ​sceptical ​  ​about​  ​some​  ​realist  
positions ​  ​due​  ​to ​  ​their ​  ​entities ​  ​posited ​  ​being ​  ​inaccessible ​  ​to ​  ​science. ​  ​​  ​Colin ​  ​Cheyne’s  
arguments ​  ​for ​  ​scepticism​  ​about​  ​the​  ​existence ​  ​of ​  ​mathematical ​  ​objects, ​  ​due​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​causal  
13 ​  ​​Physics ​  ​and​  ​biology​  ​use​  ​extraordinary​  ​amounts ​  ​of​  ​mathematics,​  ​and​  ​the​  ​building​  ​of​  ​knowledge​  ​of​  ​any  
system​  ​of​  ​practice​  ​requires ​  ​having​  ​a​  ​history​  ​from​  ​which​  ​to​  ​build​  ​upon.  
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§2.4​  ​Relationships ​  ​amongst​  ​naturalisms  
  
For​  ​the​  ​remainder ​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​chapter, ​  ​I ​  ​look ​  ​at​  ​the​  ​relationships ​  ​between ​  ​the​  ​various  
naturalistic ​  ​views ​  ​outlined ​  ​in ​  ​previous ​  ​sections. ​  ​​  ​Some​  ​commentators ​  ​have​  ​claimed ​  ​that  
ontological ​  ​naturalism​  ​is ​  ​an ​  ​assumption ​  ​of ​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalism​  ​(e.g. ​  ​Forrest  
2000). ​  ​​  ​Others ​  ​have​  ​argued ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​two ​  ​are​  ​independent ​  ​of ​  ​one​  ​another ​  ​(e.g.  
Williamson ​  ​2014,​  ​Boudry​  ​et. ​  ​al​  ​2012). ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​will​  ​argue​  ​that​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalism​  ​and  
epistemological ​  ​naturalism​  ​have​  ​a​  ​symbiotic/mutually ​  ​reinforcing ​  ​relationship ​  ​with​  ​one  
another, ​  ​in ​  ​that​  ​with​  ​more​  ​knowledge​  ​and ​  ​progress ​  ​generated ​  ​via​  ​the​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice  
that​  ​constitute​  ​the​  ​sciences, ​  ​more​  ​credence ​  ​for ​  ​the​  ​epistemological ​  ​naturalist​  ​is ​  ​gathered.  
I ​  ​will​  ​argue​  ​that​  ​many ​  ​variants ​  ​of ​  ​ontological ​  ​naturalism​  ​are​  ​in ​  ​conflict​  ​with  
methodological ​  ​naturalism, ​  ​but​  ​in ​  ​§5.4​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​thesis, ​  ​I ​  ​outline​  ​an ​  ​ontological ​  ​framework  
that​  ​I ​  ​take​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​currently ​  ​best​  ​supported ​  ​by​  ​naturalistic ​  ​methodological ​  ​and  
epistemological ​  ​concerns.  
  
  
The​  ​mutually​  ​reinforcing ​  ​relationship ​  ​between ​  ​methodological​  ​and ​  ​epistemological  
naturalisms  
  
As ​  ​has ​  ​been ​  ​mentioned ​  ​throughout, ​  ​this ​  ​thesis ​  ​assumes ​  ​the​  ​naturalistic ​  ​starting ​  ​point,  
which ​  ​is ​  ​accepting ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​have​  ​generated ​  ​knowledge, ​  ​and ​  ​that​  ​they ​  ​have​  ​done  
so​  ​via​  ​the​  ​methods ​  ​of ​  ​their ​  ​various ​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice. ​  ​​  ​This ​  ​is ​  ​really ​  ​just​  ​the​  ​claim​  ​that  
methodological ​  ​naturalism​  ​supports ​  ​epistemological ​  ​naturalism​  ​through ​  ​repeated  
generations ​  ​of ​  ​scientific ​  ​knowledge. ​  ​​  ​Methodological ​  ​naturalism​  ​and ​  ​epistemological  
naturalism​  ​reinforce​  ​one​  ​another. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​take​  ​it​  ​as ​  ​a​  ​contingent​  ​fact​  ​about​  ​the​  ​world ​  ​that​  ​the  
sciences ​  ​have​  ​generated ​  ​knowledge, ​  ​and ​  ​with​  ​successive​  ​generations ​  ​of ​  ​knowledge​  ​by  
the​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​sciences, ​  ​the​  ​epistemologically ​  ​naturalistic ​  ​claim​  ​that​  ​the  
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sciences ​  ​generate ​  ​knowledge​  ​is ​  ​lent​  ​more​  ​support​  ​over ​  ​time. ​  ​​  ​Thus,​  ​the​  ​two ​  ​views ​  ​can  
be​  ​seen​  ​as ​  ​having ​  ​an ​  ​active ​  ​and ​  ​mutually ​  ​supportive​  ​relationship, ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​extent​  ​that​  ​the  
practices ​  ​recommended ​  ​by​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalism​  ​yield ​  ​knowledge. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​claims  
that​  ​the​  ​epistemological ​  ​naturalist​  ​makes, ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​generate ​  ​knowledge, ​  ​can ​  ​be  
justified ​  ​by​  ​activities ​  ​that​  ​adhere​  ​to ​  ​methodologically ​  ​naturalistic ​  ​standards. ​  ​​  ​We​  ​can  
observe​  ​the​  ​various ​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​at​  ​play ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​sciences, ​  ​and ​  ​recognise​  ​the  
knowledge​  ​they ​  ​accumulate, ​  ​to ​  ​support​  ​this ​  ​position. ​  ​​  ​This ​  ​in ​  ​turn ​  ​can ​  ​lend ​  ​support​  ​to  
the​  ​worthiness ​  ​of ​  ​using​  ​these​  ​methods.  
  
  
Potential​  ​conflicts ​  ​regarding ​  ​ontological​  ​naturalisms  
  
Whilst​  ​I ​  ​have​  ​argued ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​relationship ​  ​between ​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalism​  ​and  
epistemological ​  ​naturalism​  ​is ​  ​one​  ​of ​  ​mutual​  ​reinforcement, ​  ​I ​  ​do​  ​not​  ​think ​  ​the​  ​same  
holds ​  ​between ​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalism​  ​and ​  ​ontological ​  ​naturalism, ​  ​if ​  ​ontological  
naturalism​  ​is ​  ​defined ​  ​in ​  ​any ​  ​substantive​  ​way.     
  
Some​  ​commentators ​  ​have​  ​argued ​  ​that​  ​ontological ​  ​naturalism​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​metaphysical  
assumption ​  ​of ​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalism:  
  
[m]etaphysical ​  ​naturalism​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​constitutive ​  ​ontological ​  ​principle​  ​of ​  ​science​  ​in  14
that​  ​the​  ​general​  ​empirical ​  ​methods ​  ​of ​  ​science, ​  ​such ​  ​as ​  ​observation, ​  ​measurement  
and ​  ​experiment, ​  ​and ​  ​thus ​  ​the​  ​very ​  ​production ​  ​of ​  ​empirical ​  ​evidence, ​  ​presuppose  
a​  ​no-­supernature​  ​principle.  
(Mahner ​  ​2012​  ​:​  ​1437)  
  
I ​  ​am​  ​unsure​  ​how ​  ​to ​  ​make​  ​sense​  ​of ​  ​claims ​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​kind. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​can ​  ​only ​  ​assume​  ​that​  ​an  
endorsee​  ​of ​  ​a​  ​view ​  ​like​  ​this ​  ​means ​  ​something ​  ​like​  ​“we ​  ​assume​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​no​  ​spooky​  ​stuff  
out​  ​there”. ​  ​​  ​Others ​  ​have​  ​argued ​  ​along ​  ​similar​  ​lines, ​  ​claiming ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​operate  
assuming ​  ​atheism:  
  
14​  ​Mahner​  ​uses ​  ​‘metaphysical​  ​naturalism’​  ​to​  ​mean​  ​the​  ​same​  ​as ​  ​what​  ​I​  ​mean​  ​by​  ​‘ontological​  ​naturalism’.  
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If ​  ​a​  ​Watchmaker ​  ​is ​  ​thus ​  ​carefully ​  ​excluded ​  ​at​  ​the​  ​beginning, ​  ​we​  ​need ​  ​not​  ​be  
surprised ​  ​if ​  ​no​  ​Watchmaker ​  ​appears ​  ​at​  ​the​  ​end. ​  ​The​  ​dice​  ​have​  ​been ​  ​loaded  
against​  ​him.  
   (Macbeth ​  ​1974​  ​:​  ​126)    
  
Macbeth ​  ​is ​  ​claiming ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​operate​  ​excluding ​  ​a​  ​designer, ​  ​and ​  ​that​  ​therefore  
the​  ​sciences ​  ​will​  ​not​  ​discover ​  ​that​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​one. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​think ​  ​these​  ​claims ​  ​are​  ​false. ​  ​​  ​The  
sciences ​  ​have​  ​turned ​  ​out​  ​to ​  ​generate ​  ​knowledge​  ​that​  ​tell​  ​us ​  ​the​  ​world ​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​very ​  ​bizarre  
place, ​  ​much ​  ​different​  ​to ​  ​a​  ​naive​  ​commonsense​  ​understanding ​  ​of ​  ​it. ​  ​​  ​There​  ​are​  ​many  
things ​  ​that​  ​once​  ​might​  ​have​  ​been ​  ​considered ​  ​“spooky ​  ​stuff”, ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​are​  ​happy  
to ​  ​countenance. ​  ​​  ​For​  ​example, ​  ​the​  ​various ​  ​ontologies ​  ​of ​  ​quantum​  ​mechanics ​  ​are​  ​very  
contrary ​  ​to ​  ​common ​  ​sense. ​  ​​  ​An​  ​example ​  ​from​  ​the​  ​history ​  ​of ​  ​science​  ​is ​  ​useful​  ​to  
illustrate ​  ​this ​  ​point. ​  ​​  ​Einstein ​  ​attacked ​  ​Bohr​  ​over ​  ​the​  ​principle​  ​of ​  ​action ​  ​at​  ​a​  ​distance​  ​in  
quantum​  ​mechanics, ​  ​on​  ​the​  ​grounds ​  ​that​  ​it​  ​was​  ​“spooky”​  ​​  ​(see​  ​Nikolic​  ​2012,​  ​for ​  ​a  
useful​  ​discussion).​  ​​  ​Quantum​  ​physicists ​  ​today ​  ​are​  ​very ​  ​happy ​  ​to ​  ​countenance ​  ​action ​  ​at​  ​a  
distance.  
  
It​  ​is ​  ​much ​  ​more​  ​plausible​  ​to ​  ​think ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​as ​  ​being ​  ​agnostic, ​  ​and ​  ​as ​  ​looking ​  ​at  
the​  ​evidence ​  ​for ​  ​various ​  ​hypotheses, ​  ​before​  ​concluding ​  ​either ​  ​way​  ​on​  ​such ​  ​matters. ​  ​​  ​If  
we​  ​view ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​in ​  ​this ​  ​way, ​  ​we​  ​can ​  ​reasonably ​  ​easily ​  ​show ​  ​by​  ​example​  ​that​  ​the  
claims ​  ​of ​  ​Mahner ​  ​and ​  ​Macbeth ​  ​above​  ​are​  ​misguided. ​  ​​  ​Macbeth ​  ​talks ​  ​about​  ​excluding ​  ​a  
watchmaker ​  ​at​  ​the​  ​beginning, ​  ​and ​  ​if ​  ​this ​  ​is ​  ​re-­interpreted ​  ​as ​  ​being ​  ​agnostic​  ​about​  ​a  
watchmaker ​  ​at​  ​the​  ​beginning, ​  ​as ​  ​I ​  ​suggest​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​more​  ​plausible​  ​interpretation ​  ​of ​  ​a​  ​starting  
point​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​sciences, ​  ​we​  ​can ​  ​point​  ​to ​  ​various ​  ​ontologies ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​were​  ​once  
agnostic​  ​about, ​  ​but​  ​which ​  ​they ​  ​now ​  ​take​  ​very ​  ​seriously. ​  ​​  ​You​  ​could ​  ​more​  ​or ​  ​less ​  ​pick  
any ​  ​entity ​  ​from​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​to ​  ​demonstrate ​  ​this ​  ​point, ​  ​but​  ​let’s ​  ​take​  ​the​  ​electron ​  ​as ​  ​an  
example. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​sciences ​  ​were​  ​not​  ​anti-­realists ​  ​about​  ​electrons ​  ​at​  ​any ​  ​stage, ​  ​there​  ​was​  ​just  
not​  ​sufficient​  ​evidence ​  ​for ​  ​their ​  ​existence ​  ​until​  ​modern ​  ​physics.​  ​​  ​Now ​  ​that​  ​there​  ​is  
sufficient​  ​evidence ​  ​for ​  ​the​  ​existence ​  ​of ​  ​electrons, ​  ​contemporary ​  ​science​  ​counts ​  ​them  
amongst​  ​its ​  ​ontology ​  ​very ​  ​readily. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​dice​  ​were​  ​never ​  ​loaded ​  ​against​  ​the​  ​electron, ​  ​and  
neither ​  ​are​  ​they ​  ​loaded ​  ​against​  ​the​  ​existence ​  ​of ​  ​a​  ​deity. ​  ​​  ​If ​  ​there​  ​were​  ​sufficient​  ​evidence  
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for ​  ​the​  ​existence ​  ​of ​  ​a​  ​deity, ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​should​  ​just​  ​as ​  ​happily ​  ​countenance ​  ​it​  ​amongst  
its ​  ​ontology.  
  
Timothy ​  ​Williamson ​  ​expresses ​  ​this ​  ​same​  ​point​  ​as ​  ​follows:  
  
[methodological] ​  ​naturalism​  ​is ​  ​not​  ​as ​  ​restrictive ​  ​as ​  ​it​  ​sounds.​  ​For​  ​example, ​  ​some  
of ​  ​its ​  ​hard-­nosed ​  ​advocates ​  ​undertake​  ​to ​  ​postulate​  ​a​  ​soul​  ​or ​  ​a​  ​god,​  ​if ​  ​doing ​  ​so  
turns ​  ​out​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​part​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​best​  ​explanation ​  ​of ​  ​our ​  ​experience, ​  ​for ​  ​that​  ​would​  ​be  
an ​  ​application ​  ​of ​  ​scientific ​  ​method. ​  ​Naturalism​  ​is ​  ​not​  ​incompatible ​  ​in ​  ​principle  
with​  ​all​  ​forms ​  ​of ​  ​religion. ​  ​In ​  ​practice, ​  ​however, ​  ​most​  ​naturalists ​  ​doubt​  ​that​  ​belief  
in ​  ​souls ​  ​or ​  ​gods ​  ​withstands ​  ​scientific ​  ​scrutiny.  
(Williamson ​  ​2014​  ​:​  ​30)  
  
The​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​have​  ​no​  ​need ​  ​to ​  ​make​  ​overarching ​  ​metaphysical  
assumptions. ​  ​​  ​Often ​  ​sciences ​  ​work​  ​with​  ​an ​  ​assumed ​  ​fundamental ​  ​ontology, ​  ​but​  ​they ​  ​do  
not​  ​consider ​  ​it​  ​fixed ​  ​​a​  ​priori​,​  ​and ​  ​leave​  ​it​  ​subject​  ​to ​  ​revision ​  ​over ​  ​time. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​sciences,  
by​  ​and ​  ​large, ​  ​share​  ​a​  ​commitment ​  ​to ​  ​discovering ​  ​the​  ​true​  ​nature​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​world, ​  ​and ​  ​I ​  ​see  
no​  ​evidence ​  ​that​  ​they ​  ​begin ​  ​with​  ​fixed ​  ​​a​  ​priori​​  ​ontological ​  ​assumptions ​  ​that​  ​rule  
anything ​  ​out​  ​by​  ​fiat. ​  ​​  ​If ​  ​it​  ​can ​  ​be​  ​shown​  ​where​  ​sciences ​  ​currently ​  ​do​  ​this, ​  ​it​  ​would​  ​be  
important​  ​to ​  ​subject​  ​those​  ​assumptions ​  ​to ​  ​scrutiny, ​  ​and ​  ​treat​  ​them​  ​as ​  ​fallible.     
  
Fishman ​  ​and ​  ​Boudry ​  ​(2013) ​  ​claim​  ​that​  ​​a​  ​priori​​  ​metaphysical ​  ​assumptions ​  ​should​  ​not​  ​be  
included ​  ​in ​  ​accounts ​  ​of ​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalism:  
  
Science, ​  ​at​  ​least ​  ​ideally, ​  ​is ​  ​committed ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​pursuit​  ​of ​  ​truth ​  ​about​  ​the​  ​nature​  ​of  
reality, ​  ​whatever ​  ​it​  ​may ​  ​be, ​  ​and ​  ​hence​  ​cannot​  ​exclude​  ​the​  ​existence ​  ​of ​  ​the  
supernatural​  ​​a​  ​priori​,​  ​be​  ​it​  ​on​  ​methodological ​  ​or ​  ​metaphysical ​  ​grounds,​  ​without  
artificially ​  ​limiting ​  ​its ​  ​scope​  ​and ​  ​power.    
(2013 ​  ​:​  ​929)  
  
I ​  ​agree​  ​with​  ​Williamson ​  ​and ​  ​Fishman ​  ​and ​  ​Boudry.​  ​​  ​Ontological​  ​naturalism​  ​is ​  ​not​  ​an  
assumption ​  ​of ​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalism. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​see​  ​no​  ​plausible​  ​way​  ​to ​  ​give​  ​an ​  ​account​  ​of  
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ontological ​  ​naturalism​  ​as ​  ​a​  ​substantive​  ​metaphysical ​  ​view, ​  ​that​  ​coheres ​  ​with​  ​the​  ​views  
of ​  ​Mahner ​  ​and ​  ​Macbeth. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​argue​  ​that​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​do​  ​not​  ​involve​  ​a​  ​commitment ​  ​to ​  ​fixed  
a​  ​priori​​  ​metaphysical ​  ​assumptions. ​  ​​  ​Rather, ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​often ​  ​start​  ​out​  ​with​  ​revisable  
assumptions, ​  ​and ​  ​change​  ​them​  ​as ​  ​new ​  ​evidence ​  ​comes ​  ​to ​  ​light​  ​that​  ​is ​  ​relevant ​  ​to ​  ​their  
various ​  ​metaphysical ​  ​commitments.     
  
  
Is ​  ​ontological​  ​naturalism​  ​a​  ​consequence​  ​of ​  ​methodological​  ​naturalism?  
  
Barbara​  ​Forrest​  ​has ​  ​argued ​  ​that​  ​ontological ​  ​naturalism​  ​-­ ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​same​  ​sense​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​term  
used ​  ​by​  ​Macbeth ​  ​and ​  ​Mahner ​  ​-­ ​  ​is ​  ​the​  ​only ​  ​plausible​  ​consequence​  ​of ​  ​practices ​  ​endorsed  
by​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalism. ​  ​​  ​She​  ​describes ​  ​her ​  ​view ​  ​as ​  ​follows:  
  
[Ontological] ​  ​naturalism​  ​is ​  ​emphatically ​  ​not​  ​an ​  ​arbitrary ​  ​philosophical  
preference, ​  ​but​  ​rather ​  ​the​  ​only ​  ​reasonable​  ​metaphysical ​  ​conclusion-­-­if ​  ​by  
reasonable​  ​one​  ​means ​  ​​both ​​  ​empirically ​  ​grounded ​  ​and ​  ​logically ​  ​coherent.  
(2000 ​  ​:​  ​7)  
  
By​  ​ontological ​  ​naturalism, ​  ​Forrest​  ​seems​  ​to ​  ​mean ​  ​something ​  ​like​  ​non-­supernaturalism.  
As ​  ​above, ​  ​when ​  ​I ​  ​argued ​  ​that​  ​ontological ​  ​naturalism​  ​is ​  ​not​  ​a​  ​working ​  ​assumption ​  ​of  
methodological ​  ​naturalism, ​  ​I ​  ​find ​  ​no​  ​plausible​  ​way​  ​to ​  ​view ​  ​it​  ​as ​  ​a​  ​non-­trivial​  ​conclusion  
of ​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalism​  ​either. ​  ​​  ​If ​  ​she​  ​means ​  ​that​  ​there​  ​exist​  ​no​  ​entities ​  ​that​  ​are  
not​  ​yet​  ​posited ​  ​by​  ​the​  ​current​  ​sciences, ​  ​her ​  ​view ​  ​is ​  ​surely ​  ​false, ​  ​as ​  ​of ​  ​course​  ​the​  ​sciences  
are​  ​not​  ​complete ​  ​and ​  ​in ​  ​many ​  ​respects ​  ​might​  ​well​  ​not​  ​be​  ​correct​  ​either. ​  ​​  ​If ​  ​she​  ​means  
that​  ​some​  ​future​  ​science​  ​will​  ​eventually ​  ​settle​  ​the​  ​ontological ​  ​nature​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​world, ​  ​it​  ​is  
neither ​  ​informative ​  ​-­ ​  ​as ​  ​who​  ​are​  ​we​  ​to ​  ​know ​  ​what​  ​some​  ​ideal​  ​science​  ​might​  ​settle​  ​upon,  
and ​  ​nor ​  ​is ​  ​it​  ​naturalistically ​  ​justifiable ​  ​-­ ​  ​as ​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​no​  ​means ​  ​by​  ​which ​  ​we​  ​could ​  ​provide  
evidence ​  ​for ​  ​or ​  ​against​  ​this ​  ​claim. ​  ​​  ​Of​  ​course​  ​there​  ​are​  ​various ​  ​ontologies ​  ​posited ​  ​by​  ​the  
sciences, ​  ​and ​  ​on​  ​methodologically ​  ​naturalistic ​  ​grounds ​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​good​  ​evidence ​  ​for ​  ​them,  
but​  ​these​  ​cases ​  ​are​  ​local, ​  ​and ​  ​Forrest’s ​  ​thesis ​  ​is ​  ​unworkable​  ​as ​  ​a​  ​claim​  ​that​  ​is ​  ​general  
and ​  ​substantive.     
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Ontological​  ​naturalism​  ​is ​  ​neither ​  ​an ​  ​assumption, ​  ​nor ​  ​a​  ​consequence​  ​of, ​  ​methodological  
naturalism, ​  ​in ​  ​any ​  ​way​  ​that​  ​understands ​  ​the​  ​view ​  ​to ​  ​involve​  ​holding ​  ​fixed ​  ​metaphysical  
views ​  ​about​  ​the​  ​nature​  ​of ​  ​reality. ​  ​​  ​In ​  ​§5.4​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​thesis, ​  ​I ​  ​outline​  ​an ​  ​ontological  
framework ​  ​called ​  ​​aspectival​  ​realism ​,​  ​a​  ​view ​  ​that​  ​I ​  ​argue​  ​is ​  ​well​  ​motivated ​  ​by  
methodological ​  ​naturalism​  ​and ​  ​its ​  ​symbiotic​  ​relationship ​  ​with​  ​epistemological  
naturalism. ​  ​​  ​This ​  ​view ​  ​is ​  ​most​  ​closely ​  ​related ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​groups ​  ​of ​  ​views ​  ​I ​  ​discussed ​  ​earlier  
in ​  ​this ​  ​section ​  ​under ​  ​the​  ​title​  ​of ​  ​​perspectival ​  ​realism ​.​  ​​  ​For​  ​now,​  ​I ​  ​hope​  ​to ​  ​have​  ​shown  
the​  ​difficulty ​  ​of ​  ​justifying ​  ​many ​  ​kinds ​  ​of ​  ​ontological ​  ​naturalism​  ​on​  ​methodologically  





In ​  ​this ​  ​chapter ​  ​I ​  ​have​  ​discussed ​  ​a​  ​number ​  ​of ​  ​different​  ​views ​  ​that​  ​have​  ​gone​  ​under ​  ​the  
broad ​  ​label​  ​of ​  ​naturalism. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​have​  ​spent​  ​some​  ​time​  ​discussing​  ​three​  ​more​  ​specific​  ​kinds  
of ​  ​naturalism: ​  ​methodological, ​  ​ontological, ​  ​and ​  ​epistemological. ​  ​​  ​This ​  ​has ​  ​involved  
discussing​  ​various ​  ​other ​  ​specific​  ​views ​  ​within ​  ​these​  ​kinds.​  ​​   ​This ​  ​taxonomy ​  ​is ​  ​surely ​  ​not  
exhaustive, ​  ​but​  ​I ​  ​think ​  ​it​  ​provides ​  ​a​  ​cursory ​  ​glance​  ​at​  ​some​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​predominant​  ​views  
within ​  ​the​  ​grab-­bag ​  ​of ​  ​naturalistic ​  ​views, ​  ​that​  ​allows ​  ​my ​  ​discussion​  ​to ​  ​proceed ​  ​within  
these​  ​conceptual ​  ​frameworks. ​  ​​  ​Methodological ​  ​naturalism​  ​has ​  ​something ​  ​of ​  ​a​  ​symbiotic  
relationship ​  ​with​  ​epistemological ​  ​naturalism;; ​  ​the​  ​more​  ​good​  ​work​  ​that​  ​is ​  ​the​  ​product​  ​of  
the​  ​sciences, ​  ​the​  ​more​  ​evidence ​  ​for ​  ​the​  ​epistemic ​  ​credibility ​  ​of ​  ​their ​  ​methods ​  ​is  
gathered. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​have​  ​argued ​  ​that​  ​ontological ​  ​naturalism​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​hard ​  ​view ​  ​to ​  ​substantiate, ​  ​in  
any ​  ​way​  ​that​  ​makes ​  ​it​  ​a​  ​robust​  ​and ​  ​general​  ​metaphysical ​  ​framework. ​  ​​  ​However ​  ​in ​  ​§5.4  
of ​  ​this ​  ​thesis, ​  ​I ​  ​develop ​  ​a​  ​metaphysical ​  ​view ​  ​called ​  ​​aspectival​  ​realism ​.​  ​​  ​This ​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​view  
most​  ​closely ​  ​related ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​perspectival ​  ​realisms ​  ​that​  ​were​  ​discussed ​  ​in ​  ​section ​  ​three​  ​of  
this ​  ​chapter.  
  
In ​  ​the​  ​next​  ​chapter, ​  ​I ​  ​narrow ​  ​my ​  ​focus ​  ​to ​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalism, ​  ​and ​  ​argue​  ​that​  ​the  
sciences ​  ​exhibit​  ​methodological ​  ​pluralism. ​  ​​  ​This ​  ​discussion​  ​begins ​  ​to ​  ​shape​  ​my ​  ​positive  
view, ​  ​that​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalism​  ​is ​  ​best​  ​understood ​  ​as ​  ​encouraging ​  ​a​  ​plurality ​  ​of  
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systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice, ​  ​and ​  ​that​  ​many, ​  ​but​  ​not​  ​any, ​  ​different​  ​methods ​  ​can ​  ​amount​  ​to  


































In ​  ​this ​  ​chapter, ​  ​I ​  ​narrow ​  ​the​  ​focus ​  ​of ​  ​my ​  ​discussion​  ​to ​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalism. ​  ​​  ​I  
begin ​  ​by​  ​outlining ​  ​the​  ​argument​  ​for ​  ​reformist​  ​naturalism, ​  ​which ​  ​was​  ​introduced ​  ​in ​  ​the  
preceding ​  ​chapter. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​argument​  ​for ​  ​reform​  ​relies ​  ​on​  ​two ​  ​substantial​  ​claims. ​  ​​  ​One​  ​is ​  ​a  
claim​  ​that​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​significant​  ​difference ​  ​between ​  ​philosophy, ​  ​or ​  ​parts ​  ​thereof, ​  ​and ​  ​the  
sciences. ​  ​​  ​There​  ​are​  ​two ​  ​ways ​  ​in ​  ​which ​  ​a​  ​relevant ​  ​difference ​  ​between ​  ​the​  ​domains  
might​  ​be​  ​had, ​  ​either ​  ​by​  ​finding ​  ​significant​  ​differences ​  ​in ​  ​methodological ​  ​practices  
between ​  ​domains, ​  ​or ​  ​by​  ​finding ​  ​that​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​an ​  ​inapplicability ​  ​of ​  ​methodologically  
naturalistic ​  ​practices ​  ​within ​  ​philosophy ​  ​or ​  ​some​  ​part​  ​thereof. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​second ​  ​substantial  
claim​  ​that​  ​the​  ​argument​  ​for ​  ​reform​  ​requires, ​  ​is ​  ​that​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​something ​  ​unsatisfactory  
about​  ​this ​  ​difference ​  ​between ​  ​the​  ​domains. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​usual​  ​complaint ​  ​regarding ​  ​a​  ​purported  
difference ​  ​is ​  ​that​  ​whatever ​  ​constitutes ​  ​said​  ​difference ​  ​is ​  ​responsible, ​  ​at​  ​least ​  ​in ​  ​some  
part, ​  ​for ​  ​a​  ​lack ​  ​of ​  ​progress ​  ​in ​  ​philosophy.     
  
This ​  ​chapter ​  ​focuses ​  ​on​  ​the​  ​claims ​  ​of ​  ​descriptive ​  ​difference ​  ​between ​  ​philosophy ​  ​and ​  ​the  
sciences, ​  ​and ​  ​concludes ​  ​that​  ​pinpointing ​  ​a​  ​significant​  ​difference ​  ​is ​  ​less ​  ​than  
straightforward ​  ​due​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​plurality ​  ​of ​  ​methods ​  ​exhibited ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​sciences. ​  ​​  ​Further, ​  ​the  
systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​tailor ​  ​their ​  ​methods ​  ​depending ​  ​on​  ​the​  ​phenomena  
they ​  ​are​  ​interested ​  ​in, ​  ​and ​  ​their ​  ​particular ​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims. ​  ​​  ​It​  ​is ​  ​not​  ​straightforwardly  
obvious ​  ​how ​  ​various ​  ​methods ​  ​might​  ​be​  ​usefully ​  ​applied ​  ​within ​  ​philosophy. ​  ​​  ​However, ​  ​I  
discuss ​  ​a​  ​number ​  ​of ​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims ​  ​that​  ​are​  ​typical​  ​of ​  ​various ​  ​sciences, ​  ​and ​  ​argue​  ​that  
many ​  ​of ​  ​them​  ​will​  ​be​  ​relevantly ​  ​similar​  ​to ​  ​those​  ​of ​  ​various ​  ​philosophical​  ​domains. ​  ​​  ​The  
lack ​  ​of ​  ​clear ​  ​application ​  ​of ​  ​suitably ​  ​naturalistic ​  ​methods ​  ​within ​  ​philosophy ​  ​is ​  ​not​  ​seen  
as ​  ​an ​  ​area​  ​of ​  ​concern, ​  ​however. ​  ​​  ​In ​  ​fact, ​  ​it​  ​motivates ​  ​a​  ​need ​  ​for ​  ​work​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​philosophy  
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of ​  ​science, ​  ​epistemology, ​  ​metaphysics, ​  ​and ​  ​probably ​  ​most​  ​other ​  ​parts ​  ​of ​  ​philosophy, ​  ​to  
conduct​  ​a​  ​careful​  ​study​  ​of ​  ​various ​  ​philosophical​  ​domains ​  ​of ​  ​inquiry, ​  ​and ​  ​various  
scientific ​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​that​  ​might​  ​be​  ​relevantly ​  ​drawn ​  ​upon​  ​for ​  ​appropriate  
applications ​  ​of ​  ​methods. ​  ​​  ​This ​  ​will​  ​involve​  ​practitioners ​  ​of ​  ​philosophy ​  ​being ​  ​careful​  ​in  
describing ​  ​the​  ​various ​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims ​  ​of ​  ​their ​  ​areas ​  ​of ​  ​inquiry, ​  ​and ​  ​aspiring ​  ​to  
implement ​  ​naturalistic ​  ​methods ​  ​where​  ​they ​  ​might​  ​be​  ​fruitful. ​  ​​  ​If ​  ​philosophers ​  ​clearly  
state​  ​their ​  ​aims, ​  ​we​  ​can ​  ​evaluate ​  ​the​  ​effectiveness ​  ​of ​  ​their ​  ​methods ​  ​in ​  ​terms ​  ​of ​  ​how ​  ​well  
they ​  ​bring ​  ​about​  ​their ​  ​specific​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims. ​  ​​  ​This ​  ​will​  ​be​  ​at​  ​least ​  ​a​  ​partly ​  ​empirical  
matter, ​  ​which ​  ​might​  ​best​  ​be​  ​tested ​  ​by​  ​implementing ​  ​a​  ​plurality ​  ​of ​  ​methods, ​  ​and  
observing ​  ​their ​  ​effectiveness ​  ​in ​  ​realising ​  ​various ​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims. ​  ​​  ​Whether ​  ​or ​  ​not​  ​it​  ​is  
simply ​  ​an ​  ​empirical ​  ​matter ​  ​depends ​  ​on​  ​whether ​  ​the​  ​full​  ​description ​  ​of ​  ​those​  ​methods ​  ​is  
itself ​  ​simply ​  ​empirical. ​  ​​  ​If ​  ​the​  ​full​  ​description ​  ​is ​  ​itself ​  ​partly ​  ​evaluative ​  ​(e.g. ​  ​if ​  ​it​  ​refers  
to ​  ​evidence, ​  ​without​  ​‘naturalising’ ​  ​that​  ​evaluative ​  ​notion), ​  ​then ​  ​it’s ​  ​not​  ​obvious ​  ​that​  ​the  
evaluation ​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​considered ​  ​will​  ​be​  ​simply ​  ​empirical.  
  
Throughout​  ​this ​  ​discussion,​  ​I ​  ​begin ​  ​to ​  ​motivate ​  ​and ​  ​sketch ​  ​the​  ​methodological  
naturalism​  ​that​  ​I ​  ​go​  ​on​  ​to ​  ​advance. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​following ​  ​chapter ​  ​looks ​  ​more​  ​carefully ​  ​at​  ​the  
normative ​  ​component​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​reformist​  ​naturalist​  ​argument​  ​to ​  ​do​  ​with​  ​progress.​  ​​  ​With  
the​  ​discussion​  ​of ​  ​various ​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims ​  ​that​  ​are​  ​motivated ​  ​throughout​  ​this ​  ​chapter,  
measuring ​  ​progress ​  ​is ​  ​made​  ​clearer, ​  ​by​  ​way​  ​of ​  ​determining ​  ​how ​  ​effectively ​  ​a  
philosophical​  ​domain ​  ​achieves ​  ​its ​  ​various ​  ​aims. ​  ​​  ​In ​  ​this ​  ​chapter, ​  ​I ​  ​often ​  ​discuss  
philosophy ​  ​as ​  ​if ​  ​it​  ​were​  ​one​  ​domain, ​  ​which ​  ​of ​  ​course​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​not. ​  ​​  ​Some​  ​reformist  
arguments ​  ​are​  ​targeted ​  ​at​  ​specific​  ​parts ​  ​of ​  ​philosophy. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​discuss ​  ​some​  ​of ​  ​these  
arguments ​  ​that​  ​are​  ​directed ​  ​specifically ​  ​at​  ​metaphysics. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​reader ​  ​is ​  ​encouraged ​  ​to  
substitute​  ​some​  ​part​  ​of ​  ​philosophy ​  ​(e.g. ​  ​metaphysics, ​  ​epistemology, ​  ​philosophy ​  ​of  
science, ​  ​etc.) ​  ​with​  ​philosophy ​  ​in ​  ​case ​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​thought​  ​that​  ​these​  ​arguments ​  ​could ​  ​be  
applied ​  ​to ​  ​other ​  ​specific​  ​areas. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​aspire​  ​to, ​  ​and ​  ​don’t​  ​rule​  ​out, ​  ​an ​  ​extension ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​scope  
of ​  ​my ​  ​argument​  ​to ​  ​all​  ​of ​  ​analytic ​  ​philosophy, ​  ​but​  ​due​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​nature​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​thesis, ​  ​I ​  ​can’t  





§3.1​  ​The​  ​argument ​  ​for​  ​reformist ​  ​naturalism  
  
The​  ​argument​  ​for ​  ​reformist-­naturalism ​  ​has ​  ​a​  ​structure​  ​as ​  ​follows:  
  
P1) There​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​significant​  ​difference ​  ​between ​  ​philosophy ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​sciences  
P2) This ​  ​difference ​  ​is ​  ​responsible​  ​for ​  ​a​  ​comparative ​  ​lack ​  ​of ​  ​progress ​  ​in ​  ​philosophy  
P3) Philosophy​  ​ought​  ​to ​  ​do​  ​what​  ​it​  ​can ​  ​in ​  ​order ​  ​to ​  ​make​  ​more​  ​progress  
∴ Philosophy​  ​ought​  ​to ​  ​reform​  ​by​  ​way​  ​of ​  ​eliminating ​  ​this ​  ​significant​  ​difference  
  
In ​  ​this ​  ​chapter ​  ​I ​  ​am​  ​interested ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​first​  ​premise​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​argument​  ​for ​  ​reform, ​  ​and  
consider ​  ​first​  ​whether ​  ​there​  ​are​  ​significant​  ​methodological ​  ​differences ​  ​between  
philosophy ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​sciences. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​then ​  ​go​  ​on​  ​to ​  ​consider ​  ​whether ​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​significant  
difference ​  ​in ​  ​domain ​  ​between ​  ​philosophy ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​sciences, ​  ​such ​  ​that​  ​scientific ​  ​methods  
might​  ​be​  ​inappropriate ​  ​for ​  ​application ​  ​in ​  ​philosophy. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​argue​  ​that​  ​methods ​  ​exhibited ​  ​in  
the​  ​sciences ​  ​are​  ​many, ​  ​and ​  ​that​  ​pinpointing ​  ​significant​  ​differences ​  ​between ​  ​scientific  
and ​  ​philosophical​  ​domains ​  ​in ​  ​terms ​  ​of ​  ​method ​  ​is ​  ​not​  ​straightforward. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​then ​  ​argue​  ​that  
neither ​  ​is ​  ​it​  ​straightforward ​  ​to ​  ​pinpoint​  ​significant​  ​differences ​  ​between ​  ​the​  ​domains  
themselves, ​  ​such ​  ​that​  ​naturalistic ​  ​methods ​  ​might​  ​be​  ​considered ​  ​inapplicable ​  ​to  
philosophy, ​  ​or ​  ​some​  ​of ​  ​its ​  ​constituent​  ​parts. ​  ​​  ​From​  ​these​  ​discussions,​  ​a​  ​positive​  ​account  
of ​  ​aspirational ​  ​naturalism, ​  ​the​  ​view ​  ​that​  ​philosophy ​  ​should​  ​aspire​  ​to ​  ​use​  ​appropriate  
naturalistic ​  ​methods ​  ​where​  ​possible, ​  ​is ​  ​developed. ​  ​​  ​Precisely ​  ​what​  ​those​  ​methods ​  ​should  
be, ​  ​will​  ​be​  ​domain ​  ​specific, ​  ​depending ​  ​on​  ​the​  ​objects ​  ​of ​  ​inquiry ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims  
of ​  ​a​  ​particular ​  ​philosophical​  ​system​  ​of ​  ​practice. ​  ​​  ​This ​  ​is ​  ​how ​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalism  
works ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​sciences, ​  ​and ​  ​how ​  ​we​  ​should​  ​expect​  ​it​  ​to ​  ​work​  ​in ​  ​philosophy ​  ​also.  
Methodological ​  ​naturalism​  ​entails ​  ​a​  ​plurality ​  ​of ​  ​philosophical​  ​practices, ​  ​with​  ​methods  
tailored ​  ​to ​  ​best​  ​fit​  ​the​  ​aims, ​  ​and ​  ​objects ​  ​of ​  ​interest, ​  ​of ​  ​particular ​  ​philosophical​  ​inquiries.  
Despite​  ​arguing ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​first​  ​premise​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​argument​  ​for ​  ​reform​  ​is ​  ​false, ​  ​or ​  ​at​  ​best​  ​too  
vague​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​made​  ​both ​  ​determinate ​  ​and ​  ​credible, ​  ​I ​  ​promote​  ​some​  ​methodological  
heuristics ​  ​which ​  ​form​  ​part​  ​of ​  ​my ​  ​positive​  ​view. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​devote​  ​chapter ​  ​four ​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​thesis ​  ​to  
discussions ​  ​on​  ​scientific ​  ​and ​  ​philosophical​  ​progress.  
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§3.2​  ​Methods,​  ​methodologies, ​  ​and ​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice  
  
Before​  ​looking ​  ​into ​  ​the​  ​details ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​argument​  ​for ​  ​reform, ​  ​I ​  ​wish​  ​to ​  ​make​  ​clear ​  ​my  
intended ​  ​use​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​terms ​  ​‘methodology’ ​  ​and ​  ​“methods”. ​  ​​  ​​Here​  ​I ​  ​follow ​  ​Sandra  
Harding, ​  ​who​  ​differentiates ​  ​​method ​​  ​from​  ​​methodology​​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​following ​  ​way:  
  
Methods ​  ​are​  ​“techniques ​  ​for ​  ​gathering ​  ​evidence,” ​  ​whereas ​  ​methodology ​  ​is ​  ​“a  
theory ​  ​and ​  ​analysis ​  ​of ​  ​how ​  ​research ​  ​should​  ​proceed.” ​  ​Epistemology ​  ​is ​  ​the  
“theory ​  ​of ​  ​knowledge​  ​or ​  ​justificatory ​  ​strategy”​  ​that​  ​underlies ​  ​the​  ​methodology  
(Harding ​  ​1987,​  ​2).  
  
Underlying ​  ​a​  ​methodology, ​  ​is ​  ​an ​  ​epistemology, ​  ​which ​  ​Harding ​  ​defines ​  ​as ​  ​the​  ​“theory ​  ​of  
knowledge​  ​or ​  ​justificatory ​  ​strategy”​  ​(1987 ​  ​:​  ​2). ​  ​​  ​This ​  ​should​  ​not​  ​be​  ​viewed ​  ​as ​  ​an  
epistemological ​  ​foundation ​  ​for ​  ​the​  ​methodology, ​  ​but​  ​more​  ​a​  ​framework ​  ​of ​  ​adjustable  
epistemic ​  ​aims ​  ​that​  ​set​  ​success ​  ​conditions ​  ​for ​  ​the​  ​methodology. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​take​  ​“methods”​  ​to ​  ​be  
understood ​  ​broadly, ​  ​following ​  ​Michael​  ​Dickson, ​  ​who​  ​understands ​  ​methods ​  ​to:  
  
include​  ​such ​  ​things ​  ​as ​  ​principles ​  ​of ​  ​experimental ​  ​design, ​  ​methods ​  ​for  
determining ​  ​causal​  ​relations, ​  ​methods ​  ​for ​  ​analyzing ​  ​data, ​  ​and ​  ​even ​  ​techniques  
for ​  ​proof ​  ​in ​  ​mathematics ​  ​and ​  ​theoretical ​  ​physics.   
(2006 ​  ​:​  ​45)  
  
Further, ​  ​I ​  ​encourage​  ​a​  ​wider ​  ​understanding ​  ​of ​  ​both ​  ​scientific ​  ​and ​  ​philosophical​  ​domains  
than ​  ​more​  ​traditional ​  ​accounts ​  ​that​  ​treat​  ​them​  ​as ​  ​bodies ​  ​of ​  ​propositions ​  ​and ​  ​focus  
mostly ​  ​on​  ​justificatory ​  ​strategies ​  ​offered ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​support​  ​of ​  ​their ​  ​propositional​  ​content, ​  ​to  
include​  ​a​  ​larger ​  ​focus ​  ​on​  ​actual ​  ​practice, ​  ​which ​  ​involves ​  ​attention ​  ​to ​  ​certain ​  ​aspects ​  ​that  
this ​  ​propositional​  ​focus ​  ​allows ​  ​on​  ​its ​  ​own.  
  
Hasok​  ​Chang ​  ​(2014) ​  ​encourages ​  ​a​  ​similar​  ​wider ​  ​understanding, ​  ​and ​  ​argues ​  ​that​  ​the  
more​  ​restrictive ​  ​traditional ​  ​accounts ​  ​of ​  ​science​  ​leave​  ​out​  ​important​  ​features ​  ​of ​  ​scientific  
practice. ​  ​​  ​He​  ​complains ​  ​that:  
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Standard ​  ​Anglophone​  ​philosophical​  ​analyses ​  ​of ​  ​science​  ​have​  ​been ​  ​unduly  
limited ​  ​by​  ​the​  ​common ​  ​habit​  ​of ​  ​viewing ​  ​science​  ​as ​  ​a​  ​body​  ​of ​  ​propositions,  
focusing ​  ​on​  ​the​  ​truth-­value ​  ​of ​  ​those​  ​propositions ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​logical​  ​relationships  
between ​  ​them. ​  ​The​  ​premier ​  ​subject​  ​of ​  ​discussion​  ​in ​  ​such ​  ​philosophy ​  ​of ​  ​science  
has ​  ​been ​  ​theories ​  ​as ​  ​organized ​  ​bodies ​  ​of ​  ​propositions. ​  ​This ​  ​has ​  ​led ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​neglect  
of ​  ​experimentation ​  ​and ​  ​other ​  ​non-­verbal​  ​and ​  ​non-­propositional​  ​dimensions ​  ​of  
science​  ​in ​  ​philosophical​  ​analyses.    
(2014 ​  ​:​  ​67)  
  
Chang’s ​  ​move​  ​to ​  ​step​  ​away ​  ​from​  ​viewing ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​as ​  ​solely ​  ​consisting ​  ​of ​  ​bodies ​  ​of  
propositional​  ​knowledge​  ​which ​  ​can ​  ​be​  ​tested ​  ​for ​  ​truth ​  ​or ​  ​falsity, ​  ​enables ​  ​an ​  ​account​  ​to  
be​  ​given ​  ​of ​  ​scientific ​  ​knowledge​  ​that​  ​can ​  ​include​  ​a​  ​much ​  ​richer ​  ​description ​  ​of ​  ​the  
growth ​  ​of ​  ​science. ​  ​​  ​Various ​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​achieve ​  ​their ​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims ​  ​by  
generating ​  ​techniques ​  ​of ​  ​how ​  ​best​  ​to ​  ​measure, ​  ​test, ​  ​predict, ​  ​model, ​  ​or ​  ​theorise​  ​about  
their ​  ​objects ​  ​of ​  ​inquiry. ​  ​​  ​These​  ​important​  ​parts ​  ​of ​  ​science​  ​and ​  ​its ​  ​practice ​  ​are​  ​not​  ​easily  
reduced ​  ​to ​  ​propositional​  ​knowledge​  ​that​  ​is ​  ​usefully ​  ​thought​  ​of ​  ​as ​  ​being ​  ​true​  ​or ​  ​false,  
and ​  ​are​  ​thus ​  ​not​  ​captured ​  ​by​  ​viewing ​  ​of ​  ​scientific ​  ​knowledge​  ​as ​  ​merely ​  ​propositional.  
Hasok​  ​Chang ​  ​borrows ​  ​a​  ​distinction ​  ​from​  ​Gilbert​  ​Ryle​  ​(1945), ​  ​between ​  ​knowledge-­that ​  ​-­  
i.e. ​  ​propositional​  ​knowledge, ​  ​and ​  ​knowledge-­how ​  ​-­ ​  ​which ​  ​Chang ​  ​labels  
active-­knowledge, ​  ​and ​  ​takes ​  ​the​  ​latter ​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​an ​  ​important​  ​aspect​  ​of ​  ​scientific ​  ​knowledge  
which ​  ​is ​  ​missing ​  ​from​  ​purely ​  ​propositional​  ​accounts.     
  
Chang’s ​  ​work​  ​here​  ​is ​  ​novel​  ​and ​  ​exciting, ​  ​but​  ​might​  ​face​  ​criticisms ​  ​by​  ​those​  ​who​  ​argue  
that​  ​knowledge-­how ​  ​can ​  ​itself ​  ​be​  ​reduced ​  ​to ​  ​knowledge-­that. ​  ​​  ​However, ​  ​whether ​  ​such ​  ​a  
reduction ​  ​of ​  ​Chang’s ​  ​active-­knowledge ​  ​to ​  ​propositional​  ​knowledge​  ​is ​  ​possible​  ​should  
be​  ​treated ​  ​as ​  ​an ​  ​open ​  ​question, ​  ​and ​  ​his ​  ​conceptual ​  ​distinction ​  ​usefully ​  ​illuminates  
important​  ​aspects ​  ​of ​  ​scientific ​  ​practice ​  ​that​  ​seem,​  ​​prima​  ​facie​,​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​overlooked ​  ​when  
the​  ​sciences ​  ​are​  ​viewed ​  ​solely ​  ​through ​  ​the​  ​lenses ​  ​of ​  ​discovery ​  ​and ​  ​justification. ​  ​​  ​With  
the​  ​distinction ​  ​between ​  ​​ontological​​  ​and ​  ​​explanatory​​  ​reduction ​  ​that​  ​was​  ​discussed ​  ​in ​  ​the  
§2.3​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​thesis ​  ​in ​  ​mind, ​  ​Chang’s ​  ​active-­knowledge ​  ​would​  ​have​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​shown​  ​to ​  ​be  
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explanatorily ​  ​reducible ​  ​to ​  ​propositional​  ​knowledge, ​  ​for ​  ​it​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​satisfactorily ​  ​done​  ​away  
with.    
  
Much ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​twentieth ​  ​century ​  ​philosophy ​  ​of ​  ​science​  ​involved ​  ​focusing ​  ​on​  ​how  
scientific ​  ​theories ​  ​are​  ​justified. ​  ​​  ​Once​  ​a​  ​theory ​  ​is ​  ​proposed, ​  ​such ​  ​philosophers ​  ​are  
interested ​  ​in ​  ​analysing ​  ​bodies ​  ​of ​  ​evidence ​  ​for ​  ​the​  ​theory, ​  ​performing ​  ​controlled  
experiments ​  ​to ​  ​compare​  ​observational ​  ​data​  ​with​  ​predictions, ​  ​checking ​  ​for ​  ​logical  
consistency, ​  ​and ​  ​looking ​  ​at​  ​how ​  ​the​  ​theory ​  ​fits ​  ​with​  ​currently ​  ​accepted ​  ​science. ​  ​​  ​The  
process ​  ​of ​  ​scientific ​  ​discovery, ​  ​the​  ​circumstances ​  ​and ​  ​considerations ​  ​under ​  ​which ​  ​a  
scientific ​  ​theory ​  ​is ​  ​produced, ​  ​were​  ​thought​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​uninteresting, ​  ​or ​  ​at​  ​least ​  ​uninformative,  
in ​  ​terms ​  ​of ​  ​highlighting ​  ​the​  ​important​  ​epistemic ​  ​features ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​sciences. ​  ​​  ​Moreover,  
social​  ​factors ​  ​that​  ​contribute​  ​to ​  ​scientific ​  ​knowledge​  ​such ​  ​as ​  ​interaction ​  ​and ​  ​peer  
review, ​  ​are​  ​excluded. ​  ​​  ​These​  ​seem​  ​like​  ​obvious ​  ​candidates ​  ​for ​  ​contributing ​  ​factors ​  ​to  
eliminating ​  ​personal​  ​bias, ​  ​a​  ​strategy ​  ​which ​  ​many ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​employ ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​hope​  ​to  
attain ​  ​greater ​  ​​objectivity ​.​  ​​  ​These​  ​are​  ​not​  ​easily ​  ​captured ​  ​when ​  ​viewing ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​as  
bodies ​  ​of ​  ​propositions. ​  ​​  ​Further, ​  ​the​  ​discovery/justification ​  ​distinction ​  ​is ​  ​not​  ​a​  ​very ​  ​neat  
fit​  ​when ​  ​observing ​  ​how ​  ​scientific ​  ​work​  ​is ​  ​carried ​  ​out. ​  ​​  ​Temporally, ​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​not​  ​a​  ​clear  
distinction ​  ​between ​  ​discovery ​  ​ending, ​  ​and ​  ​justification ​  ​beginning. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​conceptual  
distinction ​  ​between ​  ​discovery ​  ​and ​  ​justification ​  ​is ​  ​indeed ​  ​a​  ​useful​  ​one. ​  ​​  ​With ​  ​it​  ​in ​  ​place,  
we​  ​can ​  ​focus ​  ​on​  ​evidence ​  ​for ​  ​various ​  ​theories ​  ​or ​  ​models, ​  ​or ​  ​the​  ​predictions ​  ​they ​  ​make,  
but​  ​it​  ​does ​  ​not​  ​provide​  ​a​  ​natural​  ​understanding ​  ​of ​  ​how ​  ​scientific ​  ​work​  ​is ​  ​carried ​  ​out​  ​in  
practice, ​  ​and ​  ​nor ​  ​does ​  ​it​  ​capture​  ​everything ​  ​that​  ​is ​  ​important​  ​in ​  ​contributing ​  ​to ​  ​the  
epistemic ​  ​success ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​sciences.    
  
In ​  ​more​  ​recent​  ​philosophy ​  ​of ​  ​science​  ​literature, ​  ​more​  ​attention ​  ​is ​  ​being ​  ​given ​  ​to ​  ​a​  ​study  
of ​  ​scientific ​  ​practice. ​  ​​  ​Rather ​  ​than ​  ​imposing ​  ​​a​  ​priori​​  ​conceptual ​  ​distinctions ​  ​and ​  ​using  
them​  ​to ​  ​analyse​  ​science, ​  ​more​  ​attention ​  ​is ​  ​being ​  ​paid ​  ​to ​  ​observing ​  ​what​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​that  
scientists ​  ​do.​  ​​  ​Given ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​naturalistic ​  ​starting ​  ​point​  ​involved ​  ​admiring ​  ​the​  ​sciences,  
and ​  ​observing ​  ​what​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​that​  ​they ​   ​do,​  ​carefully ​  ​trying ​  ​to ​  ​withhold ​  ​​a​  ​priori​​  ​analysis ​  ​as ​  ​far  
as ​  ​possible, ​  ​this ​  ​focus ​  ​on​  ​scientific ​  ​practice ​  ​seems​  ​in ​  ​keeping ​  ​with​  ​the​  ​motivations ​  ​of  
the​  ​naturalist. ​  ​​  ​This ​  ​chapter ​  ​considers ​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalism​  ​from​  ​both ​  ​​a​  ​priori​​  ​and  
practice-­focused ​  ​empirical ​  ​perspectives.     
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§3.3​  ​Williamson’s ​  ​dilemma  
  
In ​  ​a​  ​recent​  ​dialogue​  ​between ​  ​Timothy ​  ​Williamson ​  ​and ​  ​Alex​  ​Rosenberg ​  ​(see​  ​Williamson  
2014,​  ​and ​  ​Rosenberg ​  ​2014), ​  ​Williamson ​  ​spells ​  ​out​  ​a​  ​problem​  ​for ​  ​reformist  
methodological ​  ​naturalism. ​  ​​  ​He​  ​argues ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​reformist​  ​naturalist​  ​faces ​  ​a​  ​dilemma. ​  ​​  ​On  
the​  ​one​  ​hand, ​  ​they ​  ​can ​  ​restrict​  ​a​  ​definition ​  ​of ​  ​naturalism​  ​so​  ​that​  ​it​  ​can ​  ​genuinely ​  ​offer  
the​  ​significant​  ​descriptive ​  ​difference ​  ​between ​  ​philosophy ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​that​  ​the  
reformist​  ​requires ​  ​for ​  ​their ​  ​argument​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​plausible. ​  ​​  ​An​  ​unwanted ​  ​consequence​  ​of  
restricting ​  ​a​  ​set​  ​of ​  ​naturalistic ​  ​methods ​  ​in ​  ​this ​  ​way, ​  ​is ​  ​that​  ​it​  ​would​  ​end ​  ​up​  ​ruling ​  ​out  
methods ​  ​that​  ​are​  ​used ​  ​successfully ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​as ​  ​being ​  ​non-­naturalistic. ​  ​​  ​This ​  ​is ​  ​in  
conflict ​  ​with​  ​the​  ​naturalistic ​  ​starting-­point. ​  ​​  ​Rather ​  ​than ​  ​accepting ​  ​the​  ​methods ​  ​of  
science​  ​that​  ​we​  ​can ​  ​observe, ​  ​such ​  ​a​  ​view ​  ​starts ​  ​with​  ​​a​  ​priori​  ​​intuitions ​  ​about​  ​scientific  
method ​  ​either ​  ​as ​  ​practiced, ​  ​or ​  ​as ​  ​it​  ​allegedly ​  ​should​  ​be​  ​practiced ​  ​in ​  ​an ​  ​‘ideal’ ​  ​or ​  ​‘future’  
science, ​  ​and ​  ​ends ​  ​up​  ​ruling ​  ​out​  ​successful​  ​naturalistic ​  ​methods ​  ​as ​  ​illegitimate. ​  ​​  ​On​  ​the  
other ​  ​hand, ​  ​if ​  ​the​  ​reformist​  ​adopts ​  ​the​  ​naturalistic ​  ​starting-­point, ​  ​and ​  ​describes ​  ​scientific  
methods ​  ​as ​  ​practiced, ​  ​Williamson ​  ​argues ​  ​that​  ​their ​  ​definition ​  ​loses ​  ​bite, ​  ​leaving ​  ​the  
definition ​  ​of ​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalism​  ​as ​  ​prescribing ​  ​a​  ​vague​  ​grab-­bag ​  ​of ​  ​practices,  
that​  ​no​  ​longer ​  ​offers ​  ​any ​  ​argument​  ​for ​  ​genuine​  ​reform.     
  
This ​  ​chapter ​  ​explores ​  ​the​  ​two ​  ​horns ​  ​of ​  ​Williamson’s ​  ​dilemma, ​  ​and ​  ​offers ​  ​a​  ​considered  
third ​  ​option. ​  ​​  ​That​  ​is, ​  ​I ​  ​argue​  ​that​  ​Williamson’s ​  ​dilemma ​  ​is ​  ​instead ​  ​a​  ​trilemma, ​  ​and ​  ​I  
advocate ​  ​this ​  ​newly ​  ​minted ​  ​‘third ​  ​way’ ​  ​as ​  ​a​  ​solution. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​argue​  ​that​  ​methodological  
pluralism​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​realistic ​  ​description ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​as ​  ​practiced. ​  ​​  ​Whilst​  ​this ​  ​doesn’t  
amount​  ​to ​  ​offering ​  ​a​  ​precise​  ​and ​  ​generally ​  ​implementable ​  ​account​  ​of ​  ​naturalistic  
methods ​  ​suitable​  ​for ​  ​all​  ​domains ​  ​of ​  ​inquiry ​  ​immediately, ​  ​it​  ​does ​  ​give​  ​the​  ​naturalist  
some​  ​guidelines ​  ​as ​  ​to ​  ​various ​  ​methods ​  ​that​  ​can ​  ​stake​  ​claim​  ​for ​  ​epistemic ​  ​credibility  
drawn ​  ​from​  ​their ​  ​successful​  ​application ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​sciences, ​  ​and ​  ​encourages ​  ​a​  ​plurality ​  ​of  
approaches ​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​implemented. ​  ​​  ​Further, ​  ​it​  ​allows ​  ​that​  ​some​  ​methods ​  ​might​  ​be​  ​criticised  
in ​  ​local​  ​contexts.     
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Rather ​  ​than ​  ​offering ​  ​significant​  ​reform​  ​of ​  ​philosophical​  ​domain ​  ​or ​  ​method, ​  ​I ​  ​take​  ​on  
board ​  ​some​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​criticisms ​  ​that​  ​various ​  ​reformist​  ​naturalists ​  ​have​  ​made​  ​and ​  ​sketch  
some​  ​methodological ​  ​heuristics ​  ​which ​  ​help ​  ​to ​  ​shape​  ​my ​  ​positive​  ​view. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​am​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​view  
that​  ​many ​  ​philosophical​  ​methods ​  ​are​  ​perfectly ​  ​suitable​  ​by​  ​naturalistic ​  ​lights ​  ​already,  
and ​  ​thus ​  ​do​  ​not​  ​require​  ​that​  ​the​  ​naturalism​  ​that​  ​I ​  ​endorse​  ​provide​  ​a​  ​silver-­bullet, ​  ​to  
provide​  ​“bite”. ​  ​​  ​Rather ​  ​than ​  ​trying ​  ​to ​  ​bite​  ​off ​  ​more​  ​than ​  ​one​  ​can ​  ​chew, ​  ​the  
methodological ​  ​naturalism​  ​that​  ​I ​  ​am​  ​in ​  ​favour ​  ​of ​  ​is ​  ​more​  ​interested ​  ​in ​  ​local​  ​nibblings.  
Williamson ​  ​seems​  ​to ​  ​suggest​  ​that​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalism​  ​must​  ​either ​  ​be​  ​all  
inclusive, ​  ​or ​  ​implausibly ​  ​restrictive. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​pluralism​  ​which ​  ​I ​  ​endorse​  ​lies ​  ​somewhere​  ​in  
the​  ​middle. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​spend ​  ​more​  ​time​  ​defending ​  ​this ​  ​middle​  ​ground ​  ​in ​  ​§5.5​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​thesis, ​  ​when  
I ​  ​defend ​  ​methodological ​  ​pluralism​  ​from​  ​criticisms ​  ​that​  ​it​  ​collapses ​  ​into ​  ​relativism.  
  
Williamson ​  ​describes ​  ​the​  ​dilemma ​  ​for ​  ​the​  ​reformist​  ​naturalist​  ​as ​  ​follows:  
  
If ​  ​they ​  ​are​  ​too ​  ​inclusive​  ​in ​  ​what​  ​they ​  ​count​  ​as ​  ​science, ​  ​naturalism​  ​loses ​  ​its ​  ​bite.  
Naturalists ​  ​typically ​  ​criticize ​  ​some​  ​traditional ​  ​forms ​  ​of ​  ​philosophy ​  ​as  
insufficiently ​  ​scientific, ​  ​because​  ​they ​  ​ignore​  ​experimental ​  ​tests. ​  ​​  ​How ​  ​can ​  ​they  
maintain ​  ​such ​  ​objections ​  ​unless ​  ​they ​  ​restrict​  ​scientific ​  ​method ​  ​to  
hypothetico-­deductivism? ​  ​​  ​But​  ​if ​  ​they ​  ​are​  ​too ​  ​exclusive​  ​in ​  ​what​  ​they ​  ​count​  ​as  
science, ​  ​naturalism​  ​loses ​  ​its ​  ​credibility, ​  ​by​  ​imposing ​  ​a​  ​method ​  ​appropriate ​  ​to  
natural​  ​science​  ​on​  ​areas ​  ​where​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​inappropriate. ​  ​​  ​When ​  ​on​  ​the​  ​attack, ​  ​they  
assume​  ​an ​  ​exclusive​  ​understanding ​  ​of ​  ​science​  ​as ​  ​hypothetico-­deductive. ​  ​​  ​When  
under ​  ​attack ​  ​themselves, ​  ​they ​  ​fall​  ​back ​  ​on​  ​a​  ​more​  ​inclusive​  ​understanding ​  ​of  
science​  ​that​  ​drastically ​  ​waters ​  ​down​  ​naturalism. ​  ​​  ​Such​  ​manoeuvring ​  ​makes  
naturalism​  ​an ​  ​obscure​  ​article ​  ​of ​  ​faith. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​don’t​  ​call​  ​myself ​  ​a​  ​naturalist​  ​because​  ​I  
don’t​  ​want​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​implicated ​  ​in ​  ​equivocal ​  ​dogma. ​  ​​  ​Dismissing​  ​an ​  ​idea​  ​as  
‘inconsistent​  ​with​  ​naturalism’ ​  ​is ​  ​little ​  ​better ​  ​than ​  ​dismissing ​  ​it​  ​as ​  ​‘inconsistent  
with​  ​Christianity’.  




I ​  ​begin ​  ​by​  ​discussing​  ​the​  ​second ​  ​horn ​  ​of ​  ​WIlliamson’s ​  ​dilemma, ​  ​and ​  ​I ​  ​agree​  ​that  
reformist​  ​naturalists ​  ​often ​  ​offer ​  ​an ​  ​implausibly ​  ​restrictive ​  ​description ​  ​of ​  ​methodological  
naturalism​  ​that​  ​lacks ​  ​credibility. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​demonstrate ​  ​this ​  ​by​  ​showing​  ​examples ​  ​of ​  ​reformist  
naturalists ​  ​who​  ​propose​  ​such ​  ​austere​  ​definitions ​  ​of ​  ​naturalism, ​  ​and ​  ​by​  ​showing​  ​that​  ​they  
are​  ​implausibly ​  ​restrictive. ​  ​​  ​Such​  ​definitions, ​  ​I ​  ​will​  ​argue, ​  ​often ​  ​appeal​  ​to  
methodological ​  ​monism, ​  ​the​  ​idea​  ​that​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​an ​  ​overarching ​  ​singular ​  ​scientific ​  ​method.  
Such​  ​appeals ​  ​to ​  ​monism​  ​lack ​  ​evidentiary ​  ​support​  ​from​  ​the​  ​sciences. ​  ​​  ​A ​  ​careful  
inspection ​  ​and ​  ​description ​  ​of ​  ​scientific ​  ​methods ​  ​yields ​  ​methodological ​  ​pluralism.  
Rather ​  ​than ​  ​there​  ​being ​  ​one​  ​singular ​  ​scientific ​  ​method, ​  ​there​  ​are​  ​a​  ​number ​  ​of ​  ​different  
systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice, ​  ​with​  ​a​  ​number ​  ​of ​  ​different​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims, ​  ​implementing ​  ​a​  ​number  
of ​  ​different​  ​methods, ​  ​many ​  ​of ​  ​which ​  ​can ​  ​stake​  ​claim​  ​to ​  ​epistemic ​  ​merit.     
  
After ​  ​dismissing ​  ​kinds ​  ​of ​  ​naturalism​  ​that​  ​fail​  ​on​  ​these​  ​grounds,​  ​I ​  ​look ​  ​to ​  ​forge​  ​a​  ​middle  
ground, ​  ​whereby ​  ​I ​  ​propose​  ​a​  ​credible ​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalism, ​  ​that​  ​is ​  ​not​  ​an ​  ​obscure  
article ​  ​of ​  ​faith. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​aspirational ​  ​naturalism​  ​which ​  ​I ​  ​defend ​  ​is ​  ​rather ​  ​inclusive, ​  ​but​  ​it  
does ​  ​not​  ​find ​  ​itself ​  ​“implicated ​  ​in ​  ​equivocal ​  ​dogma”​  ​(Williamson ​  ​2014​  ​:​  ​30) ​  ​either.  
The​  ​methodological ​  ​heuristics ​  ​which ​  ​I ​  ​outline​  ​in ​  ​section ​  ​four ​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​chapter ​  ​draw  
support​  ​from​  ​their ​  ​successful​  ​application ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​sciences. ​  ​​  ​They ​  ​do​  ​not​  ​offer ​  ​a​  ​cut​  ​and  
dry ​  ​monistic​  ​philosophical​  ​methodology, ​  ​but​  ​neither ​  ​do​  ​they ​  ​collapse​  ​into ​  ​a​  ​vicious  
relativism, ​  ​or ​  ​anarchism, ​  ​thus ​  ​avoiding ​  ​the​  ​first​  ​horn ​  ​of ​  ​Williamson’s ​  ​dilemma. ​  ​​  ​The  
methodological ​  ​pluralism​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​can ​  ​stake​  ​claim​  ​to ​  ​epistemic ​  ​respectability  
through ​  ​its ​  ​output. ​  ​​  ​If ​  ​this ​  ​results ​  ​in ​  ​a​  ​somewhat​  ​vague​  ​collection ​  ​of ​  ​methods, ​  ​without​  ​a  
definitive ​  ​overarching ​  ​rule​  ​for ​  ​when ​  ​they ​  ​are​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​applied, ​  ​this ​  ​need ​  ​not​  ​concern ​  ​the  
methodological ​  ​naturalist. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​naturalistic ​  ​starting-­point​  ​involved ​  ​first​  ​respecting ​  ​the  
methods ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​sciences, ​  ​and ​  ​claiming ​  ​that​  ​they ​  ​are​  ​credible. ​  ​​  ​Thus,​  ​whatever ​  ​these  
methods ​  ​are, ​  ​pluralistic ​  ​or ​  ​otherwise, ​  ​they ​  ​are​  ​methods ​  ​which ​  ​the​  ​naturalistically  





§3.4​  ​Reformist ​  ​methodological​  ​naturalisms  
  
Alex​  ​Rosenberg ​  ​describes ​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalism​  ​thus:  
  
Naturalism​  ​is ​  ​the​  ​philosophical​  ​theory ​  ​that​  ​treats ​  ​science​  ​as ​  ​our ​  ​most​  ​reliable  
source​  ​of ​  ​knowledge​  ​and ​  ​scientific ​  ​method ​  ​as ​  ​the​  ​most​  ​effective ​  ​route​  ​to  
knowledge.  
(2014 ​  ​:​  ​32)  
  
Within ​  ​Rosenberg’s ​  ​claim​  ​that​  ​“scientific ​  ​method ​  ​[is] ​  ​the​  ​most​  ​effective ​  ​route​  ​to  
knowledge”​  ​(32), ​  ​is ​  ​an ​  ​implicit ​  ​assumption ​  ​of ​  ​methodological ​  ​monism. ​  ​​  ​Science​  ​is  
described ​  ​as ​  ​having ​  ​a​  ​singular ​  ​method, ​  ​and ​  ​its ​  ​method ​  ​is ​  ​described ​  ​as ​  ​being ​  ​a​  ​singular  
most​  ​effective ​  ​route​  ​to ​  ​knowledge. ​  ​​  ​When ​  ​pressed ​  ​on​  ​defining ​  ​the​  ​scientific ​  ​method,  
Rosenberg ​  ​stipulates ​  ​that​  ​it​  ​is:  
  
the​  ​experimental/observational ​  ​methods ​  ​all​  ​the​  ​natural​  ​sciences ​  ​share, ​  ​the​  ​social  
sciences ​  ​increasingly ​  ​adopt, ​  ​and ​  ​that​  ​naturalists ​  ​devote​  ​themselves ​  ​to ​  ​making  
specific.  
  
(2014 ​  ​:​  ​33)  
  
That​  ​he​  ​includes ​  ​‘methods’ ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​plural​  ​does ​  ​not​  ​amount​  ​to ​  ​an ​  ​endorsement​  ​of  
pluralism, ​  ​as ​  ​he​  ​is ​  ​monistic​  ​with​  ​regards ​  ​to ​  ​there​  ​being ​  ​a​  ​singular ​  ​set​  ​of ​  ​methods ​  ​that  
“all​  ​the​  ​natural​  ​sciences ​  ​share”​  ​(33).  
  
Others ​  ​who​  ​have​  ​defended ​  ​reformist​  ​naturalist​  ​positions ​  ​often ​  ​restrict​  ​their ​  ​criteria ​  ​for  
application ​  ​to ​  ​one​  ​particular ​  ​area​  ​of ​  ​philosophy. ​  ​​  ​Quine​  ​famously ​  ​argued ​  ​that  
epistemology ​  ​was​  ​in ​  ​need ​  ​of ​  ​reform​  ​(Quine​  ​1969). ​  ​​  ​James​  ​Maclaurin ​  ​and ​  ​Heather ​  ​Dyke  
(2012) ​  ​have​  ​proposed ​  ​methodological ​  ​constraints ​  ​within ​  ​metaphysics ​  ​by​  ​stipulating ​  ​that  
naturalistic ​  ​metaphysics ​  ​must​  ​directly ​  ​engage​  ​with​  ​observational​  ​methods. ​  ​​  ​Maclaurin  
and ​  ​Dyke’s ​  ​definition ​  ​of ​  ​non-­naturalistic ​  ​metaphysics ​  ​shares ​  ​a​  ​strong​  ​resemblance ​  ​to  
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the​  ​verificationism ​  ​about​  ​meaning ​  ​proposed ​  ​by​  ​A.J.​  ​Ayer ​  ​in ​  ​his ​  ​​Language,​  ​Truth​  ​and  
Logic​  ​​(1952). ​  ​​  ​Maclaurin ​  ​and ​  ​Dyke’s ​  ​proposal​  ​is ​  ​as ​  ​follows:  
  
[W]e​  ​define​  ​[non-­naturalistic ​  ​metaphysics] ​  ​as ​  ​any ​  ​philosophical​  ​theory ​  ​that  
makes ​  ​some​  ​ontological ​  ​claim​  ​(as ​  ​opposed ​  ​to ​  ​conceptual ​  ​claim), ​  ​where​  ​that
ontological ​  ​claim​  ​has ​  ​no​  ​observable​  ​consequences.  
(2012 ​  ​:​  ​291)  
  
As ​  ​well​  ​as ​  ​tying ​  ​their ​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalism​  ​with​  ​respect​  ​to ​  ​metaphysics ​  ​to  
observation, ​  ​Maclaurin ​  ​and ​  ​Dyke​   ​stipulate​  ​one​  ​further ​  ​feature​  ​of ​  ​non-­naturalistic  
metaphysics. ​  ​​  ​They ​  ​argue​  ​that​  ​appeals ​  ​to ​  ​intuition ​  ​as ​  ​part​  ​of ​  ​a​  ​justificatory ​  ​strategy ​  ​are  
“discontinuous ​  ​with​  ​science” ​  ​(291). ​  ​​  ​For​  ​now ​  ​I ​  ​consider ​  ​the​  ​first​  ​part​  ​of ​  ​their ​  ​claim, ​  ​to  
do​  ​with​  ​their ​  ​requirements ​  ​about​  ​observation. ​  ​​  ​In ​  ​section ​  ​four ​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​chapter, ​  ​I ​  ​consider  
whether ​  ​some​  ​aspects ​  ​of ​  ​philosophical​  ​method ​  ​-­ ​  ​including ​  ​the​  ​use​  ​of ​  ​intuition ​  ​-­ ​  ​are  
somehow ​  ​antithetical ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​sciences.  
  
In ​  ​a​  ​recently ​  ​published ​  ​paper, ​  ​Amanda​  ​Bryant​  ​defines ​  ​an ​  ​area​  ​that​  ​she​  ​calls ​  ​“free-­range  
metaphysics” ​  ​(2017), ​  ​raising ​  ​a​  ​host​  ​of ​  ​methodological ​  ​concerns ​  ​for ​  ​philosophers  
involved ​  ​in ​  ​this ​  ​fowl​  ​practice. ​  ​​  ​She​  ​describes ​  ​her ​  ​philosopher ​  ​belongs ​  ​in ​  ​a​  ​battery ​  ​farm  
view ​  ​as ​  ​follows:  
  
Free​  ​range​  ​metaphysics ​  ​is ​  ​metaphysics ​  ​that​  ​science​  ​has ​  ​only ​  ​a​  ​nominal​  ​role​  ​in  
constraining. ​  ​Academic ​  ​metaphysics ​  ​that​  ​floats ​  ​entirely ​  ​free​  ​of ​  ​science​  ​does ​  ​not  
really ​  ​exist, ​  ​since​  ​most​  ​educated ​  ​people​  ​have​  ​undergone​  ​at​  ​least ​  ​some​  ​basic  
level​  ​of ​  ​science​  ​education, ​  ​which ​  ​contributes ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​background ​  ​of ​  ​belief ​  ​against  
which ​  ​they ​  ​form​  ​metaphysical ​  ​judgments. ​  ​But​  ​in ​  ​free​  ​range​  ​metaphysics,  
science​  ​plays ​  ​a​  ​minimal ​  ​role. ​  ​In ​  ​the​  ​construction ​  ​of ​  ​free​  ​range​  ​metaphysical  
theories, ​  ​the​  ​institutional ​  ​products ​  ​of ​  ​science​  ​—​  ​data, ​  ​theories, ​  ​books ​  ​and  
journal​  ​articles ​  ​—​  ​are​  ​not​  ​directly ​  ​or   explicitly ​  ​appealed ​  ​to. ​  ​That​  ​is, ​  ​free​  ​range  
metaphysics ​  ​does ​  ​not​  ​directly ​  ​engage​  ​with​  ​science. ​  ​Instead, ​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​constrained  
primarily ​  ​by​  ​logical​  ​demands, ​  ​such ​  ​as ​  ​the​  ​demand ​  ​for ​  ​consistency, ​  ​aesthetic  
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demands, ​  ​such ​  ​as ​  ​the​  ​demand ​  ​for ​  ​simplicity, ​  ​and ​  ​psychological​  ​demands, ​  ​such  
as ​  ​the​  ​demands ​  ​for ​  ​intuitive ​  ​plausibility ​  ​and   explanatory ​  ​power.     
(Bryant​  ​2017​  ​:​  ​2)  
  
On​  ​Bryant’s ​  ​view, ​  ​free-­range ​  ​philosophers ​  ​respond ​  ​to ​  ​logical, ​  ​aesthetic, ​  ​and  
psychological​  ​demands, ​  ​which ​  ​she​  ​demarcates ​  ​from​  ​scientific ​  ​demands. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​think ​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​fair  
to ​  ​interpret ​  ​her ​  ​as ​  ​meaning ​  ​that​  ​these​  ​demands ​  ​alone​  ​do​  ​not​  ​constitute​  ​employing  
naturalistically ​  ​acceptable ​  ​methods, ​  ​on​  ​the​  ​grounds ​  ​that​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​no​  ​direct​  ​engagement  
with​  ​the​  ​findings ​  ​of ​  ​science. ​  ​​  ​Bryant​  ​seems​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​suggesting ​  ​a​  ​necessary ​  ​criterion ​  ​of  
results ​  ​naturalism​  ​(see​  ​§2.2,​  ​this ​  ​thesis), ​  ​in ​  ​that​  ​she​  ​requires ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​kind ​  ​of ​  ​metaphysics  
she​  ​takes ​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​naturalistically ​  ​acceptable ​  ​directly ​  ​engages ​  ​with​  ​the​  ​institutional  
products ​  ​of ​  ​science .     15
  
Aaron ​  ​Novick ​  ​(2016) ​  ​shares ​  ​concerns ​  ​for ​  ​the​  ​methods ​  ​of ​  ​metaphysics, ​  ​but​  ​his ​  ​concerns  
are​  ​quite​  ​different​  ​to, ​  ​and ​  ​seem​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​in ​  ​tension ​  ​with, ​  ​those​  ​of ​  ​Bryant’s. ​  ​​  ​Novick ​  ​argues  
that​  ​Inference ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​Best​  ​Explanation ​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​method ​  ​which ​  ​cannot​  ​of ​  ​its ​  ​own​  ​accord ​  ​be  16
considered ​  ​a​  ​naturalistic ​  ​method, ​  ​and ​  ​thus ​  ​that​  ​employing ​  ​such ​  ​a​  ​method ​  ​does ​  ​not  
amount​  ​to ​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalism, ​  ​in ​  ​and ​  ​of ​  ​itself. ​  ​​  ​Implicit ​  ​in ​  ​this ​  ​claim​  ​is ​  ​that​  ​IBE  
is ​  ​not​  ​a​  ​sufficient​  ​condition ​  ​for ​  ​an ​  ​implementation ​  ​of ​  ​naturalistically ​  ​suitable​  ​methods.  
Novick ​  ​further ​  ​adds ​  ​that:  
  
at​  ​least ​  ​in ​  ​many ​  ​cases, ​  ​the​  ​successful​  ​reliance ​  ​on​  ​the​  ​theoretical ​  ​virtues ​  ​in  
scientific ​  ​contexts ​  ​shows ​  ​only ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​theoretical ​  ​virtues ​  ​are​  ​truth-­conducive  
within ​  ​those​  ​local​  ​contexts, ​  ​and ​  ​not​  ​that​  ​they ​  ​are​  ​truth-­conducive ​  ​generally.     
(Novick ​  ​2016​  ​:​  ​1)  
  
This ​  ​seems​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​an ​  ​argument​  ​against​  ​imperialistic ​  ​naturalism. ​  ​​  ​Novick ​  ​argues ​  ​that​  ​from  
the​  ​observed ​  ​merit​  ​of ​  ​deploying ​  ​these​  ​desiderata ​  ​in ​  ​scientific ​  ​practice, ​  ​one​  ​cannot  
reliably ​  ​infer ​  ​that​  ​imperialist ​  ​expansion ​  ​of ​  ​that​  ​scientific ​  ​practice ​  ​into ​  ​hitherto  
15 ​  ​​At​  ​least,​  ​it​  ​seems ​  ​to​  ​me​  ​as ​  ​though​  ​this ​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​fair​  ​interpretation​  ​of​  ​her​  ​claim.​  ​​  ​Her​  ​passage​  ​describes  
something​  ​that​  ​she​  ​also​  ​says ​  ​doesn’t​  ​exist​  ​in​  ​pure​  ​form,​  ​which​  ​makes ​  ​an​  ​interpretation​  ​difficult.  
16​  ​Henceforth,​  ​IBE.  
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non-­scientific ​  ​domains ​  ​of ​  ​inquiry ​  ​will​  ​generate ​  ​similar​  ​observable​  ​merit. ​  ​​  ​Whereas  
Bryant​  ​criticised ​  ​metaphysics ​  ​that​  ​merely ​  ​appeals ​  ​to ​  ​certain ​  ​sorts ​  ​of ​  ​success ​  ​factors  
while​  ​ignoring ​  ​scientific ​  ​findings, ​  ​Novick ​  ​seems​  ​to ​  ​claim​  ​that​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​themselves  
successfully ​  ​deploy ​  ​these​  ​very ​  ​same​  ​success ​  ​factors, ​  ​and ​  ​cautions ​  ​against​  ​inferring ​  ​from  
this ​  ​that​  ​‘doing ​  ​as ​  ​the​  ​scientists ​  ​do’ ​  ​in ​  ​other ​  ​areas ​  ​will​  ​be​  ​likewise​  ​successful.  
  
I ​  ​will​  ​show ​  ​that​  ​all​  ​of ​  ​these​  ​instances ​  ​of ​  ​reformist​  ​naturalism​  ​are​  ​implausible ​  ​as ​  ​they  
impose​  ​methodological ​  ​restrictions ​  ​that​  ​are​  ​far ​  ​too ​  ​restrictive. ​  ​​  ​There​  ​are​  ​numerous  
examples ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​breaking ​  ​the​  ​various ​  ​methodological ​  ​demands ​  ​for ​  ​which ​  ​these  
reformists ​  ​require​  ​philosophy ​  ​or ​  ​parts ​  ​of ​  ​philosophy ​  ​to ​  ​maintain. ​  ​​  ​They ​  ​impose​  ​a  
restriction ​  ​on​  ​naturalism​  ​that​  ​is ​  ​unwarranted, ​  ​unsuitable, ​  ​and ​  ​unscientific. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​use​  ​these  
cases ​  ​to ​  ​illustrate ​  ​the​  ​failure​  ​of ​  ​these​  ​restrictive ​  ​sorts ​  ​of ​  ​naturalistic ​  ​reform. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​think ​  ​it​  ​is  
likely ​  ​that​  ​other ​  ​instances ​  ​of ​  ​narrowly ​  ​construed ​  ​reformist​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalisms  
are​  ​likely ​  ​to ​  ​fail​  ​for ​  ​similar​  ​reasons. ​  ​​  ​This ​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​hypothesis ​  ​which ​  ​draws ​  ​inductive​  ​support  
from​  ​observed ​  ​cases, ​  ​and ​  ​which ​  ​is ​  ​empirically ​  ​tractable. ​  ​​  ​It​  ​could ​  ​be​  ​viewed ​  ​as ​  ​my  
pessimistic​  ​meta-­induction ​  ​against​  ​reformist-­naturalism ​.​  ​​  ​Whereas ​  ​Laudan ​  ​(1981)  
demonstrated ​  ​various ​  ​failed ​  ​attempts ​  ​of ​  ​demarcating ​  ​science​  ​from​  ​non-­science, ​  ​and  
inferred ​  ​from​  ​this ​  ​his ​  ​pessimistic​  ​meta-­induction ​  ​against​  ​any ​  ​future​  ​attempt ​  ​at  
demarcation, ​  ​the​  ​case ​  ​studies ​  ​which ​  ​I ​  ​discuss ​  ​show ​  ​the​  ​failures ​  ​of ​  ​various ​  ​restrictive  
reformist​  ​naturalisms, ​  ​from​  ​which ​  ​I ​  ​infer ​  ​a​  ​pessimistic​  ​meta-­induction ​  ​against​  ​any  
future​  ​attempts ​  ​at​  ​successful​  ​implementation ​  ​of ​  ​such ​  ​restrictions. ​  ​​  ​If ​  ​one​  ​accepts ​  ​that  
Laudan ​  ​has ​  ​shown​  ​that​  ​demarcation ​  ​of ​  ​science​  ​from​  ​non-­science​  ​will​  ​likely ​  ​fail, ​  ​it  
should​  ​be​  ​no​  ​surprise​  ​that​  ​attempts ​  ​to ​  ​demarcate ​  ​naturalistic ​  ​(scientific) ​  ​methods ​  ​from  
non-­naturalistic ​  ​(non-­scientific) ​  ​methods ​  ​will​  ​likely ​  ​fail​  ​for ​  ​similar​  ​reasons.  
  
    
Pluralism ​  ​about​  ​method  
  
It​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​commonly ​  ​held ​  ​view ​  ​within ​  ​science​  ​studies ​  ​subjects, ​  ​that​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​no​  ​such ​  ​thing ​  ​as  
a​  ​singular ​  ​scientific ​  ​method:     
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[S]cholarly ​  ​studies ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​history ​  ​and ​  ​practice ​  ​of ​  ​science​  ​long ​  ​ago ​  ​showed  
that, ​  ​in ​  ​fact, ​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​no​  ​such ​  ​thing ​  ​as ​  ​the​  ​Scientific ​  ​Method.  
(Kidd ​  ​&​  ​McKinnel​  ​2015​  ​:​  ​163)  
  
Similar​  ​views ​  ​stem​  ​back ​  ​to ​  ​at​  ​least ​  ​Paul​  ​Feyerabend ​  ​(1975), ​  ​from​  ​his ​  ​aptly ​  ​titled  
Against​  ​Method ​.​  ​​  ​Ladyman ​  ​and ​  ​Ross ​  ​(2007) ​  ​elaborate:  
  
there​  ​is ​  ​no​  ​such ​  ​thing ​  ​as ​  ​'scientific ​  ​method', ​  ​by​  ​which ​  ​we​  ​mean:​  ​no​  ​particular  
set​  ​of ​  ​positive​  ​rules ​  ​for ​  ​reasoning ​  ​that​  ​all​  ​and ​  ​only ​  ​scientists ​  ​do​  ​or ​  ​should  




This ​  ​is ​  ​very ​  ​much ​  ​a​  ​commonplace ​  ​view ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​philosophy ​  ​of ​  ​science​  ​since​  ​Larry  
Laudan’s ​  ​argument​  ​highlighting ​  ​the​  ​various ​  ​failures ​  ​of ​  ​demarcating ​  ​science​  ​from  
non-­science​  ​(1981). ​  ​​  ​There​  ​is ​  ​no​  ​observational ​  ​evidence ​  ​that​  ​conveys ​  ​overall​  ​support​  ​on  
the​  ​claim​  ​that​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​one​  ​overarching ​  ​unified ​  ​‘scientific ​  ​method’. ​  ​​  ​A ​  ​careful​  ​inspection  
of ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​as ​  ​practiced ​  ​reveals ​  ​that​  ​there​  ​are​  ​a​  ​plurality ​  ​of ​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice,  
embodying ​  ​a​  ​vast​  ​plurality ​  ​of ​  ​methods, ​  ​working ​  ​towards ​  ​achieving ​  ​a​  ​plurality ​  ​of  
epistemic ​  ​aims. ​  ​​  ​Assuming​  ​that​  ​some​  ​ideal​  ​science​  ​would​  ​eventually ​  ​find ​  ​one​  ​singular  
method ​  ​(or ​  ​one​  ​fixed ​  ​set​  ​of ​  ​methods) ​  ​is ​  ​not​  ​plausible​  ​from​  ​the​  ​naturalistic ​  ​starting ​  ​point,  
given ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​are​  ​currently ​  ​radically ​  ​pluralistic ​  ​in ​  ​practice.     
  
I ​  ​see​  ​no​  ​good​  ​reason ​  ​why​  ​philosophy ​  ​should​  ​attempt ​  ​to ​  ​meet​  ​a​  ​restrictive  
methodological ​  ​standard ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​themselves ​  ​cannot​  ​attain. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​naturalist  
began ​  ​with​  ​respecting ​  ​science​  ​for ​  ​its ​  ​epistemic ​  ​credibility, ​  ​and ​  ​by​  ​observing ​  ​the  
sciences, ​  ​we​  ​find ​  ​that​  ​there​  ​are​  ​a​  ​plurality ​  ​of ​  ​methods ​  ​used ​  ​both ​  ​across ​  ​and ​  ​within  
various ​  ​different​  ​scientific ​  ​domains ​  ​(for ​  ​a​  ​thorough ​  ​defence​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​view, ​  ​see​  ​Kellert​  ​et  
al. ​  ​2006). ​  ​​  ​Thus,​  ​if ​  ​the​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalist​  ​proposes ​  ​to ​  ​use​  ​scientific ​  ​methods,  
they ​  ​will​  ​have​  ​a​  ​plurality ​  ​of ​  ​suitably ​  ​naturalistic ​  ​methods ​  ​at​  ​their ​  ​disposal, ​  ​and ​  ​I ​  ​will  
point​  ​toward ​  ​some​  ​of ​  ​these​  ​during ​  ​this ​  ​chapter, ​  ​before​  ​developing ​  ​them​  ​further, ​  ​and  
outlining ​  ​my ​  ​more​  ​specific​  ​methodological ​  ​views ​  ​in ​  ​chapter ​  ​five. ​  ​​  ​For​  ​now,​  ​I ​  ​will  
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illustrate ​  ​methodological ​  ​pluralism​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​with​  ​a​  ​case ​  ​study​  ​from​  ​within ​  ​the  
behavioural ​  ​sciences. ​  ​​  ​In ​  ​light​  ​of ​  ​this, ​  ​we​  ​can ​  ​return ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​reformist​  ​naturalists ​  ​claims  
about​  ​philosophy, ​  ​and ​  ​see​  ​that​  ​they ​  ​are​  ​implausibly ​  ​restrictive.  
  
  
Pluralism ​  ​in ​  ​behavioural​  ​sciences  
  
Helen​  ​Longino ​  ​(2006) ​  ​has ​  ​recently ​  ​researched ​  ​the​  ​extent​  ​of ​  ​pluralism​  ​within ​  ​the  
sciences ​  ​of ​  ​human ​  ​behaviour. ​  ​​  ​Longino ​  ​investigates ​  ​a​  ​variety ​  ​of ​  ​different​  ​approaches ​  ​to  
behaviour ​  ​that​  ​draw ​  ​on​  ​different​  ​bodies ​  ​of ​  ​scientific ​  ​investigation. ​  ​​  ​These​  ​include  
quantitative ​  ​behavioural ​  ​genetics ​  ​-­ ​  ​which ​  ​draws ​  ​primarily ​  ​on​  ​classical ​  ​genetics,  
molecular ​  ​behaviour ​  ​genetics ​  ​-­ ​  ​which ​  ​draws ​  ​on​  ​contemporary ​  ​molecular ​  ​biology, ​  ​work  
on​  ​neurophysiology ​  ​of ​  ​behaviour ​  ​-­ ​  ​which ​  ​draws ​  ​on​  ​work​  ​within ​  ​neuroscience, ​  ​and  
social​  ​environment ​  ​oriented ​  ​psychology. ​  ​​  ​Many ​  ​previous ​  ​meta-­analyses ​  ​of ​  ​these​  ​areas  
of ​  ​research ​  ​concluded ​  ​that​  ​one​  ​of ​  ​these​  ​approaches ​  ​is ​  ​the​  ​right​  ​approach ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​study​  ​of  
behaviour;;​  ​however ​  ​little ​  ​agreement ​  ​has ​  ​been ​  ​reached ​  ​as ​  ​to ​  ​which ​  ​approach ​  ​is ​  ​correct  
(see​  ​Longino ​  ​2006​  ​for ​  ​details). ​  ​​  ​Rather ​  ​than ​  ​looking ​  ​for ​  ​a​  ​singular ​  ​best​  ​approach,  
Longino ​  ​looks ​  ​at​  ​what​  ​each ​  ​approach ​  ​can ​  ​accomplish, ​  ​and ​  ​also ​  ​at​  ​the​  ​limitations ​  ​each  
approach ​  ​exhibits, ​  ​and ​  ​concludes ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​different​  ​approaches ​  ​are​  ​not​  ​fairly ​  ​evaluated  
as ​  ​being ​  ​contenders ​  ​for ​  ​giving ​  ​the​  ​one​  ​true​  ​account​  ​of ​  ​behaviour. ​  ​​  ​Rather, ​  ​each  
approach ​  ​had ​  ​its ​  ​own​  ​set​  ​of ​  ​questions, ​  ​experimental ​  ​and ​  ​observational​  ​strategies ​  ​for  
answering ​  ​those​  ​questions, ​  ​different​  ​patterns ​  ​of ​  ​argument, ​  ​and ​  ​a​  ​range​  ​of ​  ​alternative  
hypotheses. ​  ​​  ​She​  ​finds ​  ​that​  ​each ​  ​approach ​  ​is ​  ​more​  ​focused ​  ​on​  ​generating ​  ​questions ​  ​of  
interest​  ​and ​  ​building ​  ​a​  ​body​  ​of ​  ​results, ​  ​than ​  ​on​  ​trying ​  ​to ​  ​confirm​  ​its ​  ​underlying ​  ​theories.  
Different​  ​approaches ​  ​investigate ​  ​different​  ​potential ​  ​causes ​  ​of ​  ​behaviour ​  ​within ​  ​a  
population.     
  
Each ​  ​approach ​  ​has ​  ​instruments ​  ​and ​  ​equipment​  ​designed ​  ​to ​  ​measure​  ​certain ​  ​kinds ​  ​of  
things, ​  ​but​  ​these​  ​differ ​  ​between ​  ​approaches. ​  ​​  ​This ​  ​involves ​  ​having ​  ​a​  ​variety ​  ​of ​  ​methods  
for ​  ​conducting ​  ​measurement, ​  ​depending ​  ​on​  ​the​  ​potential ​  ​causal​  ​field ​  ​an ​  ​approach ​  ​is  
interested ​  ​in. ​  ​​  ​Further, ​  ​the​  ​methods ​  ​for ​  ​measuring ​  ​the​  ​strength ​  ​of ​  ​association ​  ​of  
variation ​  ​in ​  ​that​  ​field, ​  ​and ​  ​variation ​  ​in ​  ​behaviour, ​  ​vary ​  ​between ​  ​approaches, ​  ​and ​  ​also  
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shape​  ​the​  ​field ​  ​of ​  ​investigation ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​association ​  ​measures ​  ​that​  ​are​  ​possible​  ​from​  ​such  
an ​  ​approach. ​  ​​  ​From​  ​the​  ​molecular ​  ​genetic ​  ​approach, ​  ​investigation ​  ​produced ​  ​data​  ​that  
were​  ​sufficient​  ​to ​  ​distinguish ​  ​between ​  ​different​  ​molecular ​  ​genetic​  ​hypotheses, ​  ​but  
methods ​  ​for ​  ​determining ​  ​the​  ​association ​  ​between ​  ​some​  ​genetic ​  ​mutation ​  ​with​  ​a  
behavioural ​  ​trait​  ​of ​  ​interest​  ​could ​  ​not​  ​determine ​  ​the​  ​degree​  ​of ​  ​association ​  ​of ​  ​variation  
with​  ​respect​  ​to ​  ​neurophysiological ​  ​factors, ​  ​nor ​  ​social​  ​environmental ​  ​factors. ​  ​​  ​Methods  
of ​  ​each ​  ​approach ​  ​require​  ​dividing ​  ​the​  ​epistemic ​  ​labour ​  ​of ​  ​investigating ​  ​the​  ​various  
causes ​  ​of ​  ​behaviour ​  ​between ​  ​alternate ​  ​approaches. ​  ​​  ​Each ​  ​approach ​  ​produces ​  ​different  
and ​  ​incommensurable ​  ​measurements ​  ​of ​  ​behaviour. ​  ​​  ​Further, ​  ​no​  ​approach ​  ​can ​  ​produce  
sufficient​  ​data​  ​to ​  ​establish ​  ​that​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​superior ​  ​theory.  
  
From​  ​this, ​  ​Longino ​  ​concludes ​  ​a​  ​number ​  ​of ​  ​things. ​  ​​  ​She​  ​finds ​  ​that​  ​different​  ​approaches  
measure​  ​variation ​  ​in ​  ​different​  ​construals ​  ​of ​  ​causal​  ​space, ​  ​that​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​no​  ​measurement  
which ​  ​is ​  ​common ​  ​between ​  ​different​  ​potential ​  ​causal​  ​factors, ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​approaches ​  ​are  
evidentially ​  ​incommensurable, ​  ​and ​  ​that​  ​they ​  ​cannot​  ​be​  ​taken ​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​empirical  
competitors ​  ​in ​  ​any ​  ​substantial​  ​way. ​  ​​  ​Thus,​  ​we​  ​have​  ​incommensurability ​  ​at​  ​the​  ​level​  ​of  
measurement ​  ​and ​  ​evidence, ​  ​and ​  ​incompatibility ​  ​at​  ​the​  ​level​  ​of ​  ​theoretical  
pronouncement.  
  
Nevertheless, ​  ​Longino ​  ​argues ​  ​that​  ​these​  ​approaches ​  ​are​  ​all​  ​productive, ​  ​in ​  ​that​  ​each ​  ​is  
able​  ​to ​  ​to ​  ​generate ​  ​replicable ​  ​results ​  ​and ​  ​has ​  ​practical ​  ​use​  ​by​  ​way​  ​of ​  ​implementation ​  ​in  
cognitive​  ​and ​  ​other ​  ​projects. ​  ​​  ​Each ​  ​approach ​  ​reveals ​  ​significant​  ​causal​  ​relationships ​  ​that  
cannot​  ​readily ​  ​be​  ​revealed ​  ​by​  ​any ​  ​other ​  ​approach. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​lesson​  ​Longino ​  ​draws ​  ​from​  ​this  
is ​  ​one​  ​of ​  ​pluralism. ​  ​​  ​That​  ​is, ​  ​an ​  ​attitude ​  ​or ​  ​stance​  ​of ​  ​pluralism​  ​should​  ​be​  ​taken ​  ​towards  
these​  ​approaches ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​study​  ​of ​  ​behaviour. ​  ​​  ​We​  ​have​  ​no​  ​grounds ​  ​to ​  ​expect​  ​one​  ​theory  
to ​  ​be​  ​able​  ​to ​  ​integrate ​  ​and ​  ​explain ​  ​behaviour ​  ​adequately, ​  ​unifying ​  ​all​  ​of ​  ​these  
approaches, ​  ​without​  ​losing ​  ​insights ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​approaches ​  ​as ​  ​a​  ​plurality ​  ​provide. ​  ​​  ​The  
incommensurability ​  ​and ​  ​incompatibility ​  ​between ​  ​these​  ​various ​  ​approaches, ​  ​should​  ​not  
be​  ​viewed ​  ​as ​  ​problematic, ​  ​but​  ​perhaps ​  ​be​  ​lauded ​  ​for ​  ​the​  ​different​  ​aspects ​  ​of ​  ​behavioural  
knowledge​  ​each ​  ​illuminates.    
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A ​  ​recent​  ​edited ​  ​collection ​  ​of ​  ​Kellert​  ​et​  ​al. ​  ​(2006) ​  ​comprises ​  ​an ​  ​excellent ​  ​defence​  ​of  
scientific ​  ​pluralism​  ​that​  ​involves ​  ​discussion​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​case ​  ​made​  ​here​  ​by​  ​Longino, ​  ​but​  ​also  
presents ​  ​chapters ​  ​that​  ​demonstrate ​  ​the​  ​pervasiveness ​  ​of ​  ​pluralism​  ​within ​  ​quantum  
mechanics, ​  ​mathematics, ​  ​and ​  ​economics. ​  ​​  ​These​  ​case ​  ​studies ​  ​are​  ​used ​  ​to ​  ​support​  ​the  
view ​  ​that​  ​useful​  ​methods ​  ​are​  ​various, ​  ​depending ​  ​on​  ​specificities ​  ​to ​  ​do​  ​with​  ​the  
particular ​  ​objects ​  ​of ​  ​interest​  ​and ​  ​aims ​  ​specific​  ​to ​  ​various ​  ​scientific ​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice.  
  
I ​  ​take​  ​it​  ​that​  ​these​  ​case ​  ​studies ​  ​help ​  ​illustrate ​  ​the​  ​wider ​  ​point​  ​that​  ​an ​  ​accurate ​  ​description  
of ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​finds ​  ​that​  ​they ​  ​are​  ​methodologically ​  ​pluralistic. ​  ​​  ​Longino ​  ​uses ​  ​her ​  ​case  
study​  ​to ​  ​illustrate ​  ​another ​  ​significant​  ​point, ​  ​noting ​  ​that​  ​despite​  ​the​  ​various ​  ​models ​  ​of  
measuring ​  ​behaviour ​  ​involving ​  ​observation, ​  ​the​  ​observations ​  ​​recorded ​  ​do​  ​not​  ​provide  
evidentiary ​  ​support​  ​for ​  ​their ​  ​theories ​.​  ​​  ​These​  ​studies ​  ​from​  ​the​  ​behavioural ​  ​sciences  
make​  ​ontological ​  ​claims ​  ​about​  ​human ​  ​behaviour, ​  ​and ​  ​model​  ​ways ​  ​to ​  ​measure​  ​causal  
relationships ​  ​between ​  ​possible​  ​contributing ​  ​factors, ​  ​but​  ​do​  ​not​  ​require​  ​that​  ​the  





Care​  ​with ​  ​assuming​  ​that​  ​views ​  ​are​  ​in ​  ​genuine​  ​competition ​  ​with ​  ​one​  ​another  
  
It​  ​is ​  ​reasonably ​  ​common ​  ​for ​  ​many ​  ​philosophical​  ​arguments ​  ​to ​  ​motivate ​  ​a​  ​positive​  ​view,  
in ​  ​part​  ​by​  ​arguing ​  ​against​  ​“competing” ​  ​views. ​  ​​  ​An​  ​important​  ​heuristic​  ​we​  ​can ​  ​draw  
from​  ​Longino’s ​  ​examples ​  ​is ​  ​to ​  ​do​  ​with​  ​the​  ​fact​  ​that​  ​she​  ​has ​  ​presented ​  ​different​  ​kinds ​  ​of  
theories ​  ​that​  ​can ​  ​each ​  ​claim​  ​to ​  ​successfully ​  ​explain ​  ​some​  ​aspects ​  ​of ​  ​a​  ​phenomenon:  
human ​  ​behaviour. ​  ​​  ​Given ​  ​that​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​plurality ​  ​of ​  ​cogent​  ​naturalistic ​  ​models ​  ​that  
provide​  ​different​  ​causal​  ​explanations ​  ​for ​  ​behavioural ​  ​traits, ​  ​one​  ​might​  ​wonder ​  ​whether  
different​  ​models ​  ​that​  ​purport​  ​to ​  ​address ​  ​a​  ​particular ​  ​area​  ​of ​  ​philosophical​  ​inquiry, ​  ​might  
be​  ​viewed ​  ​in ​  ​a​  ​similar​  ​way​  ​to ​  ​these​  ​models ​  ​-­ ​  ​not​  ​necessarily ​  ​as ​  ​competitors ​  ​for ​  ​the​  ​one  
true​  ​view ​  ​about​  ​an ​  ​area​  ​of ​  ​inquiry, ​  ​but​  ​perhaps ​  ​as ​  ​focusing ​  ​on​  ​different​  ​aspects ​  ​of  
somehow ​  ​related ​  ​phenomena. ​  ​​  ​Care​  ​needs ​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​taken ​  ​when ​  ​using​  ​certain ​  ​kinds ​  ​of  
argumentative ​  ​strategies ​  ​to ​  ​favour ​  ​a​  ​particular ​  ​model​  ​or ​  ​theory ​  ​in ​  ​a​  ​domain ​  ​of  
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philosophical​  ​inquiry. ​  ​​  ​It​  ​may ​  ​be​  ​the​  ​case ​  ​that​  ​“competing” ​   ​views ​  ​are​  ​in ​  ​genuine  
conflict ​  ​with​  ​one​  ​another, ​  ​and ​  ​careful​  ​work​  ​should​  ​be​  ​done​  ​to ​  ​investigate ​  ​whether ​  ​this  
might​  ​be​  ​the​  ​case ​  ​in ​  ​particular ​  ​domains. ​  ​​  ​One​  ​take​  ​on​  ​this ​  ​is ​  ​that​  ​on​  ​many ​  ​topics ​  ​that​  ​are  
complex, ​  ​multi-­faceted, ​  ​and ​  ​hard ​  ​to ​  ​access, ​  ​overall​  ​increase​  ​of ​  ​knowledge​  ​is ​  ​often  
maximised ​  ​by​  ​capturing ​  ​fragments ​  ​of ​  ​such ​  ​knowledge​  ​through ​  ​use​  ​of ​  ​multiple ​  ​and  
diverse​  ​methods. ​  ​​  ​There​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​very ​  ​large​  ​set​  ​of ​  ​truths, ​  ​with​  ​multiple ​  ​paths ​  ​of ​  ​access, ​  ​and  





Many ​  ​within ​  ​the​  ​philosophy ​  ​of ​  ​science​  ​literature ​  ​view ​  ​observational​  ​methods ​  ​of  
justification ​  ​as ​  ​often ​  ​important​  ​but​  ​ultimately ​  ​unnecessary ​  ​components ​  ​of ​  ​naturalistic  
methods. ​  ​​  ​Observation ​  ​and ​  ​carefully ​  ​controlled ​  ​experiment ​  ​are​  ​certainly ​  ​important  
features ​  ​of ​  ​many ​  ​methods ​  ​found ​  ​within ​  ​the​  ​sciences, ​  ​but​  ​observation ​  ​is ​  ​not​  ​a​  ​necessary  
condition ​  ​of ​  ​naturalistically ​  ​acceptable ​  ​methods. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​will​  ​briefly ​  ​rehearse​  ​two ​  ​examples  
from​  ​twentieth ​  ​century ​  ​philosophy ​  ​of ​  ​science​  ​that​  ​illustrate ​  ​that​  ​observation ​  ​is ​  ​a  
complicated ​  ​feature​  ​of ​  ​a​  ​naturalistic ​  ​methods, ​  ​and ​  ​that​  ​empirical ​  ​adequacy ​  ​cannot​  ​be  




The​  ​theory-­ladenness ​  ​of ​  ​observation  
  
One​  ​problem​  ​with​  ​relying ​  ​on​  ​observation-­based ​  ​data​  ​alone, ​  ​is ​  ​due​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​fact​  ​that  
observation ​  ​is ​  ​theory-­laden. ​  ​​  ​That​  ​is, ​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​no​  ​such ​  ​thing ​  ​as ​  ​theory-­free​  ​observation.  
Various ​  ​experimental ​  ​evidence ​  ​appears ​  ​within ​  ​a​  ​bigger ​  ​theory ​  ​with​  ​an ​  ​established ​  ​body  
of ​  ​work​  ​behind ​  ​it, ​  ​and ​  ​with​  ​a​  ​number ​  ​of ​  ​theoretical ​  ​assumptions. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​significance ​  ​of  
this, ​  ​is ​  ​that​  ​all​  ​observational ​  ​data​  ​is ​  ​viewed ​  ​through ​  ​some​  ​or ​  ​other ​  ​theoretical ​  ​lens. ​  ​​  ​It​  ​is  
not​  ​as ​  ​if ​  ​scientific ​  ​theory ​  ​is ​  ​written ​  ​by​  ​osmosis ​  ​from​  ​simply ​  ​observing ​  ​the​  ​world.  
Observation ​  ​does ​  ​not​  ​straightforwardly ​  ​describe​  ​a​  ​unique​  ​set​  ​of ​  ​methods ​  ​that​  ​apply ​  ​in ​  ​a  
clear ​  ​and ​  ​general​  ​way​  ​(see​  ​Kuhn​  ​1962). ​  ​​  ​This ​  ​is ​  ​only ​  ​a​  ​very ​  ​brief ​  ​outline​  ​of ​  ​a​  ​very ​  ​large  
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topic​  ​with​  ​a​  ​significant​  ​quantity ​  ​of ​  ​literature, ​  ​and ​  ​I ​  ​cannot​  ​provide​  ​a​  ​full​  ​and ​  ​thorough  
account​  ​of ​  ​it​  ​presently. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​merely ​  ​wish​  ​to ​  ​point​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​less ​  ​than ​  ​straightforward ​  ​nature​  ​of  
appeals ​  ​to ​  ​observational ​  ​methods, ​  ​which ​  ​is ​  ​all​  ​I ​  ​need ​  ​to ​  ​do​  ​for ​  ​now ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​overall  
context​  ​of ​  ​my ​  ​argument.  
  
  
Underdetermination ​  ​of ​  ​theory ​  ​by​  ​data  
  
Perhaps ​  ​more​  ​importantly, ​  ​Duhem​  ​(1914) ​  ​pointed ​  ​out​  ​long ​  ​ago ​  ​that​  ​scientific ​  ​theories  
are​  ​underdetermined ​  ​by​  ​way​  ​of ​  ​observational ​  ​data. ​  ​​  ​As ​  ​a​  ​simple​  ​logical​  ​point, ​  ​an  
infinite​  ​number ​  ​of ​  ​theories ​  ​could ​  ​be​  ​made​  ​empirically ​  ​equivalent ​  ​to ​  ​any ​  ​one​  ​theory.  
There​  ​are​  ​a​  ​number ​  ​of ​  ​instances ​  ​from​  ​the​  ​history ​  ​of ​  ​science​  ​where​  ​competing ​  ​theories  
have​  ​had ​  ​observationally ​  ​equivalent ​  ​predictions ​  ​of ​  ​phenomena, ​  ​and ​  ​have​  ​used  
non-­observational ​  ​criteria ​  ​to ​  ​guide​  ​theory ​  ​choice. ​  ​​  ​Here, ​  ​considerations ​  ​of ​  ​elegance,  
parsimony, ​  ​and ​  ​unification ​  ​with​  ​other ​  ​accepted ​  ​theories, ​  ​have​  ​played ​  ​important​  ​roles ​  ​in  
scientific ​  ​theory ​  ​choice. ​  ​​  ​Important​  ​moments ​  ​from​  ​this ​  ​history ​  ​of ​  ​science, ​  ​such ​  ​as ​  ​the  
Copernican ​  ​revolution, ​  ​where​  ​a​  ​heliocentric ​  ​model​  ​of ​  ​astronomy ​  ​took ​  ​over ​  ​from​  ​the  
geocentric ​  ​Ptolemaic ​  ​model​  ​as ​  ​the​  ​preferred ​  ​scientific ​  ​theory, ​  ​are​  ​regarded ​  ​as ​  ​important  
instances ​  ​of ​  ​scientific ​  ​progress,​  ​where​  ​observation ​  ​played ​  ​no​  ​initial ​  ​role​  ​in ​  ​adjudication  
between ​  ​theories. ​  ​​  ​Helen​  ​Longino ​  ​(1996) ​  ​has ​  ​illustrated ​  ​how ​  ​rife​  ​underdetermination ​  ​in  
the​  ​sciences ​  ​really ​  ​is. ​  ​​  ​Longino’s ​  ​arguments ​  ​are​  ​in ​  ​tension ​  ​with​  ​the​  ​commonly ​  ​held  
belief ​  ​that​  ​genuine​  ​instances ​  ​of ​  ​underdetermination ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​are​  ​rare.  
  
Criteria ​  ​such ​  ​as ​  ​novel​  ​prediction, ​  ​and ​  ​explanatory ​  ​breadth ​  ​have​  ​played ​  ​important​  ​roles  
throughout​  ​the​  ​history ​  ​of ​  ​science, ​  ​and ​  ​they ​  ​ought​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​considered ​  ​naturalistically  
acceptable ​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims, ​  ​alongside​  ​empirical ​  ​equivalence. ​  ​​  ​Non-­observation ​  ​based  
epistemic ​  ​virtues ​  ​as ​  ​components ​  ​of ​  ​criteria ​  ​for ​  ​theory ​  ​choice​  ​are​  ​important​  ​to ​  ​science,  
and ​  ​using​  ​these​  ​criteria ​  ​is ​  ​naturalistic, ​  ​in ​  ​so​  ​far ​  ​as ​  ​they ​  ​can ​  ​be​  ​shown​  ​in ​  ​practice ​  ​to ​  ​help  
generate ​  ​scientific ​  ​knowledge. ​  ​​  ​Applying ​  ​naturalistic ​  ​methods ​  ​more​  ​widely ​  ​is ​  ​to ​  ​be  
encouraged, ​  ​but​  ​this ​  ​does ​  ​not​  ​imply ​  ​knowing​  ​in ​  ​advance​  ​which ​  ​methods ​  ​will​  ​be  
effective ​  ​in ​  ​realising ​  ​a​  ​given ​  ​system’s ​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims, ​  ​and ​  ​it​  ​does ​  ​not​  ​imply ​  ​that​  ​those  




Science​  ​that​  ​plainly ​  ​does ​  ​not​  ​involve​  ​observation  
  
There​  ​are​  ​contemporary ​  ​scientific ​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​that​  ​do​  ​not​  ​involve​  ​observation ​  ​at  
all. ​  ​​  ​String ​  ​theory, ​  ​for ​  ​instance, ​  ​seems​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​autonomous ​  ​from​  ​observational ​  ​evidence.  
In ​  ​physics,​  ​string ​  ​theory ​  ​provides ​  ​a​  ​theoretical ​  ​model​  ​in ​  ​which ​  ​point-­like​  ​particles ​  ​of  
particle ​  ​physics ​  ​are​  ​replaced ​  ​by​  ​one-­dimensional ​  ​objects ​  ​called ​  ​strings.​  ​​  ​The​  ​theory  
describes ​  ​how ​  ​strings ​  ​interact ​  ​and ​  ​how ​  ​they ​  ​spread ​  ​through ​  ​space. ​  ​​  ​There​  ​are​  ​no  
recorded ​  ​observations ​  ​that​  ​could ​  ​provide​  ​evidence ​  ​for ​  ​string ​  ​theory’s ​  ​truth ​  ​or ​  ​falsity, ​  ​or  
at​  ​least, ​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​currently ​  ​no​  ​evidence ​  ​to ​  ​support​  ​a​  ​claim​  ​that​  ​observation-­centred  
methods ​  ​could ​  ​have​  ​traction. ​  ​​  ​String ​  ​theory ​  ​is ​  ​often ​  ​criticised ​  ​on​  ​these​  ​grounds.​  ​​  ​If ​  ​the  
naturalist​  ​demands ​  ​that​  ​observation-­centred ​  ​methods ​  ​are​  ​necessary, ​  ​string ​  ​theory ​  ​looks  
patently ​  ​non-­naturalistic. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​methods ​  ​employed ​  ​by​  ​much ​  ​of ​  ​theoretical ​  ​physics,​  ​do  
not​  ​enlist​  ​observation ​  ​in ​  ​any ​  ​obvious ​  ​way.     
  
The​  ​reformist​  ​naturalist, ​  ​if ​  ​requiring ​  ​that​  ​observation-­centred ​  ​methods ​  ​are​  ​necessary,  
can ​  ​respond ​  ​to ​  ​this ​  ​in ​  ​three​  ​ways.​  ​​  ​Their ​  ​options ​  ​seem​  ​to ​  ​be:​  ​(1) ​  ​accept ​  ​their ​  ​own  
criteria ​  ​generally, ​  ​and ​  ​assert​  ​that​  ​string ​  ​theory ​  ​is ​  ​non-­naturalistic, ​  ​(2) ​  ​claim​  ​string ​  ​theory  
does ​  ​use​  ​observation, ​  ​so​  ​it​  ​meets ​  ​any ​  ​observation ​  ​requirement, ​  ​or ​  ​(3) ​  ​say​  ​that​  ​string  
theory ​  ​doesn’t​  ​use​  ​observation, ​  ​but​  ​it​  ​needn’t, ​  ​though ​  ​insist​  ​that​  ​philosophy ​  ​(or ​  ​some  
relevant ​  ​part​  ​thereof) ​  ​still​  ​does ​  ​need ​  ​to ​  ​-­ ​  ​then ​  ​specify ​  ​the​  ​relevant ​  ​difference ​  ​between  
philosophy ​  ​and ​  ​string ​  ​theory ​  ​that​   ​justifies ​  ​this ​  ​different​  ​treatment, ​  ​and ​  ​thereby ​  ​also ​  ​this  
scope​  ​restriction ​  ​on​  ​the​  ​observation ​  ​requirement. ​  ​​  ​None​  ​of ​  ​these​  ​three​  ​options ​  ​seem  
very ​  ​plausible​  ​from​  ​the​  ​naturalistic ​  ​starting ​  ​point, ​  ​but​  ​I ​  ​do​  ​not​  ​take​  ​this ​  ​brief ​  ​discussion  
to ​  ​involve​  ​a​  ​knock-­down ​  ​argument. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​challenge ​  ​remains ​  ​for ​  ​the​  ​reformist​  ​to ​  ​point  
out​  ​why​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​that​  ​philosophy, ​  ​or ​  ​some​  ​its ​  ​parts, ​  ​require​  ​special​  ​treatment ​  ​in ​  ​terms ​  ​of ​  ​the  
naturalistically ​  ​acceptable ​  ​methods ​  ​at​  ​its ​  ​disposal. ​  ​​  ​Imposing ​  ​restrictions ​  ​on​  ​philosophy  
due​  ​to ​  ​naturalist​  ​critiques, ​  ​that​  ​are​  ​not​  ​also ​  ​restrictions ​  ​placed ​  ​on​  ​the​  ​sciences  








For​  ​any ​  ​reformist​  ​naturalist​  ​who​  ​insists ​  ​on​  ​the​  ​necessity ​  ​of ​  ​observation-­centred  
methods, ​  ​the​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​of ​  ​mathematics ​  ​provide​  ​a​  ​troubling ​  ​case. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​methods  
of ​  ​working ​  ​mathematicians ​  ​involve​  ​starting ​  ​with​  ​​a​  ​priori​​  ​axioms, ​  ​and ​  ​generating ​  ​proofs  
without​  ​employing ​  ​observation. ​  ​​  ​Mathematics ​  ​plays ​  ​a​  ​supremely ​  ​important​  ​role​  ​within  
the​  ​sciences. ​  ​​  ​If ​  ​the​  ​reformist​  ​requires ​  ​observation ​  ​as ​  ​a​  ​necessary ​  ​feature​  ​of ​  ​all​  ​sets​  ​of  
naturalistic ​  ​methods, ​  ​they ​  ​will​  ​need ​  ​to ​  ​explain ​  ​why​  ​the​  ​practices ​  ​of ​  ​mathematics ​  ​have  
been ​  ​so​  ​useful​  ​both ​  ​for ​  ​their ​  ​own​  ​purposes,​  ​and ​  ​for ​  ​their ​  ​application ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​sciences,  
given ​  ​that​  ​they ​  ​do​  ​not​  ​meet​  ​this ​  ​restrictive ​  ​methodological ​  ​constraint. ​  ​​  ​If ​  ​a​  ​reformist  
naturalist​  ​insists ​  ​that​  ​observation ​  ​is ​  ​necessary ​  ​for ​  ​philosophy, ​  ​or ​  ​for ​  ​some​  ​branch ​  ​of  
philosophy, ​  ​they ​  ​will​  ​need ​  ​to ​  ​explain ​  ​why​  ​mathematics ​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​domain ​  ​which ​  ​is ​  ​exempt  
from​  ​such ​  ​requirements, ​  ​and ​  ​why​  ​philosophy, ​  ​or ​  ​a​  ​particular ​  ​domain ​  ​of ​  ​philosophy, ​  ​is  
to ​  ​be​  ​treated ​  ​differently. ​  ​​  ​There​  ​might​  ​well​  ​be​  ​good​  ​arguments ​  ​to ​  ​do​  ​just​  ​this, ​  ​but​  ​this ​  ​is  
a​  ​challenge ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​reformist​  ​must​  ​rise​  ​to. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​see​  ​no​  ​other ​  ​way​  ​than ​  ​to ​  ​consider ​  ​the  
methods ​  ​of ​  ​mathematics ​  ​as ​  ​a​  ​subset​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​plurality ​  ​of ​  ​naturalistic ​  ​methods ​  ​at​  ​first  
glance.     
  
One​  ​reply ​  ​a​  ​reformist​  ​might​  ​give​  ​would​  ​be​  ​to ​  ​allow ​  ​for ​  ​an ​  ​‘indispensability ​  ​to ​  ​science’  
exemption ​  ​that​  ​extends ​  ​to ​  ​a​  ​lot​  ​of ​  ​mathematics, ​  ​but​  ​doesn’t​  ​extend ​  ​to ​  ​a​  ​lot​  ​of  
philosophy. ​  ​​  ​This ​  ​will​  ​again ​  ​require​  ​spelling ​  ​out​  ​the​  ​relevant ​  ​difference ​  ​between  
mathematics ​  ​and ​  ​philosophy ​  ​that​  ​justifies ​  ​this ​  ​different​  ​treatment, ​  ​and ​  ​thereby ​  ​a​  ​scope  
restriction ​  ​on​  ​the​  ​observation ​  ​requirement ​  ​for ​  ​different​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice.  
    
  
Science​  ​that​  ​doesn’t​  ​engage​  ​with ​  ​other​  ​science​  ​-­ ​  ​results ​  ​naturalism  
  
In ​  ​§2.2​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​thesis, ​  ​I ​  ​introduced ​  ​results ​  ​naturalism. ​  ​​  ​Results ​  ​naturalists ​  ​align  
themselves ​  ​with​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​by​  ​engaging ​  ​with​  ​the​  ​results ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​sciences. ​  ​​  ​Amanda  
Bryant’s ​  ​(2017) ​  ​discussion​  ​of ​  ​“free-­range ​  ​metaphysics” ​  ​involved ​  ​criticising ​  ​instances ​  ​of  
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metaphysics ​  ​that​  ​did ​  ​not​  ​directly ​  ​engage​  ​with​  ​the​  ​results ​  ​of ​  ​science, ​  ​and ​  ​is ​  ​thus ​  ​an  
instance​  ​of ​  ​results ​  ​naturalism. ​  ​​  ​Bryant’s ​  ​view ​  ​involves ​  ​placing ​  ​restrictions ​  ​on​  ​certain  
philosophical​  ​views ​  ​that​  ​are​  ​not​  ​placed ​  ​upon​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​themselves. ​  ​​  ​We​  ​do​  ​not​  ​expect  
that​  ​a​  ​theoretical ​  ​physicist​  ​should​  ​engage​  ​with​  ​the​  ​results ​  ​from​  ​some​  ​other ​  ​scientific  
system​  ​of ​  ​practice, ​  ​e.g. ​  ​psychology, ​  ​in ​  ​order ​  ​to ​  ​exhibit​  ​naturalistic ​  ​methods. ​  ​​  ​As ​  ​was​  ​the  
case ​  ​with​  ​regards ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​above​  ​discussions ​  ​surrounding ​  ​observational​  ​methods, ​  ​the  
reformist​  ​will​  ​need ​  ​to ​  ​clarify ​  ​why​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​that​  ​philosophy, ​  ​or ​  ​metaphysics, ​  ​or ​  ​whichever  
system​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​is ​  ​attributed ​  ​more​  ​restrictive ​  ​methodological ​  ​requirements ​  ​than  
others, ​  ​is ​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​singled ​  ​out​  ​in ​  ​this ​  ​regard.     
  
  
Do​  ​specific​  ​domains ​  ​have​  ​local​  ​and ​  ​exclusive​  ​epistemic​  ​aims?  
  
The​  ​last ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​reformist​  ​naturalist​  ​views ​  ​outlined ​  ​earlier ​  ​in ​  ​this ​  ​section ​  ​was​  ​that​  ​of  
Aaron ​  ​Novick, ​  ​who​  ​claimed ​  ​that​  ​various ​  ​epistemic ​  ​virtues ​  ​are​  ​only ​  ​truth-­conducive ​  ​in  
local​  ​contexts ​  ​(2016). ​  ​​  ​Novick’s ​  ​paper ​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​reply ​  ​to ​  ​a​  ​paper ​  ​of ​  ​Laurie​  ​Paul’s ​  ​(2012),  
where​  ​Paul​  ​argues ​  ​that​  ​metaphysics ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​share​  ​an ​  ​overarching ​  ​methodology  
of ​  ​​inference ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​best​  ​explanation ​,​  ​and ​  ​thus ​  ​that​  ​metaphysics ​  ​employs ​  ​suitably  
naturalistic ​  ​methods. ​  ​​  ​Novick’s ​  ​paper ​  ​involves ​  ​a​  ​discussion​  ​of ​  ​two ​  ​case ​  ​studies ​  ​from  
biology, ​  ​that​  ​exhibit​  ​a​  ​methodological ​  ​constraint​  ​of ​  ​​vera ​  ​causa ​.     
  
Vera​  ​causa​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​methodological ​  ​principle​  ​that​  ​was​  ​first​  ​described ​  ​by​  ​Newton, ​  ​and  
literally ​  ​translates ​  ​to ​  ​​true​  ​cause​.​  ​​  ​Vera​  ​causa​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​constraint​  ​that​  ​suggests ​  ​that​  ​we​  ​can  
determine ​  ​the​  ​​best​  ​​explanation ​  ​from​  ​a​  ​number ​  ​of ​  ​empirically ​  ​equivalent ​  ​theories ​  ​if ​  ​one  
of ​  ​the​  ​theories ​  ​makes ​  ​use​  ​of ​  ​a​  ​previously ​  ​accepted ​  ​cause. ​  ​The​  ​theory ​  ​that​  ​uses ​  ​the  
previously ​  ​accepted ​  ​cause​  ​is ​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​preferred ​  ​to ​  ​others ​  ​that​  ​do​  ​not. ​  ​​  ​Novick ​  ​(2016)  
demonstrates ​  ​two ​  ​case ​  ​studies ​  ​from​  ​biology ​  ​that​  ​make​  ​use​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​vera​  ​causa​  ​principle.  
Novick ​  ​argues ​  ​further ​  ​that​  ​this ​  ​tells ​  ​us ​  ​something ​  ​interesting ​  ​about​  ​biology, ​  ​in ​  ​that​  ​it  
uses ​  ​IBE​  ​in ​  ​a​  ​specific​  ​way, ​  ​by​  ​employing ​  ​vera​  ​causa. ​  ​​  ​From​  ​here​  ​Novick ​  ​suggests ​  ​that  
this ​  ​shows ​  ​that​  ​local​  ​domains ​  ​(of ​  ​which ​  ​he​  ​takes ​  ​biology ​  ​to ​  ​describe​  ​one​  ​such) ​  ​have  
local​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims, ​  ​and ​  ​that​  ​we​  ​should​  ​therefore​  ​be​  ​sceptical ​  ​about​  ​applying ​  ​the  
method ​  ​of ​  ​IBE​  ​within ​  ​metaphysics. ​  ​​  ​According ​  ​to ​  ​Novick, ​  ​metaphysics ​  ​cannot​  ​stake  
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claim​  ​to ​  ​naturalism, ​  ​merely ​  ​by​  ​employing ​  ​IBE. ​  ​​  ​He​  ​argues ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​challenge ​  ​is ​  ​now ​  ​on  
the​  ​metaphysician ​  ​to ​  ​justify ​  ​the​  ​suitability ​  ​of ​  ​using​  ​IBE​  ​for ​  ​their ​  ​purposes.​  ​​  ​Novick  
takes ​  ​it​  ​that​  ​he​  ​has ​  ​demonstrated ​  ​that​  ​biology ​  ​is ​  ​justified ​  ​in ​  ​using​  ​IBE, ​  ​but​  ​expresses  
scepticism​  ​at​  ​the​  ​use​  ​of ​  ​IBE​  ​in ​  ​metaphysics.     
  
I’ve​  ​already ​  ​argued ​  ​that​  ​a​  ​current​  ​description ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​includes ​  ​a​  ​plurality ​  ​of  
systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice, ​  ​each ​  ​with​  ​specific​  ​and ​  ​sometimes ​  ​different​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims, ​  ​with  
different​  ​underlying ​  ​methodologies ​  ​that​  ​purport​  ​to ​  ​realise​  ​the​  ​aims ​  ​of ​  ​a​  ​practice. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​think  
a​  ​charitable ​  ​interpretation ​  ​of ​  ​Novick ​  ​would​  ​suggest​  ​that​  ​he​  ​means ​  ​something ​  ​like​  ​this,  
when ​  ​he​  ​talks ​  ​about​  ​local​  ​domains ​  ​having ​  ​local​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims. ​  ​​  ​However, ​  ​that​  ​we  
should​  ​be​  ​sceptical ​  ​about​  ​metaphysics ​  ​employing ​  ​a​  ​method ​   ​that​  ​is ​  ​often ​  ​instanced ​  ​in  
various ​  ​scientific ​  ​practices ​  ​does ​  ​not​  ​obviously ​  ​follow ​  ​from​  ​his ​  ​discussion.​  ​​  ​If ​  ​Novick’s  
examples ​  ​and ​  ​arguments ​  ​are​  ​taken ​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​universally ​  ​applied, ​  ​they ​  ​would​  ​result​  ​in ​  ​a  
general​  ​scepticism​  ​of ​  ​every ​  ​scientific ​  ​system​  ​of ​  ​practice, ​  ​and ​  ​every ​  ​other ​  ​broadly  
epistemic ​  ​system​  ​of ​  ​practice, ​  ​except​  ​biology ​  ​-­ ​  ​or ​  ​maybe​  ​even ​  ​of ​  ​every ​  ​single​  ​theory  
other ​  ​than ​  ​the​  ​two ​  ​that​  ​he​  ​discusses.​  ​​  ​For​  ​example, ​  ​he​  ​seems​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​arguing ​  ​that​  ​showing  
how ​  ​​vera ​  ​causa ​​  ​works ​  ​in ​  ​these​  ​cases ​  ​does ​  ​only ​  ​this, ​  ​it​  ​provides ​  ​justification ​  ​for ​  ​using  
IBE​  ​qua​  ​vera​  ​causa​  ​in ​  ​these​  ​cases, ​  ​and ​  ​these​  ​cases ​  ​alone. ​  ​​  ​If ​  ​he​  ​takes ​  ​it​  ​that​  ​this ​  ​leads ​  ​to  
a​  ​scepticism​  ​for ​  ​metaphysics, ​  ​due​  ​to ​  ​showing​  ​that​  ​an ​  ​epistemic ​  ​aim​  ​is ​  ​unique​  ​to ​  ​a  
particular ​  ​theory, ​  ​then ​  ​it​  ​would​  ​follow ​  ​that​  ​we​  ​ought​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​sceptical ​  ​of ​  ​any ​  ​theory ​  ​that  
uses ​  ​IBE​  ​that​  ​is ​  ​not​  ​one​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​two ​  ​he​  ​discusses.​  ​​  ​The​  ​list ​  ​of ​  ​theories ​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​sceptical ​  ​of,  
if ​  ​Novick’s ​  ​argument​  ​generalises ​  ​as ​  ​he​  ​suggests,​  ​is ​  ​quite​  ​large. ​  ​​  ​If ​  ​Novick’s ​  ​criteria ​  ​is  
only ​  ​supposed​  ​to ​  ​apply ​  ​to ​  ​metaphysical ​  ​theories, ​  ​he​  ​needs ​  ​to ​  ​provide​  ​more​  ​detail​  ​that  
shows ​  ​why​  ​metaphysics ​  ​should​  ​be​  ​singled ​  ​out​  ​in ​  ​in ​  ​this ​  ​regard. ​  ​​  ​To ​  ​make​  ​a​  ​claim​  ​about  
some​  ​parts ​  ​of ​  ​biology ​  ​in ​  ​order ​  ​to ​  ​argue​  ​for ​  ​domain ​  ​specific​  ​aims, ​  ​to ​  ​then ​  ​claim​  ​a​  ​special  
restriction ​  ​on​  ​methods ​  ​for ​  ​different​  ​specific​  ​domains, ​  ​is ​  ​so​  ​far ​  ​an ​  ​incomplete ​  ​argument.     
  
I ​  ​encourage​  ​metaphysicians ​  ​to ​  ​clearly ​  ​express ​  ​the​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims ​  ​of ​  ​their ​  ​system​  ​of  
practice, ​  ​and ​  ​to ​  ​make​  ​use​  ​of ​  ​methods ​  ​that​  ​have​  ​been ​  ​used ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​where  
possible. ​  ​​  ​We​  ​cannot​  ​know ​  ​​a​  ​priori​​  ​that​  ​a​  ​method ​  ​from​  ​one​  ​system​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​will​  ​be  
usefully ​  ​applied ​  ​to ​  ​a​  ​different​  ​system​  ​of ​  ​practice, ​  ​but​  ​we​  ​can ​  ​be​  ​optimistic​  ​that​  ​methods  
that​  ​have​  ​been ​  ​used ​  ​successfully ​  ​elsewhere​  ​might​  ​be​  ​usefully ​  ​applied ​  ​more​  ​widely. ​  ​​  ​A  
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system​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​can ​  ​be​  ​criticised ​  ​by​  ​demonstrating ​  ​that​  ​its ​  ​underlying ​  ​methodologies  
are​  ​inappropriate ​  ​for ​  ​the​  ​achievement ​  ​of ​  ​its ​  ​aims. ​  ​​  ​By​  ​showing​  ​that​  ​biology ​  ​sometimes  
uses ​  ​a​   ​particular ​  ​kind ​  ​of ​  ​IBE​  ​does ​  ​not​  ​provide​  ​evidence ​  ​for ​  ​scepticism​  ​about​  ​the  
methods ​  ​of ​  ​metaphysics, ​  ​in ​  ​and ​  ​of ​  ​itself.     
  
The​  ​aspirational ​  ​naturalism​  ​which ​  ​I ​  ​defend ​  ​encourages ​  ​the​  ​appropriate ​  ​alignment ​  ​of ​  ​the  
epistemic ​  ​aims ​  ​of ​  ​philosophy ​  ​with​  ​those​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​sciences. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​cannot​  ​see​  ​any ​  ​argument​  ​for  
ruling ​  ​out​  ​particular ​  ​aims ​  ​as ​  ​being ​  ​appropriate ​  ​for ​  ​a​  ​particular ​  ​philosophical​  ​practice ​  ​​a  
priori​,​  ​and ​  ​it​  ​would​  ​be​  ​antithetical ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​naturalistic ​  ​starting ​  ​point​  ​to ​  ​claim​  ​otherwise.  
Thus,​  ​the​  ​prudent​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalist​  ​encourages ​  ​alignment ​  ​with​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​in ​  ​a  
variety ​  ​of ​  ​ways,​  ​and ​  ​does ​  ​not​  ​rule​  ​any ​  ​methods ​  ​out​  ​​a​  ​priori​.  
  
  
Heuristics ​  ​around ​  ​observation ​  ​and ​  ​scientific​  ​results  
  
Despite​  ​dismissing ​  ​a​  ​requirement ​  ​of ​  ​observation, ​  ​or ​  ​a​  ​direct​  ​engagement ​  ​with​  ​the​  ​results  
of ​  ​science​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​included ​  ​as ​  ​necessary ​  ​conditions ​  ​for ​  ​implementing ​  ​the​  ​view ​  ​that  
methodological ​  ​naturalism​  ​endorses, ​  ​I ​  ​offer ​  ​a​  ​methodological ​  ​heuristic​  ​that​  ​forms ​  ​part  
of ​  ​my ​  ​positive​  ​view. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​argue​  ​that​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalism​  ​should​  ​include​  ​a  
theoretical ​  ​commitment ​  ​to ​  ​​relevance ​.​  ​​  ​I ​  ​define​  ​relevance, ​  ​as ​  ​holding ​  ​that, ​  ​at​  ​least ​  ​in  
principle, ​  ​philosophical​  ​theorising ​  ​should​  ​commit​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​belief ​  ​that​  ​various ​  ​scientific  
findings ​  ​or ​  ​scientific ​  ​methods, ​  ​observational ​  ​or ​  ​otherwise, ​  ​could ​  ​be​  ​usefully  
implemented ​  ​within ​  ​their ​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice. ​  ​​  ​If ​  ​some​  ​product​  ​of ​  ​scientific ​  ​methods, ​  ​or  
the​  ​implementation ​  ​of ​  ​some​  ​observational ​  ​or ​  ​otherwise​  ​scientific ​  ​method, ​  ​could ​  ​be  
utilised ​  ​usefully ​  ​within ​  ​philosophical​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice, ​  ​philosophers ​  ​are​  ​encouraged  
to ​  ​do​  ​so.​  ​​  ​Whether ​  ​particular ​  ​methods ​  ​will​  ​be​  ​useful​  ​in ​  ​local​  ​contexts ​  ​will​  ​be​  ​partly ​  ​an  
empirical ​  ​matter, ​  ​and ​  ​an ​  ​​a​  ​priori​​  ​insistence​  ​on​  ​favoured ​  ​methods ​  ​is ​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​treated ​  ​with  
scepticism.     
  
  
What​  ​to ​  ​make​  ​of ​  ​reformist ​  ​naturalism?  
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In ​  ​light​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​discussion​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​chapter, ​  ​we​  ​can ​  ​return ​  ​to ​  ​look ​  ​at​  ​the​  ​restrictive  
instances ​  ​of ​  ​reformist​  ​naturalism​  ​that​  ​were​  ​introduced ​  ​earlier. ​  ​​  ​Alex​  ​Rosenberg’s ​  ​(2014)  
insistence​  ​on​  ​a​  ​singular ​  ​scientific ​  ​method ​  ​is ​  ​implausible, ​  ​in ​  ​light​  ​of ​  ​a​  ​current​  ​description  
of ​  ​scientific ​  ​practice ​  ​as ​  ​exhibiting ​  ​methodological ​  ​pluralism. ​  ​​  ​Maclaurin ​  ​and ​  ​Dyke’s  
(2012) ​  ​claims ​  ​that​  ​metaphysics ​  ​must​  ​by​  ​necessity ​  ​engage​  ​with​  ​observation ​  ​imposes  
restrictions ​  ​for ​  ​metaphysics ​  ​that​  ​are​  ​not​  ​met​  ​by​  ​various ​  ​sciences. ​  ​​  ​Amanda​  ​Bryant’s  
(2017) ​  ​requirement ​  ​that​  ​metaphysics ​  ​must​  ​directly ​  ​engage​  ​with​  ​scientific ​  ​results ​  ​again  
imposes ​  ​restrictions ​  ​that​  ​various ​  ​sciences ​  ​themselves ​  ​do​  ​not​  ​live​  ​up​  ​to. ​  ​​  ​Aaron ​  ​Novick’s  
(2016) ​  ​claim​  ​is ​  ​as ​  ​yet​  ​incomplete, ​  ​and ​  ​relies ​  ​on​  ​​a​  ​priori​​  ​assumptions ​  ​about​  ​science​  ​and  
philosophy ​  ​which ​  ​are​  ​not​  ​obviously ​  ​well-­motivated. ​  ​​  ​These​  ​four ​  ​naturalisms ​  ​all  
prescribed ​  ​different​  ​variants ​  ​of ​  ​reform​  ​for ​  ​philosophy ​  ​that​  ​are​  ​implausibly ​  ​restrictive.  
  
Having ​  ​rejected ​  ​these​  ​instances ​  ​of ​  ​reformist​  ​naturalism, ​  ​I ​  ​single​  ​out​  ​several​  ​aspects ​  ​of  
philosophical​  ​practice ​  ​that​  ​have​  ​been ​  ​criticised ​  ​at​  ​times ​  ​for ​  ​purportedly ​  ​being  
non-­naturalistic, ​  ​in ​  ​case ​  ​these​  ​might​  ​provide​  ​the​  ​significant​  ​descriptive​  ​difference  
between ​  ​philosophy ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​reformist​  ​seeks ​  ​to ​  ​identify ​  ​and ​  ​deploy.  
  
  




Various ​  ​philosophers ​  ​have​  ​criticised ​  ​the​  ​use​  ​of ​  ​intuition ​  ​within ​  ​analytic ​  ​philosophy.  
Ladyman ​  ​and ​  ​Ross ​  ​(2007) ​  ​and ​  ​Maclaurin ​  ​and ​  ​Dyke​  ​(2012) ​  ​have​  ​argued ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​use​  ​of  
intuition ​  ​in ​  ​philosophy ​  ​(their ​  ​complaints ​  ​are​  ​specifically ​  ​directed ​  ​toward ​  ​the​  ​use​  ​of  
intuition ​  ​in ​  ​metaphysics) ​  ​establishes ​  ​a​  ​“discontinuity” ​  ​with​  ​the​  ​sciences. ​  ​​  ​A ​  ​growing  
number ​  ​of ​  ​philosophers ​  ​have​  ​adopted ​  ​the​  ​method ​  ​of ​  ​experimental ​  ​philosophy, ​  ​which  
was​  ​initially ​  ​motivated ​  ​by​  ​a​  ​scepticism​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​reliability ​  ​of ​  ​accurately ​  ​intuiting ​  ​folk  
beliefs ​  ​(e.g. ​  ​Weinberg, ​  ​Nichols ​  ​​  ​and ​  ​Stich​  ​2001). ​  ​​  ​Other ​  ​commentators ​  ​have  
downplayed ​  ​the​  ​role​  ​of ​  ​intuition ​  ​within ​  ​philosophical​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice. ​  ​​  ​Cian ​  ​Dorr  
(2010) ​  ​suggests ​  ​that​  ​often ​  ​when ​  ​philosophers ​  ​claim​  ​that​  ​a​  ​proposition ​,​  ​P​,​  ​is ​  ​intuitively  
plausible​  ​they ​  ​are​  ​rather ​  ​announcing ​  ​an ​  ​assumption ​  ​that​  ​​P​  ​​is ​  ​the​  ​case, ​  ​without​  ​providing  
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further ​  ​argument. ​  ​​  ​Timothy ​  ​Williamson ​  ​(2004) ​  ​suggests ​  ​that​  ​often ​  ​when ​  ​philosophers  
claim​  ​that​  ​a​  ​proposition, ​  ​​P​,​  ​is ​  ​intuitively ​  ​plausible, ​  ​they ​  ​are​  ​instead ​  ​announcing ​  ​that  
they ​  ​are​  ​making ​  ​a​  ​judgment​  ​that​  ​​P​,​  ​or ​  ​perhaps ​  ​making ​  ​an ​  ​abductive​  ​inference ​  ​to ​  ​​P​,  
based ​  ​on​  ​available ​  ​evidence ​  ​(Williamson ​  ​2004).     
  
I ​  ​do​  ​not​  ​wish​  ​to ​  ​take​  ​sides ​  ​in ​  ​this ​  ​debate​  ​by​  ​offering ​  ​a​  ​diagnosis ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​“genuine” ​  ​role​  ​of  
intuition ​  ​in ​  ​philosophical​  ​practice, ​  ​but​  ​instead ​  ​I ​  ​offer ​  ​some​  ​methodological ​  ​heuristics  
that​  ​we​  ​can ​  ​draw ​  ​from​  ​the​  ​various ​  ​commentators ​  ​in ​  ​this ​  ​debate. ​  ​​  ​These​  ​heuristics ​  ​form  
part​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​aspirational ​  ​naturalism​  ​which ​  ​I ​  ​advance, ​  ​and ​  ​outline​  ​in ​  ​more​  ​detail​  ​in ​  ​chapter  
five. ​  ​​  ​Philosophers ​  ​should​  ​take​  ​more​  ​care​  ​with​  ​regards ​  ​to ​  ​using​  ​the​  ​term​  ​‘intuition’.  
Dorr​  ​is ​  ​probably ​  ​right​  ​that​  ​there​  ​are​  ​times ​  ​when ​  ​a​  ​philosopher ​  ​uses ​  ​the​  ​term​  ​‘intuitively  
plausible’, ​  ​when ​  ​rather ​  ​they ​  ​mean ​  ​that​  ​they ​  ​will​  ​make​  ​an ​  ​assumption ​  ​for ​  ​which ​  ​they  
will​  ​not​  ​provide​  ​an ​  ​argument. ​  ​​  ​A ​  ​philosopher ​  ​who​  ​intends ​  ​this ​  ​usage​  ​is ​  ​encouraged ​  ​to  
make​  ​it​  ​explicit ​  ​that​  ​they ​  ​do​  ​so.​  ​​  ​One​  ​should​  ​state​  ​clearly ​  ​that​  ​they ​  ​are​  ​making ​  ​an  
assumption, ​  ​and ​  ​make​  ​plain ​  ​what​  ​that​  ​assumption ​  ​is, ​  ​rather ​  ​than ​  ​using​  ​the​  ​term  
‘intuitively ​  ​plausible’. ​  ​​  ​An​  ​argument’s ​  ​having ​  ​assumptions, ​  ​and ​  ​working ​  ​with  
downstream​  ​consequences ​  ​is ​  ​not​  ​necessarily ​  ​problematic. ​  ​​  ​All​  ​scientific ​  ​systems ​  ​of  
practice ​  ​have​  ​working ​  ​assumptions, ​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​nothing ​  ​non-­naturalistic ​  ​about​  ​doing ​  ​so.  
But, ​  ​an ​  ​epistemic ​  ​aim​  ​that​  ​philosophy ​  ​rightly ​  ​values ​  ​is ​  ​an ​  ​aim​  ​for ​  ​clarity ​  ​and ​  ​precision,  
and ​  ​one​  ​ought​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​clear ​  ​and ​  ​precise​  ​as ​  ​to ​  ​what​  ​one​  ​is ​  ​doing, ​  ​especially ​  ​given ​  ​the  
current​  ​negative ​  ​press ​  ​that​  ​intuition ​  ​has ​  ​received ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​literature. ​  ​​  ​Likewise, ​  ​if  
Williamson ​  ​is ​  ​right​  ​that​  ​sometimes ​  ​the​  ​term​  ​‘intuition’ ​  ​is ​  ​used ​  ​to ​  ​indicate ​  ​that​  ​one​  ​is  
making ​  ​a​  ​judgement, ​  ​which ​  ​seems​  ​a​  ​plausible​  ​description ​  ​for ​  ​at​  ​least ​  ​some​  ​uses ​  ​of ​  ​the  
term, ​  ​one​  ​should​  ​stipulate​  ​this ​  ​explicitly ​  ​for ​  ​precisely ​  ​the​  ​same​  ​reasons. ​  ​​  ​This ​  ​will  
curtail​  ​any ​  ​potential ​  ​straw-­man ​  ​attacks ​  ​on​  ​those​  ​who​  ​misuse​  ​the​  ​term​  ​in ​  ​these​  ​innocent  
contexts.     
  
If ​  ​a​  ​philosopher ​  ​is ​  ​genuinely ​  ​relying ​  ​on​  ​their ​  ​intuitions ​  ​as ​  ​serious ​  ​and ​  ​exclusive  
evidence ​  ​for ​  ​a​  ​philosophical​  ​claim, ​  ​one​  ​might​  ​rightly ​  ​express ​  ​some​  ​degree​  ​of ​  ​scepticism  
in ​  ​certain ​  ​cases. ​  ​​  ​We​  ​might​  ​consider ​  ​the​  ​following ​  ​questions, ​  ​when ​  ​evaluating ​  ​the  
strength ​  ​of ​  ​such ​  ​evidence. ​  ​​  ​Is ​  ​the​  ​philosopher ​  ​an ​  ​expert​  ​in ​  ​a​  ​particular ​  ​domain, ​  ​such ​  ​that  
relevant ​  ​intuitions ​  ​might​  ​be​  ​theory-­guided, ​  ​or ​  ​are​  ​they ​  ​merely ​  ​throwing ​  ​caution ​  ​to ​  ​the  
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wind​  ​and ​  ​saying ​  ​they ​  ​intuit​  ​something ​  ​for ​  ​which ​  ​they ​  ​can ​  ​provide​  ​no​  ​other ​  ​justification?  
Could ​  ​these​  ​intuitions ​  ​provide​  ​reliable ​  ​evidence ​  ​about​  ​the​  ​matter ​  ​in ​  ​question?  
Intuitively ​  ​plausible​  ​ideas ​  ​can ​  ​often ​  ​make​  ​for ​  ​good​  ​hypotheses, ​  ​or ​  ​starting ​  ​points ​  ​for ​  ​an  
investigation, ​  ​and ​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​no​  ​reason ​  ​why​  ​they ​  ​can’t​  ​be​  ​relied ​  ​on​  ​to ​  ​contribute​  ​towards  
such ​  ​practices, ​  ​but​  ​the​  ​epistemic ​  ​weight​  ​we​  ​might​  ​place​  ​on​  ​a​  ​given ​  ​agent’s ​  ​intuition  
might​  ​rightly ​  ​be​  ​questioned ​  ​in ​  ​particular ​  ​circumstances.     
  
Laurie​  ​Paul​  ​outlines ​  ​a​  ​fallacious ​  ​argument​  ​structure​  ​which ​  ​involves ​  ​a​  ​reliance ​  ​on​  ​using  
intuitions ​  ​as ​  ​conclusive​  ​evidence ​  ​for ​  ​the​  ​matter ​  ​in ​  ​question. ​  ​​  ​She​  ​names ​  ​this ​  ​the  
homunculus ​  ​fallacy​​  ​(2010). ​  ​​  ​According ​  ​to ​  ​Paul, ​  ​this ​  ​is ​  ​committed ​  ​when ​  ​one​  ​concludes  
that​  ​a​  ​proposition ​  ​is ​  ​true, ​  ​only ​  ​on​  ​the​  ​basis ​  ​that​  ​one​  ​finds ​  ​the​  ​proposition ​  ​intuitively  
plausible. ​  ​​  ​Arguments ​  ​that​  ​commit​  ​the​  ​‘homunculus ​  ​fallacy’ ​  ​have​  ​the​  ​following  
structure:  
  
P1)​  ​​X​  ​​is ​  ​intuitively ​  ​plausible  
∴​  ​​X  
  
Some​  ​reformist​  ​naturalists ​  ​express ​  ​scepticism​  ​toward ​  ​the​  ​using​  ​of ​  ​intuition ​  ​as ​  ​a​  ​means  
of ​  ​providing ​  ​evidentiary ​  ​support​  ​for ​  ​various ​  ​philosophical​  ​arguments ​  ​(e.g. ​  ​Maclaurin  
and ​  ​Dyke​  ​2012,​  ​Ladyman ​  ​and ​  ​Ross ​  ​2007,​  ​Weinberg ​  ​et. ​  ​al​  ​2001). ​  ​​  ​Philosophers ​  ​should  
make​  ​explicit ​  ​the​  ​intended ​  ​use​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​term​  ​‘intuition’ ​  ​(e.g. ​  ​as ​  ​a​  ​judgement, ​  ​an  
assumption, ​  ​an ​  ​intellectual ​  ​seeming, ​  ​etc.). ​  ​​  ​The​  ​meaning ​  ​of ​   ​‘intuitions’ ​  ​that​  ​both ​  ​the  
reformists ​  ​express ​  ​scepticism​  ​towards ​  ​and ​  ​that​  ​Laurie​  ​Paul’s ​  ​homunculus ​  ​fallacy  
describe, ​  ​is ​  ​close​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​meaning ​  ​attributed ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​everyday ​  ​use​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​term, ​  ​where​  ​it  
describes ​  ​something ​  ​like​  ​an ​  ​​instinctive ​  ​feeling ,​  ​or ​  ​an ​  ​​intellectual ​  ​seeming ​​  ​(e.g. ​  ​Bealer  17
1998). ​  ​​  ​Judgements ​  ​and ​  ​assumptions ​  ​are​  ​not​  ​subject​  ​to ​  ​these​  ​sceptical ​  ​arguments. ​  ​​  ​More  
attention ​  ​to ​  ​detail​  ​by​  ​way​  ​of ​  ​clearly ​  ​defining ​  ​one’s ​  ​terminology, ​  ​enables ​  ​the​  ​wheat​  ​to ​  ​be  
sorted ​  ​from​  ​the​  ​chaff, ​  ​as ​  ​it​  ​were, ​  ​and ​  ​help ​  ​ensure​  ​that​  ​the​  ​arguments ​  ​presented ​  ​by  
sceptics ​  ​about​  ​intuition ​  ​are​  ​not​  ​misapplied. ​  ​​  ​This ​  ​allows ​  ​more​  ​fruitful​  ​conversations  
about​  ​specific​  ​usages ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​term​  ​‘intuition’ ​  ​to ​  ​take​  ​place. ​  ​​  ​This ​  ​is ​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​encouraged. ​  ​​  ​I  
next​  ​look ​  ​at​  ​the​  ​role​  ​of ​  ​thought​  ​experiments, ​  ​which ​  ​themselves ​  ​involve​  ​intuition. ​  ​​  ​After  
17 ​  ​​Oxford​  ​dictionary.​  ​​  ​Retrieved​  ​from​  ​https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/  
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this, ​  ​I ​  ​present​  ​some​  ​findings ​  ​from​  ​psychological​  ​research, ​  ​that​  ​might​  ​help ​  ​clarify ​  ​certain  
circumstances ​  ​in ​  ​which ​  ​intuitions ​  ​are​  ​more​  ​reliable ​  ​than ​  ​others.  
  
  
The​  ​role​  ​of ​  ​thought​  ​experiment  
  
Thought​  ​experiments ​  ​have​  ​played ​  ​a​  ​colourful​  ​role​  ​within ​  ​philosophical​  ​practice.  
Famous ​  ​examples ​  ​include​  ​the​  ​Gettier​  ​cases ​  ​(1963) ​  ​-­ ​  ​where​  ​many ​  ​took ​  ​Gettier​  ​to ​  ​have  
successfully ​  ​refuted ​  ​the​  ​traditional ​  ​epistemological ​  ​conception ​  ​of ​  ​knowledge​  ​as ​  ​justified  
true​  ​belief, ​  ​Kripke’s ​  ​twin ​  ​earth ​  ​thought​  ​experiments ​  ​(1972) ​  ​-­ ​  ​which ​  ​were​  ​important  
arguments ​  ​against​  ​the​  ​reference ​  ​theory ​  ​of ​  ​meaning, ​  ​various ​  ​trolley-­themed ​  ​thought  
experiments ​  ​in ​  ​ethics ​  ​-­ ​  ​which ​  ​place​  ​the​  ​reader ​  ​in ​  ​an ​  ​imaginary ​  ​scenario ​  ​in ​  ​order ​  ​to  
illuminate ​  ​consequences ​  ​of ​  ​particular ​  ​ethical ​  ​theories ​  ​(see​  ​Singer ​  ​2005​  ​for ​  ​discussion),  
Rene​  ​Descartes’ ​  ​evil​  ​demon ​  ​hypothesis ​  ​(1641), ​  ​and ​  ​David ​  ​Chalmers’ ​  ​arguments ​  ​for ​  ​the  
possibility ​  ​of ​  ​zombies ​  ​-­ ​  ​physical​  ​duplicates ​  ​of ​  ​agents ​  ​that​  ​lacked ​  ​consciousness ​  ​-­ ​  ​which  
were​  ​arguments ​  ​against​  ​various ​  ​materialist ​  ​theories ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​philosophy ​  ​of ​  ​mind ​  ​(2002).     
  
Using​  ​thought​  ​experiment ​  ​as ​  ​an ​  ​argumentative ​  ​strategy ​  ​in ​  ​philosophy ​  ​has ​  ​been  
criticised ​  ​at​  ​times, ​  ​for ​  ​precisely ​  ​the​  ​same​  ​considerations ​  ​that​  ​concern ​  ​sceptics ​  ​about​  ​the  
reliability ​  ​of ​  ​intuition. ​  ​​  ​Thought​  ​experiments ​  ​are​  ​sometimes ​  ​offered ​  ​as ​  ​attempts ​  ​to ​  ​refute  
claims ​  ​about​  ​necessity, ​  ​by​  ​constructing ​  ​a​  ​hypothetical ​  ​situation ​  ​which ​  ​would​  ​provide​  ​a  
counterexample ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​necessity ​  ​claim, ​  ​if ​  ​it​  ​could ​  ​be​  ​demonstrated ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​purported  
situation ​  ​were​  ​possible. ​  ​​  ​If ​  ​a​  ​thought​  ​experiment ​  ​can ​  ​convince​  ​a​  ​test ​  ​subject​  ​as ​  ​to ​  ​the  
possibility ​  ​of ​  ​a​  ​counterexample ​  ​to ​  ​some​  ​necessity ​  ​claim, ​  ​then ​  ​a​  ​rational​  ​subject​  ​must  
dismiss ​  ​the​  ​necessity ​  ​claim​  ​on​  ​logical​  ​grounds.​  ​​  ​It​  ​cannot​  ​be​  ​the​  ​case ​  ​that​  ​​X​​  ​is  
necessarily ​  ​true, ​  ​and ​  ​also ​  ​possible​  ​that​  ​​X​​  ​is ​  ​false. ​  ​​  ​On​  ​the​  ​contrary, ​  ​if ​  ​​X​​  ​is ​  ​necessarily  
true, ​  ​then ​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​impossible​  ​that​  ​​X​​  ​is ​  ​false. ​  ​​  ​Thought​  ​experiments ​  ​may ​  ​be​  ​otherwise  
employed ​  ​as ​  ​intuition ​  ​pumps,​  ​allowing ​  ​a​  ​greater ​  ​understanding ​  ​of ​  ​some​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​central  
concepts ​  ​of ​  ​a​  ​philosophical​  ​theory, ​  ​by​  ​highlighting ​  ​kinds ​  ​of ​  ​scenarios ​  ​that​  ​might​  ​have​  ​to  
be​  ​accommodated ​  ​by​  ​particular ​  ​conceptual ​  ​distinctions ​  ​(see​  ​Dennett​  ​2013).    
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Again, ​  ​I ​  ​do​  ​not​  ​proffer ​  ​any ​  ​adjudication ​  ​on​  ​the​  ​epistemic ​  ​credibility ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​various  
thought​  ​experiments ​  ​listed ​  ​above, ​  ​but​  ​I ​  ​suggest​  ​that​  ​thought​  ​experiments ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​former  
kind ​  ​discussed ​  ​above, ​  ​are​  ​epistemically ​  ​credible ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​degree​  ​to ​  ​which ​  ​they ​  ​establish  
the​  ​possibility ​  ​of ​  ​their ​  ​putative​  ​counterexamples. ​  ​​  ​Thought​  ​experiments ​  ​involve  
counterfactual ​  ​reasoning, ​  ​a​  ​cognitive​  ​process ​  ​which ​  ​is ​  ​carried ​  ​out​  ​reliably ​  ​in ​  ​many  
situations. ​  ​​  ​Suppose​  ​an ​  ​employer ​  ​levels ​  ​the​  ​following ​  ​counterfactual ​  ​to ​  ​an ​  ​employee: ​  ​“If  
I ​  ​let​  ​you​  ​off ​  ​work​  ​early, ​  ​will​  ​you​  ​come​  ​and ​  ​have​  ​a​  ​drink ​  ​with​  ​me​  ​at​  ​the​  ​pub?”. ​  ​​  ​This  
proposal​  ​consists ​  ​of ​  ​a​  ​counterfactual ​  ​scenario ​  ​in ​  ​which ​  ​an ​  ​employee’s ​  ​intuitions ​  ​are  
likely ​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​pretty ​  ​reliable. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​employee ​  ​might​  ​make​  ​a​  ​number ​  ​of ​  ​considerations  
whilst​  ​thinking ​  ​of ​  ​how ​  ​they ​  ​will​  ​reply. ​  ​​  ​They ​  ​might​  ​consider ​  ​whether ​  ​they ​  ​had ​  ​any  
previous ​  ​engagements ​  ​around ​  ​the​  ​time​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​proposed ​  ​drink, ​  ​or ​  ​whether ​  ​any ​  ​other  
relevant ​  ​personal​  ​factors ​  ​might​  ​impact​  ​on​  ​their ​  ​making ​  ​a​  ​decision ​  ​one​  ​way​  ​or ​  ​the​  ​other.  
Perhaps ​  ​the​  ​employee ​  ​drove​  ​to ​  ​work​  ​that​  ​day ​  ​and ​  ​drinking ​  ​alcohol​  ​would​  ​prevent​  ​their  
ability ​  ​to ​  ​get​  ​home​  ​safely. ​  ​​  ​Maybe​  ​they ​  ​consider ​  ​their ​  ​boss ​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​of ​  ​dubious ​  ​character  
and ​  ​could ​  ​think ​  ​of ​  ​nothing ​  ​worse​  ​than ​  ​their ​  ​spending ​  ​social​  ​time​  ​together. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​see​  ​no  
good​  ​reason ​  ​for ​  ​a​  ​general​  ​scepticism​  ​about​  ​the​  ​ability ​  ​of ​  ​each ​  ​party ​  ​to ​  ​reliably ​  ​cognize  
about​  ​such ​  ​counterfactual ​  ​scenarios ​  ​-­ ​  ​these​  ​scenarios ​  ​seem​  ​very ​  ​​familiar ​​  ​to ​  ​day ​  ​to ​  ​day  
experiences. ​  ​​  ​Hence, ​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​no​  ​good​  ​reason ​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​sceptical ​  ​about​  ​the​  ​ability ​  ​to ​  ​reliably  
cognize​  ​about​  ​counterfactuals ​  ​in ​  ​general. ​  ​​  ​When ​  ​considering ​  ​something ​  ​less ​  ​familiar ​  ​to  
our ​  ​day ​  ​to ​  ​day ​  ​experiences, ​  ​e.g. ​  ​the​  ​metaphysical ​  ​possibility ​  ​of ​  ​philosophical​  ​zombies ​  ​-­  
i.e. ​  ​physical​  ​duplicates ​  ​of ​  ​humans ​  ​that​  ​lack ​  ​consciousness ​  ​-­, ​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​not​  ​obvious ​  ​that  
intuitions ​  ​can ​  ​gain ​  ​much ​  ​traction. ​  ​​  ​This ​  ​is ​  ​intended ​  ​to ​  ​make​  ​the​  ​wider-­scope​  ​point​  ​that  
the​  ​reliability ​  ​of ​  ​and ​  ​hence​  ​evidentiary ​  ​weight​  ​attributed ​  ​to ​  ​an ​  ​agent’s ​  ​intuitions ​  ​will  
vary ​  ​according ​  ​to ​  ​their ​  ​familiarity ​  ​with​  ​the​  ​antecedent ​  ​conditions ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​counterfactual  
conditional. ​  ​I ​  ​next​  ​make​  ​this ​  ​suggestion ​  ​more​  ​precise, ​  ​and ​  ​illustrate ​  ​with​  ​a  
psychological​  ​case ​  ​study​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​reliability ​  ​of ​  ​intuitions.  
  
Psychologist​  ​Daniel​  ​Kahnemann ​  ​(2011) ​  ​describes ​  ​a​  ​project​  ​conducted ​  ​for ​  ​determining  
circumstances ​  ​where​  ​intuitions ​  ​are​  ​at​  ​their ​  ​most​  ​reliable. ​  ​​  ​Kahnemann ​  ​found ​  ​that  
forming ​  ​reliable ​  ​intuitive ​  ​judgments ​  ​is ​  ​an ​  ​acquired ​  ​skill, ​  ​and ​  ​that​  ​these​  ​skills ​  ​are​  ​best  
developed ​  ​within ​  ​an ​  ​environment​  ​that​  ​is ​  ​sufficiently ​  ​regular. ​  ​​  ​Above, ​  ​I ​  ​had ​  ​suggested  
that​  ​the​  ​reliability ​  ​of ​  ​intuitive ​  ​judgments ​  ​is ​  ​correlated ​  ​with​  ​familiarity. ​  ​​  ​Where​  ​I ​  ​used  
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the​  ​term​  ​‘antecedent ​  ​conditions’, ​  ​Kahnemann ​  ​uses ​  ​the​  ​term​  ​‘environment’ ​  ​analogously.  
Familiarity ​  ​with​  ​the​  ​antecedent ​  ​conditions ​  ​is ​  ​most​  ​likely ​  ​to ​  ​increase​  ​when ​  ​those  
conditions ​  ​exhibit​  ​greater ​  ​regularity. ​  ​​  ​Regularity ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​antecedent ​  ​conditions ​  ​makes  
systematic​  ​prediction ​  ​possible, ​  ​and ​  ​affords ​  ​the​  ​opportunity ​  ​for ​  ​prolonged ​  ​practice, ​  ​in  
order ​  ​for ​  ​an ​  ​agent​  ​to ​  ​best​  ​learn ​  ​what​  ​these​  ​regularities ​  ​are. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​more​  ​regularities  
learned, ​  ​the​  ​more​  ​familiar ​  ​one​  ​is ​  ​with​  ​the​  ​antecedent ​  ​conditions. ​  ​​  ​According ​  ​to  
Kahnemann’s ​  ​study,​  ​the​  ​more​  ​regular ​  ​the​  ​antecedent ​  ​conditions ​  ​are, ​  ​the​  ​more​  ​reliable  
our ​  ​intuitions ​  ​about​  ​them​  ​are​  ​likely ​  ​to ​  ​be. ​  ​​  ​He​  ​doesn’t​  ​use​  ​the​  ​term​  ​‘familiarity’, ​  ​but​  ​I  
think ​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​useful​  ​conceptual ​  ​addition ​  ​to ​  ​his ​  ​claim​  ​that​  ​increased ​  ​regularity ​  ​leads ​  ​to  
more​  ​reliable ​  ​intuitions. ​  ​​  ​More​  ​carefully, ​  ​increased ​  ​regularity ​  ​of ​  ​antecedent ​  ​conditions  
enables ​  ​the​  ​agent​  ​to ​  ​acquire​  ​greater ​  ​familiarity, ​  ​and ​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​this ​  ​greater ​  ​familiarity ​  ​that  
increases ​  ​the​  ​reliability ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​agent’s ​  ​intuitive ​  ​judgments ​  ​about​  ​the​  ​matter ​  ​in ​  ​question.  
  
There​  ​are​  ​other ​  ​factors ​  ​that​  ​constrain ​  ​the​  ​reliability ​  ​of ​  ​an ​  ​agent’s ​  ​intuitive ​  ​judgments, ​  ​to  
do​  ​with​  ​characteristics ​  ​of ​  ​individual​  ​agents, ​  ​other ​  ​than ​  ​the​  ​regularity ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​antecedent  
conditions. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​extent​  ​to ​  ​which ​  ​reliable ​  ​intuitive ​  ​judgments ​  ​about​  ​particular ​  ​matters  
will​  ​depend ​  ​upon​  ​the​  ​cognitive​  ​make-­up ​  ​of ​  ​individual​  ​agents. ​  ​​  ​Scepticism​  ​regarding ​  ​the  
reliability ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​intuitive ​  ​judgments ​  ​of ​  ​a​  ​particular ​  ​agent​  ​will​  ​be​  ​warranted, ​  ​should​  ​the  
agent​  ​be​  ​cognitively ​  ​impaired ​  ​in ​  ​some​  ​way. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​reliability ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​intuitive​  ​judgments ​  ​of  
a​  ​sufferer ​  ​of ​  ​a​  ​cognitive​  ​disease​  ​such ​  ​as ​  ​Alzheimer’s ​  ​-­ ​  ​a​  ​degenerative ​  ​neurological  
condition, ​  ​with​  ​symptoms ​  ​of ​  ​confusion ​  ​and ​  ​memory ​  ​loss ​  ​-­ ​  ​will​  ​be​  ​questionable,  
regardless ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​regularity ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​environment. ​  ​​  ​This ​  ​provides ​  ​another ​  ​reason ​  ​for  
including ​  ​‘familiarity’ ​  ​as ​  ​a​  ​useful​   ​addition ​  ​to ​  ​Kahnemann’s ​  ​conceptual ​  ​scheme. ​  ​​  ​An  
agent’s ​  ​ability ​  ​to ​  ​gain ​  ​familiarity ​  ​with​  ​any ​  ​antecedent ​  ​conditions, ​  ​regardless ​  ​of  
regularity, ​  ​is ​  ​constrained ​  ​by​  ​the​  ​cognitive​  ​make-­up ​  ​of ​  ​individual​  ​agents. ​  ​​  ​Thought  
experiments ​  ​need ​  ​not​  ​be​  ​merely ​  ​hypothetical ​  ​scenarios. ​  ​​  ​Timothy ​  ​Williamson ​  ​(2007)  
performed ​  ​real​  ​Gettier​  ​cases ​  ​on​  ​his ​  ​own​  ​lecture ​  ​theatres, ​  ​for ​  ​example, ​  ​thus ​  ​actualising  
them.     
  
A ​  ​number ​  ​of ​  ​famous ​  ​thought​  ​experiments ​  ​are​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​found ​  ​within ​  ​the​  ​history ​  ​of ​  ​science.  
Einstein’s ​  ​various ​  ​​gedankenexperiments ​​  ​(see​  ​Cohen ​  ​1989), ​  ​and ​  ​Newton’s ​  ​cannonball  
experiment ​  ​(see​  ​Velentzas ​  ​and ​  ​Halkia​  ​2013) ​  ​are​  ​examples ​  ​of ​  ​such. ​  ​​  ​Use​  ​of ​  ​thought  
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experiment ​  ​is ​  ​not​  ​exclusive​  ​to ​  ​philosophy, ​  ​nor ​  ​is ​  ​it​  ​alien ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​sciences. ​  ​​  ​Epistemic  
scepticism​  ​is ​  ​sometimes ​  ​warranted ​  ​towards ​  ​thought​  ​experiments, ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​extent​  ​that​  ​the  
possibility ​  ​of ​  ​their ​  ​proposed ​  ​counterexamples ​  ​can ​  ​be​  ​reliably ​  ​ascertained ​  ​through  
cognition. ​  ​​  ​That​  ​something ​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​thought​  ​experiment ​  ​in ​  ​and ​  ​of ​  ​itself, ​  ​does ​  ​not​  ​establish  
this ​  ​skepticism.  
  
After ​  ​discussing​  ​the​  ​use​  ​of ​  ​intuition ​  ​and ​  ​thought​  ​experiment ​  ​within ​  ​philosophical  
practice, ​  ​I ​  ​have​  ​argued ​  ​that​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​nothing ​  ​particularly ​  ​unusual​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​fact​  ​that  
philosophy ​  ​uses ​  ​them, ​  ​since​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​do​  ​so​  ​too. ​  ​​  ​However, ​  ​I ​  ​have​  ​not​  ​addressed ​  ​​how  
philosophy ​  ​or ​  ​science​  ​uses ​  ​them​  ​in ​  ​detail. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​have​  ​discussed ​   ​and ​  ​commented ​  ​on​  ​some  
aspects ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​reliability ​  ​of ​  ​intuition ​  ​and ​  ​thought​  ​experiment ​  ​in ​  ​certain ​  ​circumstances.  
This ​  ​provides ​  ​at​  ​least ​  ​some​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​groundwork​  ​for ​  ​further ​  ​examination ​  ​into ​  ​the  
appropriate ​  ​uses ​  ​of ​  ​intuition ​  ​and ​  ​thought​  ​experiment ​  ​in ​  ​philosophy ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​sciences.  
Despite​  ​requiring ​  ​further ​  ​detailed ​  ​work​  ​to ​  ​make​  ​these​  ​claims ​  ​more​  ​precise, ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​have  
offered ​  ​some​  ​methodological ​  ​heuristics ​  ​of ​  ​care​  ​when ​  ​using​   ​intuition ​  ​and ​  ​thought  
experiment ​  ​which ​  ​are​  ​a​  ​starting ​  ​point:     
  
1) ​  ​The​  ​intended ​  ​meaning ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​term​  ​‘intuition’ ​  ​should​  ​be​  ​made​  ​explicitly ​  ​and ​  ​as  
precisely ​  ​as ​  ​possible. ​  ​​  ​If ​  ​other ​  ​terms ​  ​more​  ​accurately ​  ​express ​  ​the​  ​author’s  
intended ​  ​meaning, ​  ​these​  ​should​  ​be​  ​favoured ​  ​instead ​  ​(e.g. ​  ​‘assumption’,  
‘judgement’, ​  ​or ​  ​‘inference’).  
  
2) ​  ​Outlining ​  ​both ​  ​the​  ​intended ​  ​evidentiary ​  ​role​  ​and ​  ​justificatory ​  ​weight​  ​that​  ​the  
author ​  ​intends ​  ​to ​  ​attribute ​  ​to ​  ​intuition ​  ​and/or ​  ​thought​  ​experiment ​  ​should​  ​also ​  ​be  
made​  ​as ​  ​explicit ​  ​and ​  ​precise​  ​as ​  ​possible. ​  ​​  ​A ​  ​thought​  ​experiment ​  ​might​  ​be  
intended ​  ​to ​  ​​demonstrate​​  ​the​  ​possibility ​  ​of ​  ​a​  ​particular ​  ​state​  ​of ​  ​affairs. ​  ​​  ​Less  
ambitious ​  ​roles ​  ​for ​  ​thought​  ​experiments ​  ​include​  ​using​  ​them​  ​as ​  ​intuition ​  ​pumps,  
in ​  ​order ​  ​to ​  ​​highlight​​  ​interesting ​  ​aspects ​  ​of ​  ​a​  ​particular ​  ​theory. ​  ​​  ​Outlining ​  ​the  
epistemic ​  ​aims ​  ​and ​  ​methodologies ​  ​of ​  ​a​  ​philosophical​  ​system​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​with  
greater ​  ​precision, ​  ​makes ​  ​evaluating ​  ​the​  ​methods ​  ​of ​  ​intuition ​  ​and ​  ​thought  
experiment ​  ​more​  ​tractable ​  ​on​  ​a​  ​case ​  ​by​  ​case ​  ​basis.    
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​  ​3) ​  ​Laurie​  ​Paul’s ​  ​‘homunculus ​  ​fallacy’ ​  ​occurs ​  ​within ​  ​arguments ​  ​that  
afford ​  ​intuition ​  ​too ​  ​great​  ​an ​  ​evidentiary ​  ​role. ​  ​​  ​Paul’s ​  ​fallacy ​  ​is ​  ​committed ​  ​when  
one​  ​concludes ​  ​​x​,​  ​from​  ​merely ​  ​intuiting ​  ​​x​.​  ​​  ​In ​  ​general, ​  ​we​  ​might​  ​be​  ​sceptical  
about​  ​arguments ​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​form .    18
  
This ​  ​chapter ​  ​has ​  ​so​  ​far ​  ​dismissed ​  ​a​  ​number ​  ​of ​  ​reformist​  ​naturalist​  ​views, ​  ​that​  ​attempted  
to ​  ​rule​  ​out​  ​various ​  ​philosophical​  ​practices ​  ​as ​  ​non-­naturalistic. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​argued ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​various  
criteria ​  ​that​  ​reformist​  ​naturalist​  ​arguments ​  ​impose​  ​on​  ​philosophical​  ​practice ​  ​are  
untenable, ​  ​in ​  ​that​  ​they ​  ​offer ​  ​restrictions ​  ​on​  ​philosophy ​  ​that​  ​are​  ​too ​  ​harsh. ​  ​​  ​The  
restrictions ​  ​suggested ​  ​are​  ​not​  ​endorsed ​  ​by​  ​the​  ​sciences, ​  ​and ​  ​neither ​  ​are​  ​they ​  ​restrictions  
that​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​themselves ​  ​employ. ​  ​​  ​After ​  ​dismissing ​  ​these​  ​views, ​  ​I ​  ​have​  ​looked ​  ​at  
other ​  ​reformist​  ​criticisms ​  ​that​  ​expressed ​  ​scepticism​  ​towards ​  ​the​  ​use​  ​of ​  ​intuition ​  ​and  
thought​  ​experiment. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​have​  ​shown​  ​that​  ​the​  ​use​  ​of ​  ​intuition ​  ​and ​  ​thought​  ​experiment, ​  ​in  
and ​  ​of ​  ​itself, ​  ​does ​  ​not​  ​provide​  ​grounds ​  ​for ​  ​scepticism​  ​on​  ​naturalistic ​  ​grounds.  
However, ​  ​relevant ​  ​findings ​  ​from​  ​psychology ​  ​give​  ​us ​  ​some​  ​guidance​  ​as ​  ​to ​  ​conditions  
when ​  ​intuitions ​  ​will​  ​be​  ​more​  ​reliable ​  ​than ​  ​other ​  ​times.  
  
I ​  ​have​   ​argued ​  ​that​  ​reformist​  ​arguments ​  ​do​  ​not​  ​succeed ​  ​by​  ​focusing ​  ​on​  ​various ​  ​methods  
of ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​and ​  ​philosophy ​  ​to ​  ​provide​  ​the​  ​significant​  ​difference ​  ​between ​  ​domains  
that​  ​the​  ​argument​  ​for ​  ​reform​  ​requires. ​  ​​  ​For​  ​the​  ​remainder ​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​chapter ​  ​I ​  ​consider ​  ​some  
more​  ​abstract​  ​considerations ​  ​on​  ​behalf ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​reformist, ​  ​to ​  ​see​  ​if ​  ​these​  ​might​  ​provide​  ​the  
relevant ​  ​difference ​  ​between ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​and ​  ​philosophy ​  ​that​  ​they ​  ​require​  ​for ​  ​the  
argument​  ​for ​  ​reform​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​successful.     
  
  
Is ​  ​philosophy​  ​some​  ​kind​  ​of ​  ​analytic​  ​​a​  ​priori​​  ​activity, ​  ​autonomous ​  ​from ​  ​the  
sciences?  
  
18 ​  ​​Not​  ​all​  ​instances ​  ​of​  ​this ​  ​argument​  ​pattern​  ​are​  ​naturalistically​  ​unreliable,​  ​however.​  ​​  ​A ​  ​subject’s  
intuitions ​  ​might​  ​be​  ​taken​  ​as ​  ​reliable​  ​evidence​  ​for​  ​a​  ​medical​  ​practitioner​  ​providing​  ​a​  ​medical​  ​diagnosis,​  ​for  
example.  
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Some​  ​commentators ​  ​have​  ​claimed ​  ​that​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​significant​  ​difference ​  ​between  
philosophy ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​at​  ​a​  ​sufficiently ​  ​abstract​  ​level, ​  ​and ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​domains ​  ​can ​  ​be  
demarcated ​  ​from​  ​one​  ​another ​  ​by​  ​philosophy’s ​  ​having ​  ​an ​  ​exclusive​  ​realm​  ​of ​  ​interest​  ​by  
way​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​analytic ​  ​​a​  ​priori​,​  ​whilst​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​are​  ​thought​  ​to ​  ​reign ​  ​over ​  ​the​  ​synthetic​  ​​a  
posteriori​.​  ​​  ​I ​  ​will​  ​briefly ​  ​introduce​  ​these​  ​distinctions, ​  ​before​  ​discussing​  ​commentators  
who​  ​hold ​  ​related ​  ​views.     
  
Different​  ​philosophers ​  ​often ​  ​work​  ​with​  ​different​  ​definitions ​  ​of ​  ​these​  ​terms, ​  ​as ​  ​I ​  ​will  
highlight​  ​below. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​will​  ​introduce​  ​these​  ​terms ​  ​in ​  ​what​  ​I ​  ​take​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​a​  ​fairly ​  ​conventional  
and ​  ​non-­controversial ​  ​way. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​do​  ​not​  ​claim​  ​that​  ​this ​  ​is ​  ​the​  ​correct​  ​way​  ​to ​  ​use​  ​the​  ​term, ​  ​or  
that​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​one​  ​uniquely ​  ​correct​  ​usage. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​analytic-­synthetic ​  ​distinction ​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​semantic  
distinction ​  ​to ​  ​do​  ​with​  ​what​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​that​  ​makes ​  ​a​  ​particular ​  ​proposition ​  ​true​  ​or ​  ​false. ​  ​​  ​An  
analytic​​  ​proposition ​  ​is ​  ​made​  ​true​  ​or ​  ​false​  ​by​  ​definition. ​  ​​  ​For​  ​instance, ​  ​the​  ​proposition  
‘all​  ​bachelors ​  ​are​  ​unmarried’ ​  ​is ​  ​true​  ​by​  ​definition, ​  ​whilst​  ​the​  ​proposition ​  ​‘all​  ​bachelors  
are​  ​married’ ​  ​is ​  ​false. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​proposition ​  ​‘all​  ​bachelors ​  ​are​  ​unmarried’ ​  ​is ​  ​analytically ​  ​true,  
whilst​  ​the​  ​proposition ​  ​‘all​  ​bachelors ​  ​are​  ​married’ ​  ​is ​  ​analytically ​  ​false. ​  ​​  ​Contrasting ​  ​this,  
a​  ​​synthetic ​  ​​proposition ​  ​is ​  ​made​  ​true​  ​or ​  ​false​  ​by​  ​the​  ​way​  ​the​  ​world ​  ​is. ​  ​​  ​For​  ​instance, ​  ​the  
proposition ​  ​‘the​  ​sun​  ​is ​  ​the​  ​gravitational ​  ​centre​  ​of ​  ​our ​  ​solar ​  ​system’ ​  ​is ​  ​made​  ​either ​  ​true​  ​or  
false​  ​(true, ​  ​I ​  ​believe!) ​  ​in ​  ​so​  ​far ​  ​as ​  ​it​  ​provides ​  ​an ​  ​accurate ​  ​description ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​world.    
  
The​  ​​a​  ​priori​/​a​  ​posteriori​​  ​distinction ​  ​is ​  ​an ​  ​epistemological ​  ​one, ​  ​to ​  ​do​  ​with​  ​how ​  ​we​  ​can  
know ​  ​the​  ​truth ​  ​of ​  ​propositions. ​  ​​  ​If ​  ​a​  ​proposition ​  ​is ​  ​knowable​  ​​a​  ​priori​,​  ​its ​  ​truth ​  ​or ​  ​falsity  
can ​  ​be​  ​ascertained ​  ​without​  ​observing ​  ​the​  ​world. ​  ​​  ​Our​  ​old ​  ​friend, ​  ​the​  ​bachelor, ​  ​can ​  ​come  
to ​  ​the​  ​party ​  ​again ​  ​to ​  ​illustrate ​  ​this ​  ​point .​  ​​  ​The​  ​truth ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​proposition ​  ​‘all​  ​bachelors ​  ​are  19
unmarried’ ​  ​can ​  ​be​  ​ascertained ​  ​without​  ​observing ​  ​the​  ​world. ​  ​​  ​One​  ​does ​  ​not​  ​have​  ​to ​  ​count  
each ​  ​and ​  ​every ​  ​bachelor, ​  ​carefully ​  ​checking ​  ​whether ​  ​they ​  ​are​  ​also ​  ​unmarried ​  ​before  
knowing​  ​the​  ​proposition ​  ​is ​  ​true. ​  ​​  ​On​  ​the​  ​other ​  ​hand, ​  ​we​  ​cannot​  ​ascertain ​  ​the​  ​truth ​  ​or  
falsity ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​proposition ​  ​‘the​  ​sun​  ​is ​  ​the​  ​gravitational ​  ​centre​  ​of ​  ​our ​  ​solar ​  ​system’ ​  ​simply  
by​  ​understanding ​  ​the​  ​various ​  ​terms ​  ​involved. ​  ​​  ​Astronomers ​  ​provide​  ​evidence ​  ​for ​  ​the  
truth ​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​proposition ​  ​by​  ​observing ​  ​the​  ​world.     
  
19 ​  ​​A ​  ​bachelor​  ​party,​  ​if​  ​you​  ​will!  
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Colin ​  ​McGinn’s ​  ​​Truth​  ​by​  ​Analysis ​​  ​(2012) ​  ​makes ​  ​the​  ​case ​  ​that​  ​philosophy ​  ​has ​  ​its ​  ​own  
unique​  ​role, ​  ​and ​  ​that​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​solely ​  ​to ​  ​perform​  ​conceptual ​  ​analysis. ​  ​​  ​He​  ​argues ​  ​that​  ​it​  ​is  
exclusively ​  ​focused ​  ​on​  ​making ​  ​​analytic​​  ​claims, ​  ​and ​  ​justifying ​  ​them​  ​by​  ​​a​  ​priori​​  ​means.  
He​  ​adds ​  ​further, ​  ​that​  ​this ​  ​in ​  ​itself ​  ​gives ​  ​no​  ​reason ​  ​to ​  ​think ​  ​that​  ​philosophy ​  ​is  
unscientific, ​  ​and ​  ​indeed ​  ​that​  ​it​  ​should​  ​rightly ​  ​be​  ​considered ​  ​a​  ​science​  ​of ​  ​its ​  ​own.     
Frank ​  ​Jackson ​  ​has ​  ​argued ​  ​along ​  ​similar​  ​lines ​  ​at​  ​various ​  ​times ​  ​(e.g. ​  ​1998), ​  ​claiming ​  ​that  
there​  ​is ​  ​room​  ​for ​  ​a​  ​distinct​  ​role​  ​for ​  ​philosophy ​  ​as ​  ​conceptual ​  ​analysis. ​  ​​  ​Jackson ​  ​thinks  
this ​  ​role​  ​will​  ​be​  ​analytic ​  ​and ​  ​​a​  ​priori​.  
  
In ​  ​Timothy ​  ​Williamson’s ​  ​introduction ​  ​to ​  ​his ​  ​​The​​  ​​Philosophy​  ​of​  ​Philosophy​​  ​(2007), ​  ​a  
similar​  ​view ​  ​is ​  ​described.  
  
[W]e​  ​may ​  ​put​  ​the​  ​difference ​  ​to ​  ​a​  ​first​  ​approximation ​  ​thus:​  ​the​  ​current  
methodology ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​natural​  ​sciences ​  ​is ​  ​​a​  ​posteriori​;;​  ​the​  ​current​  ​methodology  
of ​  ​philosophy ​  ​is ​  ​​a​  ​priori​.  
(1)  
  
Williamson ​  ​goes ​  ​on​  ​to ​  ​reject ​  ​this ​  ​approximation, ​  ​claiming ​  ​that​  ​it​  ​cannot​  ​be​  ​neatly  
applied ​  ​to ​  ​philosophy ​  ​or ​  ​science​  ​in ​  ​any ​  ​significant​  ​way.  
  
David ​  ​Papineau ​  ​has ​  ​advanced ​  ​a​  ​quite​  ​different​  ​view ​  ​to ​  ​Jackson ​  ​and ​  ​McGinn:  
  
[p]hilosophy ​  ​investigates ​  ​reality ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​same​  ​way​  ​as ​  ​science. ​  ​​  ​Its ​  ​methods ​  ​are  
akin ​  ​to ​  ​scientific ​  ​methods, ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​knowledge​  ​it​  ​yields ​  ​is ​  ​akin ​  ​to ​  ​scientific  
knowledge.  
(2014 ​  ​:​  ​166)  
  
Papineau ​  ​goes ​  ​on​  ​to ​  ​add ​  ​that​  ​philosophical​  ​claims ​  ​are​  ​synthetic​  ​in ​  ​nature, ​  ​and ​  ​that  
philosophical​  ​knowledge​  ​is ​  ​​a​  ​posteriori​​  ​rather ​  ​than ​  ​​a​  ​posteriori​.​  ​​  ​Interesting ​  ​features ​  ​of  
this ​  ​view ​  ​include​  ​regarding ​  ​various ​  ​methods ​  ​of ​  ​justification ​  ​for ​  ​philosophical​  ​theory  
choice​  ​-­ ​  ​such ​  ​as ​  ​considerations ​  ​of ​  ​elegance ​  ​or ​  ​parsimony ​  ​-­ ​  ​as ​  ​being ​  ​​a​  ​posteriori​,​  ​rather  
than ​  ​a​  ​more​  ​typical​  ​categorization ​  ​that​  ​considers ​  ​them​  ​​a​  ​priori​.  
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I ​  ​will​  ​not​  ​weigh ​  ​in ​  ​heavily ​  ​on​  ​these​  ​debates. ​  ​​  ​It​  ​is ​  ​not​  ​my ​  ​task ​  ​to ​  ​provide​  ​a​  ​correct  
description ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​analytic ​  ​and ​  ​synthetic, ​  ​or ​  ​the​  ​​a​  ​priori​​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​​a​  ​posteriori​.​  ​​  ​For​  ​what  
it’s ​  ​worth, ​  ​I ​  ​think ​  ​that​  ​McGinn ​  ​and ​  ​Jackson ​  ​largely ​  ​misdiagnose​  ​their ​  ​own​  ​practices, ​  ​but  
I ​  ​will​  ​not​  ​argue​  ​for ​  ​this ​  ​view ​  ​presently. ​  ​​  ​It​  ​seems​  ​to ​  ​me​  ​obvious ​  ​that​  ​philosophy ​  ​is ​  ​often,  
if ​  ​not​  ​usually, ​  ​interested ​  ​not​  ​just​  ​in ​  ​conceptual ​  ​analysis, ​  ​but​  ​also ​  ​in ​  ​making ​  ​arguments  
about​  ​how ​  ​particular ​  ​concepts ​  ​can ​  ​denote​  ​features ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​world. ​  ​​  ​Epistemologists ​  ​who  
perform​  ​analyses ​  ​of ​  ​knowledge, ​  ​are​  ​trying ​  ​to ​  ​describe​  ​a​  ​phenomenon ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​world:  
knowledge. ​  ​​  ​Philosophers ​  ​of ​  ​mind ​  ​are​  ​trying ​  ​to ​  ​describe​  ​an ​  ​object​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​world:​  ​the  
mind. ​  ​​  ​Metaphysicians ​  ​of ​  ​time​  ​are​  ​trying ​  ​to ​  ​describe​  ​the​  ​nature​  ​of ​  ​some​  ​phenomenon ​  ​in  
the​  ​world:​  ​time. ​  ​​  ​These​  ​seem​  ​to ​  ​me​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​patently ​  ​synthetic​  ​claims. ​  ​​  ​Regarding ​  ​whether  
various ​  ​methods ​  ​of ​  ​justification ​  ​are​  ​rightly ​  ​considered ​  ​​a​  ​priori​  ​​or ​  ​​a​  ​posteriori​,​  ​it​  ​does  
not​  ​matter ​  ​for ​  ​my ​  ​purposes.​  ​​  ​My​  ​interest​  ​is ​  ​whether ​  ​such ​  ​methods ​  ​of ​  ​justification ​  ​are  
naturalistic ​  ​or ​  ​not. ​  ​​  ​Neither ​  ​the​  ​analytic/synthetic ​  ​distinction, ​  ​not​  ​the​  ​​a​  ​priori​/​a  
posteriori​​  ​distinction ​  ​provide​  ​the​  ​significant​  ​difference ​  ​between ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​and  
philosophy ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​argument​  ​needs ​  ​to ​  ​succeed.    
  
  
Does ​  ​philosophy,​  ​or​  ​some​  ​part ​  ​thereof, ​  ​have​  ​a​  ​distinctive​  ​subject​  ​matter?  
  
Laurie​  ​Paul​  ​(2012) ​  ​has ​  ​advanced ​  ​a​  ​view ​  ​about​  ​metaphysics, ​  ​claiming ​  ​it​  ​has ​  ​a  
“distinctive ​  ​subject​  ​matter” ​  ​(1), ​  ​compared ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​sciences. ​  ​​  ​She​  ​claims ​  ​that​  ​metaphysical  
questions ​  ​are​  ​more​  ​general​  ​in ​  ​nature, ​  ​than ​  ​those​  ​that​  ​concern ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​(ibid.).  
However, ​  ​Paul​  ​thinks ​  ​that​  ​metaphysics ​  ​still​  ​makes ​  ​use​  ​of ​  ​naturalistically ​  ​respectable  
methods. ​  ​​  ​If ​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​significant​  ​difference ​  ​between ​  ​some​  ​part​  ​of ​  ​philosophy ​  ​and ​  ​the  
sciences ​  ​in ​  ​terms ​  ​of ​  ​subject​  ​matter, ​  ​the​  ​argument​  ​for ​  ​reform​  ​might​  ​yet​  ​succeed. ​  ​​  ​For​  ​this  
to ​  ​be​  ​the​  ​case, ​  ​the​  ​reformist​  ​needs ​  ​to ​  ​establish ​  ​the​  ​truth ​  ​of ​  ​both:​  ​1) ​  ​that​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​a  
significant​  ​difference ​  ​between ​  ​this ​  ​part​  ​of ​  ​philosophy ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​sciences, ​  ​​  ​and ​  ​2) ​  ​that  
naturalistic ​  ​methods ​  ​are​  ​unable​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​applied ​  ​to ​  ​this ​  ​particular ​  ​domain ​  ​of ​  ​inquiry. ​  ​​  ​Paul  
maintains ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​first​  ​of ​  ​these​  ​conditions ​  ​is ​  ​met, ​  ​but​  ​not​  ​the​  ​second. ​  ​​  ​Like​  ​Paul, ​  ​I ​  ​think  
that​  ​metaphysics, ​  ​by​  ​and ​  ​large, ​  ​uses ​  ​naturalistically ​  ​respectable ​  ​methods. ​  ​​  ​​Pace​​  ​Paul,  
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however, ​  ​I ​  ​do​  ​not​  ​think ​  ​that​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​clear ​  ​sense​  ​in ​  ​which ​  ​the​  ​truth ​  ​of ​  ​her ​  ​​generalness  
of​  ​questions ​​  ​description ​  ​of ​  ​metaphysics ​  ​can ​  ​be​  ​established.  
  
There​  ​are​  ​many ​  ​instances ​  ​of ​  ​useful​  ​connection ​  ​between ​  ​metaphysics ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​sciences  
that​  ​cast ​  ​doubt​  ​over ​  ​this ​  ​claim. ​  ​​  ​Much ​  ​contemporary ​  ​philosophy ​  ​of ​  ​mind ​  ​engages ​  ​with  
findings ​  ​from​  ​the​  ​neurosciences ​  ​and ​  ​psychology ​  ​(e.g. ​  ​Baron-­Cohen ​  ​et​  ​al. ​  ​2013).  
Philosophy​  ​of ​  ​time​  ​literature ​  ​has ​  ​found ​  ​important​  ​connections ​  ​between ​  ​its ​  ​subject  
matter ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​special​  ​theory ​  ​of ​  ​relativity ​  ​(see​  ​§2.3,​  ​this ​  ​thesis). ​  ​​  ​The​  ​philosophy ​  ​of  
properties ​  ​has ​  ​involved ​  ​various ​  ​crossover ​  ​with​  ​sciences ​  ​such ​  ​as ​  ​chemistry ​  ​(e.g. ​  ​Lewis  
1986). ​  ​​  ​In ​  ​this ​  ​chapter ​  ​I ​  ​have​  ​argued ​  ​for ​  ​methodological ​  ​pluralism, ​  ​and ​  ​take​  ​it​  ​that, ​  ​at  
least ​  ​in ​  ​principle, ​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​no​  ​evidence ​  ​for ​  ​the​  ​claim​  ​that​  ​reality ​  ​can ​  ​be​  ​viewed ​  ​through  
more​  ​or ​  ​less ​  ​fundamental ​  ​lenses. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​have​  ​outlined ​  ​why​  ​I ​  ​prefer ​  ​to ​  ​think ​  ​of ​  ​different  
scientific ​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​as ​  ​having ​  ​different​  ​objects ​  ​of ​  ​inquiry, ​  ​investigating  
different​  ​aspects ​  ​of ​  ​reality. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​sciences ​  ​ask ​  ​a​  ​great​  ​many ​  ​questions ​  ​about​  ​a​  ​great​  ​many  
aspects ​  ​of ​  ​reality, ​  ​from​  ​quantum​  ​mechanical ​  ​theories ​  ​that​  ​try ​  ​to ​  ​describe​  ​very ​  ​general  
features ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​world, ​  ​through ​  ​to ​  ​much ​  ​more​  ​specific​  ​matters, ​  ​such ​  ​as ​  ​those​  ​that​  ​focus  
on​  ​partial ​  ​causes ​  ​of ​  ​specific​  ​human ​  ​behaviours.  
  
I ​  ​think ​  ​that​  ​Paul’s ​  ​view ​  ​can ​  ​be​  ​usefully ​  ​interpreted ​  ​as ​  ​making ​  ​the​  ​point​  ​that  
metaphysical ​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​are​  ​interested ​  ​in ​  ​investigating ​  ​certain ​  ​aspects ​  ​of  
reality, ​  ​with​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims ​  ​specific​  ​to ​  ​their ​  ​practice. ​  ​​  ​As ​  ​a​  ​wider ​  ​point, ​  ​I ​  ​think ​  ​the​  ​same  
applies ​  ​to ​  ​pretty ​  ​well​  ​all​  ​parts ​  ​of ​  ​philosophy, ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​sciences. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​see​  ​no​  ​reason ​  ​to ​  ​think  
of ​  ​metaphysics ​  ​as ​  ​being ​  ​a​  ​unique​  ​instance​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​point. ​  ​​  ​Thus, ​  ​I ​  ​have​  ​no​  ​​a​  ​priori​​  ​views  
over ​  ​which ​  ​methods ​  ​are​  ​appropriate ​  ​for ​  ​different​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice. ​  ​​  ​​  ​Appropriate  
methods ​  ​for ​  ​a​  ​system​  ​of ​  ​practice, ​  ​scientific ​  ​or ​  ​philosophical, ​  ​will​  ​depend ​  ​on​  ​its  
epistemic ​  ​aims, ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​objects ​  ​of ​  ​inquiry ​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​interested ​  ​in.     
  
Many ​  ​scientific ​  ​methods ​  ​have​  ​demonstrated ​  ​success, ​  ​and ​  ​philosophers ​  ​are​  ​encouraged  
to ​  ​align ​  ​themselves ​  ​with​  ​relevantly ​  ​useful​  ​methods ​  ​from​  ​the​  ​sciences. ​  ​​  ​Many ​  ​reformist  
arguments ​  ​try ​  ​to ​  ​make​  ​broad ​  ​claims ​  ​about​  ​the​  ​whole​  ​of ​  ​philosophy ​  ​or ​  ​science, ​  ​or  
sometimes ​  ​the​  ​more​  ​restricted, ​  ​but​  ​still​  ​rather ​  ​broad ​  ​domains ​  ​such ​  ​as ​  ​metaphysics, ​  ​or  
the​  ​natural​  ​sciences. ​  ​​  ​These​  ​claims ​  ​are​  ​hard ​  ​to ​  ​make​  ​good​  ​at​  ​this ​  ​level​  ​of ​  ​abstraction,  
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due​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​plurality ​  ​of ​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​within ​  ​these​  ​broad ​  ​categories ​  ​that​  ​exhibit  
extremely ​  ​diverse​  ​aims ​  ​and ​  ​methods. ​  ​​  ​If ​  ​reformist​  ​naturalist​  ​arguments ​  ​are​  ​to ​  ​succeed,  
their ​  ​focus ​  ​needs ​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​narrowed ​  ​further, ​  ​and ​  ​directed ​  ​at​  ​specific​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice.  
Criticising ​  ​a​  ​particular ​  ​system​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​might​  ​be​  ​warranted ​  ​if ​  ​it​  ​can ​  ​be​  ​shown​  ​that​  ​the  
practice ​  ​in ​  ​question ​  ​has ​  ​inferior ​  ​methods ​  ​that​  ​cannot​  ​bring ​  ​about​  ​its ​  ​aims. ​  ​​  ​So​  ​far, ​  ​the  





In ​  ​this ​  ​chapter ​  ​I ​  ​have​  ​argued ​  ​that​  ​reformist​  ​naturalists ​  ​impose​  ​implausibly ​  ​restrictive  
criteria ​  ​for ​  ​philosophical​  ​methods, ​  ​ones ​  ​that​  ​are​  ​inappropriate ​  ​for ​  ​philosophy, ​  ​and ​  ​ones  
not​  ​even ​  ​required ​  ​of ​  ​various ​  ​scientific ​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​have​  ​considered ​  ​whether  
there​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​relevant ​  ​descriptive ​  ​difference ​  ​between ​  ​philosophy ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​that  
might​  ​warrant​  ​a​  ​call​  ​for ​  ​reform​  ​of ​  ​philosophy, ​  ​and ​  ​concluded ​  ​that​  ​such ​  ​differences ​  ​are  
not​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​found ​  ​at​  ​first​  ​glance, ​  ​and ​  ​unlikely ​  ​to ​  ​succeed ​  ​as ​  ​such ​  ​broad ​  ​claims.     
  
Throughout​  ​this ​  ​discussion,​  ​I ​  ​have​  ​motivated ​  ​methodological ​  ​pluralism, ​  ​and ​  ​have​  ​begun  
to ​  ​shape​  ​this ​  ​view ​  ​with​  ​various ​  ​methodological ​  ​heuristics. ​  ​​  ​I’ve​  ​argued ​  ​that  
philosophers ​  ​should​  ​aspire​  ​to ​  ​use​  ​appropriate ​  ​methods, ​  ​and ​  ​that​  ​aligning ​  ​with​  ​the  
various ​  ​scientific ​  ​methods ​  ​is ​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​encouraged. ​  ​​  ​However, ​  ​given ​  ​the​  ​plurality ​  ​of  
methods ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​exhibit, ​  ​application ​  ​isn’t​  ​a​  ​straightforward ​  ​matter. ​  ​​  ​Different  
systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​have​  ​their ​  ​own​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims ​  ​and ​  ​objects ​  ​of ​  ​inquiry. ​  ​​  ​The  
appropriate ​  ​application ​  ​of ​  ​methods ​  ​for ​  ​philosophical​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​will​  ​be​  ​context  
dependent, ​  ​and ​  ​can ​  ​be​  ​evaluated ​  ​in ​  ​terms ​  ​of ​  ​how ​  ​well​  ​its ​  ​methods ​  ​succeed ​  ​in ​  ​satisfying  
a​  ​system’s ​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims. ​  ​​  ​We​  ​should​  ​assume, ​  ​at​  ​least ​  ​in ​  ​principle, ​  ​that​  ​scientific  
findings ​  ​and ​  ​methods ​  ​might​  ​be​  ​relevantly ​  ​applied ​  ​within ​  ​all​  ​areas ​  ​of ​  ​philosophy, ​  ​unless  
we​  ​have​  ​good​  ​evidence ​  ​to ​  ​suppose​  ​otherwise.  
  
In ​  ​the​  ​following ​  ​chapter ​  ​I ​  ​discuss ​  ​progress ​  ​in ​  ​philosophy ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​sciences, ​  ​and ​  ​consider  
how ​  ​it​  ​might​  ​be​  ​measured, ​  ​suggesting ​  ​that​  ​methodological ​  ​pluralism​  ​might​  ​lead ​  ​to  











In ​  ​the​  ​last ​  ​chapter ​  ​I ​  ​outlined ​  ​and ​  ​appraised ​  ​the​  ​argument​  ​for ​  ​reformist​  ​naturalism.  
Reformist​  ​naturalists ​  ​call​  ​for ​  ​some​  ​kind ​  ​of ​  ​a​  ​reform​  ​in ​  ​philosophy ​  ​in ​  ​order ​  ​for ​  ​it​  ​achieve  
greater ​  ​progress.​  ​​  ​I ​  ​have​  ​already ​  ​expressed ​  ​my ​  ​grounds ​  ​for ​  ​scepticism​  ​about​  ​the  
descriptive ​  ​claims ​  ​on​  ​which ​  ​the​  ​argument​  ​relies, ​  ​and ​  ​these​  ​undermine​  ​the​  ​reformists  
claims ​  ​about​  ​progress.​  ​​  ​Nonetheless, ​  ​philosophers ​  ​should​  ​happily ​  ​welcome​  ​discussions  
about​  ​progress,​  ​given ​  ​that​  ​they ​  ​are​  ​working ​  ​in ​  ​an ​  ​epistemic ​  ​domain, ​  ​and ​  ​as ​  ​careful  
critical ​  ​thinkers, ​  ​they ​  ​should​  ​encourage​  ​useful​  ​models ​  ​for ​  ​improvement. ​  ​​  ​This ​  ​chapter  
looks ​  ​at​  ​some​  ​models ​  ​of ​  ​philosophical​  ​progress ​  ​that​  ​measure​  ​progress ​  ​by​  ​convergence.  
I ​  ​argue​  ​that​  ​this ​  ​measure​  ​will​  ​not​  ​do,​  ​if ​  ​it​  ​assumes ​  ​that​  ​what​  ​is ​  ​true​  ​is ​  ​reducible ​  ​to ​  ​one  
answer ​  ​in ​  ​any ​  ​given ​  ​domain, ​  ​due​  ​to ​  ​its ​  ​begging ​  ​the​  ​question ​  ​against​  ​pluralism. ​  ​​  ​Further,  
it​  ​assumes ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​are​  ​convergent, ​  ​and ​  ​seems​  ​to ​  ​beg ​  ​the​  ​question ​  ​about​  ​the  
extent​  ​of ​  ​pluralism​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​as ​  ​practised. ​  ​​  ​In ​  ​chapter ​  ​three, ​  ​I ​  ​spent​  ​some​  ​time  
arguing ​  ​that​  ​pluralism​  ​is ​  ​an ​  ​accurate ​  ​description ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​at​  ​present, ​  ​if ​  ​not​  ​an  
accurate ​  ​description ​  ​for ​  ​the​  ​way​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​will​  ​turn ​  ​out. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​pluralism​  ​found ​  ​in ​  ​the  
sciences ​  ​undermines ​  ​the​  ​convergence ​  ​measure​  ​of ​  ​progress.​  ​​  ​There​  ​isn’t​  ​a​  ​clear ​  ​way​  ​to  
describe​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​as ​  ​making ​  ​progress ​  ​by​  ​way​  ​of ​  ​convergence. ​  ​​  ​A ​  ​different​  ​model​  ​of  
progress ​  ​will​  ​be​  ​required. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​lay ​  ​some​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​groundwork​  ​for ​  ​a​  ​better ​  ​model​  ​of ​  ​progress,  
outlining ​  ​some​  ​considerations ​  ​that​  ​this ​  ​model​  ​will​  ​need ​  ​to ​  ​take​  ​into ​  ​account, ​  ​but​  ​I ​  ​leave  




§4.1​  ​What​  ​constitutes ​  ​progress?  
  
To ​  ​make​  ​sense​  ​of ​  ​comparisons ​  ​between ​  ​philosophy ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​in ​  ​terms ​  ​of  
progress,​  ​the​  ​beginnings ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​discussion​  ​of ​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims ​  ​from​  ​the​  ​preceding ​  ​chapter  
can ​  ​be​  ​usefully ​  ​drawn ​  ​upon​  ​and ​  ​expanded ​  ​somewhat. ​  ​​  ​Progress,​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​usual​  ​sense, ​  ​is  
best​  ​thought​  ​of ​  ​as ​  ​trajectory ​  ​towards ​  ​a​  ​goal. ​  ​​  ​On​  ​this ​  ​reading, ​  ​progress ​  ​can ​  ​be​  ​evaluated  
by​  ​determining ​  ​how ​  ​effectively ​  ​a​  ​system​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​meets ​  ​its ​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims. ​  ​​  ​This ​  ​will  
support​  ​inter-­inquiry ​  ​but​  ​not​  ​intra-­inquiry ​  ​comparisons ​  ​of ​  ​progress.​  ​​  ​For​  ​now,​  ​I ​  ​narrow  
the​  ​scope​  ​of ​  ​my ​  ​discussion​  ​to ​  ​inter-­inquiry ​  ​comparisons ​  ​of ​  ​progress.​  ​​  ​Intra-­inquiry  
comparisons ​  ​of ​  ​progress ​  ​might​  ​be​  ​fair ​  ​in ​  ​cases ​  ​where​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​clearly ​  ​the​  ​case ​  ​that​  ​the  
domains ​  ​in ​  ​question ​  ​share​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims. ​  ​​  ​Further ​  ​details ​  ​of ​  ​what​  ​intra-­inquiry  
measures ​  ​of ​  ​progress ​  ​may ​  ​amount​  ​to ​  ​are​  ​largely ​  ​left​  ​for ​  ​further ​  ​work,​  ​but​  ​some  
considerations ​  ​for ​  ​such ​  ​a​  ​measure​  ​are​  ​discussed ​  ​in ​  ​section ​  ​six​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​chapter.  
  
The​  ​claim​  ​that​  ​the​  ​reformist​  ​makes ​  ​about​  ​philosophy’s ​  ​making ​  ​more​  ​progress ​  ​through  
utilising ​  ​scientifically ​  ​inspired ​  ​methods ​  ​is ​  ​plausible​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​extent​  ​that​  ​philosophy ​  ​and  
the​  ​sciences ​  ​share​  ​similar​  ​aims. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​will​  ​argue​  ​that​  ​there​  ​are​  ​clear ​  ​instances ​  ​where  
philosophy ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​do​  ​share​  ​similar​  ​aims. ​  ​​  ​However, ​  ​it​  ​seems​  ​to ​  ​me​  ​that  
philosophy ​  ​sometimes ​  ​has ​  ​some​  ​quite​  ​specific​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims, ​  ​including ​  ​conceptual  
clarification, ​  ​structural​  ​analysis ​  ​of ​  ​arguments, ​  ​and ​  ​broadly ​  ​generating ​  ​understanding,  
alongside​  ​striving ​  ​to ​  ​generate ​  ​knowledge​  ​in ​  ​a​  ​more​  ​straightforwardly ​  ​“scientific” ​  ​way.     
  
There​  ​are​  ​two ​  ​clear ​  ​senses ​  ​in ​  ​which ​  ​we​  ​could ​  ​talk ​  ​about​  ​progress,​  ​in ​  ​terms ​  ​of ​  ​​quantity  
or ​  ​​quality​.​  ​​  ​It​  ​is ​  ​clear ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​reformist​  ​is ​  ​not​  ​intending ​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​considering ​  ​quantitative  
progress,​  ​which ​  ​we​  ​could ​  ​easily ​  ​measure​  ​by​  ​counting ​  ​published ​  ​journal​  ​articles,  
conferences, ​  ​books,​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​like, ​  ​and ​  ​very ​  ​easily ​  ​prescribe​  ​a​  ​remedy ​  ​for ​  ​(i.e. ​  ​do​  ​more!).  
The​  ​reformist​  ​argues ​  ​that​  ​philosophy ​  ​makes ​  ​insufficient ​  ​qualitative ​  ​progress.​  ​​  ​I ​  ​propose  
a​  ​number ​  ​of ​  ​suggestions ​  ​for ​  ​what​  ​qualitative ​  ​progress ​  ​might​  ​amount​  ​to. ​  ​​  ​One​  ​obvious  
suggestion ​  ​is ​  ​that​  ​philosophy ​  ​and ​  ​science​  ​achieve ​  ​qualitative ​  ​progress ​  ​when ​  ​they  
discover ​  ​truths ​  ​about​  ​the​  ​world. ​  ​​  ​As ​  ​plausible​  ​as ​  ​it​  ​may ​  ​be​  ​that​  ​the​  ​discovery ​  ​of ​  ​truths ​  ​is  
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an ​  ​aim​  ​for ​  ​both ​  ​philosophy ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​at​  ​times, ​  ​measuring ​  ​a​  ​goal​  ​like​  ​this ​  ​seems  
difficult. ​  ​​  ​Viewing ​  ​philosophy ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​as ​  ​bodies ​  ​of ​  ​propositional​  ​knowledge,  
and ​  ​adopting ​  ​something ​  ​like​  ​the​  ​classic ​  ​epistemological ​  ​definition ​  ​of ​  ​knowledge,  
knowledge​  ​is ​  ​generated ​  ​when ​  ​true​  ​and ​  ​justified ​  ​propositions ​  ​are​  ​the​  ​outputs ​  ​of ​  ​systems  
of ​  ​practice. ​  ​​  ​First-­order ​  ​instances ​  ​of ​  ​knowledge​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​kind ​  ​might​  ​be​  ​achievable ​  ​by​  ​the  
various ​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​if ​  ​some​  ​of ​  ​their ​  ​outputs ​  ​were​  ​both ​  ​true​  ​and ​  ​justified. ​  ​​  ​But  
measuring ​  ​progress ​  ​by​  ​the​  ​attainment ​  ​of ​  ​first-­order ​  ​instances ​  ​of ​  ​knowledge​  ​would  
require​  ​the​  ​second-­order ​  ​claims ​  ​that​  ​we​  ​know ​  ​which ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​outputs ​  ​of ​  ​various ​  ​systems  
of ​  ​practice ​  ​are​  ​actually ​  ​true. ​  ​​  ​Measurement​  ​of ​  ​these​  ​second-­order ​  ​knowledge​  ​claims  
would​  ​be​  ​easy ​  ​from​  ​a​  ​“God’s-­eye”​  ​view-­point, ​  ​where​  ​we​  ​could ​  ​sift​  ​through ​  ​the​  ​various  
findings ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​and ​  ​philosophy, ​  ​comparing ​  ​them​  ​with​  ​the​  ​​real​​  ​truths ​  ​about​  ​the  
world, ​  ​and ​  ​compare​  ​philosophy ​  ​with​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​in ​  ​terms ​  ​of ​  ​how ​  ​well​  ​their ​  ​outputs  
match ​  ​up​  ​with​  ​some​  ​list ​  ​of ​  ​​real​​  ​truths. ​  ​​  ​Without​  ​the​  ​power ​  ​of ​  ​omniscience, ​  ​analysing  
such ​  ​measures ​  ​of ​  ​progress ​  ​seems​  ​problematic ​  ​at​  ​best.     
  
David ​  ​Chalmers ​  ​(2015) ​  ​proposes ​  ​such ​  ​a​  ​measure​  ​of ​  ​progress,​  ​and ​  ​is ​  ​aware​  ​of ​  ​the  
difficulties ​  ​regarding ​  ​second-­order ​  ​knowledge​  ​evaluation. ​  ​​  ​Chalmers ​  ​attempts ​  ​to  
sidestep ​  ​these​  ​concerns ​  ​by​  ​using​  ​a​  ​logical​  ​generalisation ​  ​from​  ​convergence ​  ​in ​  ​general,  
to ​  ​convergence ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​truth, ​  ​but​  ​I ​  ​argue​  ​that​  ​his ​  ​proposal​  ​does ​  ​not​  ​succeed. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​express  
scepticism​  ​about​  ​models ​  ​of ​  ​progress ​  ​that​  ​attempt ​  ​to ​  ​measure​  ​truth ​  ​by​  ​convergence ​  ​in  
general.    
  
I ​  ​go​  ​on​  ​to ​  ​demonstrate ​  ​cases ​  ​where​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​clear ​  ​that​  ​philosophy ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​have  
different​  ​aims ​  ​than ​  ​attaining ​  ​truth. ​  ​​  ​Oftentimes ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​work​  ​within ​  ​models ​  ​that  
they ​  ​know ​  ​to ​  ​be, ​  ​strictly ​  ​speaking, ​  ​false. ​  ​​  ​They ​  ​use​  ​these​  ​models ​  ​because​  ​they ​  ​achieve  
other ​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims, ​  ​such ​  ​as ​  ​usefulness, ​  ​generating ​  ​understanding, ​  ​making ​  ​something  
measureable, ​  ​the​  ​clearing ​  ​up​  ​of ​  ​conceptual ​  ​confusions, ​  ​generating ​  ​plausible​  ​hypotheses,  
or ​  ​even ​  ​sometimes ​  ​-­ ​  ​the​  ​sending ​  ​of ​  ​rockets ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​moon. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​sciences ​  ​demonstrate​  ​a  
plurality ​  ​of ​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims, ​  ​which ​  ​require​  ​different​  ​measures ​  ​of ​  ​progress.​  ​​  ​A ​  ​particular  
system​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​can ​  ​be​  ​viewed ​   ​as ​  ​progressive​  ​in ​  ​so​  ​far ​  ​as ​  ​it​  ​meets ​  ​its ​  ​various  
epistemic ​  ​aims, ​  ​which ​  ​are​  ​in ​  ​part​  ​determined ​  ​by​  ​the​  ​phenomena, ​  ​or ​  ​object​  ​of ​  ​inquiry, ​  ​it  
is ​  ​interested ​  ​in.  
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I ​  ​consider ​  ​other ​  ​causal​  ​factors ​  ​involved ​  ​with​  ​progress ​  ​that​  ​should​  ​be​  ​taken ​  ​into  
consideration ​  ​when ​  ​attempting ​  ​to ​  ​measure​  ​intra-­inquiry ​  ​progress,​  ​however ​  ​that​  ​may ​  ​be  
done. ​  ​​  ​In ​  ​terms ​  ​of ​  ​population ​  ​size,​  ​there​  ​are​  ​far ​  ​more​  ​working ​  ​scientists ​  ​than  
philosophers. ​  ​​  ​In ​  ​terms ​  ​of ​  ​financial ​  ​investment, ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​receive ​  ​more​  ​funding ​  ​than  
philosophy ​  ​does ​  ​by​  ​order ​  ​of ​  ​magnitude. ​  ​​  ​Any​  ​measure​  ​of ​  ​progress ​  ​between ​  ​the​  ​two  
domains ​  ​needs ​  ​to ​  ​factor ​  ​in ​  ​these​  ​important​  ​causal​  ​and ​  ​scale​  ​factors. ​  ​​  ​For​  ​example, ​  ​if  
philosophy ​  ​progresses ​  ​far ​  ​less ​  ​than ​  ​science, ​  ​this ​  ​may ​  ​be​  ​merely ​  ​proportional​  ​to ​  ​the  
highly ​  ​unequal​  ​human ​  ​and ​  ​monetary ​  ​resources ​  ​each ​  ​domain ​  ​has ​  ​at​  ​its ​  ​disposal. ​  ​​  ​One  
implication ​  ​of ​  ​a​  ​commitment ​  ​to ​  ​scientific ​  ​naturalism​  ​is ​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​at​  ​least ​  ​minimally ​  ​clear  
and ​  ​determinate ​  ​in ​  ​one’s ​  ​own​  ​empirical ​  ​or ​  ​semi-­empirical ​  ​and ​  ​meta-­philosophical  
claims. ​  ​​  ​Notably ​  ​indeterminate ​  ​claims ​  ​about​  ​the​  ​comparative ​  ​progress ​  ​of ​  ​philosophy  
and ​  ​science​  ​do​  ​not​  ​meet​  ​this ​  ​standard. ​  ​​  ​One​  ​way​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​notably ​  ​indeterminate, ​  ​for  
example, ​  ​is ​  ​not​  ​to ​  ​make​  ​it​  ​clear ​  ​whether ​  ​or ​  ​not​  ​one​  ​is ​  ​making ​  ​this ​  ​comparison ​  ​​per ​  ​unit  
of​  ​resource​​  ​devoted ​  ​to ​  ​each ​  ​of ​  ​these​  ​forms ​  ​of ​  ​inquiry.     
  
David ​  ​Papineau ​  ​(2017) ​  ​has ​  ​recently ​  ​proposed ​  ​that​  ​a​  ​reason ​  ​for ​  ​philosophy’s ​  ​slower  
comparative ​  ​progress ​  ​is ​  ​that​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​very ​  ​hard. ​  ​​  ​These​  ​considerations ​  ​should​  ​be​  ​taken ​  ​into  
account​  ​in ​  ​terms ​  ​of ​  ​having ​  ​a​  ​reasonable​  ​level​  ​of ​  ​expectation ​  ​for ​  ​philosophy’s ​  ​progress.  
This ​  ​motivates ​  ​some​  ​work​  ​for ​  ​epistemologists, ​  ​in ​  ​terms ​  ​of ​  ​observing ​  ​various ​  ​systems ​  ​of  
practice, ​  ​and ​  ​attempting ​  ​to ​  ​demonstrate ​  ​what​  ​a​  ​given ​  ​system’s ​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims ​  ​are. ​  ​​  ​It  
also ​  ​motivates ​  ​some​  ​work​  ​for ​  ​metaphysicians, ​  ​in ​  ​terms ​  ​of ​  ​analysing ​  ​the​  ​ontological  
assumptions ​  ​and ​  ​entailments ​  ​that​  ​are​  ​attributable ​  ​to ​  ​a​  ​system​  ​of ​  ​practice, ​  ​or ​  ​to  
determine ​  ​whether ​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​overlap ​  ​and ​  ​interaction ​  ​between ​  ​different​  ​systems.​  ​​  ​If ​  ​we  
have​  ​this ​  ​information ​  ​at​  ​hand, ​  ​we​  ​can ​  ​make​  ​informed ​  ​and ​  ​more​  ​precise​  ​claims ​  ​about  
progress,​  ​which ​  ​might​  ​then ​  ​motivate ​  ​suggestions ​  ​for ​  ​suitable​  ​measures ​  ​of ​  ​it. ​  ​​  ​As ​  ​much  
as ​  ​the​  ​claim​  ​that​  ​philosophy ​  ​progresses ​  ​less ​  ​than ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​may ​  ​seem​  ​intuitive, ​  ​in  
order ​  ​that​  ​one​  ​can ​  ​provide​  ​evidence ​  ​for ​  ​such ​  ​a​  ​claim​  ​or ​  ​to ​  ​prescribe​  ​possible  
methodological ​  ​remedies, ​  ​more​  ​clarificatory ​  ​work​  ​about​  ​the​  ​plurality ​  ​of ​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims  
must​  ​be​  ​done.    
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Progress ​  ​is ​  ​achieved ​  ​when ​  ​a​  ​particular ​  ​system​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​is ​  ​effective ​  ​in ​  ​meeting ​  ​its  
epistemic ​  ​aims. ​  ​​  ​Towards ​  ​the​  ​end ​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​chapter ​  ​I ​  ​sketch ​  ​a​  ​number ​  ​of ​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims,  
drawing ​  ​from​  ​the​  ​work​  ​of ​  ​Hasok​  ​Chang ​  ​(2012), ​  ​Thomas ​  ​Kuhn​  ​(1962), ​  ​and ​  ​John​  ​Dupre  
(2012), ​  ​and ​  ​adding ​  ​some​  ​suggestions ​  ​of ​  ​my ​  ​own.​  ​​  ​These​  ​are​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​included ​  ​in ​  ​my  
positive​  ​account​  ​of ​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalism, ​  ​as ​  ​potentially ​  ​viable​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims ​  ​for  
various ​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​in ​  ​general. ​  ​​  ​Showing​  ​that​  ​they ​  ​are​  ​viable​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims ​  ​on  
more​  ​local​  ​scales​  ​is ​  ​not​  ​achieved ​  ​here. ​  ​​  ​Different​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​will​  ​call​  ​for ​  ​using  
different​  ​methods ​  ​suitable​  ​for ​  ​their ​  ​aims, ​  ​and ​  ​more​  ​work​  ​will​  ​need ​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​done​  ​within  
philosophical​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​to ​  ​provide​  ​insight​  ​into ​  ​which ​  ​methods ​  ​will​  ​be​  ​usefully  
drawn ​  ​upon.​  ​​  ​This ​  ​chapter ​  ​does ​  ​not​  ​provide​  ​a​  ​complete ​  ​and ​  ​clear ​  ​way​  ​to ​  ​measure  
progress ​  ​between ​  ​philosophy ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​sciences, ​  ​but​  ​it​  ​demonstrates ​  ​ways ​  ​that​  ​will​  ​not  
work,​  ​and ​  ​provides ​  ​a​  ​sketch ​  ​for ​  ​further ​  ​work​  ​in ​  ​terms ​  ​of ​  ​making ​  ​meta-­progress.  
  
  
§4.2​  ​Dissatisfaction ​  ​with ​  ​philosophy  
  
It​  ​is ​  ​all​  ​too ​  ​common ​  ​to ​  ​hear ​  ​complaints ​  ​about​  ​the​  ​lack ​  ​of ​  ​progress ​  ​in ​  ​philosophy ​  ​these  
days. ​  ​​  ​Such​  ​comments ​  ​sometimes ​  ​come​  ​from​  ​scientists, ​  ​who​  ​look ​  ​down​  ​scathingly ​  ​upon  
us ​  ​petty ​  ​philosophers, ​  ​locked ​  ​in ​  ​our ​  ​rooms ​  ​with​  ​our ​  ​books,​   ​our ​  ​armchairs, ​  ​and ​  ​a​  ​curious  
nature. ​  ​​  ​Nobel​  ​prize​  ​winner ​  ​and ​  ​famed ​  ​physicist​  ​Richard ​  ​Feynman ​  ​made​  ​a​  ​number ​  ​of  
scathing ​  ​comments ​  ​about​  ​philosophy ​  ​throughout​  ​his ​  ​career, ​  ​describing ​  ​his ​  ​distaste​  ​for  
philosophy, ​  ​and ​  ​especially ​  ​the​  ​philosophy ​  ​of ​  ​science, ​  ​which ​  ​he​  ​described ​  ​as ​  ​being ​  ​as  
useful​  ​to ​  ​scientists ​  ​as ​  ​ornithology ​  ​is ​  ​to ​  ​birds ​  ​(discussed ​  ​in ​  ​Wilkins ​  ​and ​  ​Ebach ​  ​2013).  
My​  ​own​  ​hunch ​  ​is ​  ​that​  ​he​  ​could ​  ​be​  ​correct​  ​her, ​  ​but​  ​only ​  ​because​  ​ornithology ​  ​is ​  ​rather  
useful​  ​to ​  ​birds ​  ​-­ ​  ​for ​  ​instance, ​  ​through ​  ​its ​  ​indirect​  ​contribution ​  ​to ​  ​conservation. ​  ​​  ​When  
describing ​  ​philosophical​  ​practice, ​  ​Feynman ​  ​makes ​  ​the​  ​following ​  ​colourful​  ​anecdote:  
  
We​  ​can’t​  ​define​  ​anything ​  ​precisely. ​  ​If ​  ​we​  ​attempt ​  ​to, ​  ​we​  ​get​  ​into ​  ​that​  ​paralysis  
of   thought​  ​that​  ​comes ​  ​to ​  ​philosophers… ​  ​one​  ​saying ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​other:​  ​you​  ​don’t​  ​know  
what​  ​you​  ​are​  ​talking ​  ​about! ​  ​The​  ​second ​  ​one​  ​says:​  ​what​  ​do​  ​you​  ​mean ​  ​by  
‘talking’? ​  ​What​  ​do​  ​you​  ​mean ​  ​by​  ​‘you’?​  ​What​  ​do​  ​you​  ​mean ​  ​by​  ​‘know’?  
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(Feynman ​  ​1963,​  ​April)  
  
Similar​  ​sentiments ​  ​are​  ​expressed ​  ​by​  ​other ​  ​contemporary ​  ​scientists ,​  ​including ​  ​such  20
luminaries ​  ​as ​  ​Stephen ​  ​Hawking, ​  ​who​  ​claimed ​  ​that​  ​“philosophy ​  ​is ​  ​dead”​  ​(2011, ​  ​May  
16). ​  ​​  ​Neil​  ​deGrasse​  ​Tyson​  ​also ​  ​provides ​  ​an ​  ​illuminating ​  ​illustration ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​practices ​  ​of  
the​  ​philosopher, ​  ​comparing ​  ​their ​  ​practice ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​scientist, ​  ​and ​  ​arguing ​  ​that​  ​science​  ​is  
superior:  
  
if ​  ​you​  ​are​  ​distracted ​  ​by​  ​your ​  ​questions ​  ​so​  ​that​  ​you​  ​can’t​  ​move​  ​forward, ​  ​you​  ​are  
not​  ​being ​  ​a​  ​productive​  ​contributor ​  ​to ​  ​our ​  ​understanding ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​natural​  ​world.  
And​  ​so​  ​the​  ​scientist​  ​knows ​  ​when ​  ​the​  ​question ​  ​“What​  ​is ​  ​the​  ​sound​  ​of ​  ​one​  ​hand  
clapping?” ​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​pointless ​  ​delay ​  ​in ​  ​our ​  ​progress.  
(2014, ​  ​March)  
  
Lawrence ​  ​Krauss ​  ​echoes ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​footsteps ​  ​of ​  ​Feynman, ​  ​and ​  ​claims ​  ​that  
  
Philosophy​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​field ​  ​that, ​  ​unfortunately, ​  ​reminds ​  ​me​  ​of ​  ​that​  ​old ​  ​Woody ​  ​Allen  
joke, ​  ​those​  ​that​  ​can’t​  ​do,​  ​teach, ​  ​and ​  ​those​  ​that​  ​can’t​  ​teach, ​  ​teach ​  ​gym.' ​  ​And​  ​the
​  ​worst​  ​part​  ​of ​  ​philosophy ​  ​is ​  ​the​  ​philosophy ​  ​of ​  ​science;; ​  ​the​  ​only ​  ​people, ​  ​as ​  ​far ​  ​as  
I ​  ​can ​  ​tell, ​  ​that   read ​  ​work​  ​by​  ​philosophers ​  ​of ​  ​science​  ​are​  ​other ​  ​philosophers ​  ​of  
science. ​  ​It​  ​has ​  ​no​  ​impact​  ​on​  ​physics ​  ​what​  ​so​  ​ever. ​  ​[...] ​  ​[T]hey ​  ​have​  ​every ​  ​right​  ​to  
feel​  ​threatened, ​  ​because​  ​science​  ​progresses ​  ​and ​  ​philosophy ​  ​doesn’t.  
(2012, ​  ​April​  ​23)  
  
At​  ​this ​  ​stage, ​  ​one​  ​might​  ​be​  ​forgiven ​  ​for ​  ​thinking, ​  ​​pace​​  ​Feynman, ​  ​that​  ​the  
metaphilosophy ​  ​espoused ​  ​by​  ​physicists ​  ​is ​  ​as ​  ​useful​  ​to ​  ​philosophy ​  ​as ​  ​football​  ​is ​  ​to ​  ​birds.  
Other ​  ​philosophical​  ​wonderings ​  ​come​  ​to ​  ​mind, ​  ​such ​  ​as, ​  ​does ​  ​a​  ​strawman ​  ​really ​  ​burn ​  ​if  
nobody​  ​is ​  ​watching?​  ​​  ​Do​  ​these​  ​scientists ​  ​think ​  ​they ​  ​have​  ​a​  ​ready ​  ​method ​  ​for ​  ​measuring  
these​  ​claims ​  ​of ​  ​progress,​  ​or ​  ​will​  ​asking ​  ​them​  ​this ​  ​get​  ​them​  ​involved ​  ​in ​  ​some​  ​kind ​  ​of  
paralysis ​  ​of ​  ​thought?  
  
20​  ​Often​  ​physicists,​  ​oddly!  
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Should​  ​we​  ​philosophers ​  ​take​  ​these​  ​‘folk’ ​  ​metaphilosophical ​  ​views ​  ​seriously?​  ​​  ​They ​  ​are  
awfully ​  ​easy ​  ​philosophical​  ​targets ​  ​to ​  ​thought-­paralyse. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​contend ​  ​that​  ​we​  ​should​  ​take  
them​  ​seriously. ​  ​​  ​We​  ​live​  ​in ​  ​a​  ​time​  ​where​  ​proving ​  ​our ​  ​value​  ​to ​  ​outsiders ​  ​is ​  ​important.  
Our​  ​careers ​  ​and ​  ​livelihoods ​  ​are​  ​sometimes ​  ​on​  ​the​  ​line​  ​due​  ​to ​  ​various ​  ​funding ​  ​cuts  
across ​  ​universities ​  ​globally. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​philosophy ​  ​department ​  ​of ​   ​which ​  ​I ​  ​am​  ​a​  ​student, ​  ​is  
facing ​  ​examination ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​next​  ​round ​  ​of ​  ​proposed ​  ​funding ​  ​cuts ​  ​for ​  ​the​  ​humanities ​  ​at​  ​the  
University ​  ​of ​  ​Otago ​  ​(Taylor ​  ​2016,​  ​Aug.​  ​3). ​  ​​  ​The​  ​popular ​  ​scientists ​  ​discussed ​  ​are  
popular ​  ​public​  ​figures, ​  ​with​  ​wide​  ​audiences. ​  ​​  ​A ​  ​quick ​  ​glance​  ​at​  ​numbers ​  ​of ​  ​views ​  ​on  
youtube​  ​with​  ​comparably ​  ​“famous”​  ​philosophers ​  ​can ​  ​illustrate ​  ​this ​  ​point .  21
  
  
§4.3​  ​Progress ​  ​as ​  ​convergence​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​truth  
  
We​  ​should​  ​engage​  ​with​  ​these​  ​‘folk’ ​  ​metaphilosophical ​  ​views, ​  ​but​  ​thankfully ​  ​we​  ​can  
find ​  ​better ​  ​formulated ​  ​versions ​  ​as ​  ​expressed ​  ​by​  ​philosophers ​  ​themselves. ​  ​​  ​We​  ​can ​  ​tip  
our ​  ​hat​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​popular ​  ​scientists, ​  ​and ​  ​lead ​  ​the​  ​discussion​  ​towards ​  ​better  
metaphilosophical ​  ​views ​  ​about​  ​progress,​  ​that​  ​state​  ​more​  ​carefully ​  ​and ​  ​more​  ​plausibly,  
views ​  ​that​  ​are​  ​relevantly ​  ​similar​  ​to ​  ​what​  ​these​  ​‘folk’ ​  ​views ​  ​have​  ​in ​  ​mind. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​do​  ​wonder  
why​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​that​  ​such ​  ​eminent​  ​individuals ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​large​  ​and ​  ​high-­prestige​  ​fields ​  ​of ​  ​the  
sciences ​  ​are​  ​so​  ​aggressive​  ​towards ​  ​the​  ​small​  ​and ​  ​low-­prestige​  ​field ​  ​of ​  ​philosophy, ​  ​but​  ​I  
leave​  ​these​  ​psychological​  ​curiosities ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​side​  ​and ​  ​focus ​  ​on​  ​better ​  ​formulated ​  ​versions  
of ​  ​scepticism​  ​about​  ​philosophical​  ​progress.     
  
In ​  ​a​  ​recent​  ​collection ​  ​on​  ​the​  ​question ​  ​of ​  ​progress ​  ​in ​  ​philosophy, ​  ​Eric​  ​Dietrich ​  ​argued  
that​  ​philosophy ​  ​makes ​  ​none​  ​at​  ​all:  
  
Except​  ​for ​  ​a​  ​patina​  ​of ​  ​twenty-­first​  ​century ​  ​modernity, ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​form​  ​of ​  ​logic​  ​and  
language, ​  ​philosophy ​  ​is ​  ​exactly ​  ​the​  ​same​  ​now ​  ​as ​  ​it​  ​ever ​  ​was;;​  ​it​  ​has ​  ​made​  ​no  
progress ​  ​whatsoever. ​  ​We​  ​philosophers ​  ​wrestle​  ​with​  ​the​  ​exact​  ​same​  ​problems ​  ​the  
21​  ​A ​  ​cursory​  ​glance​  ​comparing​  ​Peter​  ​Singer’s ​  ​most​  ​popularly​  ​viewed​  ​youtube​  ​video,​  ​a​  ​TED ​  ​conference  
talk​  ​(212,954​  ​views),​  ​compared​  ​to​  ​Neil​  ​deGrasse​  ​Tyson’s ​  ​​Everything​  ​Wrong​  ​with​  ​Gravity​​  ​(7,232,196  
views)​  ​yields ​  ​one​  ​such​  ​relevant​  ​statistic.​  ​​  ​The​  ​popularity​  ​of​  ​Singer’s ​  ​clip​  ​is ​  ​unusually​  ​high​  ​compared​  ​to  
other​  ​notable​  ​philosophers,​  ​whereas ​  ​Neil​  ​deGrasse​  ​Tyson’s ​  ​is ​  ​typical​  ​of​  ​many​  ​other​  ​popular​  ​scientists.  
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Pre-­Socratics ​  ​wrestled ​  ​with. ​  ​Even ​  ​more​  ​outrageous ​  ​than ​  ​this ​  ​claim, ​  ​though, ​  ​is  
the​  ​blatant​  ​denial​  ​of ​  ​its ​  ​obvious ​  ​truth ​  ​by​  ​many ​  ​practicing ​  ​philosophers. ​  ​The  
No-­Progress ​  ​view ​  ​is ​  ​explored ​  ​and ​  ​argued ​  ​for ​  ​here. ​  ​Its ​  ​denial​  ​is ​  ​diagnosed ​  ​as ​  ​a  
form​  ​of ​  ​anosognosia, ​  ​a​  ​mental​  ​condition ​  ​where​  ​the​  ​affected ​  ​person ​  ​denies ​  ​there  
is ​  ​any ​  ​problem.  
(2011 ​  ​:​  ​334)  
  
Dietrich’s ​  ​article ​  ​is ​  ​charming ​  ​and ​  ​witty, ​  ​and ​  ​without​  ​wanting ​  ​to ​  ​attribute ​  ​myself ​  ​a  
psychological​  ​illness, ​  ​I ​  ​think ​  ​it​  ​gives ​  ​more​  ​of ​  ​a​  ​colourful​  ​sociological ​  ​account​  ​of  
philosophy, ​  ​than ​  ​it​  ​does ​  ​to ​  ​demonstrate ​  ​that​  ​philosophy ​  ​does ​  ​not​  ​progress.​  ​​  ​However, ​  ​at  
one​  ​point​  ​in ​  ​Dietrich’s ​  ​article, ​  ​he​  ​fleshes ​  ​out​  ​the​  ​claim​  ​in ​  ​a​  ​little​  ​more​  ​detail, ​  ​explaining  
a​  ​feature​  ​that​  ​is ​  ​taken ​  ​as ​  ​evidence ​  ​for ​  ​his ​  ​claim​  ​that​  ​philosophy ​  ​does ​  ​not​  ​progress.  
Dietrich ​  ​takes ​  ​a​  ​lack ​  ​of ​  ​​convergence ​​  ​to ​  ​provide​  ​sufficient​  ​evidence ​  ​that​  ​philosophy  
exhibits ​  ​a​  ​lack ​  ​of ​  ​progress.​  ​​  ​When ​  ​arguing ​  ​for ​  ​his ​  ​no-­progress ​  ​thesis, ​  ​Dietrich ​  ​supports  
his ​  ​argument​  ​by​  ​stating ​  ​that​  ​“no ​  ​philosophy ​  ​theory ​  ​is ​  ​true, ​  ​or ​  ​at​  ​least ​  ​no​  ​theory ​  ​is  
regarded ​  ​as ​  ​true​  ​by​  ​[a] ​  ​significant​  ​and ​  ​large​  ​majority ​  ​of ​  ​philosophers”​  ​(2011 ​  ​:​  ​335). ​  ​​  ​In  
the​  ​same​  ​collection ​  ​of ​  ​papers, ​  ​Zach ​  ​Weber ​  ​suggests ​  ​that​  ​progress ​  ​is ​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​measured ​  ​in  
terms ​  ​of, ​  ​or ​  ​is ​  ​otherwise​  ​attributable ​  ​to, ​  ​agreement:  
  
If ​  ​philosophers ​  ​started ​  ​accepting ​  ​each ​  ​others’ ​  ​results, ​  ​we​  ​would​  ​make​  ​progress.  
We​  ​could ​  ​have​  ​proofs ​  ​in ​  ​philosophy ​  ​-­-­ ​  ​say, ​  ​Evans' ​  ​proof ​  ​that​  ​there​  ​are​  ​no​  ​vague  
identities, ​  ​or ​  ​Williamson’s ​  ​proof ​  ​that​  ​everything ​  ​that​  ​exists ​  ​does ​  ​so​  ​necessarily.  
We​  ​have, ​  ​from​  ​Tarski, ​  ​a​  ​nice​  ​formal​  ​answer ​  ​to ​  ​‘what​  ​is ​  ​truth[?]’. ​  ​But​  ​for ​  ​any ​  ​P,  
there​  ​is ​  ​someone​  ​(sometimes ​  ​that​  ​someone​  ​is ​  ​me), ​  ​who​  ​says ​  ​not​  ​P.​  ​It​  ​is  
temperament ​  ​that​  ​sets​  ​us ​  ​apart.  
(2011 ​  ​:​  ​199)  
  
Where​  ​Dietrich ​  ​diagnosed ​  ​that​  ​optimists ​  ​about​  ​philosophical​  ​progress ​  ​are​  ​suffering  
from​  ​a​  ​psychological ​  ​condition, ​  ​Weber ​  ​attributes ​  ​a​  ​pyschological​  ​factor ​  ​in ​  ​being  
causally ​  ​relevant ​  ​to ​  ​a​  ​lack ​  ​of ​  ​convergence, ​  ​arguing ​  ​that​  ​philosophers ​  ​are​  ​disagreeable  
by​  ​nature. ​  ​​  ​Weber ​  ​takes ​  ​this ​  ​lack ​  ​of ​  ​convergence ​  ​a​  ​causal​  ​factor ​  ​for ​  ​philosophy’s ​  ​lack ​  ​of  
progress.​  ​​  ​Performing ​  ​a​  ​psychoanalysis ​  ​of ​  ​philosophers ​  ​is ​  ​beyond ​  ​the​  ​scope​  ​of ​  ​this  
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thesis, ​  ​but​  ​each ​  ​of ​  ​these​  ​views ​  ​seems​  ​to ​  ​claim​  ​that​  ​convergence ​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​sufficient​  ​condition  
for ​  ​progress.  
  
Another ​  ​view ​  ​that​  ​progress ​  ​and ​  ​convergence ​  ​are​  ​importantly ​  ​related ​  ​is ​  ​outlined, ​  ​but​  ​not  
endorsed, ​  ​by​  ​Thomas ​  ​Kuhn,​  ​in ​  ​his ​  ​​Structure​  ​of​  ​Scientific ​  ​Revolutions ​:  
  
If ​  ​we​  ​doubt, ​  ​as ​  ​many ​  ​do,​  ​that​  ​non-­scientific ​  ​fields ​  ​make​  ​progress,​  ​that​  ​cannot​  ​be  
because​  ​individual​  ​schools ​  ​make​  ​none. ​  ​Rather, ​  ​it​  ​must​  ​be​  ​because​  ​there​  ​are  
always ​  ​competing ​  ​schools,​  ​each ​  ​of ​  ​which ​  ​constantly ​  ​questions ​  ​the​  ​very  
foundations ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​others. ​  ​The​  ​man ​  ​who​  ​argues ​  ​that​  ​philosophy, ​  ​for ​  ​example,  
has   made​  ​no​  ​progress ​  ​emphasizes ​  ​that​  ​there​  ​are​  ​still​  ​Aristotelians, ​  ​not​  ​that  
Aristotelianism ​  ​has ​  ​failed ​   ​to ​  ​progress.    
(Kuhn​  ​1962​  ​:​  ​162-­3)  
  
It​  ​is ​  ​implicit ​  ​in ​  ​this ​  ​claim​  ​that​  ​progress ​  ​is ​  ​had ​  ​by​  ​way​  ​of ​  ​convergence, ​  ​to ​  ​singular  
philosophical​  ​schools.​  ​​  ​Weber’s ​  ​convergence ​  ​is ​  ​focused ​  ​on​   ​convergence ​  ​on​  ​results,  
which ​  ​implies ​  ​something ​  ​like​  ​convergence ​  ​on​  ​fewer ​  ​propositions. ​  ​​  ​Deitrich’s ​  ​focus ​  ​is  
on​  ​convergence ​  ​on​  ​theories. ​  ​​  ​This ​  ​shows ​  ​that​  ​appeal​  ​to ​  ​convergence ​  ​alone​  ​isn’t​  ​fully  
determinate, ​  ​and ​  ​a​  ​better ​  ​account​  ​of ​  ​progress ​  ​as ​  ​convergence ​  ​will​  ​need ​  ​to ​  ​settle​  ​on  
which ​  ​convergence ​  ​is ​  ​the​  ​relevant ​  ​kind. ​  ​​  ​A ​  ​measure​  ​of ​  ​progress ​  ​that​  ​appeals ​  ​to  
convergence ​  ​of ​  ​any ​  ​of ​  ​these​  ​kinds ​  ​will​  ​need ​  ​to ​  ​do​  ​more​  ​than ​  ​just​  ​this ​  ​if ​  ​they ​  ​want​  ​to  
deny ​  ​that​  ​schools ​  ​of ​  ​fundamentalist ​  ​christians ​  ​who​  ​take​  ​a​  ​literal ​  ​interpretation ​  ​of ​  ​the  
bible​  ​do​  ​not​  ​come​  ​out​  ​on​  ​top ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​and ​  ​philosophy ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​progress ​  ​polls.     
  
In ​  ​a​  ​more​  ​formal​  ​attempt ​  ​to ​  ​measure​  ​philosophical​  ​progress,​  ​David ​  ​Chalmers ​  ​(2015)  
extrapolates ​  ​from​  ​results ​  ​he​  ​gathered ​  ​whilst​  ​co-­conducting ​  ​a​  ​survey ​  ​of ​  ​faculty ​  ​at​  ​99  
leading ​  ​departments ​  ​of ​  ​philosophy ​  ​internationally ​  ​(Bourget​   ​and ​  ​Chalmers ​  ​2009).  
Chalmers’ ​  ​measure​  ​of ​  ​progress ​  ​in ​  ​philosophy ​  ​is ​  ​“collective ​  ​convergence ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​truth”  
(2015 ​  ​:​  ​9). ​  ​​  ​His​  ​proxy ​  ​measurement ​  ​for ​  ​collective ​  ​convergence ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​truth ​  ​is ​  ​collective  
convergence ​  ​to ​  ​one​  ​philosophical​  ​position ​  ​on​  ​the​  ​questions ​  ​which ​  ​he​  ​takes ​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​the  
“big ​  ​questions”​  ​of ​  ​philosophy. ​  ​​  ​He​  ​argues ​  ​that​  ​philosophy ​  ​doesn’t​  ​exhibit​  ​collective  
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convergence ​  ​to ​  ​singular ​  ​answers ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​“big ​  ​questions”, ​  ​so​  ​concludes ​  ​that​  ​it​  ​therefore  
doesn’t​  ​exhibit​  ​collective ​  ​convergence ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​truth.     
This ​  ​measure​  ​of ​  ​progress ​  ​begs ​  ​several​  ​questions. ​  ​​  ​It​  ​is ​  ​implicit ​  ​in ​  ​these​  ​arguments, ​  ​that  
a) ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​are​  ​convergent​  ​in ​  ​a​  ​way​  ​that​  ​is ​  ​relevantly ​  ​similar​  ​to ​  ​Chalmers’ ​  ​“big  
questions”, ​  ​b) ​  ​that​  ​this ​  ​kind ​  ​of ​  ​convergence ​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​sufficient​  ​measure​  ​of ​  ​progress ​  ​in ​  ​the  
sciences, ​  ​and ​  ​c) ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​progress ​  ​of ​  ​philosophy ​  ​can ​  ​be​  ​relevantly ​  ​compared ​  ​with​  ​the  
progress ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​using​  ​a​  ​commensurable ​  ​measurement ​  ​of ​  ​convergence. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​will  
argue​  ​that​  ​each ​  ​of ​  ​these​  ​assumptions ​  ​is ​  ​implausible, ​  ​or ​  ​at​  ​best, ​  ​in ​  ​need ​  ​of ​  ​much ​  ​more  
clarification ​  ​and ​  ​evidentiary ​  ​justification.     
  
The​  ​problem​  ​with​  ​the​  ​first​  ​of ​  ​these​  ​assumptions ​  ​is ​  ​that​  ​it​  ​assumes ​  ​monism​  ​both ​  ​about  
the​  ​sciences ​  ​as ​  ​a​  ​description ​  ​of ​  ​current​  ​practice, ​  ​and ​  ​as ​  ​a​  ​regulatory ​  ​aim​  ​for ​  ​the  
sciences. ​  ​​  ​In ​  ​§3.4​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​thesis, ​  ​I ​  ​discussed ​  ​Helen​  ​Longino’s ​  ​(2006) ​  ​​  ​meta-­analysis ​  ​of  
the​  ​scientific ​  ​studies ​  ​of ​  ​human ​  ​behaviour. ​  ​​  ​Each ​  ​study​  ​Longino ​  ​investigated ​  ​used  
unique​  ​theoretical ​  ​models, ​  ​measurements, ​  ​and ​  ​hypotheses, ​  ​and ​  ​each ​  ​resulted ​  ​in ​  ​different  
findings. ​  ​​  ​Longino’s ​  ​careful​  ​analysis ​  ​of ​  ​these​  ​studies ​  ​motivates ​  ​the​  ​case ​  ​for ​  ​pluralism  
about​  ​human ​  ​behaviour ​  ​-­ ​  ​that​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​not​  ​one​  ​“true”​  ​description ​  ​of ​  ​what​  ​is ​  ​causally  
responsible​  ​for ​  ​human ​  ​behaviour. ​  ​​  ​Rather, ​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​plurality ​  ​of ​  ​descriptions ​  ​about  
human ​  ​behaviour ​  ​that​  ​each ​  ​provide​  ​a​  ​useful​  ​contribution ​  ​towards ​  ​understanding  
different​  ​aspects ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​complex ​  ​phenomena​  ​that​  ​human ​  ​behaviour ​  ​comprises.     
  
Insofar ​  ​as ​  ​these​  ​case ​  ​studies ​  ​reflect ​  ​the​  ​general​  ​nature​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​sciences, ​  ​they ​  ​demonstrate  
that​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​do​  ​not​  ​present​  ​anything ​  ​like​  ​convergence ​  ​to ​  ​simple​  ​and ​  ​singular  
instances ​  ​of ​  ​knowledge. ​  ​​  ​Pluralism, ​  ​rather ​  ​than ​  ​monism, ​  ​is ​  ​an ​  ​accurate ​  ​description ​  ​of  
the​  ​sciences ​  ​at​  ​present. ​  ​​  ​If ​  ​pluralism​  ​demonstrates ​  ​convergence ​  ​in ​  ​any ​  ​straightforward  
sense, ​   ​it​  ​is ​  ​implausible ​  ​that​  ​it​  ​aligns ​  ​with​  ​Chalmers’ ​  ​measure​  ​of ​  ​“big ​  ​question”  
convergence. ​  ​​  ​According ​  ​to ​  ​pluralists, ​  ​“big”​  ​questions ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​are​  ​tackled ​  ​by​  ​a  
plurality ​  ​of ​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice, ​  ​often ​  ​investigating ​  ​different​  ​aspects ​  ​of ​  ​related  
phenomena. ​  ​​  ​Chalmers ​  ​assumes ​  ​that​  ​an ​  ​account​  ​of ​  ​convergence ​  ​can ​  ​be​  ​specified ​  ​in ​  ​a  
determinate ​  ​enough ​  ​manner, ​  ​and ​  ​that​  ​a​  ​reliably ​  ​operationalisable ​  ​measure​  ​of ​  ​it​  ​can ​  ​be  
collected ​  ​in ​  ​its ​  ​terms. ​  ​​  ​Kuhn’s ​  ​convergence ​  ​on​  ​‘schools’, ​  ​and ​  ​Deitrich’s ​  ​convergence ​  ​on  
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theories ​  ​indicate ​  ​that​  ​‘truth’ ​  ​might​  ​not​  ​necessarily ​  ​play ​  ​a​  ​central ​  ​role​  ​in ​  ​all​  ​ways ​  ​of  
specifying ​  ​the​  ​above​  ​matters.     
  
  
§4.4​  ​Pluralism ​  ​about​  ​epistemic​  ​aims  
  
During ​  ​the​  ​last ​  ​chapter ​  ​I ​  ​began ​  ​to ​  ​sketch ​  ​a​  ​view ​  ​regarding ​  ​a​  ​plurality ​  ​of ​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims.  
Not​  ​only ​  ​is ​  ​it​  ​the​  ​case ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​do​  ​not​  ​currently ​  ​neatly ​  ​converge​  ​to ​  ​monistic  
answers ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​questions ​  ​they ​  ​purport​  ​to ​  ​answer, ​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​not​  ​evident​  ​that​  ​they ​  ​are​  ​even  
attempting ​  ​to ​  ​do​  ​so.​  ​​  ​Newtonian ​  ​mechanics ​  ​has ​  ​not​  ​disappeared ​  ​from​  ​physics ​  ​textbooks,  
even ​  ​though ​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​considered ​  ​to ​  ​be, ​  ​strictly ​  ​speaking, ​  ​false. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​reason ​  ​Newtonian  
mechanics ​  ​is ​  ​still​  ​taught, ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​reason ​  ​physicists ​  ​are​  ​actively ​  ​engaged ​  ​within ​  ​this  
system​  ​of ​  ​practice, ​  ​is ​  ​because​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​useful, ​  ​despite​  ​being ​  ​false. ​  ​​  ​Science​  ​makes ​  ​progress  
when ​  ​it​  ​implements ​  ​Newtonian ​  ​mechanics, ​  ​a​  ​theory ​  ​it​  ​knows ​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​false, ​  ​and ​  ​uses ​  ​it​  ​to  
send ​  ​rockets ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​moon.    
  
Different​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​have​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims ​  ​other ​  ​than ​  ​truth, ​  ​and ​  ​their  
methodologies ​  ​are​  ​often ​  ​successful​  ​at​  ​realising ​  ​these​  ​aims. ​  ​​  ​To ​  ​the​  ​extent​  ​that  
Newtonian ​  ​mechanics ​  ​can ​  ​still​  ​meet​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims, ​  ​we​  ​ought​  ​to ​  ​consider ​  ​it  
progressive, ​  ​and ​  ​for ​  ​quite​  ​good​  ​reason. ​  ​​  ​From​  ​this ​  ​example ​  ​we​  ​can ​  ​also ​  ​see​  ​that  
epistemic ​  ​aims ​  ​might​  ​change​  ​over ​  ​time. ​  ​​  ​For​  ​some​  ​time, ​  ​it​  ​had ​  ​been ​  ​quite​  ​reasonable​  ​to  
think ​  ​that​  ​Newtonian ​  ​mechanics ​  ​was​  ​aiming ​  ​to ​  ​truthfully ​  ​describe​  ​reality, ​  ​but​  ​now ​  ​that  
we​  ​know ​  ​it​  ​can ​  ​not​  ​achieve ​  ​this, ​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​still​  ​other ​  ​work​  ​that​  ​the​  ​theory ​  ​can ​  ​assist ​  ​with.  
Hasok​  ​Chang’s ​  ​inaugural​  ​professorial​  ​lecture ​  ​at​  ​Cambridge​  ​involved ​  ​a​  ​nice​  ​example​  ​of  
various ​  ​different​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​being ​  ​combined ​  ​to ​  ​achieve ​  ​something ​  ​that​  ​seems  
to ​  ​me​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​patently ​  ​progressive. ​  ​​  ​His​  ​example ​  ​provides ​  ​a​  ​lovely ​  ​description ​  ​of ​  ​plurality  
at​  ​work,​  ​by​  ​describing ​  ​the​  ​workings ​  ​of ​  ​GPS ​  ​technology:  
  
GPS ​  ​uses ​  ​satellites​  ​we​  ​keep ​  ​in ​  ​place​  ​by​  ​Newtonian ​  ​physics,​  ​an ​  ​atomic​  ​clock  
ruled ​  ​by​  ​quantum​  ​mechanics ​  ​and ​  ​corrected ​  ​by​  ​special​  ​and ​  ​general​  ​relativity;; ​  ​it  
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maps ​  ​the​  ​surface​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​round ​  ​earth ​  ​on​  ​a​  ​geostatic ​  ​grid ​  ​and ​  ​gives ​  ​advice​  ​to  
people​  ​on​  ​the​  ​ground ​  ​from​  ​a​  ​flat​  ​earth ​  ​point​  ​of ​  ​view. ​  ​It​  ​all​  ​works ​  ​beautifully.  
(2012, ​  ​October ​  ​11)  
  
Contemporary ​  ​uses ​  ​of ​  ​Newtonian ​  ​mechanics ​  ​are​  ​no​  ​longer ​  ​trying ​  ​to ​  ​accurately ​  ​describe  
the​  ​world, ​  ​but​  ​they ​  ​have​  ​plenty ​  ​of ​  ​other ​  ​useful​  ​work​  ​to ​  ​do.​  ​​  ​Chang ​  ​encourages ​  ​those  
engaged ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​history ​  ​and ​  ​philosophy ​  ​of ​  ​science ​  ​literature ​  ​to ​  ​think ​  ​carefully ​  ​about  22
their ​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims, ​  ​spending ​  ​some​  ​time​  ​spelling ​  ​out​  ​precisely ​  ​what​  ​they ​  ​hope​  ​to  
achieve, ​  ​and ​  ​implementing ​  ​various ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​scientific ​  ​methods ​  ​in ​  ​pluralistic ​  ​fashion, ​  ​in ​  ​the  
hope​  ​that​  ​they ​  ​can ​  ​achieve ​  ​greater ​  ​progress ​  ​(2012, ​  ​October ​  ​11).     
  
He​  ​goes ​  ​on​  ​to ​  ​mention ​  ​one​  ​kind ​  ​of ​  ​pluralism​  ​already ​  ​at​  ​play ​  ​in ​  ​HPS ​  ​that​  ​has ​  ​been ​  ​an  
undercurrent​  ​throughout​  ​much ​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​thesis. ​  ​​  ​Viewing ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​through ​  ​the​  ​lens ​  ​of  
scientific ​  ​practice, ​  ​resulted ​  ​in ​  ​new ​  ​and ​  ​useful​  ​ways ​  ​of ​  ​thinking ​  ​about​  ​scientific  
knowledge, ​  ​illuminating ​  ​that​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​plurality ​  ​of ​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims ​  ​that​  ​various ​  ​systems  
of ​  ​practice ​  ​are​  ​striving ​  ​towards. ​  ​​  ​Viewing ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​through ​  ​the​  ​twentieth-­century  
philosophy ​  ​of ​  ​science​  ​lens ​  ​that​  ​focused ​  ​on​  ​sciences ​  ​as ​  ​bodies ​  ​of ​  ​propositional​  ​content,  
allowed ​  ​us ​  ​to ​  ​focus ​  ​on​  ​and ​  ​evaluate ​  ​various ​  ​methods ​  ​of ​  ​justification ​  ​for ​  ​scientific  
findings. ​  ​​  ​With ​  ​a​  ​pluralistic ​  ​stance​  ​taken ​  ​towards ​  ​philosophy ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​sciences, ​  ​different  
points ​  ​of ​  ​interest​  ​can ​  ​be​  ​isolated, ​  ​or ​  ​focused ​  ​on.​  ​​  ​This ​  ​amounts ​  ​to ​  ​progress ​  ​in ​  ​our  
understanding ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​sciences. ​  ​​  ​There​  ​is ​  ​no​  ​need ​  ​to ​  ​think ​  ​of ​  ​viewing ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​in  
terms ​  ​of ​  ​practice, ​  ​or ​  ​as ​  ​bodies ​  ​of ​  ​propositional​  ​knowledge, ​  ​as ​  ​mutually ​  ​exclusive  
competitors ​  ​purporting ​  ​to ​  ​give​  ​the​  ​one​  ​true​  ​account​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​sciences. ​  ​​  ​Both ​  ​perspectives  
have​  ​something ​  ​insightful​  ​to ​  ​offer. ​  ​​  ​Chang ​  ​has ​  ​encouraged ​  ​pluralism​  ​about​  ​methods ​  ​for  
HPS,​  ​and ​  ​this ​  ​is ​  ​an ​  ​example ​  ​of ​  ​where​  ​pluralism​  ​can ​  ​lead ​  ​to ​  ​progress ​  ​in ​  ​understanding. ​  ​​  ​I  
think ​  ​we​  ​have​  ​good​  ​reason ​  ​to ​  ​expect​  ​pluralism​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​usefully ​  ​applied ​  ​more​  ​broadly ​  ​to  
philosophy. ​  ​​  ​If ​  ​the​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalist​  ​wants ​  ​to ​  ​align ​  ​themselves ​  ​with​  ​the  
sciences, ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​hope​  ​of ​  ​greater ​  ​progress,​  ​a​  ​pluralism​  ​of ​  ​methods ​  ​is ​  ​what​  ​they ​  ​should  
foster, ​  ​for ​  ​that​  ​is ​  ​what​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​exhibit. ​  ​​  ​This ​  ​will​  ​take​  ​some​  ​conceptual ​  ​shifting ​  ​in  
the​  ​way​  ​we​  ​often ​  ​think ​  ​about​  ​different​  ​philosophical​  ​views ​   ​within ​  ​various ​  ​domains.     
  
22​  ​Henceforth,​  ​HPS.  
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To ​  ​make​  ​this ​  ​point​  ​clear, ​  ​let’s ​  ​think ​  ​about​  ​functionalism ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​mind-­brain ​  ​identity  
theory ​  ​for ​  ​a​  ​moment. ​  ​​  ​Perhaps ​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​incorrect ​  ​to ​  ​view ​  ​them​  ​as ​  ​competing ​  ​theories ​  ​of  
mind, ​  ​each ​  ​purporting ​  ​to ​  ​give​  ​the​   ​one​  ​genuinely ​  ​true​  ​account​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​mind. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​brain  
and ​  ​the​  ​mind ​  ​clearly ​  ​have​  ​a​  ​lot​  ​to ​  ​do​  ​with​  ​each ​  ​other, ​  ​so​  ​it​  ​makes ​  ​sense​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​interested  
in ​  ​the​  ​brain, ​  ​if ​  ​one​  ​is ​  ​interested ​  ​in ​  ​explaining ​  ​the​  ​mind. ​  ​​  ​However, ​  ​there​  ​are​  ​other  
aspects ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​mind ​  ​that​  ​one​  ​might​  ​be​  ​interested ​  ​in ​  ​asides ​  ​from​  ​its ​  ​material ​  ​composition,  
such ​  ​as ​  ​the​  ​way​  ​the​  ​mind ​  ​functions. ​  ​​  ​This ​  ​allows ​  ​one​  ​to ​  ​focus ​  ​on​  ​human ​  ​emotion ​  ​and  
behaviour, ​  ​merely ​  ​another ​  ​aspect​  ​of ​  ​interest, ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​plurality ​  ​of ​  ​insightful​  ​ways ​  ​we​  ​could  
think ​  ​about​  ​the​  ​mind .​  ​​  ​Indeed, ​  ​most​  ​contemporary ​  ​research ​  ​on​  ​Artificial ​  ​Intelligence  23
focuses ​  ​on​  ​these​  ​functional​  ​aspects ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​mind ​  ​-­ ​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​not​  ​trying ​  ​to ​  ​physically ​  ​replicate ​  ​a  
brain ​  ​-­ ​  ​but​  ​that​  ​doesn’t​  ​undermine​  ​the​  ​findings ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​neurosciences ​  ​in ​  ​any ​  ​way.  
Pluralism​  ​seemed​  ​an ​  ​appropriate ​  ​way​  ​to ​  ​think ​  ​about​  ​Helen​  ​Longino’s ​  ​meta-­study ​  ​of  
human ​  ​behaviour, ​  ​where​  ​it​  ​seemed​  ​wrong​  ​to ​  ​think ​  ​about​  ​the​  ​various ​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice  
discussed ​  ​as ​  ​competitors ​  ​for ​  ​giving ​  ​the​  ​one​  ​true​  ​account. ​  ​​  ​Rather, ​  ​each ​  ​system​  ​of  
practice ​  ​focused ​  ​on​  ​its ​  ​own​  ​object​  ​of ​  ​inquiry, ​  ​and ​  ​generated ​  ​knowledge​  ​of ​  ​aspects ​  ​of  
human ​  ​behaviour ​  ​in ​  ​a​  ​patently ​  ​scientific ​  ​way.     
  
As ​  ​Chang ​  ​encouraged ​  ​practitioners ​  ​of ​  ​HPS ​  ​to ​  ​spend ​  ​time​  ​carefully ​  ​thinking ​  ​about​  ​and  
articulating ​  ​their ​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims, ​  ​I ​  ​encourage​  ​philosophers ​  ​in ​  ​general​  ​to ​  ​adopt​  ​this  
approach. ​  ​​  ​This ​  ​will​  ​involve​  ​some​  ​conceptual ​  ​realigning ​  ​in ​  ​terms ​  ​of ​  ​argumentative  
strategies. ​  ​​  ​Typically, ​  ​philosophical​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​involve​  ​both ​  ​a​  ​destructive​  ​and ​  ​a  
constructive ​  ​aspect, ​  ​whereby ​  ​a​  ​thesis ​  ​is ​  ​defended ​  ​as ​  ​the​  ​one​  ​true​  ​answer ​  ​to ​  ​a  
philosophical​  ​question, ​  ​via​  ​constructing ​  ​a​  ​positive​  ​view ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​object​  ​of ​  ​inquiry, ​  ​and  
also ​  ​arguing ​  ​why​  ​other ​  ​theses ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​same​  ​ball-­park ​  ​fail. ​  ​​  ​On​  ​the​  ​view ​  ​that​  ​I ​  ​advocate,  
the​  ​constructive ​  ​and ​  ​destructive ​  ​aspects ​  ​of ​  ​an ​  ​argument​  ​can ​  ​still​  ​be​  ​viewed ​  ​as ​  ​separately  
useful, ​  ​but​  ​not​  ​necessarily ​  ​related ​  ​to ​  ​one​  ​another. ​  ​​  ​There​  ​is ​  ​of ​  ​course​  ​still​  ​merit​  ​in  
destruction, ​  ​and ​  ​falsification ​  ​of ​  ​theories ​  ​is ​  ​an ​  ​obvious ​  ​example ​  ​of ​  ​this. ​  ​​  ​Pluralism​  ​allows  
us ​  ​to ​  ​take​  ​what​  ​is ​  ​useful​  ​from​  ​Popper’s ​  ​falsificationism ​  ​(1957), ​  ​despite​  ​scepticism​  ​about  
the​  ​thesis ​  ​that​  ​it​  ​tells ​  ​us ​  ​everything ​  ​about​  ​science. ​  ​​  ​Falsificationists ​  ​think ​  ​science​  ​makes  
progress ​  ​when ​  ​it​  ​rules ​  ​out​  ​false​  ​theories, ​  ​whilst​  ​never ​  ​being ​  ​able​  ​to ​  ​have​  ​genuine  
23​  ​It​  ​might​  ​give​  ​Paul​  ​and​  ​Mary​  ​Churchland​  ​a​  ​means ​  ​to​  ​both​  ​truly​  ​claim​  ​to​  ​love​  ​each​  ​other,​  ​whilst​  ​also  
thinking​  ​the​  ​mind​  ​is ​  ​made​  ​of​  ​the​  ​stuff​  ​that​  ​physics ​  ​is ​  ​interested​  ​in,​  ​without​  ​contradiction!  
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knowledge​  ​that​  ​our ​  ​best​  ​theories ​  ​are​  ​true. ​  ​​  ​Indeed, ​  ​if ​  ​we​  ​can ​  ​prove​  ​that​  ​a​  ​theory ​  ​is ​  ​false,  
we​  ​have​  ​generated ​  ​knowledge, ​  ​albeit​  ​knowledge​  ​of ​  ​negative ​  ​propositions. ​  ​​  ​Just​  ​as ​  ​we  
think ​  ​we​  ​make​  ​progress ​  ​cleaning ​  ​our ​  ​house​  ​when ​  ​we​  ​discard ​  ​leftover ​  ​detritus, ​  ​we​  ​can  
think ​  ​of ​  ​knowledge​  ​of ​  ​falsehoods ​  ​analogously.     
  
But​  ​the​  ​thought​  ​that​  ​showing​  ​the​  ​falsity ​  ​of ​  ​one​  ​theory ​  ​lends ​  ​support​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​idea​  ​that​  ​a  
“competing” ​  ​theory ​  ​is ​  ​true​  ​will​  ​have​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​very ​  ​carefully ​  ​investigated. ​  ​​  ​Pluralism​  ​does  
not​  ​involve​  ​a​  ​commitment ​  ​to ​  ​thinking ​  ​that​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​never ​  ​genuine​  ​competition ​  ​between  
systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice. ​  ​​  ​If ​  ​genuine​  ​commensurability ​  ​between ​  ​theories ​  ​can ​  ​be​  ​shown,​  ​we  
have​  ​good​  ​reason ​  ​to ​  ​think ​  ​that​  ​different​  ​theories ​  ​might​  ​​really​  ​​be​  ​in ​  ​competition ​  ​with​  ​one  
another. ​  ​​  ​But​  ​this ​  ​will​  ​not​  ​be​  ​the​  ​case ​  ​in ​  ​all, ​  ​and ​  ​maybe​  ​even ​  ​many ​  ​instances. ​  ​​  ​This  
provides ​  ​an ​  ​alternate ​  ​hypothesis ​  ​to ​  ​Weber’s ​  ​suggestion ​  ​that​  ​a​  ​lack ​  ​of ​  ​progress ​  ​in  
philosophy ​  ​can ​  ​be​  ​attributed ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​nature​  ​of ​  ​philosophers’ ​  ​temperaments. ​  ​​  ​Weber  
suggested ​  ​that​  ​for ​  ​any ​​  ​P​,​  ​we​  ​have​  ​somebody ​  ​who​  ​argues ​  ​for ​  ​not​  ​​P​  ​​(2011 ​  ​:​  ​199).  
Perhaps ​  ​it​  ​isn’t​  ​really ​  ​the​  ​psychology ​  ​of ​  ​individual​  ​philosophers, ​  ​and ​  ​their ​  ​never-­ending  
desire​  ​to ​  ​disagree​  ​that​  ​is ​  ​responsible​  ​for ​  ​a​  ​lack ​  ​of ​  ​progress.​  ​​  ​Rather, ​  ​it​  ​may ​  ​be​  ​the  
misguided ​  ​assumption ​  ​of ​  ​monism​  ​that​  ​is ​  ​the​  ​main ​  ​contributing ​  ​factor. ​  ​​  ​More​  ​carefully, ​  ​I  
suggest​  ​that​  ​mine​  ​and ​  ​Weber’s ​  ​views ​  ​are​  ​not​  ​genuinely ​  ​competing ​  ​with​  ​each ​  ​other ​  ​-­  
perhaps ​  ​Weber ​  ​is ​  ​right, ​  ​and ​  ​perhaps ​  ​I ​  ​am​  ​right​  ​as ​  ​well.​  ​​  ​Perhaps ​  ​an ​  ​explanation ​  ​of ​  ​the  
causal​  ​factors ​  ​of ​  ​philosophical​  ​progress ​  ​will​  ​look ​  ​relevantly ​  ​similar​  ​to ​  ​Longino’s ​  ​study  
of ​  ​various ​  ​behavioural ​  ​sciences, ​  ​it​  ​seems​  ​plausible​  ​to ​  ​me​  ​that​  ​there​  ​will​  ​be​  ​multiple  
causal​  ​factors ​  ​involved.  
  
If ​  ​philosophers ​  ​move​  ​away ​  ​from​  ​thinking ​  ​that​  ​in ​  ​order ​  ​to ​  ​prove​  ​the​  ​worth ​  ​of ​  ​one​  ​theory,  
they ​  ​have​  ​to ​  ​also ​  ​prove​  ​that​  ​somebody ​  ​else’s ​  ​theory ​  ​is ​  ​wrong,​  ​and ​  ​instead ​  ​spend ​  ​time  
carefully ​  ​articulating ​  ​their ​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims, ​  ​looking ​  ​for ​  ​appropriate ​  ​methods ​  ​that​  ​they  
might​  ​implement ​  ​in ​  ​order ​  ​to ​  ​do​  ​so,​  ​looking ​  ​at​  ​their ​  ​opponent​  ​rather ​  ​as ​  ​a​  ​potential  
contributor ​  ​to ​  ​providing ​  ​understanding ​  ​about​  ​what​  ​might​  ​well​  ​be​  ​a​  ​complex  
phenomenon ​  ​requiring ​  ​a​  ​plurality ​  ​of ​  ​aspectival ​  ​research, ​  ​more​  ​progress ​  ​might​  ​be​  ​had. ​  ​​  ​I  
note​  ​that​  ​pluralism​  ​is ​  ​practiced ​  ​to ​  ​an ​  ​extent​  ​in ​  ​various ​  ​philosophical​  ​literatures  
presently, ​  ​and ​  ​a​  ​few ​  ​examples ​  ​include​  ​various ​  ​debates ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​philosophy ​  ​of ​  ​biology ​  ​to  
do​  ​with​  ​units ​  ​of ​  ​selection ​  ​(Wilson ​  ​2003), ​  ​and ​  ​definitions ​  ​of ​  ​species ​  ​concepts ​  ​(Mishler  
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and ​  ​Donoghue​  ​1982,​  ​Ereshefsky ​  ​1998), ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​logical​  ​pluralist​  ​view ​  ​that​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​more  
than ​  ​one​  ​good​  ​sense​  ​of ​  ​logical​  ​consequence​  ​(Beall​  ​and ​  ​Restall​  ​2006). ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​propose​  ​that  
this ​  ​programme​  ​be​  ​applied ​  ​more​  ​widely ​  ​across ​  ​philosophical​  ​domains.     
  
In ​  ​the​  ​final​  ​chapter, ​  ​threads ​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​thesis ​  ​are​  ​drawn ​  ​together ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​form​  ​of ​  ​my ​  ​positive  
account​  ​of ​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalism​  ​as ​  ​aspirational ​  ​methodological ​  ​pluralism. ​  ​​  ​We  
should​  ​aspire​  ​to ​  ​implement ​  ​a​  ​plurality ​  ​of ​  ​suitable​  ​methods ​  ​within ​  ​philosophical  
practice. ​  ​​  ​For​  ​now ​  ​I ​  ​suggest​  ​the​  ​following ​  ​sketch ​  ​from​  ​John​  ​Dupre​  ​as ​  ​a​  ​starting ​  ​point:  
  
[T]he​  ​best​  ​we​  ​can ​  ​do​  ​is ​  ​to ​   ​draw ​  ​up​  ​a​  ​list ​  ​of ​  ​epistemic ​  ​virtues ​  ​and ​  ​apportion ​  ​our  
enthusiasm​  ​for ​  ​knowledge-­claiming ​  ​practices, ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​extent​  ​that​  ​they ​  ​meet​  ​as  
many ​  ​as ​  ​possible​  ​of ​  ​such ​  ​criteria. ​  ​​  ​Such​  ​epistemic ​  ​virtues ​  ​will​  ​include​  ​certainly  
coherence ​  ​with​  ​empirical ​  ​data​  ​and ​  ​with​  ​other ​  ​things ​  ​we​  ​take​  ​ourselves ​  ​to  
know,​  ​and ​  ​these​  ​virtues ​  ​will​  ​be​  ​subject​  ​to ​  ​detailed ​  ​elaboration. ​  ​​  ​They ​  ​will  
surely ​  ​include​  ​other ​  ​things:​  ​perhaps ​  ​aesthetic ​  ​virtues ​  ​such ​  ​as ​  ​elegance ​  ​and  
simplicity, ​  ​perhaps ​  ​even ​  ​moral​  ​virtues. ​  ​​  ​There​  ​will​  ​no​  ​doubt​  ​be​  ​an ​  ​unavoidable  
element ​  ​of ​  ​boot-­strapping ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​project.  
(Dupre​  ​2012​  ​:​  ​26)  
  
  
§4.6​  ​Other​  ​contributing​  ​causal​  ​factors ​  ​of ​  ​progress  
  
So​  ​far ​   ​in ​  ​this ​  ​chapter ​  ​I ​  ​have​  ​argued ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​accounts ​  ​of ​  ​progress ​  ​I ​  ​have​  ​discussed ​  ​have  
begged ​  ​the​  ​question ​  ​of ​  ​monism. ​  ​​  ​Progress ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​is ​  ​not​  ​obviously ​  ​achieved ​  ​by  
the​  ​realisation ​  ​of ​  ​truths ​  ​by​  ​monistic​  ​research ​  ​programmes, ​  ​and ​  ​thus ​  ​using​  ​convergence  
to ​  ​monistic​  ​programmes ​  ​as ​  ​a​  ​measure​  ​of ​  ​progress ​  ​is ​  ​problematic ​  ​as ​  ​it​  ​doesn’t​  ​reflect ​  ​the  
true​  ​natures ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​sciences. ​  ​​  ​Even ​  ​if ​  ​the​  ​accumulation ​  ​of ​  ​monistic​  ​truths ​  ​was​  ​a​  ​goal​  ​or  
achievement ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​sciences, ​  ​measuring ​  ​the​  ​achievement ​  ​of ​  ​truths ​  ​would​  ​be​  ​all​  ​but  
impossible​  ​without​  ​the​  ​super-­power ​  ​of ​  ​omniscience. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​have​  ​suggested ​  ​that​  ​instead,  
progress ​  ​might​  ​be​  ​more​  ​complicated ​  ​and ​  ​messy,​  ​and ​  ​that​  ​various ​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice  
might​  ​have​  ​different​  ​ways ​  ​by​  ​which ​  ​they ​  ​can ​  ​make​  ​progress ​  ​through ​  ​attainment ​  ​of ​  ​their  
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respective ​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims. ​  ​​  ​Leaving ​  ​this ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​side​  ​for ​  ​now,​  ​I ​  ​note​  ​some​  ​other ​  ​important  
considerations ​  ​for ​  ​any ​  ​measure​  ​of ​  ​intra-­inquiry ​  ​progress,​  ​be​  ​it​  ​pluralistic ​  ​as ​  ​I ​  ​have  
suggested, ​  ​or ​  ​monistic, ​  ​as ​  ​assumed ​  ​by​  ​the​  ​various ​  ​commentators ​  ​whose​  ​views ​  ​I ​  ​have  
discussed ​  ​in ​  ​this ​  ​chapter.  
Financial​  ​and ​  ​human ​  ​resources  
  
The​  ​sciences ​  ​receive ​  ​far ​  ​greater ​  ​financial ​  ​funding ​  ​than ​  ​philosophy ​  ​does. ​  ​​  ​This ​  ​comes ​  ​in  
the​  ​form​  ​of ​  ​both ​  ​public​  ​funding, ​  ​and ​  ​private​  ​funding. ​  ​​  ​In ​  ​private​  ​funding, ​  ​the​  ​disparity ​  ​is  
likely ​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​much ​  ​greater ​  ​than ​  ​in ​  ​public​  ​funding, ​  ​which ​  ​itself ​  ​is ​  ​likely ​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​greatly  
disparate. ​  ​​  ​It​  ​would​  ​be​  ​most​  ​unfair ​  ​to ​  ​compare​  ​the​  ​progress ​   ​of ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​to ​  ​that​  ​of  
philosophy, ​  ​without​  ​taking ​  ​this ​  ​massive​  ​financial ​  ​factor ​  ​into ​  ​mind. ​  ​​  ​Various ​  ​data​  ​will  
need ​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​gathered ​  ​in ​  ​order ​  ​to ​  ​calculate ​  ​a​  ​measure​  ​of ​  ​progress ​  ​that​  ​reflects ​  ​this. ​  ​​  ​Given  
that​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​receive ​  ​financial ​  ​support​  ​by​  ​orders ​  ​of ​  ​magnitude​  ​greater ​  ​than  
philosophy, ​  ​even ​  ​if ​  ​it​  ​could ​  ​be​  ​established ​  ​that​  ​they ​  ​are​  ​more​  ​progressive​  ​than  
philosophy ​  ​by​  ​some​  ​appropriate ​  ​measure, ​  ​this ​  ​might​  ​merely ​  ​be​  ​proportional​  ​to ​  ​the  
human ​  ​and ​  ​monetary ​  ​resources ​  ​available ​  ​to ​  ​these​  ​domains. ​  ​​  ​Expecting ​  ​philosophy ​  ​to  
progress ​  ​as ​  ​much ​  ​as ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​without​  ​factoring ​  ​financial ​  ​resources ​  ​in, ​  ​would​  ​be​  ​like  
expecting ​  ​a​  ​philosopher ​  ​riding ​  ​a​  ​bicycle ​  ​to ​  ​win​  ​a​  ​race​  ​against​  ​a​  ​scientist​  ​driving ​  ​a  
Bugatti​  ​Veyron ​  ​Super ​  ​Sport ​  ​car.  24
  
Further, ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​have​  ​far ​  ​larger ​  ​numbers ​  ​of ​  ​humans ​  ​involved ​  ​in ​  ​their ​  ​enterprises,  
individually ​  ​and ​  ​collectively ​  ​working ​  ​to ​  ​make​  ​progress.​  ​​  ​A ​  ​measure​  ​of ​  ​progress  
between ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​and ​  ​philosophy ​  ​needs ​  ​to ​  ​factor ​  ​human ​  ​resources ​  ​into ​  ​account, ​  ​in  





In ​  ​a​  ​recent​  ​popular ​  ​piece, ​  ​David ​  ​Papineau ​  ​presented ​  ​a​  ​possible​  ​reason ​  ​for ​  ​philosophy’s  
lack ​  ​of ​  ​progress ​  ​when ​  ​compared ​  ​with​  ​the​  ​sciences, ​  ​claiming ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​methods ​  ​or ​  ​kinds  
24​  ​These​  ​are​  ​currently​  ​the​  ​fastest​  ​cars ​  ​on​  ​this ​  ​planet.  
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of ​  ​questions ​  ​are​  ​not​  ​at​  ​issue,​  ​but​  ​that​  ​that​  ​particular ​  ​philosophical​  ​problems ​  ​are​  ​harder ​  ​to  
settle​  ​than ​  ​scientific ​  ​ones:  
  
If ​  ​you​  ​ask ​  ​me, ​  ​the​  ​relative ​  ​inconclusiveness ​  ​of ​  ​philosophical​  ​debate​  ​does  
nothing ​  ​to ​  ​discredit​  ​the​  ​discipline. ​  ​It​  ​is ​  ​the​  ​natural​  ​upshot​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​task ​  ​facing  
philosophy. ​  ​Most​  ​people​  ​don’t​  ​enjoy ​  ​banging ​  ​their ​  ​heads ​  ​against​  ​nasty  
paradoxes. ​  ​It’s ​  ​a​  ​dirty ​  ​job, ​  ​but​  ​someone​  ​has ​  ​to ​  ​do​  ​it. ​  ​Given ​  ​this, ​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​unsurprising  
that​  ​philosophical​  ​problems ​  ​aren’t​  ​easy ​  ​to ​  ​settle.​  ​The​  ​difficulty ​  ​of ​  ​philosophy  
doesn’t​  ​stem​  ​from​  ​its ​  ​peculiar ​  ​subject​  ​matter ​  ​or ​  ​the​  ​inadequacy ​  ​of ​  ​its ​  ​methods,  
but​  ​simply ​  ​from​  ​the​  ​fact​  ​that​  ​it​  ​takes ​  ​on​  ​the​  ​hard ​  ​questions.  
(Papineau ​  ​2017,​  ​June​  ​1)  
  
I ​  ​think ​  ​that​  ​Papineau ​  ​is ​  ​close​  ​to ​  ​touching ​  ​on​  ​something ​  ​that​  ​has ​  ​been ​  ​prominent  
throughout​  ​the​  ​discussions ​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​chapter. ​  ​​  ​Perhaps ​  ​we​  ​could ​  ​plausibly ​  ​interpret  
Papineau ​  ​as ​  ​saying ​  ​that​  ​some​  ​parts ​  ​of ​  ​philosophy ​  ​have​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims ​  ​whose  
achievement ​  ​is ​  ​not​  ​as ​  ​easily ​  ​determined ​  ​as ​  ​that​  ​of ​  ​empirical ​  ​adequacy. ​  ​​  ​Having ​  ​aims  
other ​  ​than ​  ​empirical ​  ​adequacy ​  ​is ​  ​not​  ​unique​  ​to ​  ​philosophy, ​  ​and ​  ​is ​  ​certainly ​  ​not​  ​alien ​  ​to  
science, ​  ​but​  ​there​  ​may ​  ​well​  ​be​  ​something ​  ​to ​  ​Papineau’s ​  ​comment​  ​if ​  ​we​  ​took ​  ​it​  ​as ​  ​a  
rough ​  ​generalisation. ​  ​​  ​My​  ​encouragement ​  ​for ​  ​philosophers ​  ​to ​  ​spend ​  ​time​  ​thinking ​  ​about  
and ​  ​articulating ​  ​their ​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims, ​  ​considering ​  ​appropriate ​  ​methods ​  ​to ​  ​employ ​  ​in ​  ​the  





In ​  ​this ​  ​chapter ​  ​I ​  ​discussed ​  ​a​  ​number ​  ​of ​  ​expressions ​  ​of ​  ​pessimism​  ​about​  ​philosophical  
progress,​  ​both ​  ​from​  ​popular ​  ​scientists ​  ​and ​  ​from​  ​philosophers ​  ​themselves. ​  ​​  ​Many ​  ​of ​  ​the  
commentators ​  ​who​  ​raised ​  ​these​  ​criticisms ​  ​assumed ​  ​that​  ​progress ​  ​is ​  ​indicated ​  ​by  
convergence ​  ​to ​  ​monistic​  ​truths. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​question ​  ​this ​  ​assumption, ​  ​and ​  ​think ​  ​that​  ​a​  ​measure​  ​of  
progress ​  ​should​  ​at​  ​the​  ​very ​  ​least ​  ​not​  ​beg ​  ​the​  ​question ​  ​of ​  ​monism, ​  ​given ​  ​the​  ​various  
arguments ​  ​I ​  ​have​  ​presented ​  ​throughout​  ​this ​  ​thesis. ​  ​​  ​I’ve​  ​sketched ​  ​the​  ​beginnings ​  ​of ​  ​a  
different​  ​conception ​  ​of ​  ​progress,​  ​whereby ​  ​progress ​  ​is ​  ​measured ​  ​according ​  ​to ​  ​how ​  ​well​  ​a  
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given ​  ​system​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​meets ​  ​its ​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims. ​  ​​  ​In ​  ​the​  ​final​  ​chapter ​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​thesis,  
when ​  ​presenting ​  ​and ​  ​defending ​  ​my ​  ​positive​  ​account​  ​of ​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalism, ​  ​I  
spend ​  ​some​  ​time​  ​articulating ​  ​in ​  ​a​  ​little ​  ​more​  ​detail​  ​what​  ​at​  ​least ​  ​some​  ​of ​  ​these​  ​epistemic  
aims ​  ​are​  ​likely ​  ​to ​  ​be. ​  ​​  ​Once​  ​matters ​  ​on​  ​this ​  ​are​  ​clearer, ​  ​we​  ​will​  ​have​  ​a​  ​better ​  ​idea​  ​of ​  ​how  
to ​  ​measure​  ​progress.​  ​​  ​If ​  ​scientific ​  ​progress ​  ​is ​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​compared ​  ​with​  ​philosophical  
progress,​  ​we​  ​need ​  ​to ​  ​take​  ​into ​  ​account​  ​important​  ​causal​  ​factors ​  ​such ​  ​as ​  ​financial ​  ​and  
human ​  ​resources, ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​relative ​  ​importance ​  ​and ​  ​difficulty ​  ​of ​  ​achieving ​  ​different  
epistemic ​  ​aims. ​  ​​  ​Some​  ​say​  ​that​  ​the​  ​pen ​  ​is ​  ​mightier ​  ​than ​  ​the​  ​sword.​  ​​  ​I ​  ​say​  ​that​  ​this ​  ​is ​  ​not  
the​  ​case ​  ​if ​  ​your ​  ​epistemic ​  ​aim​  ​is ​  ​the​  ​practical ​  ​performing ​  ​of ​  ​surgery. ​  ​​  ​It​  ​is ​  ​unsurprising  
that​  ​a​  ​scientist​  ​has ​  ​a​  ​better ​  ​chance​  ​of ​  ​landing ​  ​a​  ​rocket​  ​on​  ​the​  ​moon ​  ​than ​  ​a​  ​philosopher  





























In ​  ​this ​  ​final​  ​chapter, ​  ​I ​  ​develop ​  ​and ​  ​defend ​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalism, ​  ​which ​  ​I ​  ​suggest​  ​is  
best​  ​implemented ​  ​as ​  ​​aspirational​  ​methodological​  ​pluralism ​.​  ​​  ​The​  ​methodological  
position ​  ​that​  ​I ​  ​advance, ​  ​is ​  ​to ​  ​aspire​  ​to ​  ​implement ​  ​a​  ​pluralism​  ​of ​  ​methods ​  ​which ​  ​will​  ​best  
suit​  ​specific​  ​philosophical​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice, ​  ​given ​  ​their ​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims. ​  ​​  ​This ​  ​has  
some​  ​implications ​  ​for ​  ​philosophical​  ​practice, ​  ​although ​  ​it​  ​doesn’t​  ​amount​  ​to ​  ​a​  ​significant  
reform​  ​of ​  ​philosophy ​  ​as ​  ​currently ​  ​practiced. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​naturalistic ​  ​starting ​  ​point​  ​involved  
admiring ​  ​the​  ​sciences, ​  ​and ​  ​then ​  ​observing ​  ​their ​  ​practices. ​  ​​  ​From​  ​a​  ​study​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​sciences  
as ​  ​practiced, ​  ​pluralism​  ​is ​  ​an ​  ​accurate ​  ​description ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​various ​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice  
exhibited. ​  ​​  ​Given ​  ​that​  ​different​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​will​  ​have​  ​different​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims  
and ​  ​objects ​  ​of ​  ​inquiry, ​  ​further ​  ​work​  ​will​  ​need ​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​done, ​  ​carefully ​  ​articulating ​  ​these  
more​  ​precisely. ​  ​​  ​This ​  ​motivates ​  ​both ​  ​an ​  ​epistemological ​  ​programme​  ​focussed ​  ​on​  ​aims,  
and ​  ​a​  ​metaphysical ​  ​programme​  ​focussed ​  ​on​  ​objects, ​  ​of ​  ​various ​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice. ​  ​​  ​I  
defend ​  ​the​  ​methodological ​  ​pluralism​  ​that​  ​I ​  ​advance​  ​from​  ​claims ​  ​of ​  ​vaguery, ​  ​and  
relativism. ​  ​​  ​This ​  ​chapter ​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​mere​  ​sketch ​  ​of ​  ​methodological ​  ​pluralism, ​  ​and ​  ​motivates  
much ​  ​important​  ​further ​  ​work.    
  
  
§5.1​  ​A ​  ​sketch ​  ​of ​  ​methodological​  ​naturalism  
  
I ​  ​suggest​  ​that​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalism​  ​should​  ​assume​  ​​relevance ​.​  ​​  ​I ​  ​define​  ​relevance  
as ​  ​the​  ​working ​  ​assumption ​  ​that​  ​scientific ​  ​methods, ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​products ​  ​of ​  ​scientific  
methods, ​  ​are, ​  ​at​  ​least ​  ​in ​  ​principle, ​  ​relevant ​  ​to ​  ​all​  ​areas ​  ​of ​  ​philosophical​  ​inquiry. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​do​  ​not  
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think ​  ​philosophy ​  ​can ​  ​justify ​  ​the​  ​view ​  ​that​  ​it​  ​has ​  ​its ​  ​own​  ​autonomous ​  ​domain, ​  ​in ​  ​which ​  ​it  
can ​  ​maintain ​  ​a​  ​unique​  ​and ​  ​specific​  ​set​  ​of ​  ​methods. ​  ​​  ​Given ​  ​pluralism​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​sciences, ​  ​it  
will​  ​not​  ​always ​  ​be​  ​obvious ​  ​where​  ​and ​  ​when ​  ​particular ​  ​scientific ​  ​methods, ​  ​or ​  ​the  
products ​  ​they ​  ​generate, ​  ​will​  ​be​  ​relevant ​  ​to ​  ​a​  ​given ​  ​philosophical​  ​system​  ​of ​  ​practice.  
The​  ​articulation ​  ​of ​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims ​  ​of ​  ​philosophical​  ​inquiries ​  ​will​  ​be​  ​a​  ​good​  ​place​  ​to  
start, ​  ​before​  ​looking ​  ​to ​  ​both ​  ​philosophy ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​to ​  ​inform​  ​judgements ​  ​about  
which ​  ​methods ​  ​might​  ​be​  ​of ​  ​use.  
  
This ​  ​motivates ​  ​a​  ​large​  ​epistemological ​  ​programme​  ​for ​  ​philosophy, ​  ​whereby ​  ​specific  
systems ​  ​of ​  ​philosophical​  ​practice ​  ​can ​  ​specify ​  ​their ​  ​aims ​  ​precisely, ​  ​and ​  ​look ​  ​for ​  ​the​  ​most  
plausible​  ​methodological ​  ​candidates ​  ​that​  ​will​  ​likely ​  ​be​  ​useful​  ​for ​  ​achieving ​  ​them. ​  ​​  ​It  
should​  ​not​  ​be​  ​expected ​  ​that​  ​this ​  ​can ​  ​be​  ​achieved ​  ​overnight. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​successful​  ​methods  
will​  ​not​  ​be​  ​knowable​  ​​a​  ​priori​,​  ​but​  ​we​  ​can ​  ​reasonably ​  ​speculate ​  ​hypotheses, ​  ​with​  ​the  
best​  ​evidence ​  ​we​  ​have​  ​available, ​  ​and ​  ​treat​  ​them​  ​fallibly. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​methods ​  ​of ​  ​current  
philosophical​  ​practice ​  ​should​  ​be​  ​retained, ​  ​so​  ​useful​  ​comparisons ​  ​can ​  ​be​  ​made​  ​with  
others ​  ​that​  ​we​  ​want​  ​to ​  ​test. ​  ​​  ​If ​  ​new ​  ​methods ​  ​are​  ​developed, ​  ​we​  ​should​  ​not  
straightforwardly ​  ​assume​  ​that​  ​they ​  ​are​  ​replacements ​  ​for ​  ​the​   ​ones ​  ​with​  ​which ​  ​we​  ​are  
comparing ​  ​them. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​sciences ​  ​tell​  ​us ​  ​that​  ​oftentimes ​  ​having ​  ​a​  ​plurality ​  ​of ​  ​systems ​  ​of  
practice ​  ​is ​  ​the​  ​best​  ​way​  ​to ​  ​describe​  ​aspects ​  ​of ​  ​some​  ​phenomena. ​  ​​  ​Viewing ​  ​the​  ​sciences  
through ​  ​a​  ​plurality ​  ​of ​  ​lenses, ​  ​such ​  ​as ​  ​Chang’s ​  ​practice ​  ​centred ​  ​science​  ​studies ​  ​(2012), ​  ​or  
through ​  ​the​  ​more​  ​traditional ​  ​lens ​  ​of ​  ​seeing ​  ​sciences ​  ​as ​  ​bodies ​  ​of ​  ​propositional​  ​content,  
suggests ​  ​that​  ​epistemology ​  ​has ​  ​more​  ​to ​  ​do​  ​than ​  ​presenting ​  ​an ​  ​account​  ​of ​  ​propositional  
knowledge, ​  ​but​  ​not​  ​that​  ​traditional ​  ​methods ​  ​of ​  ​epistemology ​  ​are​  ​inferior. ​  ​​  ​Appreciating  
that​  ​there​  ​are​  ​a​  ​plurality ​  ​of ​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims ​  ​motivates ​  ​the​  ​fact​  ​that​  ​we​  ​need ​  ​more  
accounts ​  ​of ​  ​knowledge​  ​to ​  ​accommodate ​  ​them. ​  ​​  ​This ​  ​amounts ​  ​to ​  ​a​  ​richer ​  ​pluralism​  ​than  
previously ​  ​dominant​  ​views ​  ​allowed, ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​​objects ​​  ​of ​  ​knowledge​  ​(e.g. ​  ​it’s ​  ​not​  ​only ​  ​the  
knowledge-­that ​  ​constituted ​  ​by​  ​the​  ​content​  ​of ​  ​scientific ​  ​theories), ​  ​and ​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​more​  ​work  
to ​  ​be​  ​done​  ​articulating ​  ​the​  ​different​  ​aspects ​  ​of ​  ​knowledge​  ​that​  ​can ​  ​contribute​  ​to ​  ​a  
description ​  ​of ​  ​knowledge​  ​in ​  ​this ​  ​broader ​  ​sense.  
  
Thinking ​  ​about​  ​knowledge​  ​in ​  ​this ​  ​pluralist​  ​sense, ​  ​indicates ​  ​a​  ​need ​  ​to ​  ​move​  ​away ​  ​from  
continuity ​​  ​models ​  ​of ​  ​naturalism. ​  ​​  ​Much ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​discussion​  ​of ​  ​naturalism​  ​in ​  ​philosophy  
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has ​  ​involved ​  ​this ​  ​model, ​  ​with​  ​claims ​  ​along ​  ​the​  ​lines ​  ​that​  ​philosophy ​  ​is ​  ​naturalistic ​  ​by  
way​  ​of ​  ​being ​  ​continuous ​  ​with​  ​science. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​continuity ​  ​metaphor ​  ​is ​  ​unhelpful. ​  ​​  ​There​  ​is  
an ​  ​historical​  ​continuity ​  ​between ​  ​philosophy ​  ​and ​  ​science​  ​that​  ​is ​  ​easily ​  ​recognisable, ​  ​due  
to ​  ​the​  ​fact​  ​that​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​grew ​  ​out​  ​of ​  ​philosophy, ​  ​as ​  ​natural​  ​philosophy. ​  ​​  ​Other ​  ​kinds  
of ​  ​continuity ​  ​are​  ​not​  ​much ​  ​more​  ​help ​  ​-­ ​  ​given ​  ​the​  ​pluralistic ​  ​nature​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​sciences,  
continuity ​  ​with​  ​some​  ​part​  ​of ​  ​science​  ​comes ​  ​cheap, ​  ​and ​  ​it​  ​is ​   ​not​  ​obvious ​  ​precisely ​  ​which  
way​  ​philosophy ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​are​  ​supposed​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​continuous. ​  ​​  ​My​  ​worry​  ​here​  ​is ​  ​that  
‘continuity’ ​  ​is ​  ​too ​  ​vague​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​helpful. ​  ​​  ​Unless ​  ​carefully ​  ​spelled ​  ​out, ​  ​it’s ​  ​no​  ​more  
illuminating ​  ​than ​  ​the​  ​observation ​  ​that​  ​absolute​  ​zero ​  ​is ​  ​continuous ​  ​with​  ​a​  ​million ​  ​degrees  
centigrade. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​methodological ​  ​pluralism​  ​which ​  ​I ​  ​endorse​  ​is ​  ​better ​  ​thought​  ​about​  ​in  
terms ​  ​of ​  ​​alignment​.​  ​​  ​A ​  ​philosophical​  ​system​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​can ​  ​align ​  ​itself ​  ​with​  ​various  
scientific ​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​in ​  ​many ​  ​different​  ​ways.​  ​​  ​That​   ​this ​  ​will​  ​be​  ​a​  ​good​  ​idea​  ​will  
be​  ​a​  ​case ​  ​by​  ​case ​  ​matter, ​  ​and ​  ​precisely ​  ​how ​  ​it​  ​will​  ​be​  ​a​  ​good​  ​idea​  ​will​  ​be​  ​somewhat​  ​up  
for ​  ​grabs. ​  ​​  ​We​  ​can ​  ​reasonably ​  ​believe ​  ​that​  ​aligning ​  ​ourselves ​  ​with​  ​the​  ​successful  
practices ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​will​  ​be​  ​a​  ​good​  ​idea, ​  ​likely ​  ​to ​  ​yield ​  ​new ​  ​aspectival ​  ​knowledge.  
Of​  ​course​  ​there​  ​are​  ​many ​  ​ways ​  ​in ​  ​which ​  ​philosophy ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​are​  ​already  
aligned. ​  ​​  ​From​  ​the​  ​discussions ​  ​of ​  ​previous ​  ​chapters, ​  ​I ​  ​draw ​  ​together ​  ​a​  ​number ​  ​of  
methodological ​  ​heuristics ​  ​that​  ​will​  ​be​  ​a​  ​good​  ​starting ​  ​point​  ​for ​  ​my ​  ​positive​  ​view.  
  
Perhaps ​  ​what​  ​we​  ​should​  ​do​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​first​  ​instance​  ​is ​  ​just​  ​to ​  ​develop ​  ​somewhat​  ​further ​  ​an  
account​​  ​of ​  ​how ​  ​best​  ​to ​  ​proceed. ​  ​​  ​In ​  ​this ​  ​chapter ​  ​I ​  ​outline​  ​some​  ​central ​  ​elements ​  ​in ​  ​that  
account. ​  ​​  ​Full​  ​spelling ​  ​out​  ​of ​  ​that​  ​account, ​  ​and ​  ​full​  ​evaluation ​  ​of ​  ​it, ​  ​will​  ​then ​  ​have​  ​to ​  ​be  
largely ​  ​business ​  ​for ​  ​the​  ​future. ​  ​​  ​Any​  ​strong​  ​recommendation ​  ​to ​  ​implement ​  ​it​  ​in ​  ​the  
practice ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​and ​  ​philosophy ​  ​might​  ​also ​  ​need ​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​endorsed ​  ​or ​  ​withheld ​  ​well  
down​  ​the​  ​track, ​  ​depending ​  ​on​  ​just​  ​how ​  ​those​  ​future​  ​developments, ​  ​of ​  ​first​  ​spelling ​  ​out  
the​  ​account, ​  ​pan ​  ​out.  
  
I ​  ​offer ​  ​a​  ​sketch ​  ​of ​  ​a​  ​metaphysical ​  ​programme, ​  ​which ​  ​I ​  ​call​  ​​aspectival​  ​realism ​.​  ​​  ​Systems  
of ​  ​practice ​  ​are​  ​thought​  ​of ​  ​as ​  ​aspectival ​  ​investigations, ​  ​and ​  ​I ​  ​offer ​  ​two ​  ​different  
semantics ​  ​that​  ​might​  ​be​  ​usefully ​  ​implemented ​  ​for ​  ​understanding ​  ​this ​  ​view. ​  ​​​  ​This ​  ​is  
developed ​  ​further ​  ​in ​  ​section ​  ​four ​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​chapter.  
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Throughout​  ​this ​  ​thesis ​  ​I ​  ​have​  ​advanced ​  ​pluralism, ​  ​but​  ​I ​  ​do​  ​not​  ​think ​  ​this ​  ​view ​  ​has ​  ​many  
consequences ​  ​for ​  ​the​  ​plausibility ​  ​of ​  ​monistic​  ​pursuits.​  ​​  ​There​  ​have​  ​been ​  ​instances ​  ​of  
theory-­reduction ​  ​and ​  ​unification ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​sciences, ​  ​and ​  ​we​  ​can ​  ​be​  ​confident​  ​there​  ​will​  ​be  
more. ​  ​​  ​Whether ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​are​  ​ideally ​  ​pluralistic ​  ​or ​  ​monistic​  ​is ​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​treated ​  ​as ​  ​an ​  ​open  
question. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​goal​  ​of ​  ​monism​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​noble​  ​one. ​  ​​  ​If ​  ​a​  ​unified ​  ​theory ​  ​of ​  ​everything ​  ​could ​  ​be  
had, ​  ​it​  ​would​  ​be​  ​a​  ​wondrous ​  ​achievement. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​take​  ​home​  ​lesson​  ​for ​  ​monism, ​  ​however,  
is ​  ​that​  ​it​  ​should​  ​treat​  ​its ​  ​research ​  ​programme​  ​as ​  ​an ​  ​empirical ​  ​hypothesis, ​  ​not​  ​an ​  ​​a​  ​priori  
truth. ​  ​​  ​A ​  ​current​  ​description ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​shows ​  ​us ​  ​that​  ​they ​  ​are​  ​pluralistic, ​  ​and ​  ​we  
have​  ​no​  ​good​  ​evidence ​  ​to ​  ​assume​  ​that​  ​the​  ​future​  ​will​  ​yield ​  ​a​  ​monistic​  ​account​  ​of  
science. ​  ​​  ​However, ​  ​evidence ​  ​either ​  ​way​  ​will​  ​only ​  ​accumulate ​  ​through ​  ​observing ​  ​the  
success ​  ​of ​  ​both ​  ​monistic​  ​and ​  ​pluralistic ​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice, ​  ​and ​  ​thus ​  ​the​  ​pluralist  
should​  ​not​  ​discourage​  ​attempts ​  ​at​  ​unification, ​  ​or ​  ​reduction, ​  ​insofar ​  ​as ​  ​the​  ​monist​  ​can  
clearly ​  ​demonstrate ​  ​commensurability ​  ​between ​  ​whatever ​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​they ​  ​hope​  ​to ​  ​unify. ​  ​​  ​One  
cautious ​  ​suggestion, ​  ​is ​  ​that​  ​such ​  ​attempts ​  ​at​  ​unification ​  ​or ​  ​reduction ​  ​should​  ​at​  ​first​  ​be  
attempted ​  ​on​  ​much ​  ​more​  ​local​  ​scales.​  ​​  ​That​  ​unification ​  ​could ​  ​be​  ​had ​  ​in ​  ​particular ​  ​local  
areas ​  ​is ​  ​itself ​  ​not​  ​obviously ​  ​true, ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​thought​  ​that​  ​it​  ​could ​  ​be​  ​found ​  ​on​  ​a​  ​much ​  ​larger  
scale​  ​is ​  ​far ​  ​more​  ​difficult​  ​to ​  ​justify ​  ​at​  ​this ​  ​stage​  ​in ​  ​proceedings. ​  ​​  ​This ​  ​means ​  ​we​  ​cannot  
assume​  ​that​  ​metaphysics ​  ​can ​  ​be​  ​justified ​  ​in ​  ​attempting ​  ​to ​  ​give​  ​complete ​  ​foundational, ​  ​or  
universally ​  ​general​  ​accounts ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​world. ​  ​​  ​Nor​  ​can ​  ​we​  ​assume​  ​that​  ​an ​  ​ideal​  ​ethical  
theory ​  ​can ​  ​give​  ​us ​  ​the​  ​one​  ​true​  ​account​  ​of ​  ​morality ​  ​that​  ​holds ​  ​universally. ​  ​​  ​This ​  ​doesn’t  
have​  ​negative ​  ​implications ​  ​for ​  ​more​  ​local​  ​studies, ​  ​however. ​  ​​  ​In ​  ​fact, ​  ​it​  ​motivates ​  ​a​  ​vast  
research ​  ​programme​  ​attempting ​  ​an ​  ​understanding ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​relationships ​  ​between ​  ​the  
various ​  ​objects ​  ​of ​  ​inquiry ​  ​from​  ​different​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice.  
  
One​  ​criticism ​  ​of ​  ​my ​  ​view ​  ​is ​  ​that​  ​the​  ​pluralism​  ​I ​  ​advance​  ​amounts ​  ​to ​  ​a​  ​kind ​  ​of  
relativism, ​  ​nothing ​  ​more​  ​than ​  ​a​  ​Feyerabendian ​  ​style​  ​“anything ​  ​goes”​  ​(1975). ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​defend  
my ​  ​view ​  ​against​  ​these​  ​criticisms, ​  ​borrowing ​  ​the​  ​expression ​  ​from​  ​Hasok​  ​Chang ​  ​(2012),  
not​  ​that​  ​anything ​  ​goes, ​  ​but​  ​rather ​  ​that​  ​​many​  ​things ​  ​go​.​  ​​  ​A ​  ​critic​  ​might​  ​respond ​  ​that​  ​a  
fully ​  ​satisfactory ​  ​reply ​  ​from​  ​me​  ​here​  ​will​  ​eventually ​  ​need ​  ​to ​  ​say​  ​more​  ​about​  ​the​  ​natures  
of ​  ​(at​  ​least ​  ​some​  ​of) ​  ​the​  ​things ​  ​that​  ​​don’t​  ​go​.​  ​​  ​I ​  ​do​  ​illustrate ​  ​in ​  ​this ​  ​chapter ​  ​some​  ​ways ​  ​in  
which ​  ​certain ​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​can ​  ​be​  ​rightly ​  ​criticised, ​  ​and ​  ​although ​  ​pluralism​  ​about  
epistemic ​  ​aims ​  ​makes ​  ​adjudicating ​  ​a​  ​more​  ​murky ​  ​enterprise, ​  ​it​  ​does ​  ​not​  ​make​  ​it  
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impossible. ​  ​​  ​Besides, ​  ​pluralism​  ​is ​  ​an ​  ​accurate ​  ​description ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​as ​  ​practiced.  
The​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalist​  ​wanted ​  ​to ​  ​share​  ​the​  ​methods ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​due​  ​to ​  ​their  
epistemic ​  ​credibility, ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​murkiness ​  ​will​  ​be​  ​only ​  ​as ​  ​great​  ​as ​  ​current​  ​scientific  
knowledge​  ​is;; ​  ​the​  ​very ​  ​knowledge​  ​with​  ​which ​  ​the​  ​naturalist​  ​started ​  ​out​  ​with​  ​admiration  
and ​  ​respect​  ​for.  
  
  
§5.2​  ​Aspirational​  ​methodological​  ​pluralism ​  ​developed  
  
The​  ​naturalistic ​  ​starting ​  ​point​  ​involved ​  ​approaching ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​with​  ​respect​  ​as  
epistemic ​  ​enterprises. ​  ​​  ​Observing ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​as ​  ​practiced ​  ​yields ​  ​a​  ​pluralistic  
description ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​sciences, ​  ​incorporating ​  ​a​  ​vast​  ​array ​  ​of ​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice, ​  ​many ​  ​of  
which ​  ​appear ​  ​​prima​  ​facie​  ​​progressive. ​  ​​  ​It​  ​seems​  ​plausible​  ​that​  ​incorporating ​  ​as ​  ​many  
learnings ​  ​as ​  ​we​  ​can ​  ​attain ​  ​by​  ​way​   ​of ​  ​observing ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​within ​  ​philosophical  
systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​good​  ​idea, ​  ​insofar ​  ​as ​  ​there​  ​seems​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​a​  ​lot​  ​in ​  ​common ​  ​between  
these​  ​broad ​  ​domains ​  ​in ​  ​terms ​  ​of ​  ​their ​  ​being ​  ​epistemic ​  ​enterprises, ​  ​seeking ​  ​to ​  ​build  
substantial​  ​and ​  ​useful​  ​bodies ​  ​of ​  ​knowledge. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​plurality ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​means  
implementation ​  ​of ​  ​their ​  ​methods ​  ​within ​  ​philosophy ​  ​is ​  ​not​  ​a​  ​straightforward ​  ​matter.  
How ​  ​easy ​  ​it​  ​would​  ​be​  ​if ​  ​there​  ​was​  ​one​  ​genuine​  ​scientific ​  ​method, ​  ​and ​  ​implementing  
naturalism​  ​would​  ​simply ​  ​be​  ​using​  ​that​  ​very ​  ​method. ​  ​​  ​Broad ​  ​statements ​  ​such ​  ​that  
philosophy ​  ​is ​  ​unscientific, ​  ​or ​  ​even ​  ​more​  ​precise​  ​statements ​  ​such ​  ​as ​  ​that​  ​metaphysics ​  ​is  
unscientific, ​  ​are​  ​simply ​  ​too ​  ​vague​  ​at​  ​such ​  ​an ​  ​abstract​  ​level​  ​to ​  ​make​  ​sense​  ​of. ​  ​​  ​One​  ​worry  
about​  ​the​  ​sketch ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​aspirational ​  ​pluralism​  ​that​  ​I ​  ​provide​  ​in ​  ​this ​  ​chapter ​  ​is ​  ​that​  ​it’s  
similarly ​  ​vague. ​  ​​  ​An​  ​important​  ​difference, ​  ​I ​  ​think, ​  ​is ​  ​that​  ​I ​  ​am​  ​programmatically  
sketching ​  ​a​  ​path ​  ​of ​  ​development ​  ​for ​  ​future​  ​work​  ​that​  ​will​  ​take​  ​the​  ​arguments ​  ​of ​  ​my  
thesis ​  ​further ​  ​forward. ​  ​​  ​In ​  ​contrast, ​  ​those​  ​I ​  ​am​  ​here​  ​calling ​  ​to ​  ​account​  ​are​  ​using​  ​vague  
lines ​  ​of ​  ​argument​  ​to ​  ​attempt ​  ​grand-­scale​  ​dismissal​  ​of ​  ​entire​  ​practices ​  ​and ​  ​modes ​  ​of  
inquiry ​  ​(such ​  ​as ​  ​philosophy). ​  ​​  ​The​  ​appropriate ​  ​demands ​  ​of ​  ​determinacy ​  ​should​  ​be​  ​much  
higher ​  ​for ​  ​their ​  ​putative​  ​weapons ​  ​of ​  ​mass ​  ​destruction ​  ​than ​  ​for ​  ​my ​  ​programmatic  
sketches ​  ​of ​  ​future​  ​constructive ​  ​work.  
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It​  ​is ​  ​clear ​  ​that​  ​philosophy ​  ​already ​  ​implements ​  ​many ​  ​methods ​  ​that​  ​look ​  ​patently  
scientific. ​  ​​  ​Aspirational​  ​naturalism​  ​welcomes ​  ​philosophical​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​to ​  ​aspire  
to ​  ​implement ​  ​new ​  ​relevant ​  ​scientific ​  ​methods. ​  ​​  ​Will​  ​philosophical​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice  
fail?​  ​​  ​Surely, ​  ​just​  ​as ​  ​unsuccessful​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​have​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​sciences.     
  
Otto​  ​Neurath ​  ​saw​  ​philosophy ​  ​and ​  ​science​  ​as ​  ​being ​  ​onboard ​  ​the​  ​same​  ​boat, ​  ​rebuilding ​  ​its  
foundations ​  ​whilst​  ​out​  ​at​  ​sea​  ​(1921). ​  ​​  ​Quine​  ​was​  ​fond ​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​metaphor ​  ​also, ​  ​and ​  ​uses ​  ​it  
when ​  ​arguing ​  ​for ​  ​his ​  ​views ​  ​about​  ​the​  ​continuity ​  ​between ​  ​philosophy ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​in  
his ​  ​​epistemology​  ​naturalized ​​  ​(1969). ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​think ​  ​we​  ​can ​  ​extend ​  ​Neurath’s ​  ​boat​  ​metaphor,  
but​  ​think ​  ​of ​  ​different​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​as ​  ​each ​  ​having ​  ​their ​  ​own​  ​boat, ​  ​rebuilding ​  ​its  
epistemic ​  ​aims ​  ​and ​  ​methods ​  ​whilst​  ​at​  ​sea,​  ​and ​  ​sailing ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​various ​  ​great​  ​oceans ​  ​of  
knowledge. ​  ​​  ​Different​  ​boats ​  ​will​  ​be​  ​better ​  ​suited ​  ​for ​  ​different​  ​conditions. ​  ​​  ​As ​  ​we​  ​can  
learn ​  ​from​  ​yachting, ​  ​sometimes ​  ​boats ​  ​will​  ​be​  ​better ​  ​driven ​  ​by​  ​different​  ​helmspeople.  
Some​  ​boats ​  ​will​  ​hit​  ​icebergs ​  ​along ​  ​the​  ​way, ​  ​and ​  ​will​  ​become​  ​shipwrecks. ​  ​​  ​The  
aspirational ​  ​naturalist​  ​may ​  ​not​  ​have​  ​the​  ​resources ​  ​to ​  ​win​  ​the​  ​America’s ​  ​cup, ​  ​but  
paddling ​  ​down​  ​a​  ​river ​  ​in ​  ​a​  ​kayak ​  ​is ​  ​an ​  ​achievement ​  ​in ​  ​itself, ​  ​and ​  ​provides ​  ​good  
exercise.  
  
At​  ​various ​  ​points ​  ​of ​  ​discussion​  ​throughout, ​  ​I ​  ​have​  ​recommended ​  ​a​  ​number ​  ​of ​  ​plausible  
methodological ​  ​heuristics ​  ​that​  ​shape​  ​parts ​  ​of ​  ​my ​  ​positive​  ​view, ​  ​and ​  ​I ​  ​will​  ​summarise  
these​  ​below. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​list ​  ​is ​  ​surely ​  ​incomplete, ​  ​and ​  ​perhaps ​  ​some​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​heuristics ​  ​may ​  ​be  
misguided, ​  ​but​  ​I ​  ​suggest​  ​they ​  ​are​  ​good​  ​starting ​  ​points ​  ​that​  ​require​  ​further ​  ​follow ​  ​up.  
  
  




One​  ​important​  ​component​  ​of ​  ​aspirational ​  ​naturalism​  ​is ​  ​​relevance ​.​  ​​  ​In ​  ​aspiring ​  ​to ​  ​use  
naturalistic ​  ​methods, ​  ​we​  ​take​  ​it​  ​that​  ​the​  ​methods ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​sciences, ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​products ​  ​of  
those​  ​methods, ​  ​are​  ​​prima​  ​facie​​  ​relevant ​  ​to ​  ​philosophical​  ​endeavour ​  ​as ​  ​a​  ​matter ​  ​of  
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principle. ​  ​​  ​We​  ​have​  ​no​  ​good​  ​reason ​  ​to ​  ​think ​  ​otherwise, ​  ​and ​  ​if ​  ​we​  ​are​  ​to ​  ​embody  
naturalism​  ​in ​  ​philosophy, ​  ​we​  ​do​  ​so​  ​because​  ​we​  ​think ​  ​philosophy ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​are  
relevantly ​  ​similar​  ​in ​  ​ways ​  ​that​  ​learning ​  ​from​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​will​  ​assist ​  ​philosophy ​  ​to  
progress.​  ​​  ​Whilst​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​not​  ​always ​  ​obvious ​  ​when ​  ​particular ​  ​scientific ​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice  
will​  ​have​  ​useful​  ​crossover ​  ​with​  ​philosophy, ​  ​we​  ​think ​  ​it​  ​likely ​  ​that​  ​there​  ​will​  ​be​  ​relevant  
connections ​  ​between ​  ​the​  ​domains. ​  ​​  ​A ​  ​careful​  ​articulation ​  ​of ​  ​each ​  ​system​  ​of ​  ​practice’s  
epistemic ​  ​aims ​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​good​  ​place​  ​to ​  ​start. ​  ​​  ​If ​  ​we​  ​find ​  ​that​  ​a​  ​philosophical​  ​system​  ​of  
practice ​  ​and ​  ​a​  ​scientific ​  ​system​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​share​  ​a​  ​number ​  ​of ​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims, ​  ​and ​  ​if ​  ​we  
observe​  ​that​  ​the​  ​methods ​  ​exhibited ​  ​by​  ​the​  ​scientific ​  ​practice ​  ​successfully ​  ​realises ​  ​its  
aims, ​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​reasonable​  ​to ​  ​think ​  ​that​  ​these​  ​methods ​  ​might​  ​be​  ​relevantly ​  ​applied ​  ​to ​  ​the  
philosophical​  ​system. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​success ​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​implementation ​  ​of ​  ​methods ​  ​can ​  ​be​  ​evaluated  
by​  ​observing ​  ​philosophical​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice, ​  ​to ​  ​establish ​  ​whether ​  ​certain ​  ​methods ​  ​are  
indeed ​  ​relevant. ​  ​​  ​Relevance ​  ​does ​  ​not​  ​entail​  ​that​  ​any ​  ​scientific ​  ​method ​  ​or ​  ​result​  ​will  
always ​  ​be​  ​usefully ​  ​implemented.  
  
  
Continuity​  ​or​  ​alignment?  
  
Literature ​  ​on​  ​naturalism​  ​has ​  ​been ​  ​dominated ​  ​by​  ​the​  ​continuity ​  ​model, ​  ​whereby  
naturalism​  ​is ​  ​said​  ​to ​  ​involve​  ​continuity ​  ​between ​  ​philosophy ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​sciences. ​  ​​  ​Quine  
(1969) ​  ​spoke​  ​of ​  ​continuity ​  ​between ​  ​philosophy ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​sciences. ​  ​​  ​Continuity ​  ​does ​  ​not  
do​  ​justice​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​vastly ​  ​complex ​  ​nature​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​ways ​  ​in ​  ​which ​  ​they ​  ​stand  
to ​  ​one​  ​another. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​continuity ​  ​metaphor ​  ​implies ​  ​that​  ​philosophy ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​are  
on​  ​the​  ​same​  ​level, ​  ​but​  ​the​  ​pluralist​  ​denies ​  ​that​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​evidence ​  ​to ​  ​suggest​  ​there​  ​is  
anything ​  ​meaningful ​  ​beyond ​  ​this ​  ​metaphorical ​  ​level-­speak. ​  ​​  ​Instead, ​  ​the​  ​plurality ​  ​of  
sciences ​  ​exhibit​  ​a​  ​plurality ​  ​of ​  ​aspectival ​  ​knowledge. ​  ​​  ​Nature​  ​is ​  ​far ​  ​more​  ​complex ​  ​than  
the​  ​continuity ​  ​model​  ​allows, ​  ​and ​  ​thinking ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​various ​  ​ways ​  ​in ​  ​which ​  ​philosophy ​  ​and  
the​  ​sciences ​  ​can ​  ​be​  ​aligned ​  ​is ​  ​much ​  ​better. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​ways ​  ​in ​  ​which ​  ​the​  ​recommendations ​  ​of  
methodological ​  ​naturalism​  ​can ​  ​successfully ​  ​be​  ​implemented ​  ​in ​  ​a​  ​given ​  ​system​  ​of  
practice ​  ​is ​  ​better ​  ​viewed ​  ​in ​  ​terms ​  ​of ​  ​alignment ​  ​between ​  ​philosophy ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​sciences,  






The​  ​last ​  ​two ​  ​chapters ​  ​have​  ​involved ​  ​arguing ​  ​that​  ​observing ​  ​scientific ​  ​practice ​  ​yields ​  ​a  
plurality ​  ​of ​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims. ​  ​​  ​Viewing ​  ​science​  ​through ​  ​the​  ​traditional ​  ​lens ​  ​of ​  ​twentieth  
century ​  ​philosophy ​  ​of ​  ​science​  ​tended ​  ​to ​  ​focus ​  ​on​  ​just​  ​one​  ​of ​  ​these:​  ​truth. ​  ​​  ​Surely ​  ​truth ​  ​is  
an ​  ​epistemic ​  ​aim​  ​of ​  ​various ​  ​scientific ​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice. ​  ​​  ​Many ​  ​scientific ​  ​systems ​  ​of  
practice ​  ​attempt ​  ​to ​  ​accurately ​  ​describe​  ​the​  ​world;;​  ​physics ​  ​involves ​  ​attempts ​  ​to ​  ​describe  
the​  ​fundamental ​  ​particles ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​observable​  ​world, ​  ​biology ​  ​involves ​  ​attempts ​  ​to ​  ​describe  
the​  ​complexity ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​natural​  ​world, ​  ​economics ​  ​involves ​  ​attempts ​  ​to ​  ​describe​  ​our  
monetary ​  ​system​  ​and ​  ​behaviours. ​  ​​  ​And​  ​so​  ​on.​  ​​  ​Underdetermination ​  ​of ​  ​theory ​  ​by​  ​data,  
and ​  ​arguments ​  ​from​  ​theory ​  ​change​  ​in ​  ​science​  ​show ​  ​us ​  ​that​  ​measuring ​  ​the​  ​success ​  ​of ​  ​the  
sciences ​  ​in ​  ​terms ​  ​of ​  ​its ​  ​attainment ​  ​of ​  ​genuine​  ​truths ​  ​is ​  ​problematic. ​  ​​  ​That​  ​truth ​  ​is ​  ​one  
aim​  ​of ​  ​some​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​seems​  ​obvious,​  ​but​  ​various ​  ​scientific ​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice  
are​  ​not​  ​trying ​  ​to ​  ​generate ​  ​knowledge​  ​by​  ​discovering ​  ​truths, ​  ​and ​  ​are​  ​rather ​  ​aiming ​  ​for  
other ​  ​kinds ​  ​of ​  ​knowledge​  ​generation. ​  ​​  ​Some​  ​scientific ​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​adopt​  ​abstract  
models ​  ​which ​  ​they ​  ​know ​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​false, ​  ​doing ​  ​so​  ​for ​  ​many ​  ​practical ​  ​reasons, ​  ​such ​  ​as ​  ​being  
measurable ​  ​and ​  ​thus ​  ​quantitatively ​  ​implementable, ​  ​or ​  ​because​  ​they ​  ​function ​  ​usefully ​  ​for  
some​  ​other ​  ​purpose, ​  ​as ​  ​Newtonian ​  ​mechanics ​  ​still​  ​does ​  ​for ​   ​us ​  ​today.  
  
In ​  ​the​  ​last ​  ​chapter ​  ​I ​  ​outlined ​  ​a​  ​number ​  ​of ​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims ​  ​suggested ​  ​by​  ​John​  ​Dupre​  ​as ​  ​a  
starting ​  ​place, ​  ​and ​  ​his ​  ​list ​  ​included ​  ​the​  ​following:​  ​coherence ​  ​with​  ​empirical ​  ​data​  ​and  
with​  ​other ​  ​things ​  ​we​  ​take​  ​ourselves ​  ​to ​  ​know,​  ​aesthetic ​  ​virtues ​  ​such ​  ​as ​  ​elegance ​  ​and  
simplicity, ​  ​and ​  ​moral​  ​virtues ​  ​(Dupre​  ​2012). ​  ​​  ​Hasok​  ​Chang ​  ​(2011) ​  ​suggests ​  ​we​  ​might  
also ​  ​think ​  ​about​  ​fruitfulness, ​  ​usefulness, ​  ​and ​  ​operationalism ​  ​(being ​  ​measurable). ​  ​​  ​From  
Popper ​  ​we​  ​can ​  ​borrow ​  ​falsification ​  ​or ​  ​refutability ​  ​(1957). ​  ​​  ​Other ​  ​aims, ​  ​I ​  ​suggest,​  ​could  
include​  ​repeatability, ​  ​novel​  ​predictive ​  ​success, ​  ​innovation, ​  ​and ​  ​creativity. ​  ​​  ​On​  ​the​  ​face  
of ​  ​it, ​  ​many ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​successful​  ​scientific ​  ​practices ​  ​involved ​  ​success ​  ​by​  ​way​  ​of ​  ​attaining  
these​  ​aims. ​  ​​  ​Epistemic ​  ​aims ​  ​will​  ​be​  ​specific​  ​to ​  ​a​  ​system​  ​of ​  ​practice.     
  
We​  ​can ​  ​then ​  ​follow ​  ​Dupre’s ​  ​suggestion ​  ​and ​  ​apportion ​  ​enthusiasm​  ​towards ​  ​those  
systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​which ​  ​successfully ​  ​attain ​  ​their ​  ​aims ​  ​(Dupre​  ​2012​  ​:​  ​26). ​  ​​  ​Further  
113  
work​  ​will​  ​be​  ​needed ​  ​in ​  ​determining ​  ​what​  ​these​  ​aims ​  ​are, ​  ​for ​  ​any ​  ​given ​  ​practice. ​  ​​  ​It’s ​  ​not  
clear ​  ​that​  ​they ​  ​can ​  ​in ​  ​any ​  ​simple​  ​empirical ​  ​way​  ​just​  ​be​  ​read ​   ​off ​  ​the​  ​practice ​  ​in ​  ​question.  
Hasok​  ​Chang ​  ​(2011) ​  ​suggests ​  ​a​  ​framework ​  ​for ​  ​analysis ​  ​of ​  ​epistemic ​  ​activities ​  ​which ​  ​he  
intends ​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​a​  ​basis ​  ​for ​  ​evaluating ​  ​scientific ​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice. ​  ​​  ​I ​  ​suggest​  ​it​  ​can ​  ​be  
usefully ​  ​applied ​  ​to ​  ​philosophical​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​also, ​  ​in ​  ​terms ​  ​of ​  ​implementing  
methodological ​  ​naturalism. ​  ​​  ​He​  ​describes ​  ​​coherence​  ​​as ​  ​being ​  ​an ​  ​overall​  ​measure​  ​of ​  ​the  
success ​  ​of ​  ​a​  ​given ​  ​system​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​involving ​  ​various ​  ​factors, ​  ​and ​  ​this ​  ​is ​  ​explained ​  ​in  
more​  ​detail​  ​in ​  ​section ​  ​four ​  ​of ​  ​this ​   ​chapter.  
  
As ​  ​a​  ​means ​  ​to ​  ​viewing ​  ​the​  ​sciences, ​  ​Chang ​  ​is ​  ​establishing ​  ​a​  ​growing ​  ​body​  ​of ​  ​work​  ​on  
epistemic ​  ​aims ​  ​and ​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​as ​  ​a​  ​means ​  ​to ​  ​view ​  ​the​  ​sciences, ​  ​and ​  ​has ​  ​begun  
to ​  ​implement ​  ​them​  ​himself, ​  ​focusing ​  ​on​  ​HPS ​  ​as ​  ​his ​  ​object​  ​of ​  ​inquiry. ​  ​​  ​This ​  ​material  
provides ​  ​an ​  ​excellent ​  ​starting ​  ​point​  ​for ​  ​thinking ​  ​about​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims ​  ​in ​  ​a​  ​wider ​  ​context  
for ​  ​potential ​  ​implementation ​  ​in ​  ​other ​  ​areas ​  ​of ​  ​philosophy. ​  ​​  ​This ​  ​motivates ​  ​much  
exciting ​  ​and ​  ​important​  ​new ​  ​work​  ​for ​  ​philosophy, ​  ​of ​  ​which ​  ​the​  ​present​  ​outline​  ​is ​  ​merely  





Care​  ​around ​  ​the​  ​assumption ​  ​of ​  ​monism  
  
In ​  ​philosophy, ​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​common ​  ​to ​  ​find ​  ​arguments ​  ​that​  ​attempt ​  ​to ​  ​establish ​  ​the​  ​plausibility  
of ​  ​a​  ​positive​  ​philosophical​  ​view ​  ​by ​  ​attempting ​  ​to ​  ​show ​  ​why​  ​“competing” ​  ​views ​  ​are  
implausible. ​  ​​  ​Observing ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​has ​  ​shown​  ​us ​  ​that​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​not​  ​always ​  ​the​  ​case ​  ​that  
different​  ​theories ​  ​in ​  ​a​  ​given ​  ​subject​  ​area​  ​are​  ​in ​  ​genuine​  ​competition ​  ​with​  ​each ​  ​other. ​  ​​  ​I  
illustrated ​  ​this ​  ​point​  ​using​  ​Helen​  ​Longino’s ​  ​meta-­analysis ​  ​on​  ​behavioural ​  ​sciences  
(2006), ​  ​where​  ​she​  ​argues ​  ​convincingly ​  ​that​  ​looking ​  ​at​  ​different​  ​scientific ​  ​theories ​  ​of  
behaviour ​  ​as ​  ​being ​  ​competitors ​  ​is ​  ​sometimes ​  ​misguided. ​  ​​  ​Rather, ​  ​it​  ​appeared ​  ​there​  ​were  
a​  ​number ​  ​of ​  ​theories, ​  ​each ​  ​investigating ​  ​different​  ​aspects ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​complex ​  ​phenomena  
that​  ​could ​  ​be​  ​broadly ​  ​described ​  ​as ​  ​behaviour. ​  ​​  ​Throughout​  ​this ​  ​thesis ​  ​I ​  ​have​  ​taken ​  ​two  
different​  ​aspects ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​into ​  ​consideration. ​  ​​  ​Treating ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​as ​  ​bodies ​  ​of  
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propositional​  ​knowledge​  ​-­ ​  ​whose​  ​claims ​  ​can ​  ​be​  ​evaluated ​  ​in ​  ​terms ​  ​of ​  ​justification, ​  ​and  
also ​  ​taking ​  ​a​  ​practice-­centred ​  ​approach ​  ​-­ ​  ​paying ​  ​more​  ​attention ​  ​to ​  ​observing ​  ​the  
sciences ​  ​as ​  ​they ​  ​unfold, ​  ​provide​  ​useful​  ​insights ​  ​into ​  ​different​  ​important​  ​aspects ​  ​of ​  ​the  
sciences. ​  ​​  ​Both ​  ​of ​  ​these​  ​frameworks ​  ​are​  ​useful​  ​ways ​  ​of ​  ​discussing​  ​the​  ​sciences, ​  ​and  
shouldn’t​  ​be​  ​thought​  ​of ​  ​as ​  ​competing ​  ​views ​  ​for ​  ​giving ​  ​a​  ​monistic​  ​theory ​  ​of ​  ​science​  ​in  
general.     
  
From​  ​these​  ​discussions,​  ​a​  ​more​  ​general​  ​heuristic​  ​can ​  ​be​  ​drawn. ​  ​​  ​Care​  ​needs ​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​taken  
to ​  ​decipher ​  ​whether ​  ​different​  ​philosophical​  ​theories ​  ​are​  ​genuinely ​  ​competing ​  ​with​  ​one  
another, ​  ​sharing ​  ​the​  ​same​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims, ​  ​and ​  ​focusing ​  ​on​  ​the​  ​same​  ​objects ​  ​of ​  ​inquiry.  
It​  ​seems​  ​likely ​  ​that​  ​this ​  ​will​  ​sometimes ​  ​be​  ​the​  ​case, ​  ​but​  ​it​  ​shouldn’t​  ​be​  ​assumed ​  ​to ​  ​hold  
in ​  ​general, ​  ​and ​  ​careful​  ​attention ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​motivations ​  ​of ​  ​different​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​will  
need ​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​given, ​  ​before​  ​the​  ​general​  ​argumentative ​  ​strategy ​  ​that​  ​not​  ​​P​,​  ​therefore​  ​​Q ​​  ​will  
be​  ​usefully ​  ​applied. ​  ​​  ​Such​  ​a​  ​strategy ​  ​can ​  ​succeed ​  ​only ​  ​if ​  ​the​  ​two ​  ​theories ​  ​are​  ​genuine  
competitors. ​  ​​  ​This ​  ​doesn’t​  ​inhibit​  ​deconstructive ​  ​argumentative ​  ​strategies ​  ​in ​  ​philosophy  
however. ​  ​​  ​Showing​  ​that​  ​not​  ​​P​​  ​can ​  ​still​  ​generate ​  ​the​  ​knowledge​  ​that​  ​​P​​  ​is ​  ​false, ​  ​but​  ​that​  ​​Q  




Careful​  ​use​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​term ​  ​‘intuition’  
  
In ​  ​the​  ​third ​  ​chapter ​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​thesis ​  ​I ​  ​urged ​  ​greater ​  ​attention ​  ​to ​  ​detail​  ​when ​  ​using​  ​the​  ​term  
‘intuition’ ​  ​within ​  ​philosophy. ​  ​​  ​Cian ​  ​Dorr​  ​(2010) ​  ​suggests ​  ​that​  ​often ​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​used ​  ​as  
shorthand ​  ​for ​  ​indicating ​  ​an ​  ​assumption ​  ​of ​  ​one’s ​  ​argument. ​  ​​  ​Timothy ​  ​Williamson  
suggests ​  ​it​  ​is ​  ​often ​  ​used ​  ​to ​  ​mean ​  ​that​  ​somebody ​  ​is ​  ​making ​  ​a​  ​judgement​  ​based ​  ​on​  ​some  
evidence ​  ​(2011). ​  ​​  ​Others ​  ​have​  ​criticised ​  ​certain ​  ​ways ​  ​of ​  ​doing ​  ​philosophy ​  ​for ​  ​giving  
(what​  ​they ​  ​think ​  ​is) ​  ​too ​  ​big ​  ​a​  ​role​  ​to ​  ​intuitions ​  ​(Maclaurin ​  ​and ​  ​Dyke​  ​2012,​  ​Ladyman  
and ​  ​Ross ​  ​2007,​  ​Weinberg, ​  ​Stich, ​  ​and ​  ​Nichols ​  ​2001). ​  ​​  ​Skeptics ​  ​about​  ​intuition ​  ​are​  ​right  
to ​  ​question ​  ​the​  ​epistemic ​  ​status ​  ​of ​  ​a​  ​rational​  ​faculty ​  ​that​  ​would​  ​allow ​  ​the​  ​generation ​  ​of  
facts ​  ​by​  ​merely ​  ​intuiting ​  ​from​  ​the​  ​armchair. ​  ​​  ​Dorr​  ​and ​  ​Williamson ​  ​are​  ​right, ​  ​in ​  ​that  
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people​  ​sometimes ​  ​use​  ​the​  ​term​  ​intuition ​  ​to ​  ​mean ​  ​something ​  ​far ​  ​less ​  ​epistemically  
dangerous ​  ​than ​  ​what​  ​these​  ​skeptics ​  ​think ​  ​objectionable.     
  
Part​  ​of ​  ​a​  ​system​  ​of ​  ​practice’s ​  ​careful​  ​articulation ​  ​of ​  ​its ​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims ​  ​will​  ​involve  
spelling ​  ​out​  ​explicitly ​  ​and ​  ​precisely ​  ​what​  ​assumptions ​  ​are​  ​being ​  ​made, ​  ​and ​  ​will​  ​involve  
setting ​  ​forth ​  ​the​  ​epistemological ​  ​programme​  ​by​  ​which ​  ​it​  ​can ​  ​hope​  ​to ​  ​succeed. ​  ​​  ​We  
could ​  ​rightly ​  ​be​  ​skeptical​  ​towards ​  ​a​  ​system​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​that​  ​hoped ​  ​to ​  ​obtain ​  ​facts ​  ​about  
the​  ​world, ​  ​simply ​  ​by​  ​blindly ​  ​intuiting ​  ​whatever ​  ​it​  ​pleased. ​  ​​  ​Care​  ​with​  ​the​  ​use​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​term  
‘intuition’ ​  ​is ​  ​required, ​  ​and ​  ​if ​  ​the​  ​term​  ​‘assumption’ ​  ​or ​  ​‘judgement’ ​  ​could ​  ​be​  ​used ​  ​to  
more​  ​precisely ​  ​denote​  ​one’s ​  ​intended ​  ​meaning, ​  ​using​  ​these​   ​terms ​  ​instead ​  ​is ​  ​to ​  ​be  
encouraged. ​  ​​  ​Thought​  ​experiments, ​  ​whether ​  ​thought​  ​of ​  ​as ​  ​intuition ​  ​pumps ​  ​or ​  ​as ​  ​having  
some​  ​other ​  ​methodological ​  ​role​  ​should​  ​be​  ​treated ​  ​analogously. ​  ​​  ​Daniel​  ​Kahnemann’s  
(2011) ​  ​provides ​  ​some​  ​evidence ​  ​for ​  ​when ​  ​intuitions ​  ​will​  ​be​  ​more​  ​or ​  ​less ​  ​reliable. ​  ​​  ​This  






§5.4​  ​Implications ​  ​of ​  ​aspirational​  ​naturalism​  ​for​  ​epistemology ​  ​and ​  ​metaphysics  
  
I ​  ​briefly ​  ​return ​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​topics ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​second ​  ​chapter, ​  ​involving ​  ​epistemology ​  ​and  





There​  ​are​  ​a​  ​number ​  ​of ​  ​implications ​  ​for ​  ​epistemology ​  ​that​  ​result​  ​from​  ​aspirational  
naturalism​  ​that​  ​I ​  ​have​  ​discussed ​  ​at​  ​length ​  ​already. ​  ​​  ​Firstly, ​  ​there​  ​is ​  ​much ​  ​work​  ​to ​  ​be  
done​  ​carefully ​  ​describing ​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims, ​  ​appropriate ​  ​implementation ​  ​of ​  ​methods, ​  ​and  
the​  ​ways ​  ​by​  ​which ​  ​we​  ​might​  ​measure​  ​how ​  ​a​  ​given ​  ​system​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​succeeds ​  ​in  
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meeting ​  ​its ​  ​aims. ​  ​​  ​Employing ​  ​Chang’s ​  ​​system​  ​of​  ​practice​​  ​framework ​  ​(2011) ​  ​for  
analysing ​  ​the​  ​sciences ​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​start​  ​in ​  ​an ​  ​attempt ​  ​to ​  ​describe​  ​the​  ​various ​  ​aims ​  ​and ​  ​methods  
within ​  ​the​  ​sciences. ​  ​​  ​We​  ​can ​  ​employ ​  ​this ​  ​framework ​  ​to ​  ​analyse​  ​philosophical​  ​practice  
as ​  ​well,​  ​and ​  ​look ​  ​for ​  ​relevant ​  ​comparisons ​  ​between ​  ​different​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice. ​  ​​  ​A  
plurality ​  ​of ​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims ​  ​is ​  ​available ​  ​for ​  ​worthwhile​  ​epistemological ​  ​engagement. ​  ​​  ​A  
practice ​  ​centred ​  ​approach ​  ​steps ​  ​away ​  ​from​  ​the​  ​useful​  ​lens ​  ​of ​  ​viewing ​  ​science​  ​as ​  ​a​  ​body  
of ​  ​propositional​  ​knowledge, ​  ​and ​  ​as ​  ​such ​  ​it​  ​sheds ​  ​light​  ​on​  ​other ​  ​kinds ​  ​of ​  ​knowledge.  
Applying ​  ​this ​  ​approach ​  ​when ​  ​taking ​  ​philosophical​  ​systems ​   ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​as ​  ​our ​  ​objects ​  ​of  






I ​  ​will​  ​now ​  ​briefly ​  ​sketch ​  ​a​  ​metaphysical ​  ​programme​  ​which ​   ​I ​  ​think ​  ​is ​  ​well​  ​motivated ​  ​in  
light​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​findings ​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​thesis, ​  ​which ​  ​I ​  ​call​  ​​aspectival​  ​realism ​.​  ​​  ​It​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​view ​  ​that​  ​is  
relevantly ​  ​similar​  ​to ​  ​Ronald ​  ​Giere’s ​  ​​perspectival ​  ​realism ​​  ​(2006) ​  ​and ​  ​Hasok​  ​Chang’s  
active ​  ​realism ​​  ​(2012). ​  ​​  ​Whereas ​  ​Giere​  ​thinks ​  ​of ​  ​scientific ​  ​knowledge​  ​as ​  ​perspectival ​  ​(as  
do​  ​Helen​  ​Longino ​  ​(2015), ​  ​and ​  ​Massimi​  ​(2012)), ​  ​I ​  ​prefer ​  ​to ​  ​think ​  ​of ​  ​it​  ​as ​  ​​aspectival​.​  ​​  ​JC  
Beall​  ​(2006) ​  ​has ​  ​argued ​  ​for ​  ​a​  ​kind ​  ​of ​  ​logical​  ​pluralism​  ​about​  ​the​  ​treatment ​  ​of ​  ​negation,  
which ​  ​he​  ​calls ​  ​​aspectival​  ​dialetheism ​.​  ​​  ​Beall​  ​thinks ​  ​there​  ​are​  ​two ​  ​aspects ​  ​of ​  ​the  
behaviour ​  ​of ​  ​negation ​  ​that​  ​need ​  ​to ​  ​be​  ​taken ​  ​into ​  ​account, ​  ​and ​  ​thinks ​  ​that​  ​a​  ​classical  
treatment ​  ​of ​  ​negation ​  ​works ​  ​well​  ​for ​  ​most​  ​occasions, ​  ​but​  ​there​  ​are​  ​other ​  ​occasions  
where​  ​negation ​  ​needs ​  ​a​  ​different​  ​treatment, ​  ​for ​  ​which ​  ​he​  ​suggests ​  ​dialetheism ​  ​(i.e.  
logics ​  ​which ​  ​allow ​  ​for ​  ​contradiction) ​  ​is ​  ​more​  ​appropriate. ​  ​​  ​At​  ​times ​  ​Beall​  ​refers ​  ​to ​  ​his  
view ​  ​as ​  ​“double-­aspect ​  ​dialetheism” ​  ​(169), ​  ​and ​  ​indicates ​  ​that​  ​there​  ​are​  ​different​  ​aspects  
of ​  ​negation ​  ​that​  ​are​  ​better ​  ​understood ​  ​within ​  ​different​  ​logical​  ​frameworks. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​details  
of ​  ​Beall’s ​  ​paper ​  ​are​  ​not​  ​especially ​  ​relevant ​  ​here, ​  ​but​  ​his ​  ​usage​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​term​  ​‘aspectival’ ​  ​is  
relevantly ​  ​similar​  ​to ​  ​what​  ​I ​  ​have​  ​in ​  ​mind ​  ​with​  ​my ​  ​aspectival ​  ​realism. ​  ​​  ​Indeed, ​  ​I ​  ​would  
suggest​  ​that​  ​Beall’s ​  ​stance​  ​towards ​  ​the​  ​logical​  ​treatment ​  ​of ​  ​negation ​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​member ​  ​of ​  ​a  
broader ​  ​set​  ​of ​  ​aspectival ​  ​realisms.     
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I ​  ​suggest​  ​two ​  ​different​  ​semantics ​  ​for ​  ​aspectival ​  ​realism, ​  ​treating ​  ​knowledge​  ​claims  
counterfactually, ​  ​or ​  ​indexically. ​  ​​  ​On​  ​one​  ​interpretation, ​  ​we​  ​could ​  ​think ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​claim  
‘electrons ​  ​exist’ ​  ​as ​  ​a​  ​counterfactual ​  ​claim, ​  ​with​  ​the​  ​system​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​represented ​  ​by  
the​  ​antecedent ​  ​of ​  ​a​  ​conditional, ​  ​and ​  ​the​  ​particular ​  ​claim​  ​of ​  ​interest​  ​as ​  ​the​  ​consequent.  
For​  ​example, ​  ​‘If ​  ​the​  ​theory ​  ​of ​  ​physics ​  ​is ​  ​true, ​  ​then ​  ​the​  ​proposition ​  ​’electrons ​  ​exist’ ​  ​is  
true’. ​  ​​  ​If ​  ​one​  ​preferred ​  ​to ​  ​not​  ​think ​  ​in ​  ​terms ​  ​of ​  ​truth, ​  ​other ​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims ​  ​may ​  ​be​  ​used  
in ​  ​its ​  ​place. ​  ​​  ​Hasok​  ​Chang’s ​  ​​active ​  ​realism ​​  ​provides ​  ​a​  ​criteria ​  ​of ​  ​​coherence​,​  ​by​  ​which  
we​  ​might​  ​evaluate ​  ​the​  ​antecedent ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​counterfactual:  
  
The​  ​coherence ​  ​of ​  ​a​  ​system​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​has ​  ​several​  ​layers ​  ​to ​  ​it:​  ​(i) ​  ​Is ​  ​each  
constituent​  ​activity ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​system​  ​coherent​  ​within ​  ​itself, ​  ​in ​  ​serving ​  ​its ​  ​inherent  
purpose?​  ​(ii) ​  ​Do​  ​the​  ​inherent​  ​purposes ​  ​of ​  ​different​  ​activities ​  ​constituting ​  ​the  
system​  ​not​  ​interfere ​  ​with​  ​each ​  ​other?​  ​(iii) ​  ​Are​  ​the​  ​presuppositions ​  ​or  
implications ​  ​of ​  ​different​  ​activities ​  ​consistent​  ​with​  ​each ​  ​other?​  ​(iv) ​  ​Are​  ​the  
external ​  ​functions ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​activities ​  ​coordinated ​  ​so​  ​as ​  ​to ​  ​achieve ​  ​the​  ​overall  
aims ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​system?  
(Chang ​  ​2011​  ​:​  ​74)  
  
To ​  ​the​  ​extent​  ​that​  ​a​  ​system​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​is ​  ​coherent, ​  ​we​  ​might​  ​apportion ​  ​enthusiasm​  ​for  
the​  ​knowledge​  ​claims ​  ​that​  ​are​  ​represented ​  ​by​  ​the​  ​consequent​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​conditional ​  ​in ​  ​this  
counterfactual ​  ​treatment ​  ​of ​  ​aspectival ​  ​realism.  
  
Other ​  ​semantics ​  ​might​  ​also ​  ​be​  ​usefully ​  ​applied, ​  ​such ​  ​as ​  ​treating ​  ​the​  ​knowledge​  ​claims  
of ​  ​a​  ​system​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​​indexically ​.​  ​​  ​Here​  ​we​  ​think ​  ​of ​  ​knowledge​  ​claims ​  ​as ​  ​being  
relative ​  ​to ​  ​a​  ​particular ​  ​index;;​  ​the​  ​system​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​from​  ​which ​  ​they ​  ​are​  ​maintained. ​  ​​  ​I  
suggest​  ​one​  ​interpretation ​  ​of ​  ​this ​  ​indexical ​  ​treatment ​  ​using​  ​a​  ​centred-­worlds ​  ​semantics  
(for ​  ​an ​  ​application ​  ​of ​  ​centred-­worlds ​  ​semantics ​  ​to ​  ​indexical ​  ​knowledge​  ​in ​  ​general, ​  ​see  
Egan ​  ​2006), ​  ​where​  ​centred-­worlds ​  ​are​  ​ordered ​  ​pairs ​  ​<​o,​  ​w​>,​  ​with​  ​an ​  ​object, ​  ​​o​,​  ​and ​  ​a  
world, ​  ​​w​.​  ​​  ​This ​  ​semantics ​  ​might​  ​plausibly ​  ​be​  ​interpreted ​  ​such ​  ​that​  ​a​  ​world ​,​  ​w​,​  ​is ​  ​a  
system​  ​or ​  ​practice, ​  ​and ​  ​an ​  ​object, ​  ​​o​,​  ​is ​  ​an ​  ​epistemic ​  ​output​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​practice. ​  ​​  ​In ​  ​this  
semantics, ​  ​truth ​  ​is ​  ​achieved ​  ​when ​  ​​w​​  ​=​  ​a​  ​robust​  ​aspect​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​actual​  ​world, ​  ​and ​  ​when ​  ​the  
function ​  ​<​o​,​  ​​w​>​  ​is ​  ​satisfied. ​  ​​  ​Of​  ​course​  ​worlds ​  ​could ​  ​represent​  ​a​  ​plurality ​  ​of ​  ​epistemic  
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aims ​  ​other ​  ​than ​  ​truth, ​  ​for ​  ​the​  ​numerous ​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice ​   ​that​  ​are​  ​not​  ​remotely  
interested ​  ​in ​  ​achieving ​  ​truth ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​first​  ​place. ​  ​​  ​Various ​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​have​  ​much  
less ​  ​lofty ​  ​goals ​  ​than ​  ​finding ​  ​some​  ​rock ​  ​bottom​  ​truth ​  ​about​  ​reality, ​  ​such ​  ​as ​  ​building ​  ​a  
weapon ​  ​of ​  ​mass ​  ​destruction ​  ​that​  ​could ​  ​destroy ​  ​the​  ​earth ​  ​several​  ​times ​  ​over, ​  ​or ​  ​better,  
curing ​  ​cancer. ​  ​​  ​So​  ​rather ​  ​than ​  ​judging ​  ​the​  ​success ​  ​of ​  ​a​  ​given ​  ​index ​  ​by​  ​attempting ​  ​to  
compare​  ​the​  ​degree​  ​to ​  ​which ​  ​it​  ​accurately ​  ​describes ​  ​reality, ​  ​we​  ​can ​  ​let​  ​worlds ​  ​represent  
whatever ​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims ​  ​we​  ​see​  ​fit. ​  ​​  ​This ​  ​is ​  ​merely ​  ​the​  ​beginnings ​  ​of ​  ​a​  ​sketch ​  ​of  




§5.5​  ​Defending​  ​aspirational​  ​pluralism ​  ​from ​  ​charges ​  ​of ​  ​vicious-­relativism  
  
In ​  ​this ​  ​thesis ​  ​I ​  ​have​  ​defended ​  ​methodological ​  ​naturalism​  ​as ​  ​aspirational ​  ​methodological  
pluralism, ​  ​encouraging ​  ​the​  ​implementation ​  ​of ​  ​a​  ​plurality ​  ​of ​  ​suitable​  ​methods. ​  ​​  ​This  
involves ​  ​encouraging ​  ​different​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​to ​  ​make​  ​contributions ​  ​to ​  ​the  
production ​  ​of ​  ​knowledge. ​  ​​  ​It​  ​might​  ​be​  ​thought​  ​that​  ​this ​  ​view ​  ​collapses ​  ​to ​  ​a​  ​vicious ​  ​kind  
of ​  ​relativism, ​  ​as ​  ​is ​  ​sometimes ​  ​suggested ​  ​problematic ​  ​for ​  ​pluralistic ​  ​views ​  ​in ​  ​general. ​  ​​  ​I  
have​  ​presented ​  ​the​  ​view ​  ​that​  ​​many​  ​things ​  ​go​,​  ​but​  ​does ​  ​this ​  ​just​  ​amount​  ​to ​  ​the​  ​claim​  ​that  
anything ​  ​goes ​?​  ​​  ​What​  ​makes ​  ​a​  ​given ​  ​index ​  ​a​  ​sufficiently ​  ​credible ​  ​one​  ​from​  ​which ​  ​we  
could ​  ​hope​  ​to ​  ​generate ​  ​knowledge?​  ​​  ​It​  ​might​  ​be​  ​thought​  ​that​  ​my ​  ​view ​  ​amounts ​  ​to  
subjectivism, ​  ​whereby ​  ​anybody ​  ​could ​  ​construct​  ​any ​  ​old ​  ​index, ​  ​and ​  ​claim​  ​they ​  ​can  
generate ​  ​knowledge.     
  
Firstly, ​  ​anybody ​  ​could ​  ​construct​  ​an ​  ​index, ​  ​in ​  ​theory, ​  ​and ​  ​indeed ​  ​the​  ​scientific ​  ​bodies ​  ​of  
knowledge​  ​have​  ​been ​  ​constructed ​  ​through ​  ​the​  ​hard ​  ​work​  ​of ​  ​humans. ​  ​​  ​But​  ​that​  ​a  
particular ​  ​knowledge​  ​claim​  ​is ​  ​somehow ​  ​relative ​  ​to ​  ​an ​  ​index ​  ​does ​  ​not​  ​make​  ​is  
dangerously ​  ​subjective. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​following ​  ​is ​  ​an ​  ​indexical ​  ​proposition, ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​classic  
linguistic​  ​sense​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​term:​  ​‘My​  ​parents ​  ​house​  ​is ​  ​273​  ​kilometres ​  ​away ​  ​from​  ​my ​  ​house’.  
It​  ​is ​  ​an ​  ​indexical ​  ​proposition, ​  ​which ​  ​is ​  ​(approximately) ​  ​true​  ​when ​  ​uttered ​  ​by​  ​me, ​  ​as ​  ​long  
as ​  ​my ​  ​parents ​  ​and ​  ​I ​  ​remain ​  ​living ​  ​in ​  ​our ​  ​current​  ​houses.​  ​​  ​It​  ​seems​  ​to ​  ​me​  ​to ​  ​be  
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objectively ​  ​true. ​  ​​  ​It’s ​  ​not​  ​a​  ​fact​  ​that​  ​is ​  ​up​  ​for ​  ​grabs, ​  ​despite​  ​involving ​  ​theoretical  
assumptions ​  ​of ​  ​measurement, ​  ​invoking ​  ​the​  ​abstract​  ​concept​  ​of ​  ​a​  ​straight-­line, ​  ​and  
representing ​  ​the​  ​world ​  ​in ​  ​merely ​  ​two ​  ​dimensions. ​  ​​  ​There​  ​is ​  ​nothing ​  ​viciously ​  ​relativistic  
or ​  ​subjective​  ​about​  ​this ​  ​indexical ​  ​fact.  
  
Let’s ​  ​take​  ​a​  ​slightly ​  ​different​  ​example. ​  ​​  ​In ​  ​medieval ​  ​times, ​  ​‘witch’ ​  ​was​  ​a​  ​concept​  ​said​  ​to  
refer ​  ​to ​  ​biological ​  ​females ​  ​with​  ​sadistic​  ​tendencies ​  ​and ​  ​metaphysical ​  ​superpowers.​  ​​  ​It’s  
possible​  ​that​  ​witches ​  ​also ​  ​had ​  ​black ​  ​cats ​  ​and ​  ​broomsticks ​  ​as ​  ​well,​  ​but​  ​of ​  ​these​  ​details ​  ​I  
am​  ​less ​  ​sure. ​  ​​  ​What’s ​  ​more, ​  ​a​  ​measurement ​  ​was​  ​proposed ​  ​by​  ​which ​  ​we​  ​could ​  ​test ​  ​for  
witchiness. ​  ​​  ​So​  ​here​  ​we​  ​have​  ​a​  ​theory ​  ​that​  ​has ​  ​an ​  ​object​  ​of ​  ​inquiry ​  ​-­ ​  ​witches, ​  ​that​  ​had  
epistemic ​  ​aims ​  ​such ​  ​as ​  ​determining ​  ​witchiness, ​  ​that​  ​had ​  ​operationalised ​  ​a​  ​means ​  ​of  
measuring ​  ​for ​  ​witchiness ​  ​using​  ​a​  ​proxy ​  ​of ​  ​buoyancy. ​  ​​  ​If ​  ​the​  ​suspected ​  ​witch​  ​was  
buoyant​  ​when ​  ​thrown ​  ​into ​  ​a​  ​river, ​  ​and ​  ​did ​  ​not​  ​die​  ​by​  ​drowning, ​  ​then ​  ​indeed, ​  ​they ​  ​were  
a​  ​witch. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​method ​  ​of ​  ​detecting ​  ​witchiness ​  ​by​  ​measuring ​  ​buoyancy ​  ​was​  ​testable,  
repeatable, ​  ​and ​  ​patently ​  ​observational. ​  ​​  ​It​  ​might​  ​be​  ​thought​   ​that​  ​viewing ​  ​witch-­detection  
as ​  ​a​  ​system​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​could ​  ​meet​  ​the​  ​various ​  ​criteria ​  ​I ​  ​have​  ​outlined ​  ​that​  ​need ​  ​to ​  ​be  
met​  ​in ​  ​order ​  ​that​  ​something ​  ​be​  ​considered ​  ​acceptable ​  ​by​  ​methodologically ​  ​naturalistic  
lights ​  ​in ​  ​the​  ​ways ​  ​in ​  ​which ​  ​I ​  ​have​  ​advanced.  
  
But​  ​in ​  ​terms ​  ​of ​  ​its ​  ​robustness,​  ​or ​  ​coherence ​  ​as ​  ​a​  ​system​  ​of ​  ​practice, ​  ​witch-­detection ​  ​can  
be​  ​quite​  ​easily ​  ​dismissed. ​  ​​  ​Witch-­detection ​  ​theory ​  ​involved ​  ​an ​  ​aim​  ​of ​  ​detecting  
witchiness, ​  ​and ​  ​its ​  ​methodology ​  ​involved ​  ​measuring ​  ​buoyancy ​  ​as ​  ​a​  ​proxy ​  ​of ​  ​witchiness.  
There​  ​are​  ​serious ​  ​problems ​  ​with​  ​the​  ​epistemological ​  ​rigour ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​claim​  ​that​  ​measuring  
buoyancy ​  ​will​  ​also ​  ​measure​  ​witchiness. ​  ​​  ​There​  ​are​  ​serious ​  ​problems ​  ​with​  ​the  
metaphysical ​  ​assumption ​  ​that​  ​witches ​  ​have​  ​supernatural​  ​powers.​  ​​  ​That​  ​a​  ​given ​  ​proxy ​  ​for  
measurement ​  ​is ​  ​a​  ​suitable​  ​one​  ​does ​  ​not​  ​come​  ​for ​  ​free. ​  ​​  ​Part​  ​of ​  ​evaluating ​  ​the​  ​success ​  ​of  
a​  ​system​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​is ​  ​critiquing ​  ​how ​  ​well​  ​its ​  ​methods ​  ​bring ​  ​about​  ​its ​  ​epistemic ​  ​aims,  
and ​  ​there​  ​are​  ​serious ​  ​flaws ​  ​with​  ​the​  ​methodological ​  ​programme​  ​that​  ​purports ​  ​to  
measure​  ​witchiness ​  ​by​  ​measuring ​  ​buoyancy. ​  ​​  ​This ​  ​is ​  ​why​  ​we​  ​don’t​  ​see​  ​many ​  ​scientific  
journal​  ​articles ​  ​publishing ​  ​witch-­detection ​  ​theory ​  ​and ​  ​publishing ​  ​witchiness ​  ​data.  
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The​  ​sciences ​  ​as ​  ​practiced ​  ​are​  ​currently ​  ​pluralistic, ​  ​yet​  ​we​  ​do ​  ​not​  ​think ​  ​of ​  ​the​  ​knowledge  
they ​  ​produce​  ​as ​  ​being ​  ​dangerously ​  ​relativistic. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​naturalist​  ​first​  ​approached ​  ​the  
sciences ​  ​with​  ​respect​  ​for ​  ​their ​  ​epistemic ​  ​credibility, ​  ​not​  ​with​  ​distrust​  ​for ​  ​their ​  ​dangerous  
relativism. ​  ​​  ​That​  ​there​  ​are​  ​many ​  ​viable​  ​systems ​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​does ​  ​not​  ​mean ​  ​that​  ​any  
system​  ​of ​  ​practice ​  ​is ​  ​viable. ​  ​​  ​The​  ​sciences ​  ​operate​  ​well​  ​within ​  ​this ​  ​pluralistic  
framework, ​  ​generating ​  ​a​  ​plurality ​  ​of ​  ​knowledge. ​  ​​  ​We​  ​can ​  ​plausibly ​  ​assume, ​  ​as ​  ​a  
working ​  ​hypothesis, ​  ​that​  ​implementing ​  ​methods ​  ​that​  ​have​  ​generated ​  ​success ​  ​in ​  ​these  
relevantly ​  ​similar​  ​epistemic ​  ​domains ​  ​might​  ​generate ​  ​success ​  ​in ​  ​ours ​  ​too. ​  ​​  ​It​  ​seems​  ​to ​  ​me  
that​  ​we​  ​have​  ​already ​  ​implemented ​  ​a​  ​number ​  ​of ​  ​these, ​  ​and ​  ​that​  ​they ​  ​work​  ​pretty ​  ​well.  
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